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Introduction 1 
R. F. I. Smith & Patiick Weller 
From the early 1940s to the mid-1970s the range of government 
activities and the size of the public services in Australia have 
consistently increased. In the first two years of the Whitlam 
government the growth in the size of the federal public service 
accelerated dramatically, but economic problems in 1975 and the 
advent of the Eraser government brought this to a halt. The sudden 
halt was not caused solely by a change of ministry: it also indicated 
a change of mood created by a long debate on the proper and 
practicable roles of government in social and economic life. Even 
before the change from Whitlam to Eraser, there had been 
widespread questioning of the functions, responsibilities and 
effectiveness of the federal and state public services in Australia. 
The establishment of a wave of public service inquiries within 
the last five years was one significant symbol of this broad 
questioning. These inquiries included the Bland board of inquiry 
in Victoria (1973-75), the Corbett committee in South Australia 
(1973-75), a ministerial inquiry into machinery of government in 
New South Wales (1974) and, at the federal level, the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) 
chaired by Dr H.C. Coombs (1974-76).' On taking office, the 
Eraser government set up the Administrative Review Committee 
chaired by Sir Henry Bland. In New South Wales the Wran Labor 
government appointed Professor Peter Wilenski early in 1977 to 
inquire into state government administration yet again. 
Public service inquiries have a long history in Australia, but the 
most recent group came after a noticeable gap. The Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration was the first 
wide-ranging inquiry into the federal public service since the 
McLachlan commission in 1919^ and the economies commission 
in 1919-20.' In the intervening period there were two other 
committees of inquiry—the Bailey committee in 1944" and the 
Boyer committee in 1958^—but their terms of reference were 
limited to personnel policy. The situation was similar in the states. 
The recent Australian inquiries followed a number of prominent 
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inquiries in comparable countries—McCarthy in New Zealand, 
Glassco in Canada, Devlin in Eire, Fulton in the United Kingdom 
and Cronyn in Ontario. In all of these cases, whatever the action 
taken by governments, the reports themselves have provoked an 
extensive literature and provided information and cognitive maps 
for others wishing to explore the services they examined. At the 
very least they have become convenient mile posts—people refer, 
for example, to the post-Glassco and post-Fulton periods. 
The essays in this volume examine the three state inquiries 
completed—in South Australia and Victoria, and the ministerial 
review in New South Wales—and RCAGA. Our interests are twofold. 
First, we are concerned with examining the reports themselves. The 
essays present a set of textual reviews which put the recommenda-
tions of the reports in the context of broader debates about the 
topics they discuss. Second, we are interested in the mechanics of 
the inquiries—that is, how they were set up, run and implemented. 
Thus the chapters on the state inquiries and eight of the chapters 
on RCAGA are concerned with the contents of the reports themselves. 
The state chapters also discuss the background to the reports. The 
chapters by Hawker and Schaffer view the activities of RCAGA from 
the inside, focusing on operational problems and the chapters by 
Matthews and Chapman examine problems of implementation, 
generally in the latter case and with specific reference to RCAGA in 
the former. 
We cannot claim our coverage is exhaustive. In particular, since 
most of the reports were only published within the last two or three 
years, it is still too early to judge their final effects. Even though 
governments may praise reports loudly and claim to put their 
recommendations into effect, some of their more important results 
may occur through a process that is more akin to seepage than 
to the clear making of intended changes. If some of the standard 
jokes about the fate of committees have any truth in them—for 
example, that a unanimous report takes fifteen years to implement 
and that thirty years will elapse before some of the proposals of 
a divided committee take effect—then final comments may be a 
long time coming. The essays presented here can then be regarded 
as contributions to what may well be a continuing discussion. 
The use of inquiries 
Public service inquiries are part of a more general phenomenon. 
In the British system of government, as in others which follow a 
similar model, royaKcommissions, committees of inquiry and 
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advisory committees are familiar parts of the political and adminis-
trative process.' American presidential commissions and Swedish 
investigatory commissions are comparable bodies, as are task forces, 
assembled for specific purposes and dispersing afterwards, which 
are used in a variety of institutional settings. The varieties of bodies 
relevant to a discussion of public service inquiries are therefore 
extensive. 
One strand of the considerable literature on inquiries has been 
concerned with classification and categorization. This can be a 
barren enterprise, especially when divorced from the subject matter 
of the inquiries in question and the content of their reports. 
However, discussions of the reasons for setting up inquiries, the 
factors that affect their operations, and the problems they often 
encounter have identified a number of recurring themes, which can 
help to put the recent public service inquiries in Australia in a 
broader context. 
Inquiries have been established and used for a variety of purposes. 
They can range all the way from precise fact-finding operations 
to attempts to gather intelligence about, and come to terms with, 
diffuse subjects. Although lists of possible functions can easily 
become extensive, the following one brings together some of the 
more recent common suggestions. Inquiries can be set up to do the 
following:' 
a) to establish the facts and make recommendations about subjects 
of limited compass. 
b) to make general investigations on subjects where something has 
gone wrong, or there is a sense of malaise, or a general feeling 
that a review is needed. This may involve not simply finding 
facts but also redefining the terms of the inquiry and working 
out what kinds of recommendations may be relevant. 
c) to secure a peaceful synthesis or adjustment of conflicting 
interests. This may involve the participation of interested parties 
as an inducement to compliance with the results. 
d) to 'educate' the public or mobilize support for action which 
governments do not want to take solely on their own responsi-
bility. Reports intended to legitimize public service retrench-
ments fit this category. 
e) to show concern about a subject without actually having to do 
anything. At the very least this is a means of postponing 
awkward issues or taking the heat out of these situations. Such 
inquiries may have a large symbolic content. 
f) to allow the expression of grievances. This may be either a 
symbolic activity or one leading to the proposal of remedies. 
g) to follow up the suggestions of previous inquiries. 
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It is not hard to see how some items on the list could be divided 
and extended. Similarly, many combinations are possible in specific 
cases. This can make holding an inquiry an ambiguous exercise 
understood only imperfectly by both participants and observers at 
the time. 
Items (b), (d) and (f) applied in varying degrees to each of the 
Corbett, Bland and Coombs inquiries, while item (e) was also 
involved in the Coombs case. The ministerial review in New South 
Wales, being private and more restricted in scope, is harder to 
characterize. All of the inquiries were set up by governments either 
recently elected or in the process of undergoing internal changes. 
The Bland inquiry was set up by R.J. Hamer after he had succeeded 
Sir Henry Bolte as premier and been confirmed in office by an 
election. In New South Wales the review took place as Sir Robert 
Askin was about to retire as Liberal premier. In South Australia 
the Dunstan Labor government, in office since 1970, was still trying 
to remould administrative structures built up during a generation 
of Liberal rule. In Canberra RCAGA was appointed by an inex-
perienced Labor government, recently forced to a "snap" election, 
and divided about what to expect from, and how to deal with, a 
diverse federal public service. Publicly and officially none of the 
governments described their public services as deficient, but each 
of them had private reservations. They did not, however, have a 
clear conception of what needed attention. Each of the public 
inquiries had a considerable task in defining the subjects of 
investigation. This was perhaps less difficult for Sir Henry Bland 
in Victoria, and still manageable for the Corbett committee in 
South Australia, but a daunting prospect for RCAGA. 
Terms of reference 
Just as inquiries can be put to many uses, many factors may affect 
their operations. We may begin with the instructions given by the 
government setting up an inquiry. Formulating the official terms 
of reference calls for sensitive drafting and interpretation. The terms 
of reference may disguise a government's uncertainty about what 
it wants done. Equally they may try to disguise an officially well-
understood purpose or make such a purpose plain to all. How an 
inquiry interprets its terms of reference is important. This depends 
not only on the views of its members but on their relations with 
the government, as work proceeds as well as at the beginning. 
Although the independence of inquiries is a much proclaimed 
virtue, wide terms of reference and a loose set of reins are mixed 
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blessings. The vicissitudes of RCAGAS experience amply reflect this. 
Just as defining a policy problem entails making a preliminary 
estimate about what to do, instructing an inquiry may require an 
appreciation of what it might find. But even if this appreciation 
is made, successful inquiries may not simply do as they are told. 
Nor are they only appointed when the reports are foregone 
conclusions. As an inquiry proceeds it may decide that it needs to 
pose questions for investigation in a different way and to examine 
territory not included in its original mandate. This requires clear 
thinking on its part and an ability to carry the government's interest 
and support along the new course. In the Victorian inquiry Sir 
Henry Bland was able to do this for at least part of his work (his 
attention to statutory corporations) but in South Australia the 
Corbett committee stayed within its terms of reference at the cost 
of giving that state's statutory corporations (admittedly less promi-
nent than in Victoria) less attention. 
The appointment of members 
There are no set formulas for the size and composition of inquiries. 
Sir Henry Bland sat as the sole member of his inquiry, the Corbett 
committee had three members (a professor of politics, the head of 
the Premier's department and a businessman) and RCAGA had five 
members (two senior public servants, a professor of law, a member 
of the industrial bench and a public service union official). Although 
RCAGA was sometimes described as a large commission it was small 
compared with some British commissions where numbers have 
ranged from three to seventeen. Fulton, for instance, had twelve 
members. On the other hand in Canada commissions of three or 
four are usual. 
Getting agreement between commissioners was a greater task for 
RCAGA than for the other inquiries. Here the role of the chairman 
was always important. Dr Coombs adopted a consensual approach 
and did not, as some feared and others hoped, firmly carry the other 
commissioners in his own chosen direction. Professor Corbett and 
Mr Tom Lewis, the minister who led the New South Wales review, 
also preferred to adopt consensual methods. In other cases, particu-
larly in Britain, one member could dominate proceedings; for 
instance in the Fulton committee, Dr Norman Hunt (later Lord 
Crowther Hunt), although not the chairman, made the running for 
the rest of the members by maintaining close political links with 
the prime minister and preparing the first draft of the report 
himself.' On the earlier Haldane committee on machinery of 
R.F.I. Smith & Patrick WeUer 
government, Lord Haldane not only himself proposed the inquiry, 
but chaired it and was pre-eminent throughout its work.' 
Despite the implications of the size and composition of commit-
tees for their outcomes, governments quite often give these con-
siderations scant attention. T.J. Cartwright has noted that British 
governments commonly appoint members one by one until they 
think that they have enough.'" They do not give much thought, at 
least at the time, to the pattern they are creating. This seems to 
have happened with RCAGA. Although arguments about the size and 
composition of inquiries cannot be concluded without specific 
situations in mind, there is a strong case for small committees, with 
strong chairmen, some balance between experts and interests, and 
a preference for members with well-articulated views on the subject 
of study rather than for those who are neutral about it. Andrew 
Shonfield has suggested that a committee of three is often best. 
Members cannot ignore each other, nor do they tend to assume 
set roles. As a result, he claims, perhaps within a single day each 
member may in turn be the successful advocate of a proposal, a 
vociferous dissenter, and a peacemaker." 
Inquiries and research 
The ability of a committee to come to persuasive conclusions 
depends greatly on research, both by the committee itself and by 
others. Traditionally inquiries have relied extensively on "witnesses" 
who supply "evidence". Such methods often waste time, but 
witnesses can provide atmosphere, context and suggestions about 
what to look for. One proposal for getting the most out of people 
wishing to appear before an inquiry is to have prior and informal 
consultations with them about the substance and presentation of 
their views. This way an inquiry can secure their "second thoughts" 
rather than their first.'^ But even so, for more substantial material, 
inquiries have to seek out information themselves. 
Whether collecting material from witnesses or by research, an 
inquiry needs to have firm perspectives about what it wants to know. 
Shonfield has reported how the Duncan committee was not informed 
about relevant characteristics of structures of government dealing 
with its subject of overseas trade until too late to mount the 
thorough investigation that he thought was warranted. He rejects 
emphatically the "pragmatic fallacy" in the approach of many 
inquiries which he characterizes as follows: 
just plunge into your subject; collect as many facts as you can; think 
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about them hard as you go along; and at the end, use your commonsense, 
and above all your/ee/ for the practicable, to select a few good proposals 
out of the large number of suggestions which will surely come your 
way. This method . . . derives from a view of public affairs which puts 
the functions of an investigator on essentially the same footing as those 
of a common-law judge. Such a person is supposed to know all about 
the underlying theoretical assumptions of those whose affairs he is 
examining. All he needs is facts." 
Shonfield suggests that political scientists might be a good source 
of theory to help direct inquiries into key areas. There was little 
chance of such a contribution to the public service inquiries in 
Australia because few scholars of politics and public administration 
were equipped at the time to provide useful advice, RCAGA made 
extensive use of academic and other consultants but soon ran out 
of obvious people to approach. Inquiries can organize the most 
useful research programs if the research already being done in the 
relevant field is plentiful and of good quality.'" It is ironic that RCAGA, 
by its very existence as well as by the granting of consultancies, 
helped to fill the gap it suffered from. But the gap was too big 
to be filled in time for its own use. While scholars could afford 
to take several years to develop their newly awakened interests, 
RCAGA had a report to write. There is a further irony that such 
academics (including, we hasten to admit, the editors of this 
volume) provided a goodly crop of critics for RCAGAS report. At the 
very least we should acknowledge both our inadequacy and our debt. 
Even where a substantial background of research is available a 
successful research program is not guaranteed. William Plowden 
is only one of many who have lamented the poor integration of 
the Fulton committee's research activities with its findings. He 
castigates 
the magpie approach of Fulton, who accumulated a ragbag of mis-
cellaneous and not wholly relevant information and then made various 
recommendations for which the essential intelligence underpinning is 
only now being done by the Civil Service Department.'* 
Where an inquiry publishes the research it has commissioned 
separately from its own report, it is possible to see the links and 
discrepancies between research and recommendations. For this 
reason the Glassco commission in Canada did not release separate 
research papers. However academic and other consultants soon 
produced material based on their work for the inquiry. In Australia, 
RCAGA did not try to avoid this problem and published large amounts 
of commissioned and staff research in its appendix volumes. This 
was wise because once research has been done it is hard to hide. 
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Where a commission engages outside research workers it also has 
to cope with their tendency to adopt an independent approach. They 
may disagree with the formulation of the task they have been given 
or be interested mainly in producing material for academic publica-
tion. Geoffrey Hawker has described RCAGA'S experience of this 
latter problem. Academics do not adapt easily to tasks requiring 
the rapid gathering and reporting of information to clients, who 
themselves, rather than the reporters, make decisions about its 
significance and use. Inquiries need flexible researchers, akin to the 
technically skilled, politically sensitive and client-oriented analysts 
described recently by Arnold Meltsner,"" rather than people who 
in their own time produce rounded but possibly irrelevant reports. 
Relations with the bureaucracy 
Associated with the running of a research programme, and impor-
tant even where extensive research is not necessary, are the quality 
of an inquiry's secretariat and the support given by the departments 
most connected with an inquiry. Where a commission has to report 
in a hurry, the amount of initial thinking and planning done in 
the public service is vital. Once an inquiry is under way its 
secretariat has responsibility for managing logistics, keeping track 
of relevant material, preparing draft reports, and most importantly, 
providing reliable filters for important material which comes to 
hand late in the day when members of the inquiry are pressed for 
time. Sir Henry Bland worked largely on his own while the Corbett 
committee had a small and rather junior staff, RCAGA recruited a 
large staff but had difficulty in attracting people of seniority and 
experience. Although in the end the record of the staff was a good 
one they nevertheless had to spend a long time learning what to 
do. 
One persistent problem facing commissions and committees is 
that by their nature they work outside the normal machinery of 
government. The reasons for setting them up and the resources they 
are given are decided by ad hoc processes. Particular commissions 
and committees have no natural place in the scheme of things. They 
must enter into complex transactions to ensure an adequate supply 
of funds, staff, information and bureaucratic and political support. 
Going outside normal bureaucratic structures always has its costs. 
In programme implementation these are, for example, in not 
knowing the location of procedural decision points or the disposition 
of friends and foes among related agencies. In intelligence gathering 
the costs are even more apparent. While established agencies can 
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live through fluctuations in political interest, these can be utterly 
debilitating for organizations whose working lives are by nature 
short. Inquiries do not even have the resources of a programme 
to administer. If a temporary body has responsibility for a 
programme there may be some point in answering its questions, 
but inquiries can only pose questions. Decisions are made elsewhere. 
Could governments do better themselves? 
Following from this, a popular criticism of inquiries as a technique 
of investigation has been to suggest that anything ad hoc com-
missions can do, governments can do better and more honestly 
themselves. When the amount of help inquiries need from govern-
ments is considered, this view has some force. Perhaps governments 
should take the full responsibility for investigations by creating 
appropriate regular agencies and giving the job to them." However 
William Plowden has suggested that the process of ad hoc inquiries 
may be as important as what they recommend." Ad hoc inquiries 
may be organizationally weak in that they do not have established 
resources, but they do not have vested interests. They can be more 
flexible and versatile than departments; they allow the views of 
specially recruited outsiders to be incorporated in the processes of 
administration; and their structures can readily be adapted to the 
organic variety associated with innovation. They can provide fresh 
looks and disinterested reappraisals which regular arms of govern-
ment cannot do. Even if the latter can provide technically good 
work on their own, they cannot give it the credibility that comes 
from an outside review. 
But Plowden also notes the variety of purposes commissions can 
be used for and asks whether all such uses can be valid." This is 
a penetrating question, especially when linked with his later 
comment that inquiries are so often vaguely conceived and casually 
embarked upon. It is a paradox that a technique which seems so 
suited to the creative production of intelligence should be so readily 
misunderstood and misused. Governments appear to have no 
procedures for learning about the nature of inquiries from past 
experience. While there may be agencies with responsibility for 
seeing that commissions and committees conform to particular 
formal requirements, there seem to be none whose business it is 
to review their substantive contributions and to advise newly set 
up bodies on what to do and what to avoid. Relevant experience 
and understanding are dissipated among agencies concerned with 
particular inquiries. Thus while one group may be learning how 
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to proceed another group may be forgetting or not passing on what 
they have recently learnt. The length of time since previous public 
service inquiries in Australia meant that at the beginning of the 
most recent wave of inquiries relevant experience would in any case 
have been of a quite general kind. The experiences of RCAGA have 
now generated an amount of particular understanding which simply 
was not available when it began work. But that experience may 
not be used for future benefit, not because it is forgotten but because 
it is deliberately ignored. The Eraser government's Administrative 
Review Committee did not try to build on RCAGA'S experience: it 
was set up in a different way by a government suspicious of RCAGA 
and was in some senses a competitor. It regarded the lessons of 
RCAGA as irrelevant. However the most recent inquiry in New South 
Wales begun by the Wran government has been more interested 
in drawing lessons from the immediately earlier inquiries. It will 
be an interesting test case in the management of opportunities for 
learning. 
Inquiries and public policy 
What then can one expect of public service inquiries? How can 
one judge their results? What can they contribute to the making 
of public policy? The foregoing discussion suggests that inquiries 
are so closely connected with the context in which they operate 
that an evaluation of their work cannot be entirely separated from 
the wider processes of which they are a part. Inquiries are outcomes 
in public policy as well as inputs. The act of setting them up is 
an indication of concern even if it is only that an issue be efficiently 
aired. Commonly it is more substantial than that. 
The contribution of inquiries to the making of policy is chiefly 
to the intelligence gathering section of the decision making cycle 
as conventionally designated. But actual policy processes do not 
conform to the neat sequential steps of the decision-making cycle 
and inquiries are not the only contributors of intelligence. Govern-
ments do not have to wait for an official report to take notice of 
information placed before an inquiry or the results of its research. 
Further, the input of inquiries is not just in what governments do 
with their reports. It is unsatisfactory to try simply to tick off the 
score of recommendations adopted. Such a process does not take 
account of things that would probably have been done anyway; nor 
does it distinguish between trivial and significant recommendations; 
and it does not encompass ideas of sufficient stamina and attractive-
Introduction 1 I 
ness to alter ways of thinking even if the government at the time 
wants to ignore them. 
As Sir Geoffrey Vickers has pointed out, changing ways of 
thinking may be the most important contribution that public 
inquiries may make to policy making.^" To do this, a report needs 
to be of high intellectual quality and to emphasize the range of 
its central ideas as well as to work out how they might most 
immediately be applied. In some cases it may even be more 
important to concentrate on the former at the expense of the latter. 
This notion of the impact of inquiries cuts across the view expressed 
earlier that governments should know something of what they want 
when a commission is appointed. On Vickers' argument, to set up 
an inquiry is to invite someone to change current modes of thinking. 
Not all inquiries, however, are cast in this role. 
While much of what public service inquiries recommend may 
take effect indirectly or in unforeseen ways, this does not mean 
that strategies of implementation are unimportant. Implementing 
any complex programme is difficult and entails considerable ability 
to link proposals with possible effects from an early stage in the 
work. In the case of public service inquiries there is no uniquely 
effective strategy. A review of procedures followed by inquiries and 
governments, both in Australia and overseas, suggests that the 
number of different approaches to implementation is quite large. 
Styles of implementation can differ, for example, from the prompt 
endorsement by a government of general recommendations, not 
necessarily followed by substantive action, to the sustained and 
public reworking of an inquiry's ideas by special task forces as they 
test the suitability of its recommendations for all areas designated 
for attention; and from the complete non-involvement of personnel 
from an inquiry to their systematic recruitment and use in the 
implementation process. Clearly it is important that settling on an 
approach to implementation is seen as an urgent task both within 
inquiries and within the government appointing them. 
Thus in assessing the contributions of public service inquiries to 
public policy one has to examine both the intellectual and catalytic 
effects of such inquiries, and the processes by which they are 
conducted and their reports implemented—in short, one examines 
both arguments and procedures. As we said at the outset this is 
what the essays in this volume try to do. A concern with procedures 
may also contribute to increasing the stock of knowledge future 
inquiries can draw on when they begin operations, and a concern 
with arguments may help in distinguishing between recommenda-
tions with a limited life and those with continuing power and 
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attractiveness. We may end by recalling William Plowden's plea 
that more thought be given to the uses of inquiries: 
All in all, it is precisely because the rather vaguely conceived, casually 
used device of the ad hoc commission is potentially such a valuable 
aid to policy-making that it is worth thinking carefully about how and 
where it can best be used.'' 
The experiences of the recent public service inquiries in Australia 
make this a compelling conclusion. 
Notes 
1. First Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Victorian Public Service, 
(Melbourne: Government Printer, 1974). Second Report, 1974; Third Report, 
1975; Final Report, 1975. 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service of South Australia, 
(Adelaide, 1975). 
The proceedings of the Machinery of Government Review in New South Wales 
were not published. 
Report: Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, (Can-
berra: A.G.P.S., 1976). 
2. Report of the Royal Commission on Public Service Administration, (Mel-
bourne, 1920). 
3. Report upon the Public Expenditure of the Commonwealth of Australia with 
a view to Effecting Economies, Final Report, (Melbourne, 1921). 
4. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Systems of Promotion and Temporary 
Transfers, (Canberra, 1945). 
5. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Public Service Recruitment, (Can-
berra, 1958). 
6. For works which discuss and difTerenliate between various kinds of committees 
see: Gerald Rhodes, Committees of Inquiry, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975); 
T.J. Cartwright, Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees in Britain, 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1975); K.C. Wheare, Government by Commit-
tee, (Oxford University Press, 1955); PEP, Advisory Committees in British 
Government, (London: Allen and Unwin, I960); R.V. Vernon and N. Mansergh 
(eds). Advisory Bodies: A Study of their Uses in Relation to Central 
Government 1919-1939, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1940); and W.A. Robson; 
"Public Inquiries as an Instrument of Government", British Journal of 
Administrative Law, I, 1954. 
7. This list draws on material from the items in note 6 and also from Andrew 
Shonfield, "In the Course of Investigation", New Society, 24 July 1969; David 
Donnison, "Committees and Committeemen", New Society, 18 April 1968; 
William Plowden, "An Anatomy of Commissions", New Society, 15 July 1971; 
and G.B. Doern, "The Role of Royal Commissions in the General Policy Process 
and in Federal—Provincial Relations", Canadian Public Administration, 10, 4 
December 1967. 
8. See "How Dr Hunt (aided and abetted by Harold Wilson) took over Fulton" 
Sunday Times, 30 June 1968. 
9. See N. Mansergh, "The Use of Advisory Bodies in the Reform of the Machinery 
of Government", in R.V. Vernon and N. Mansergh, Advisory Bodies, 48. 
Introduction 13 
10. T.J. Cartwright, Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees, 74. 
11. Shonfield, "In the Course of Investigation", 124. 
12. Donnison, "Committees and Committeemen", 559. 
13. Shonfield, "In the Course of Investigation", 123. 
14. Donnison, "Committees and Committeemen", 559. 
15. Plowden, "An Anatomy of Commissions", 107. 
16. Arnold Meltsner, Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976). 
17. For cogent comments on this point see Doern, "The Role of Royal Commissions 
in the General Policy Process". See also R.F.I. Smith and P.M. Weller, "The 
Bureaucracy: Royal Commission- A Chance for Change?", Contemporary 
Australian Management, July 1975, 26. 
18. Plowden, "An Anatomy of Commissions". 
19. ibid. 
20. Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgment, (London: Chapman and Hall, 
1965), ch 3. 
21. Plowden, "An Anatomy of Commissions", 107. 
A Brief History of 
Public Service Inquines 
R. L Wettenhall 
2 
Administrative history is an essential companion for those of us 
who are, in the late A.H. Hanson's words, "searchers after origins". 
But, for those of us who become excited about what appear to be 
new fashions or new developments, and seek to analyze or describe 
them without much reference to the past, it can also be an awkward 
taskmaster. 
I remember W.J.M. Mackenzie diminishing some university 
economists who were arguing that cost-benefit analysis was the 
great gift of mid-century economics to public policy-making. 
Certainly, he conceded, modern economics had done an important 
job in refining measuring techniques; but, as for the basic ideas, 
they were all there in Jeremy Bentham! Likewise the "new scholars" 
of public enterprise, in their first flush of excitement with post-
World War II nationalization, were wont to see the public cor-
poration as a great new innovation. To Sir John Anderson it was 
"probably the most striking development in administrative tech-
nique of our generation".' Robson made some concessions to history: 
in his view the public corporation "in its modern form originated 
in the Port of London Authority, created by Lloyd George in 
1908".^ But they knew little or nothing of earlier developments in 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and elsewhere; indeed, they 
probably undervalued a good deal of earlier British experimenta-
tion. 
Administrative history shows that broadly similar problems have 
been faced in the past, and that solutions not so different from 
modern solutions have been proposed. Even where the contexts seem 
far apart, there is a good deal of continuity in administrative 
thought and practice; we can gather useful insights from awareness 
of past administrative events. 
I get the impression from the literature the present generation 
of public service inquiries has produced that our enthusiasms have 
made us see it as "all new". How often have we asked ourselves 
whether other major inquiries preceded McCarthy in New Zealand, 
Glassco and Cronyn in Canada, Devlin in Ireland, Fulton in Britain 
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or Coombs, Corbett, Bland and now Wilenski in Australia—and, 
if so, what became of them? How often have we asked ourselves 
whether other countries have relevant histories—and if so, whether 
we can learn anything from them? Perhaps all the debunking the 
Haldane report had to sustain in the 1950s led us to forget?^ 
I realize I overstate my case, that mostly we have some awareness 
of past generations of inquiries. It may be useful nevertheless to 
set the present generation of inquiries more firmly in a historical 
context. 
A widespread practice 
For Britain, as students of the traditional public administration used 
to be taught, the period between Northcote-Trevelyan (1854) and 
Fulton (1966-68) was punctuated by a series of major inquiries:" 
(i) Playfair commission (1874-75): appointed in the aftermath 
of the long period of piecemeal reform after 1854 to consider 
methods of recruitment, the question of transfer between 
departments, the possibility of grading the civil service as 
a whole and the employment of writers and temporary 
clerks. 
(ii) Ridley commission (1886-90): considered whether the work 
of departments was efficiently and economically performed, 
whether it could be simplified and whether the system of 
control was deficient or unnecessarily elaborate. 
(iii) MacDonnell commission (1912-15): considered methods of 
appointment and promotion, the working and efficiency of 
the competitive examination system and the existing scheme 
of organization. 
(iv) Haldane committee (1918): the original "Machinery of 
Government Committee", appointed to consider the respon-
sibilities of the various departments of the central govern-
ment, and to advise in what manner the exercise and 
distribution by the government of its functions should be 
improved, 
(v) Reorganization committee of the National Whitley Council 
(1920): introduced the familiar service-wide four-class sys-
tem (administrative, executive, clerical, writing assistant) 
and offered what was to be an influential view of the 
distinction between policy and executive work. There was 
also a 1919 committee to inquire into the organization and 
staffing of government offices. 
(vi) Tomlin commission (1929-31): reviewed the developments 
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of the past ten years in respect of coordination and 
efficiency, treasury control and conditions of service, 
(vii) Priestley commission (1953-55): considered conditions-of-
service questions such as pay, hours of work, overtime, 
allowances and superannuation, 
(viii) Plowden committee (1961): examined the mechanics of 
treasury control over the whole range of public expenditures. 
It is an arbitrary exercise to decide which inquiries to include 
in such a list. Some of those referred to have wider terms of 
reference than others; and the list does not include numerous 
inquiries appointed with relatively narrow frames of reference such 
as Bridgeman on the Post Office (1932), Assheton on civil service 
training (1943), Masterman on the political activities of civil 
servants (1948), Franks on tribunals and inquiries (1957), others 
on particular areas of public enterprise management and many 
more. 
When we look to the USA, we think first of the two Hoover 
commissions of 1949 and 1955. Among other things, they are famed 
for their development of the task force technique; they set up 
numerous task forces to deal with particular heads of inquiry, and 
the individual task force reports were published as well as the final 
integrating commission reports. Before them, however, came Presi-
dent Roosevelt's commission on administrative management (the 
Brownlow committee, which reported in 1937); President Taft's 
commission on economy and efficiency (1911-13); and—earlier still, 
in the great age of the civil service reform movement—President 
Grant's civil service commission (1871-75).^ Once more, numerous 
other inquiries with narrower frames of reference are ignored in 
such a summary treatment. Such inquiries have also become a 
prominent feature of the public administration landscape in Cana-
da, in New Zealand, in India, in Kenya, in Ghana and so on. 
The first Australian inquiry? 
The first Australian inquiry to be worthy of our notice must surely 
be that conducted by John Thomas Bigge, the commissioner 
appointed by the British government in 1819 to inquire into the 
condition of New South Wales, which colony then included Van 
Diemen's Land as a semi-autonomous dependency. 
Bigge's three reports, printed as British parliamentary papers in 
1822 and 1823, dealt particularly with the nature of the convict 
system in these two original Australian jurisdictions, with the 
workings of their judicial establishments and with the state of their 
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agriculture and trade. In compiling them and making his recom-
mendations, Bigge gathered evidence widely, and largely informally, 
from colonists and government officials alike. Inevitably, since the 
effects of government were then so all-pervading, the reports present 
a great deal of information on the operations of the contemporary 
administrative system. They are essential aids to the student of early 
Australian administrative history, even though they have been 
heavily criticized for their failure to observe proper rules of evidence 
and cross-examination, and for their biased treatment of 
Macquarie's governorship.'' 
Although there was little other inquiry activity of this sort before 
the coming of responsible government, the South Australian Legis-
lative Council did appoint two select committees in the early 1850s. 
The first, charged with investigating the condition and working of 
the civil service, led the way to the passing of Australia's first civil 
service legislation, the South Australian Classification Act of 1852. 
The second, intended primarily to examine the system of keeping 
the public accounts, in fact "gave colonial politicians their first 
chance of examining and commenting on the work of departments 
in detail".' 
From responsible government to federation 
When we turn to the period between the granting of self-government 
to the colonies* and the coming of federation in 1901, we find that 
the colonial governments and legislators made much use of the 
device of the public service inquiry. Looking at this history, the 
1894-95 NSW royal commission reported: 
How far the civil service of any country has been from attaining a lofty 
ideal may be inferred from the fact that Commission after Commission 
has sat throughout the great English-speaking colonies to inquire into 
the causes that have made it a by-word and a reproach. In order to 
ascertain what has been done in this matter elsewhere, we sent a circular 
to the Colonial Treasurer of each of the Colonies asking for full 
information on Civil Service Reform as it affected each particular 
Colony. We find that each Colony has had a Royal Commission, from 
Victoria, which led the way in 1859, down to Western Australia, where 
a Royal Commission commenced its labours in June last year . . .' 
My appreciation of these inquiries comes primarily from the 
administrative/historical research of scholars like Parker, Caiden, 
Knight, Hawker and Bourke.'" I have also referred to the various 
series of colonial/state parliamentary papers, and in compiling the 
first of the tables which follow I have been helped by an appendix 
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to the 1894-95 NSW report which presented summary information 
on earlier inquiries in England, the USA, Canada and the other 
Australian colonies. 
It is possible to see the inquiries of the later nineteenth century 
as falling into three groups (or waves). The first wave came early 
in the period. Caiden points out that the Northcote-Trevelyan 
report, just received in the colonies when the first of them became 
self-governing, "aroused speculation as to whether similar inquiries 
would reveal the same state of affairs"; and that the new govern-
ments, in "the first flush of enthusiasm . . . initiated public and 
private inquiries into the efficiency of the administration and the 
causes of staff discontent". Caiden is generous in his comments 
about the early Victorian and Tasmanian inquiries: the first, 
enlivened and informed by the intelligence of its chairman. Pro-
fessor W. E. Hearn, then Professor of Law at the University of 
Melbourne, was "more advanced in ideas than the Northcote-
Trevelyan Report"; the second was "one of the very first exercises 
in scientific management"." 
These first-wave inquiries were concerned with questions such as 
civil service appointments, promotions, classifications, super-
annuation, security of tenure and means for securing more economi-
cal management. They set the stage for later exercises but, though 
they were not unaware of the need, they did not have to grapple 
seriously with the design of service-wide legislation. 
The second wave of inquiries began in the early 1870s, when 
economic recession focussed attention once more on the alleged 
extravagances and maladministration of the civil service. To quote 
Caiden again, "When the pressure for reform mounted. Govern-
ments satisfied the critics by appointing committees of inquiry 
whose recommendations were embodied in subsequent legislation 
. . . or ignored . . .". Some progress was matje in the devising of 
integrated civil service systems, though nowhere was government 
"bold enough to adopt the far-seeing recommendations of the Royal 
Commissions whose Reports fully supported the criticisms by public 
servants of the patronage system".'^ The reports were now drawing 
attention to experiments in civil service reform elsewhere: notably 
Victoria's 1870-73 royal commission cited recent Canadian legisla-
tion establishing a central personnel authority for the whole service. 
Some experimentation followed in Australia, but it did not go far 
enough. 
Efforts to secure the reform of the public services were renewed 
in the depression of the 1890s. By now the message about patronage 
and the need for independent central personnel agencies had begun 
to sink in, and a third wave of inquiries had considerable effect. 
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In particular, the Littlejohn commission in NSW paved the way for 
new legislation establishing a powerful Public Service Board with 
virtually complete control over the management of the public 
service. The NSW government's acceptance of the inquiry recommen-
dations is widely regarded as forming "a watershed in the history 
of public personnel administration in Australia"." It provided a 
model for the new commonwealth to adapt to its own purposes after 
1901, and the philosophy it espoused was sooner or later to influence 
developments in the other states, although several of them con-
ducted their own inquiries before introducing corresponding re-
forms. As Hawker's study demonstrates, the first of the relevant 
South Australian royal commissions actually preceded that in NSW 
although it 
went too far for the legislators, whose flagging interest rendered the 
too-energetic Reports . . . ineffective for more than twenty years, a 
situation which the [Civil Service] Association did its best to make 
permanent.''' 
The comparable Tasmanian royal commission did not sit until after 
federation, when the states were adjusting to the transfer of sections 
of their public services to the new commonwealth government. 
However, it deserves to be included in this group because its 
objectives were broadly similar." 
Table One presents some information about the inquiries of this 
period (see p. 31). 
The First World War and its aftermath 
The annals of Australian administrative history teach that one other 
identifiable wave of public service inquiries occurred between the 
three surveyed in the preceding section and that of the present era. 
Of course this new wave included commonwealth as well as state 
inquiries. E.A. Bland, a keen observer of these inquiries, explained 
that 
World War I closed an era in Australian politics and administration. 
The changes effected by social, political, economic, industrial and 
administrative measures in the closing years of the nineteenth century 
produced a new temper which was reflected generally in changed 
outlooks and attitudes. And the sacrifice of a whole generation to the 
insensate appetite of war precipitated the premature birth of movements 
that might otherwise have taken years to evolve. In the field of 
administration, unrest throughout the Commonwealth led to the ap-
pointment of Royal Commissions in Victoria (1917), New South Wales 
(1917-18), The Commonwealth (1917-20), and Queensland (1919), 
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and the consideration of the "rights" of public servants bulked largely 
in the reports." 
By this time, moreover, most of Australia's administrative systems 
had a decade or more of experience with their new or "stiffened" 
Public Service Acts, and the time was ripe for review and revision. 
Bourke put it more simply: 
The 1914-18 war provoked a new series of enquiries into the Australian 
public service[s]. Between 1914 and 1928 no fewer than twelve Royal 
Commissions or Select Committees surveyed their management." 
Table Two provides summary information about these inquiries, in 
similar form to that provided in Table One (see p. 32). 
The impact was considerable, the new emphasis on efficiency in 
several of the reports finding ready acceptance at least by the 
governments of NSW and the commonwealth. Thus Allard demon-
strated how the NSW Public Service Board had slipped from the lofty 
ideals of Littlejohn in the 1890s and recommended a strengthening 
of that board; amending legislation in 1919 "incorporated the best 
of [his] thinking"." The commonwealth had two inquiries reporting 
in 1920 (McLachlan and the economies commission), and the 
completely rewritten Public Service Act of 1922, the Super-
annuation Act of 1922, and the Public Service (Arbitration) Act 
of 1920 all drew heavily on the ideas they had expressed. The new 
Section 17 of the Public Service Act (which sought to give the new 
three-man board power over the economic and efficient working of 
departments) flowed directly from the recommendations of the 
economies commission.''' 
The Queensland inquiry of 1919, conducted by J.D. Story as 
royal commissioner, was required to focus its attention particularly 
on the dissension that had been caused by a suggested scheme of 
classification for officers of the public service. It was unusual among 
such inquiries in that it heard appeals against the effects of that 
scheme; the report was, however, descriptive of personnel practice 
in general, and the outcome was a proposal for an entirely new 
classification scheme. The Story commission was also unusual in 
developing the "wheel model" as a graphic means of illustrating 
Queensland's ministerial/departmental organization and the 
classification relativities envisaged within each departmental area. 
A long period of inaction 
From this survey, it will be seen that it was rare, from 1856 right 
through to 1927, for more than a decade to pass without a public 
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service inquiry in one or other of the Australian governmental 
jurisdictions. However, if the waves followed each other fairly 
quickly in that period, it is equally clear that something of a drought 
arrived in the latter year. At first glance it would appear that all 
seven jurisdictions turned away from the public service inquiry as 
a technique of administrative review and reform after 1928, and 
that they did not return to it until a Liberal government in Victoria 
and a Labor government in South Australia decided to hold 
inquiries in 1973, and a Labor government in the commonwealth 
decided similarly in 1974. The proximity of these decisions sug-
gested that a new wave of inquiries had arrived, and of course the 
reports of this new (fourth) wave form the central focus of the 
present volume.^" 
There were of course many requests, and the absence of such 
inquiries cannot be taken to indicate that there was wide general 
satisfaction with the workings of our public administrative systems. 
The ceiling-imposing and staff-cutting operation early in Menzies' 
second prime ministership was sufficient evidence that he believed 
there was room for improvement and adjustment in the interests 
of economical management. His fellow-critics drew his attention 
to the inquiries conducted by the two Hoover commissions in the 
USA and there were suggestions that such an inquiry should be 
initiated in Australia. But the Public Service Board chairman 
advised that the government might be politically embarrassed,^' and 
Robert Kennedy, special assistant to Menzies, distributed a paper 
making several points in arguing against a Hoover-type inquiry: 
a) The Hoover commissions were, in effect, an extension of the 
congressional committee system. Such inquiries were needed in 
the USA because there was "no direct line of control from 
Congress to the Public Service". But the "direct and clear cut 
line of accountability" in Australia gives parliament effective 
control and thereby removes the need. (How narrow his 
horizons: he was obviously putting the executive's rather than 
the legislature's view!) 
b) Such inquiries take much time and are very expensive. 
c) It would be difficult in Australia to find the necessary numbers 
of qualified people to undertake them. 
d) Despite the Hoover recommendations for "substantial overall 
savings in the operation of government", the U.S. civil em-
ployment had continued to rise. 
e) The standards of efficiency of the commonwealth public service 
"are high and equal to any private industry", and the recently-
adopted system of calling on expert advisers from outside the 
service is likely to be productive. 
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f) A commission of inquiry "would relieve the Government of a 
tremendous amount of political responsibility"—providing "a 
ready repository for much criticism" and "a convenient political 
'buffer' against many attacks".^^ 
Menzies himself said in Parliament that he did not have 
the slightest sympathy with the idea, however comfortable it may be 
in a personal sense, to off-load that responsibility on to two or three 
people who are outside of government, who are not responsive to public 
opinion, and who do not know what the process has been by which 
governments today undertake responsibilities that our grandfathers did 
not think of . . . " 
Notwithstanding, the same government was prepared to set up 
a committee of inquiry to review recruitment standards and 
processes (Boyer), using as a model an earlier committee of inquiry 
on the promotion system (Bailey). Both committees conducted wide-
ranging inquiries and made substantial contributions to adminis-
trative development. In particular the Boyer report, invigorated and 
informed by the work on that committee of Professor R.S. Parker, 
presented a most valuable review and critique of important areas 
of past Australian public service development, and is a far more 
significant document than those produced by many of the earlier 
system-wide inquiries.^" 
At least one other inquiry during this "drought" period had fairly 
wide-ranging terms of reference. This was the committee of review 
on the civil staffing of wartime activities of 1945-46 (Pinner)." And, 
as always, there were also numerous narrower-perspective inquiries. 
It remains true, however, that the device of the system-wide inquiry 
was much less popular after 1927, a circumstance which Caiden 
attributes largely to the very success of the post-World War I 
inquiries. The changes they had brought about "had obviated the 
need for similar inquiries before World War II", and the failings 
of the second war period were not deemed sufficient to justify a 
repetition of the vigorous inquiry activity of the late 191 Os and early 
1920s.^ ^ 
Caiden's explanation seems unexceptionable. But the work of 
Michael Roe on the decline of western liberalism and the rise of 
the progressivist movement in the USA" suggests to me that there 
may be a second cause, more elusive but important nonetheless, 
for the decreased usage of the public service inquiry. Roe demon-
strates how American progressivism, containing within it a number 
of strands like conservation, eugenics, city planning and scientific 
management, championed the cause of efficiency. The engineer, 
applying his science, was seen as the natural leader of society; the 
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belief in efficiency brought businessmen to support reform; turned 
to public administration, the movement quickly produced the cry 
for skilled executives in government. The period covered the later 
nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, and the temporal associa-
tion with the civil service reform movement was far more than 
coincidental. While it is not easy to find direct attributions by 
Australian reformers to the leaders of scientific management and 
other strands of progressivist thought, I have little doubt that these 
intellectual currents also made themselves felt in Australia; and all 
the public service inquiries during the later nineteenth century and 
up to the 1920s can be seen in this context. 
Roe shows also how the progressivist movement both hardened 
in the European drift towards fascism after World War I and 
weakened in Britain and America with the revival of "a kind of 
liberalism" which concerned itself with issues like civil liberties, saw 
"the separation of social welfare from moralism, efficiency and 
nationalism", and increasingly looked to "workers and other out-
groups" for government support. Roe admits that the post-World 
War I picture is confused, but insists that the pattern of 
progressivism and reform "was rent to pieces".^* To the extent that 
such forces had provided a reformist drive for the Australian public 
service inquiries, their weakening through the 1920s appears 
consistent with the virtual disappearance of the inquiry for a long 
period after 1927. Of course the public service inquiry did not 
disappear from the British and American administrative landscape 
in the same way, indicating that other forces must also have been 
at work. '^ 
One was, of course, that satisfaction (or complacency?) bred of 
the reforms of the early 1920s, which Caiden noted. Another was 
probably the development of a new tradition of inquiry, that by 
the standing parliamentary committee, and especially the public 
accounts committee. Gradually governments and parliaments began 
to appreciate that such committees could do some of the work 
previously entrusted to the royal commissions and select committees 
which had hitherto been fairly consistently employed to inquire into 
matters concerning the public service. It may also be—though 
further exploration is obviously needed before we can be sure— 
that there is less demand for commissions or committees of inquiry 
in times of strong leadership within the public service. This 
possibility is suggested particularly by the circumstances of the 
1850s. While Victoria and Tasmania then appointed inquiries, NSW 
did not: but NSW had the benefit of the very clear-headed and far-
sighted Deas Thompson as colonial secretary on the eve of self-
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government, and his views from inside were influential in shapmg 
the machinery of government.'" 
It has been suggested that Australia came near to launching a 
new wave of broad-base inquiries in the 1960s: that the (Vernon) 
committee of economic inquiry was a foretaste of things to come, 
and in keeping with developments in New Zealand, Canada and 
elsewhere, but that the Menzies government's public "dumping" 
of its 1964 report set back the cause for nearly a decade." However 
that may be, and whatever other factors may have been at work, 
the accumulating force of overseas example clearly contributed to 
the great revival of the 1970s. 
The problem of evaluation 
Australian administrative history thus shows that the device of the 
public service inquiry has been popular at some times, unpopular 
at others. What can we say about the effectiveness of the device 
over the total period? 
Evaluation of such inquiries—indeed, of most committees of 
inquiry—is notoriously difficult. One Sydney study of some twenty-
one committees on a variety of subjects selected the Murray 
committee on the Australian universities as the most impressive 
success, for the reason that the government "knew what it wanted, 
and Murray gave it to them"." Are they, then, only effective when 
they are rubber stamps, popularizers of already determined courses 
of action? The general body of criticism of the public service and 
machinery of government inquiries which are the concern of this 
paper accuses them variously of being 
subjectively oriented to the aspirations of certain strong members 
(Haldane); 
set up with fairly rigid guidelines, or with limited terms of reference 
(Brownlow, Hoover I, Fulton); 
"inside jobs" with only pseudo-independence and little criticism to make 
(Plowden); 
promulgators of administrative "principles" as facades for the achieving 
of political objectives (Haldane and Brownlow again)." 
As Corbett demonstrates from the Glassco and Fulton cases, these 
inquiries tend to be the products of particular moments; the real 
reasons for them, whatever the stated terms of reference, "must 
be inferred from the politics of the time". Moreover, by under-
standing these politics, Corbett suggests, we ought to be able to 
anticipate many of their findings." 
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It is clear from judgments already reported that quick and 
substantial results followed some of the earlier Australian inquiries. 
Thus Littlejohn in NSW (1894-95) was associated with the most 
spectacular breakthrough in displacing the patronage system— 
though whether it actually persuaded or simply focused views that 
had by now become widely accepted is debatable. And McLachlan 
and the economies commission in the commonwealth, Allard in NSW 
and possibly others adapted and adjusted so effectively that little 
need was felt for further major inquiry until half a century had 
passed. 
In other cases, however, the recommendations fell mainly on deaf 
ears. Inquiries like Hearn in Victoria and Glyde in South Australia 
were obviously too far in advance of the legislative and public 
service opinion of the time. So there were no quick, spectacular 
results. But if they contributed in the long run to the development 
of a climate of opinion in which change could take place, should 
they be judged as ineffective? 
Some were terminated before they had a chance to finish their 
planned investigations (Canning in Western Australia); others were 
little more than sinecures and smoke-screens to hide government 
inactivity (Garrard in NSW)." Even the more obvious reform agents 
found some of their major recommendations ignored. To take a 
single example: McLachlan, like so many public service "cen-
tralists", hated all those separate areas of employment under 
boards, commissions, etc., and proposed a "provisional service" 
alongside the regular service to contain in a quasi-coordinated way 
all those groups of public employees engaged in functions of a 
provisional character or of a kind unsuited to the regular personnel 
machinery. He got this provision—along with many of his other 
proposals—written into amending legislation. But it remained a 
dead letter and was quietly repealed in 1954. However, if that was 
a McLachlan "failure", clearly there were a number of McLachlan 
"successes". 
To grade these inquiries according to their degrees of 
effectiveness would therefore be a hazardous task. But one rough 
generalization seems possible: the broader the canvas of the inquiry, 
the more uncertain the impact is likely to be. As we have already 
noted, in the broad inquiries some recommendations are likely to 
be accepted, some not; and even where quick results cannot be seen, 
in the long term impacts may be considerable. Usually much 
simpler decisions are required to accept or reject changes recom-
mended by narrower-frame inquiries. As RCAGA member Peter 
Bailey once correctly responded, my remark that it all became more 
difficult with the broader inquiries was a mere "truism". It is worth 
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remembering, nevertheless, how narrow-frame English inquiries like 
Acland on forestry, Weir on electricity and Crawford on broad-
casting all speedily won their central practical argument—that new 
special-purpose public corporations should be created—whereas, in 
the same period, the very non-specific Haldane committee theorized 
generally that public corporations should not be created but was 
ignored by the system-designers. 
A few interesting facts emerge from the data presented in Tables 
One and Two. Average membership of the fifteen inquiries surveyed 
in Table One was 6.5; that of the eight inquiries surveyed in Table 
Two was 1.75. The contrast is even more striking if we move the 
1905 Tasmanian inquiry into the Table Two group: it then becomes 
clear that the smallest board or commission appointed during the 
nineteenth century (the first—Hearn) had four members, whereas 
the largest appointed in the early twentieth century period (Cooch 
and Meagher) had three. The device of the single-member inquiry 
became fairly popular in the twentieth century but was not known 
in the nineteenth; and no member of parliament has sat on any 
such inquiry reporting in the twentieth century." 
Elapsed times between appointment and final report have varied 
from about four years to about one month. But long and short 
inquiries are scattered through both periods, and there is little 
evidence to suggest that either has been more influential than the 
other—except that the four-year NSW inquiry (Garrard) obviously 
took too long and ran out of steam! As to methods of inquiry, the 
department-by-department survey and the cross-examination of 
witnesses have both enjoyed considerable popularity. Fortunately, 
by the 1920s the reports were presenting their data more analytical-
ly, in integrated service-wide presentations, a great improvement 
on the earlier common practice of devoting a chapter to each 
department surveyed. The publication in full of the evidence of 
witnesses was a common feature of the inquiries of the middle 
period, and several full volumes in the various Parliamentary Papers 
series are taken up with this material. 
The first substantial use of expert investigators and consultants 
employed by the inquiring body came with the federal economies 
commission of 1917-20: the method was then novel enough to 
attract a great deal of criticism from the public servants being 
surveyed. It may well be that the development and expansion of 
these latter techniques have been among the most innovative 
contributions of the 1970s. Thus, even if Bland remained fairly true 
to tradition, the Corbett inquiry engaged its own research officers, 
and Coombs not only did this but also made extensive use of task 
forces and consultants. A second such contribution must surely be 
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the widening of the area of inquiry to include newly-recognized 
issues like access and the regionalizing of government services. The 
much greater readiness by governments and the inquiring bodies 
themselves to invite inputs from academia is another notable feature 
of the 1970s. Also, in the 1970s, there is some evidence that the 
inquiries themselves are beginning to pay attention to the problem 
of implementation. However, it is for other chapters in this volume 
to focus on these recent inquiries. 
The contribution to knowledge 
Almost inevitably, we come in the end to Corbett's lowest-common-
denominator criterion. If nothing else, an inquiry may be worth 
while if it has "improved academic research and teaching in public 
administration"." To be sure, there was not much academic 
commitment in the nineteenth century. Even so, it was in this very 
context that Hearn was stimulated to make his important early 
contribution to the study of government." Moreover, even if the 
academics were few and far between, there was still the possibility 
of attracting the interest of the "thinking public". Judged on this 
score, many of the Australian inquiries have at least been mod-
erately successful. The later nineteenth century habit of cross-
examining numerous witnesses and publishing all the evidence in 
full (partially restored in Coombs) clearly did stimulate contem-
porary public interest, and the thousands of pages of small print 
that resulted provide us today with a fascinating window through 
which the Dickensian operations of the pre-reform civil service can 
be viewed. 
Public service inquiries bring into the open the successes and 
failings, the problems and needs, the ambitions and frustrations of 
the administrative systems with which they are concerned. They 
command newspaper space and—for a time at least—increase 
public awareness and understanding of bureaucratic operations. 
They up-date and enrich the teaching materials we use both in the 
academies and in in-service training programmes. And they attract 
new scholars, who bring new insights and new approaches to the 
field of public administration. 
It is all happening now, as is demonstrated by this volume, by 
the late 1976 Saturday seminar on the Coombs report organized 
by the ACT Regional Group of RIPA, by the November 1975 
conference of all the Australian Regional Groups of RIPA on 
"Administrative Review and Change", by the special panel dis-
cussion on machinery of government issues at the August 1975 
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conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association (an 
almost unheard-of focusing of interest on matters administrative 
by that academic body), and by other such manifestations of 
heightened interest in the way we run our administrative systems. 
But most of it has happened before. 
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K a. I- i iz o o u_ t— 
Inside the Inquiries 
3 The Rise and Fall 
of R.CA.GA 
Bernard Schaffer & Geoffrey Hawker 
At its outset the Coombs commission was regarded as a reforming 
initiative of the Labor government elected in 1972. The new 
government worked the public service hard. New departments and 
new schemes were afoot, as in the arts, education, social benefits 
and urban development; there were uncomfortable experiments with 
commissions attached to departments; there were many other 
inquiries. An apparently deliberate policy used public service 
salaries as a pace-setting factor in the economy as a whole, and 
a restless rate of change brought promotion in certain sections of 
the public service so that middle management was stretched thin. 
Unexpected difficulties of unaccustomed office (none of the ministry 
had previous experience) were attributed, as is not unusual at such 
moments of apparently sudden change, to a lack of policy support 
and response from the bureaucracy for new political masters. Once-
powerful and senior permanent heads especially felt the storms. 
Possibilities and limitations 
The parliamentary Labor party (the caucus) threatened to insist 
on its own inquiries in the public service, in part because the prime 
minister was less inclined than some of his colleagues to see the 
service as conservative, entrenched and necessarily unresponsive to 
the first Labor government for 23 years. That was an immediate 
explanation for the creation of a royal commission as a safe 
alternative, and for its large (five-person) and representative 
membership. 
The legislative position of a commission of inquiry was, however, 
unhelpful. A commission which had to look at Australian adminis-
tration had to adopt positions in relation to the centres of 
bureaucratic power in the existing administrative processes, above 
all the Public Service Board, the Treasury and the department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Under legislation, this commission 
of inquiry was in eff'ect a subordinate of the department of the 
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Special Minister of State, like any other commission of inquiry or 
minor agency. That meant it was not in a strong political position 
since it had a peripheral parent. And it was fully subject to controls 
by just those authorities at the very centre of the agenda of inquiry. 
The irony was complete but unenjoyable. 
As the commission began its work, the gap between this 
background and its very broad and non-specific terms of reference 
left it wandering through relatively uncharted territory with little 
guidance. The one aim adopted from the beginning (June 1974) 
was the aim of reporting relatively fast; in fact the commission 
reported in July 1976. There are two possible strategies for a reform 
commission: to accept from the beginning that an inquiry will be 
a tedious medium-term operation or to try to make a quick prima 
facie report while the commission retains something of its initial 
political support and interest (and hence resources) and the interest 
and enthusiasm of its senior members. That exercise would require 
rewriting the commission's own terms of reference and getting a 
renewed appointment and authority after a relatively short while. 
It could indicate what areas did indeed seem to be worth investigat-
ing with a view to action and change. It would then be up to others 
to say whether the commission should proceed in those directions. 
Most commissions have adopted the first posture. Few have 
adopted the second, RCAGA seemed to have slipped between the two. 
It did not derive from its political setting what few most urgent 
tasks it should concentrate on, though like other commissions it 
was initially, and extremely temporarily, given licence to make such 
selection. Although the writing of an interim report on key issues 
was discussed vigorously at a very early point, no agreement could 
be reached within the commission; the subject was postponed and 
necessarily soon lapsed. 
The commission then had still to confront the problem of time 
and how it could be handled. Administrative research by a 
temporary, ad hoc and outside body working out the operational 
details of any specific administrative change: this was a daunting 
prospect. Irrespective of how to approach questions of adminis-
trative reform, the urgency of choosing what questions should be 
looked at implied criteria about choice. What ran through the whole 
of this experience was the large scale implication of small scale 
actions. For example, the filing system determined the way in which 
the oceans of material came to be used within the commission. 
Moreover, small questions of research and investigation, sometimes 
an individual case, sometimes a technical area (like departmental 
libraries, say, or promotion appeal procedures), had large scale 
implications for ultimate administrative change in the wider service. 
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All the problems of administration, like face-to-face relations 
between institutional insiders and outsiders or the break-up of large 
scale tasks into particular operations and the problems of overall 
control, supervision and a sense of direction and achievement, are 
present in a large-scale administrative reform commission. 
Approach 
The commission gathered its information and formulated its tasks 
and answers through a variety of methods, and largely as it went 
along: most important were formal and informal hearings, the 
operation of more or less expert task forces for particular problems 
and a wide-ranging research programme. In its early months, and 
again near the end, the commission had some closed and informal 
discussions with selected people and groups (such as parlia-
mentarians, senior public servants, "high-flyers", academics and 
businessmen). It advertised for submissions and held extensive 
formal hearings into some of the 700 which were received. It also 
went to great lengths to tour the country and make itself very open 
to those who had not made submissions. This exercise became 
known as "community hearings" and was one of the areas of the 
commission's work where it came to focus particularly on problems 
of access relationships between the citizen and the bureaucracy. 
Half-way through its life the commission established small task 
forces of commissioners, staff members and "outsiders" (including 
some public servants) to investigate questions relating to regional 
administration, economic policy-making, efficiency in government, 
health-welfare administration, science administration and training 
for aboriginal employment in the public service. One of the most 
obvious ways of involving people in the work of an administrative 
reform commission to increase its support and interest and perhaps 
to extend the time within which it is likely to be listened to is to 
issue discussion papers about its course. All but the last of the task 
forces did in fact issue reports as discussion papers, and other 
published papers arose from the research program on sex dis-
crimination in employment, position and other forms of job 
classification and, again, on regional administration and economic 
policy-making. Almost all the working papers of the research group 
were made publicly available. Doubtless the written output of the 
commission helped to stimulate the written response of academics 
and others.^ 
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Difficulties 
The ways in which the task forces should immediately be used was 
a problem. That was partly due to the distribution of topics and 
also because there were different inputs: an attempt to graft 
workable ideas about decentralization to the somewhat oddly named 
set of themes which was currently being conjured up in Australia 
under the heading of regionalism, for example, and that hard 
ground of coordination, expertise and treasury management which 
was to be trodden about economic policy. 
The ambitious research programme of the commission was 
another difficulty. Early documents which said that the commission 
would have a research programme indicated that there had been 
ritualistic rather than pragmatic thinking about research and that 
there had been no sense in which either the terms of reference or 
the political setting had been brought to a focus. Some of the initial 
papers, for instance, listed no less than 21 major areas for research 
topics; these formed no coherent plan or categories in terms of type 
of research. The first effort was to adopt some specific and fresh 
lines. There was in part a pressure to adopt a great range of 
"concerns" which were either topical or being put from particular 
standpoints. "Open government" was an example of this. The 
difficulty was that these approaches did not fit any empirical data, 
analytical method or sense of possible prescription. Certain ranges 
of concern, like science policy, came unexpectedly into the area of 
discussion. It was as difficult for this as for any other such reform 
commission to balance the work between particular sectors (like 
science or health), overall reform in the government machine, and 
fresh approaches to administration as such. In other areas there 
was empirical material such as about the rights of women in the 
public services, or work in progress in various parts of the 
government machine itself such as with alternatives to hierarchy 
in departmental organization. There was a range of concerns with 
community relations, decentralization or "working away from the 
centre", the possibilities of regional organization, delegation and 
discretion, the location of government employment and 
federal/state relations. Aspects of these and other matters could, 
it was argued, be discussed in "access situations" and in terms of 
one particular method of analysis. This could also include problems 
of information for management and a greater emphasis in program 
planning on output and outcome rather than input data. 
In the end the research successes came partly from action 
research. There was the possibility of undertaking experiments in 
government organization, particularly in local office organization. 
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in the relations between the federal, state and local governments, 
and between government and voluntary organizations. In addition 
to concerning itself with hearings, submissions and recommenda-
tions, a commission, while it had opportunity, resource and support 
could actually initiate and propose specific government organiza-
tional experiments. Action research of this sort about access 
situations in government local organization could also be an 
experiment in organization development. The responsibility for the 
details and conduct of the experiment could be left to officers and 
other workers, including voluntary organizations and community 
representative bodies, who would actually be engaged in the 
experiment. In this way experiments were undertaken with or-
ganization development, with ministerial councils (for securing the 
involvement of non-officials in departmental operations) and, most 
important, with a one-stop-shop (the Northwest One-stop Welfare 
Centre, or NOW shop). This established a storefront for government 
services in personal welfare, drawn from the three levels of 
Australian government together with some voluntary agencies: 
studies of customer and official views and of experimental work 
eff"orts were begun. The shop continued to function after the 
commission reported, even though the change of government in 
December 1975 brought other action research to an end and 
precluded the development of other experiments. 
Perhaps the most important lost opportunity concerned a possible 
restructuring of the Treasury during the life of the commission. 
In May 1975 the treasurer asked RCAGA confidentially to suggest 
ways in which that might be done. The commission responded with 
a task force to investigate the question rather than with ^cncrete 
proposals designed quickly to initiate change, and the rapidly 
declining electoral fortunes of the government meant that more 
pressing problems soon ruled out a reassessment of its approach. 
The ultimate recommendations of the commission were therefore 
left to the charge of an inviolate Treasury, not to one undergoing 
modification according to the prescriptions, in part at least, of the 
commission. A sort of action research, admittedly of uncertain and 
even fearful dimensions, was foregone, although the commission 
retained its potency to support experiment in this area until quite 
late. That does not mean that the commission ignored entirely the 
need to approach large-scale problems of organizational change. 
Implementation 
From a relatively early stage the commission and its staff" considered 
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the problem of implementation. The main hope was that one key 
department, like Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM & c), would 
undertake overall responsibility. In particular it was hoped that staff" 
from the department of Prime Minister and Cabinet would be 
detailed to work with the staff of the royal commission well before 
the final version of the major report was written and other 
concluding material prepared. Thus in October 1975 the chairman 
of the commission suggested to the then prime minister that the 
success of the eventual recommendations would depend upon the 
participation of his ministers and senior officials and perhaps others 
who would need to be supported by an appropriate secretariat. 
Agreement in principle was quickly obtained from the prime 
minister and his department head. 
After the change of government, however, a response was delayed 
until March 1976, when a unit was established within PM & c, led 
by a senior public servant (previously unconnected with the 
commission) who reported to the department head. Later, the 
Treasury and Public Service Board each seconded a senior official 
to the unit. Later again, the heads of Treasury, the Public Service 
Board and Administrative Services (formerly Special Minister of 
State) joined the head of PM & c to form a committee to consider, 
for cabinet, the reports of this unit and of their own departments. 
This was a politically influential arrangement, though it consisted 
entirely of officials. 
The appointment by the governor general on 11 November 1975 
of a caretaker government postponed the possibilities of doing 
anything either about administrative reform or about preparations 
for implementation machinery. The constitutional crisis of Novem-
ber and the election of December meant more than a time delay, 
however. The election of December 1975 and the change of 
government brought into power the Fraser ministry. Fraser had 
already been much assisted by Sir Henry Bland, himself a former 
permanent head of vast experience, a chairman of an administrative 
reform inquiry in Victoria, and the author of the (RIPA) Garran 
oration of 1975. He had, then, spoken of an administrative reform 
very different from what the more radical and adventurous elements 
of the RCAGA exercise were tending to follow. 
The Bland committee 
The prime ministerial press release immediately after the election 
on 21 December 1975 said that Bland would now chair the 
"Administrative Review Committee". Its terms of reference were: 
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to review government expenditure, and recommend on ways to eliminate 
waste and duplications within and between government departments and 
between commonwealth and state government departments. 
The committee was to: 
investigate government programs and services and examine ways that 
activities may be curtailed without a significant effect on administration. 
It will advise on activities whose benefits do not appear commensurate 
with their costs, and on changes in arrangements that might be made 
to produce economies. The committee will examine and report on the 
degree of commonwealth government involvement in supervising expen-
diture by the states of funds supplied by the commonwealth and on 
avoiding unnecessary duplication and over-lapping of commonwealth 
and state activities. 
It was widely thought that the Bland committee would make it 
possible, politically speaking, for quick action to appear to be taken, 
whilst more thoughtful, long-term or fundamental changes or a 
more general discussion of machinery of government changes would 
be left to RCAGA. 
But that of course was not really the end of the matter, nor a 
satisfactory arrangement. The membership of the Bland committee 
and much of the terminology employed was significant. Apart from 
one of the public service board commissioners, the other members 
included a member of the New South Wales public service board 
and a businessman. The member from the NSW board underlined 
the commitment of the committee in its terms of reference to look 
at "commonwealth/state duplication", that is, to carry out the 
Fraser commitment to reverse the centralization of the Whitlam 
Labor government. The terminology echoed cost-benefit analysis. 
It did, interestingly, maintain a commitment to concern about "the 
efficient delivery of social services". 
It was not then so surprising, though in other ways striking, that 
of all the RCAGA eff'orts the One-Stop Shop experiment was 
maintained and, in the end, further evaluation under the department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet was continued. But this was at a 
time when RCAGA might, according to its original objectives, have 
expected its report to have been completed. It might at least have 
expected its implementation plans to get under way. Alternatively, 
more hostile observers might have expected RCAGA to report but be 
ignored by those at the centre of the political stage. Yet the 
concentration of the new government on questions of administrative 
change brought RCAGA willy-nilly into the limelight. But that was 
not at all the same as giving it an heroic or decisive role. 
Bland mattered to Fraser, but it was not possible for a govern-
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ment so committed to apparent tidiness to ignore the existence of 
RCAGA. The very first statements emanating from the new govern-
ment talked about administrative change, not merely the appoint-
ment of Bland and his committee but also the reduction of the 
number of ministers from 27 to 24 and of departments from 28 
to 25, the creation of an inner cabinet of twelve and so on. The 
signs of the reforms to be introduced were intentionally meant to 
sound a return to previous ways. But it was these early statements 
also which reminded people of RCAGA, then "expected to submit its 
report by April 1976". That did not make life easy for RCAGA. Those 
on the commission who had argued for the political importance of 
saying something on federal-state relations were supported by the 
early statements from Fraser about administration and change. The 
bureau-shuffling which the new government indulged in also frus-
trated some of the work which RCAGA might have expected either 
to recommend or criticize. Significant things RCAGA wished to say 
on the structure of PM & c, on bureau-shuffling, on cabinet control 
and methods of coordination, were all being anticipated. At the 
same time, the creation of the Bland committee was far from 
winning universal support in the public service; at the very least, 
his operations threatened to render pointless the effort which 
departments had invested in the RCAGA commission. 
Outcomes 
The Bland committee did not represent the sort of research exercise 
RCAGA did. Bland sent out a questionnaire to heads of all depart-
ments but, were it taken seriously, the questionnaire would have 
taken a long time to answer and deal with. The committee either 
did not mean it seriously or did not understand research. Bland's 
views as well as Fraser's on the machinery of government were 
already known: his support for some bureau-shuffling exercises and 
for certain forms of restraint, such as the renewed imposition of 
staff ceilings, had an immediate impact. Beyond that, the picture 
was less clear. Drawing upon small and shifting groups of ex-
perienced public servants to comment on the operations of depart-
ments other than their own, by mid-1976, when RCAGA reported. 
Bland had already made a dozen or so short reports to the 
government. But none of them were made public and the govern-
ment steadfastly refused to say which, if any, recommendations it 
had accepted. Certainly administrative reorganization continued 
apace into late 1976, although without fanfare. Department heads 
were moved around and the reshuffling of departmental structures 
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created new departments and abolished old ones. Inquiries into some 
government activities were established, some being carried out by 
public servants (broadcasting, employment service) and some by 
businessmen (CSIRO, statutory transport authorities). The view 
among Canberra public servants, however, was that most of this 
activity owed little directly to Bland as his work was quickly wound 
down, probably unfinished, when he himself became part of the 
process of change by accepting appointment as chairman of the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission. Some recommendations 
which did become public knowledge through "leaks"—to cut 
drastically the resources of the Industries Assistance Commission, 
for example—were definitely not taken up. Others seem to have 
been of an "organization and methods" nature and were quickly 
absorbed into the ongoing review activity of departments. Bland 
petered out. 
The outcomes of RCAGA were not much clearer. Some recommen-
dations were put quickly into eff"ect by individual departments (for 
example, reviews of counter procedures) and preliminary work was 
done on others so that only decision was needed to carry them out 
quickly (certain revisions of the Public Service Act, including the 
nationality provisions). The leader of the opposition made a strong 
public speech in October 1976 endorsing the approach of the 
commission in general and some key recommendations (for exam-
ple, about forward estimates) in particular. By then responses, 
favourable in the main, had come from the main unions in the public 
sector too. The government's responses, expressed chiefly in a 
parliamentary statement by the prime minister in December 1976, 
were generally favourable but many issues raised by the report were 
not addressed. The implementation machinery planned so long 
before was beginning to work but it was fully in the hands of the 
long-existing central agencies of the public service as was the 
further consideration of the commission's objectives. These agencies 
had been little affected by Bland, and their attitude to RCAGA, while 
not hostile, seemed unlikely to bring rapid change. 
For a reform commission, the first requirement is to understand 
something of the strategy of the administrative reform process. 
What is involved is an ad hoc inquiry as against continuing 
departmental responsibility. That involves a decision about what the 
balance is to be between ignoring altogether or succumbing entirely 
to such political occasion as gave the inquiry its birth and the fresh 
atmosphere which is likely to enshrine its passing. Administrative 
reform is, in the end, a political process. It is about the rearrange-
ment of deep commitments to significant institutional positions. Any 
specific inquiry into administrative reform is supposed to illumine 
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how such arrangements can be discussed so as to make them the 
more likely to emerge. 
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Since this is an inside view, it deals with some incidents not apparent 
at the time to outside observers and with others which it is hard 
for anyone to recall. This must be so: anyone involved in the 
complex life of an organization sees many particular events, often 
trivial or incomprehensible, which are filtered from the view of the 
outsider who has a greater distance and a lesser commitment. At 
the same time, the insider is not well placed to trace the connections 
between the specific event and the general outcome, such as the 
impact of particular information on the inadequate perception of 
an important issue. He or she sees too much. But the participant 
observer is uniquely placed to gather the information which makes 
it possible for others to connect personality, social background and 
institutional procedures, say, with the world of ideas and writing. 
If this account appears to reveal too much of the irreconcilable 
and irresolute aspects of organizational life, it should be remem-
bered that the commission did produce, more or less on time, a 
report which the media, the interim judges, thought was successful. 
This does not purport to be the whole story. 
In order to look inside RCAGA I first want to look outside it at 
those elements in its environment to which the commission re-
sponded and which thereby helped to decide the nature of its 
internal operations. Throughout its life RCAGA was engaged in a 
series of transactions or exchanges with a variety of institutions 
and individuals. The commission was neither an isolated nor an 
entirely autonomous organization and it is important to understand 
the more salient of its external relationships and dependencies. 
Creation 
The first set of external influences on RCAGA were those that led 
to its creation, and naturally the commission had little control over 
them. The choice of the royal commission form as the instrument 
of inquiry was itself important. It meant that no special weight 
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was to be given to the concerns of any one of the bodies which 
had established the inquiry, including caucus, the prime minister, 
his private office, the Priorities Review Stafl", the Public Service 
Board (PSB) and the unions. The decision to use the royal com-
mission form was a compromise. Alternative forms included, for 
example, a parliamentary inquiry (which would have suited caucus) 
ar series of task forces operating within the public service itself 
to investigate particular questions (which would have suited the 
PSB). The prestige and wide ranging powers of the chosen instrument 
allowed the inquiry itself to define what its concerns should be. Its 
broad terms of reference underlined the point. Little was ruled out 
of consideration but, equally, little was placed specifically on the 
agenda. 
The membership of RCAGA further reinforced this openness. Some 
commissioners were known to have a special interest in some of 
the terms of reference (one commissioner in those dealing with 
personnel problems, for example) and some were on record with 
opinions about questions which might be encompassed by the terms 
of reference (one commissioner on the iniquity of staff ceilings and 
another on the undesirability of the lateral recruitment of per-
manent heads, for example). But in general the members seemed 
likely to approach their tasks with few preconceived views. They 
could be expected, in other words, to use their terms of reference 
and status as royal commissioners to undertake a very broad 
investigation of the public service. There was no certainty at the 
beginning about where their inquiry would go and what it would 
conclude. 
Interaction 
Ambiguity gave the commission its first task. It had to define 
problems, set them in some order of priority, and draw up an agenda 
of work. To do this RCAGA relied in part upon its own capacities, 
principally the knowledge of commissioners and staff. But it also 
searched for clues from its environment to guide action and even 
its strategy. Likewise there were those within its environment who 
sought to influence RCAGA to go in some directions rather than 
others. 
The commission needed advice, information, and assistance 
across a broad range of developing tasks. What it offered in return 
was a report which would address those tasks, presumably to the 
varying benefit of the institutions and individuals in its environment. 
Some institutions and individuals had a positive interest in getting 
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things into the report, such as a justification of their activities or 
a redress of grievances, and for some this involved RCAGA in a process 
of arbitration. Some simply wanted RCAGA not to overlook a 
restatement of their existing situation. Some were forced into 
defensive action by the activities of other actors or by the growing 
inquisitiveness of the commission itself. The exchanges between 
RCAGA and its environment therefore served various purposes and 
took various forms: formal and informal, involving the whole 
commission as a body and sometimes merely members of it, brief 
and prolonged, cooperative and antagonistic, and so on. 
One set of exchanges was between RCAGA and those individuals 
within the public service who made submissions to it, often about 
alleged injustices in the application of personnel policies. As many 
as one third of the submissions made to the commission were in 
this category. Another set of exchanges was between RCAGA and 
members of the community who had complaints to make about the 
operations of government and of public service departments in 
particular. An important characteristic of the commission's ex-
changes was that its needs were always immediate, whilst the 
reciprocating outcomes it offered might be at some rather distant 
point in the future. This applied to the submissions from individual 
public servants and from the community. 
The commission needed those submissions and the hearings which 
arose from some of them to inform itself about where the shoe was 
pinching and about the likely reception for any recommendations 
it might make. But it could not respond quickly to individual 
submissions both because it lacked the resources to do so and 
because it had to agree upon some general formula against which 
to judge them. That last capacity took time to develop. I am 
suggesting that the community, welfare and special interest groups 
and the individual public servants who had made submissions or 
other inputs to RCAGA could do little more than to await its outcome 
with varying degrees of interest. Groups in the women's movement 
were very interested and RCAGA made a partial response to them 
by issuing a discussion paper on sexism in public employment. Other 
planned and actual discussion papers, on position classification, for 
example, were intended to show that the concerns of bodies such 
as the unions were not being ignored. The public availability of 
the research and consultancy reports of RCAGA served something of 
the same purpose, as did the hiring of consultants who had 
previously been associated with submissions. 
Not everyone found these responses satisfactory. The public 
service unions, for example, wanted reassurances which the 
difficulty of arranging day to day exchanges with RCAGA made hard 
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to secure. Advisory committees of trade unionists were accordingly 
established in Sydney and Melbourne, as were similar committees 
of businessmen. Both groups were sent draft material for comment. 
The Council of Australian Government Employee Organisations, 
then known by the acronym ccpso, was also successful in inviting 
the chairman of the commission to address its members while RCAGA 
was in mid flight, though he otherwise tried to avoid going on record 
in this way. The "trade union commissioner" maintained informal 
contact with union officials and let it be known that he pursued 
a vigorous analysis of individual grievance submissions. No doubt 
RCAGA would have responded to similar demands from the business 
community but they never arose, which was always a matter of 
concern. The advisory groups of businessmen were a very inade-
quate answer. 
Some elements of the commission's environment had a greater 
potency to elicit responses from it. Because they controlled resources 
of use to RCAGA and especially because their resources, like informa-
tion, could not be consumed in a once-and-for-all-fashion, RCAGA 
found them of greater salience throughout its life. Two examples 
were politicans and the senior management of departments repre-
senting long-enduring departmental views. It is upon these two 
groups that I will concentrate. Each had the potential to engage 
the commission in prolonged exchanges and they thus had many 
opportunities—some slight, some strategic—to influence its opera-
tions and outcomes. 
Politicians 
In practice the politicians did not exercise their potential much. 
The commission was glad to reinforce this tendency, which was 
significant for the way it worked. The fact that ministers had 
established a non-political inquiry did not of course prevent them 
from seeking the help of RCAGA when that seemed advantageous to 
them. Sometimes this meant that a minister referred a question 
he found difficult to deal with. Prime minister Whitlam, for 
example, in an additional term of reference, requested it to examine 
the relationship between ministers and permanent heads after the 
earlier incidents of the loans affair had called their legal positions 
into doubt. Prime minister Fraser similarly asked it to report on 
the ethical question of public servants owning stocks, shares and 
other property. The commission accepted these new tasks reluctant-
ly, since its agenda of work seemed always never-ending, but with 
the recognition that this sort of exchange was unavoidably imposed 
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upon it. At Other times ministers less formally asked the commission 
for quick advice about pressing political problems, especially those 
involving machinery of government changes. In these cases RCAGA 
temporized. In late 1974, for instance, the prime minister sought 
its views about possible rearrangements to his own department. 
After the Terrigal conference of the Labor party, the treasurer 
asked RCAGA to advise him confidentially on rearrangements to the 
Treasury. Later the minister for repatriation and compensation 
similarly requested advice on the restructuring of departments 
concerned with health and social welfare. In the first case RCAGA 
appreciated keenly that it would have to rely upon the new secretary 
of the department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM & c) for 
support in implementing its ultimate proposals and it did not wish 
to antagonize him at the outset of his term of office by being seen 
to interfere in the business of his department. More generally and 
in all cases, RCAGA wanted to avoid involvement in suddenly-arising 
political issues: because they were always urgent they would 
demand a rapid and large diversion of the commission's scant 
resources of time, thought, money and staff; involvement in any 
such issue might encourage the reference to it of others; and the 
giving of bad or unwelcome advice might prejudice the future of 
its final recommendations. The commission responded to these 
requests by establishing task forces to examine the issues, but the 
task forces naturally took time to work with the result that political 
interest was dissipated, and with it any later possible increase in 
ministerial interest (or antipathy). 
Yet RCAGA could not avoid entirely the politicans in its environ-
ment. At times it needed their active support, as when it successfully 
requested prime minister Whitlam to instruct all departments that 
individual public servants should be enabled to give evidence to it 
without fear of retribution. At other times it wished simply to 
interest politicans in its emerging concerns since it knew that its 
report would ultimately be turned over to them and be dependent 
on their understanding and goodwill. The commission found this 
hard to do. At a very early stage informal meetings were planned 
with groups of politicians from government and opposition with and 
without ministerial experience to explore questions which concerned 
them and which might concern RCAGA. These meetings were difficult 
to arrange because of political apathy and few were held. The 
reluctance of Liberal-Country party politicans to involve themselves 
with the commission was especially worrying. The commission 
understood that its findings might be put into the hands of a Liberal-
Country party ministry one day and it never planned to make 
recommendations acceptable to Labor ministers alone. Only the 
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National Country party, the ACT branch of the Liberal party and 
a few individual former ministers made submissions to RCAGA, 
however, and the then leader of the opposition declared RCAGA to 
be "at least apparently a political body".' An informal meeting to 
reassure Mr Snedden was achieved but contact with his side of 
politics otherwise remained exiguous. The position was little better 
with Labor. What contact existed was maintained at an informal 
individual level between a few ministers and rather more of their 
personal staffs and particular commissioners and staff" members. 
The events of 11 November 1975 and the subsequent election 
convinced RCAGA that it had been right to avoid political stands but 
at the same time those events made its relationships with the 
incoming government even more uncertain. Its response after the 
election was to provide the new prime minister with short statements 
of its likely recommendations on key issues, to seek meetings 
between the prime minister and the chairman of the commission 
and to formalize the arrangements for implementation which had 
been outlined in early November. Meetings did take place and 
implementation did go ahead but at all times in an atmosphere of 
great uncertainty. 
Bureaucrats 
What of the departments? Here the position was more difficult for 
RCAGA and much more confused. All but one department made 
lengthy submissions to the commission and all appeared in hearings 
before it but their actions were broadly defensive of their existing 
positions. Departments were drawn only reluctantly into exchanges. 
The position of most was that its report was unlikely to be very 
helpful to them. From their point of view, the best thing would 
be for RCAGA to ignore them altogether. They therefore sought to 
contain their involvement with it. At an early stage, for example, 
the department of Social Security saw advantage in associating 
itself with RCAGA in a review of the efficiency of one of its offices. 
It confidently expected any such review to justify its procedures. 
But when it became apparent that RCAGA viewed efficiency in much 
wider terms than the department, to include a questioning of the 
whole definition of efficiency itself, the department saw less 
advantage in the collaboration, which did not go ahead. 
At times also the initiatives of the commission brought forth an 
acutely defensive response. The department of Defence and the 
department of Science thus responded energetically, with informa-
tion and mis-information, to the commission's investigation of the 
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career structures of professional scientists. Its investigation of 
health-welfare structures also involved a number of departments in 
a fresh round of submissions and in a sudden willingness to provide 
their own officials to staff the inquiry. 
Other departments came themselves to perceive advantages in 
being involved with RCAGA. The department of Foreign Affairs and 
the department of the Media both used it as a vehicle to publicize 
their claims for a greater coordinating role in policy and admin-
istration. The department of Aboriginal Affairs was able to use 
RCAGA in management reviews which it could not plausibly have 
undertaken alone. 
But only the Public Service Board and the Treasury were involved 
constantly and more or less intimately with the workings of the 
commission. As central coordinating agencies both soon came under 
special scrutiny by RCAGA and they could not altogether avoid 
assertion, defence and response. The relationships that each had 
with RCAGA were nevertheless quite different. The Public Service 
Board put a good proportion of its resources into dealing with the 
commission. It attended all hearings, prepared many position papers 
on a range of issues, was involved with detailed inquiries for 
information throughout, provided some of RCAGAS staff and engaged 
in more than one acerbic exchange about the unfolding development 
of the commission. Treasury on the other hand was reluctant to 
take initiatives and, though frequently in contact with it, was 
unwilling to go beyond its formal responsibilities to answer requests 
and comment on the proposals of others outside RCAGA which were 
referred to it. 
Both departments, however, sought to influence the agenda by 
the timing of their inputs to it and RCAGA was heavily dependent 
on both for the validation of many of its insights and proposals. 
It sometimes worried that these would be the most powerful 
bureaucratic actors in any implementation of its report. Accordingly 
it was reluctant to disclose its findings about these agencies until 
the last possible moment when it had got all the help from them 
it could. Indeed, RCAGA was reluctant to come to any findings even 
internally until it had no other course to follow. Issues concerning 
the PSB and Treasury were thus among the last to be settled. 
Departments could not do much in any public way to force RCAGA 
to alter its cautious strategy, even if they had wanted to. The 
commission asked the questions during its public hearings and, 
though some attempts were made to probe its thought during them, 
departmental representatives usually had to give answers. The 
commission made the news and it was well reported in the media 
as a definer of the ills of the public service. 
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Leaks from the commission which occurred both before and 
during the drafting of the report were another matter. The PSB 
especially was antagonized by stories, often misshapen, which 
seemed to indicate that RCAGA was taking up a number of positions 
in opposition to it. Other departments to suffer were the Treasury 
(on the commission's proposals about economic policy) and Urban 
and Regional Development (on growth centres and location policy). 
On the other hand, departmental representatives were able on 
less formal occasions, as when research staff sought their informa-
tion and advice, to seek assurances that its intentions towards their 
department were not unfriendly. The constant protestation of 
disinterest was a characteristic of working relationships on the 
commission's side. In addition departments could make their views 
on any issues before RCAGA known informally to the press. The PSB 
was fairly adept at this though other departments were less 
successful. The department of Science's forcibly argued threat to 
fight publicly the recommendations of the science task force, for 
example, did not materialize. However, as I have suggested, 
departments in general wanted RCAGA to proceed as quietly as 
possible since there seemed only slight profit for them in opening 
up even further the inquiry. 
Priorities 
Some observers thought that the commission's relationship with 
politicians and departments savoured of uncertainty and pro-
crastination. Within RCAGA, it rather seemed that time was needed 
to develop a strategy to tackle the issues in the right order. Even 
to determine what those issues were appeared as a large task. The 
commission attempted at first to list all those problems associated 
with the structure and operations of the public service which seemed 
to fall within its terms of reference. The attempt produced a very 
broad-ranging paper, which was widely distributed, and an equally 
broad-ranging listing of possible research topics. Both papers 
reassured those within and without RCAGA who wanted an open-
minded and comprehensive inquiry, but it found that even the 
broadest paper could not be conclusive. There were always new 
questions cropping up. Moreover, the statement of themes or 
problems and the statement of research topics were difficult to 
marry. Although staff" members and commissioners as much as 
outsiders desired to have a clear and final statement of avenues 
of investigation as a framework to work within, such a statement 
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was not produced. A conclusive listing of subjects by their priority 
therefore could not be achieved. 
Instead RCAGA commenced work on those few issues which it could 
agree were of high importance in any analysis whilst it investigated 
ways of defining others concurrently. Some issues which were 
regarded as important at the outset, like the use of unattachment 
and staff ceilings, became secondary as new concerns emerged. 
Others, like the role of PM&C and the tied funding of programmes 
to the state governments, were recognized as important but deferred 
for active consideration until they could be better defined. Still 
others, like work on minority employment, the status of statutory 
corporations and the operations of interdepartmental committees, 
remained important throughout. To enable it to discriminate 
between these and other issues RCAGA entered into a lengthy and 
even exhausting round of public hearings which lasted from 
November 1974 until April 1975. 
Hearings gave RCAGA a public presence and a certain legitimacy 
also. This was just as well, for it is not clear that hearings did 
in fact help the commission to define its agenda very much. Less 
formal hearings were also arranged with those knowledgeable about 
the service, including its critics. These meetings were also of limited 
help. True, some concerns came out very strongly from both sorts 
of hearings. The case against the stringent controls exercised by 
the coordinating agencies was argued vigorously back and forth. 
The discontent of individuals within the community at the un-
responsiveness of government to their needs was made plain. 
Widespread doubts about the efficiency of the service emerged. 
To some extent hearings were a method of defining the agenda 
of RCAGA, if only in response to the healthy discipline occasioned 
by a preparation of questions for them. The difficulty was that they 
took up much time and energy and RCAGA could not wait very long 
for the results of that expenditure of effort. Its other work and 
especially its research work had to be commenced as soon as 
possible to use painfully gathered staff resources and to provide any 
grounds for hope that research would deliver eventually whatever 
findings it was supposed to. (But the reader must make allowance 
here for my relative insensitivity, as research director, to the 
hearings; my involvement was simply less.) 
Research 
In order to commence research projects, or more generally to spend 
time in discussing issues with institutions or individuals concerned. 
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it became necessary to satisfy two conditions. First, the proposed 
subject of investigation should be able to be related in general terms 
to the range of concerns RCAGA had begun with. Second, some 
candidate whether staff or consultant should be definitely proposed 
to engage in the work. 
These conditions were not always as easy to meet as it might 
be thought. Some suggested projects came too early, while RCAGA 
was still reffecting on the possible range of its concerns, and were 
ruled out though they might later have been acceptable. More 
frequently, candidates to undertake work simply could not be found. 
Yet new issues and candidates soon replaced them in the competi-
tion for resources. To allow the definition of issues in this way meant 
that many individuals within RCAGA had some degree of capacity 
to set the agenda, even to the point where one person's possession 
of particular skills or interests could push one project rather than 
another forward. Projects could thus originate from the forcefully 
argued idea of one or a few individuals. The complex and costly 
investigation of statutory corporations, of a range of personnel 
practices, of access to government services and of the career 
patterns of public servants emerged in this way. The ultimate 
success of a project in meeting both methodological requirements 
and the emerging emphases of the commission's interests bore no 
obvious relation to the manner of its initiation. 
Efforts were of course made to restrict the scope of initiative, 
for example by limiting commissioners to particular terms of 
reference and associated research projects; but these were not very 
successful. In its early days and indeed for a long time afterwards 
the whole of the terms of reference were of concern to the whole 
commission. There were nevertheless restraints: projects involving 
the expenditure of funds required a consensus by the commission; 
the submissions and hearings did continually, if gradually, feed back 
into the process of problem definition; and every deployment of 
resources left less for the next proposal and decreased the likelihood 
of its careful scrutiny. In addition, the political and departmental 
relationships referred to above ensured that some questions would 
not be broached, for example those to do with large scale machinery 
of government changes, whilst those which elicited cooperation with 
the departments would be, for example promotion appeals, re-
cruitment and mobility. 
Certainly the approach of RCAGA did generate an agenda of 
problems. By the time the hearings ended investigations were under 
way into almost thirty different projects. In addition to those 
already mentioned, studies were being undertaken of programme 
budgeting, manpower planning, training procedures, the different 
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Styles of public and private sector employment, the workload of 
ministers, the place of non-statutory bureaus within departments, 
a possible basis for freedom of information legislation, the rela-
tionship between public service, press and parliament, the 
effectiveness of cabinet structures and procedures and the 
deficiencies of the Royal Commissions Act. The commission, in 
short, was in full sail. It had reached its period of greatest creative 
activity. So, far from there being a disposition to define an agenda 
in definitive terms and to attempt to meet it, there was rather a 
growing concern to bring together the various projects into the best 
possible synthesis. Deficiencies would doubtless be revealed and 
supplementation called for but there was no longer a question of 
determining what RCAGA was about. To make that synthesis and 
agree on what deficiencies would need to be remedied became the 
next difficult task. 
Yet new work did not stop altogether. On the contrary, a 
perception of evaporating time and money caused a few last projects 
to be pushed desperately forward. The NOW centre was thus opened 
in July after two months' intensive effort, the haste of which had 
its effect on the centre itself and accordingly on the commission's 
and the public service's judgment of it.^  That way of setting up 
the centre was adopted because there appeared to be no better way. 
However imperfect the approach, it was not without effect on RCAGA. 
It was noticeable that it won immediate and widespread political 
support. 
The experience with the centre also showed that action research 
could be a desirable strategy for the commission to pursue. Rather 
than simply investigating and evaluating the condition of the 
bureaucracy, RCAGA found that it could change some of its opera-
tions and judge the results. 
This method seemed to open up possibilities for change which 
would convince practitioners as well as illuminate the thought of 
the commission. In the latter half of 1975 experimental research 
was thus begun on organization development, on the creation of 
ministerial councils to advise ministers on the management of 
departments through the participation of non-public servants, and 
on training schemes to fit aboriginals for public service employment. 
The change of government brought these experiments to an end 
because changes were made to the top structures of the departments 
concerned or because departments were forced by financial restric-
tions to reduce their activities. The experiments of RCAGA did not 
command a high priority then. This change did not efTect the 
drafting of the report very much since the commission was disposed 
to see the experiments as valuable in their own right. Any 
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conclusions from the work would be by way of windfall gains. It 
was expected that the experiments would run beyond the life of 
RCAGA in any event, and conclusions from them would be at best 
tentative. 
The fact that most of the action research was wound up was 
not crucial, but the experiments did involve some diversion of staff 
resources. As a consequence, other more orthodox projects were 
dropped, including for instance survey work on community expecta-
tions of government, on discrimination in government employment, 
on capital works expenditure procedures and on some futurology 
studies. These were seen to lie outside the established boundaries 
of the commission's inquiry, even though it was hard to make 
explicit and divisible what those boundaries enclosed. 
Problems 
I want to pause here to reffect about the process of problem-
definition just described. Ideas for work had to be argued forcefully 
within a particular problem-solving context. It was always desirable 
that research projects should be capable of generating precise 
proposals which could issue in recommendations for specific 
changes. It was not much good making proposals which would take 
a long time to carry out. It was better to do a limited job than 
none at all. It was always necessary to be busy. These are the 
imperatives of any analysis of policy in an organization with a short 
life and too much to do. Of course the imperatives were not always 
met; after all, they took time to learn. No one on RCAGA had previous 
experience with a reform inquiry of its scope, and indeed probably 
only the two Vernon inquiries had been comparable in the previous 
20 years. But on the whole the story of the commission is the typical 
one of resources, skills and methodologies finding limited tasks 
sufficient to maintain high levels of productivity and approximate 
answers. It could all have been done better but it could not have 
been done very differently.^ 
This does not mean that alternative approaches are impossible 
to envisage—if some assumptions about the scope of the inquiry 
had been different. If RCAGA had been willing to be responsive to 
ministerial requests for advice on machinery of government changes, 
for example, it is possible to imagine that the "action research" 
approach I have just described would have been much more 
important at a much earlier stage of the commission's life." 
Involvement with politically sensitive questions could have made 
RCAGA a participant with a stake in the outcomes of administrative 
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change; and it becomes possible then to imagine how a sequence 
of involvements (PM & c. Treasury, Health-Welfare at least) might 
have given greater urgency to experiments with organization 
development, say, in those and other departments. My feeling, it 
can be no more, is that such an approach would have had an ironical 
effect of preventing the NOW experiment from beginning. Resources 
are as finite for action research as for any other kind. 
Perhaps one point, more provocative, can be added. Because 
RCAGA developed its ideas on the run, its focus of attention shifted 
constantly and by no means did every question engage the attention 
of all commissioners equally. This placed staff members in a difficult 
position, though admittedly they themselves helped to create the 
difficulties, but consultants were especially affected. They were in 
only intermittent touch with RCAGA and they could not hope to be 
up to date at all times with its expectations. Some found the 
commission's invention of new questions awkward; probably others 
were even more disconcerted by its eventual indifference to a report 
it had once awaited eagerly. Most consultants preferred terms of 
reference which permitted them to work at their own pace, away 
as much as possible from the commission. The sudden enthusiasms 
and equally sudden confusions of RCAGA were not attractive charac-
teristics and threatened projects with delay, even if not with radical 
revision. Consultants therefore tended to escape some of the 
frustrations experienced within RCAGA, probably to the benefit of 
getting their reports done but to its overall disservice. 
Some conscious attempts to change the trend were made, but 
not with notable success. Most consultants did not want to make 
the pithy recommendations which RCAGA desired. Seminars were 
arranged between commissioners, staff, consultants and sometimes 
others, usually at short notice, to discuss issues of growing 
importance. One or two were very useful. However, some consul-
tants, like one management consultancy firm, were simply ill-
prepared to go even speculatively beyond what they had committed 
to paper. Others might have done so but saw their obligations to 
the commission as discharged when their reports had been pres-
ented. Some of them, and more besides, were aware like everyone 
else that RCAGA was a passing phenomenon. They wrote for ultimate 
academic publication, as some staff members also did. 
No doubt more could have been done to integrate consultants 
with the work of the commission: different terms of reference 
emphasizing preliminary examination, different methods of receiv-
ing reports, different ways of paying people, and diflferent and more 
ffexible employment powers are some of the procedures involved. 
But they would not be enough. Underdeveloped as the study of 
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public policy in Australia is, it is particularly underdeveloped 
towards the practical or reformist end. There was almost no habit 
of prescriptive policy analysis in the tertiary departments from 
which consultants came (for most of them were academics). Action 
research, to persist with that theme, was not of much interest to 
most consultants. It was foreign to their experience. If it was 
possible to maintain traditional methods of academic research in 
the face of a broadranging inquiry which called for new methods 
(perceived largely in retrospect, admittedly), new skills of policy 
analysis will surely be difficult to develop. With some future inquiry 
things may be different and better, but only if some of the questions 
raised here are answered first. When an inquiry makes up its mind 
about what it is doing as it goes along—a characteristic of almost 
all research activity—there is a need to have everyone who works 
for the inquiry responsive to its changing requirements. To achieve 
that is partly a matter of procedures, as I have just suggested, but 
it is a matter for the would-be consultants of the future to think 
about also, RCAGA showed how difficult it is in Australia to use 
consultants effectively: it revealed the problems, not the solutions. 
Specialization 
It was, however, clear at an early stage that RCAGA could not wait 
until everything to be done by staff and consultants was complete 
—that would have been a perilous course, given reasonable suspi-
cions that some projects would never be finished. How to get from 
a position of commissioning work and reviewing it to a position 
of criticizing draft chapters was the problem. I have already 
mentioned that task forces were established partly as a response 
to ministerial requests for advice but there was another reason too: 
they seemed to promise quick conclusions in some especially salient 
areas. Task forces were set up into regionalism, economic policy, 
science administration, health and welfare structures and the 
efficiency of the service generally. Task forces had been suggested 
by the PSB in its first definition of what the inquiry should be about 
at the beginning of 1974. As established by RCAGA, the task forces 
drew as best they could upon existing commissioner and staff 
knowledge and work, found their own sources of advice in addition, 
and defined for the potential report a number of quite specific 
subjects. 
But I should not make this seem a more orderly process than 
it was. The idea of having task forces came first, not any 
preoccupation with particular prob'sms for which quick results were 
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especially needed. With the exception of the regionalism task force 
which was established before the others, task forces were a method 
at hand which sought problems to solve, rather than the other way 
round. It was in fact difficult to decide what questions the task 
forces should look at: what was salient? Establishing the task forces 
became a matter of defining the subjects upon which RCAGA had 
done enough preliminary work to make detailed investigation 
plausibly likely to generate new findings; of determining what 
people were available to be members of the task forces; and, 
importantly, of deciding what questions could be regarded as 
significant enough to warrant fresh work being given to com-
missioners. The task force method did succeed in the sense that 
the forces worked quickly and the reports of them all were 
completed by October 1975 and subsequently published as dis-
cussion papers. What delay took place was again occasioned by the 
need to negotiate the provision of information and advice with 
departments on a time scale acceptable to them as well as to the 
commission. 
Even so, the task forces reported a little late for the purposes 
of drafting the report, which process began at the beginning of 
September. With the completion date being set at the end of 1975 
or early 1976 drafting could be delayed no longer. Drafting 
therefore began with the findings of the task forces, like the findings 
of much of the research programme, still uncertain. 
There was however another problem with the task forces. Each 
was headed by a commissioner, sometimes actively, sometimes not. 
Each commissioner thereby developed a special interest in and depth 
of knowledge of one part of the commission's work. Was this 
specialization to be carried through into the drafting of the report 
itself? Should commissioners draft a part of the report based upon 
the findings of their task force? It was decided not to do that. The 
total ambit of the task forces did not cover the spread of the 
commission's inquiry as a whole; individual commissioners had 
continued to take an interest in inquiries outside the boundaries 
of their task force; most wanted a wider stake in the final report; 
and specialization might force RCAGA to endorse a particular set of 
findings about which one or more commissioners were not en-
thusiastic. 
Instead, the report was divided along different lines with com-
missioners taking responsibility for chapters of roughly equal 
importance and size. Some undertook the drafting themselves while 
others used staff members to draw sections together upon which 
they then worked. The result was not to divorce commissioners from 
involvement with the findings of their task forces but rather to 
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reinforce their tendency to be involved in drafting across the whole 
front of the report. Alternative versions of chapters did arise and 
were circulated for comment, criticism and amendment by all. The 
difficulty with this method was that the drafting of different sections 
of the report proceeded at varying paces. Some chapters reached 
a final stage quite early but others were not sighted until late. 
Adherence to the optimistic timetable of the commission only 
accentuated this tendency. One commissioner had been part-time 
from the beginning and another became so at the start of 1976 
when it had been expected that the report would be finished. In 
fact it took another six months to complete. 
Writing 
The final period was the most difficult of all. The bringing together 
of overlapping, scanty, inconsistent and under-and-over-written 
material into one "received version" which was subject to extensive 
further revision, and the choosing of supplementary material to 
support the draft, was a slow and painful process which involved 
everyone within RCAGA to some degree. Whatever the detail, the 
process is in broad outline a familiar one, especially to an academic 
audience. 
Only two points need emphasis. First, the passage of time was 
especially important. The commission knew it had a finite life and 
people grew bored and tired and wanted to be finished with the 
job. But the change of government in late 1975 introduced a new 
uncertainty into its environment. The whole of the report had to 
be reviewed to see that the early aim of political neutrality had 
in fact been achieved. This was an unconscious as much as a 
conscious process, as I have argued elsewhere.^ Undoubtedly the 
appointment of Sir Henry Bland to head the Administrative Review 
Committee also diverted and delayed the commission.' 
Procedures 
Description cannot be left at that, however. The second point about 
the writing process which needs emphasis is that RCAGA was not 
a unitary body. I have maintained this convenient fiction more or 
less throughout, with no more than a few suggestions to the 
contrary. But of course it was never true that all commissioners 
(or staff members for that matter) made equivalent contributions 
to the written report, just as their contributions to the earlier work 
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had varied from case to case. This is almost self-evident, but in 
a situation of group interaction it is difficult to trace the precise 
nature of the connections between an individual and a written 
outcome. Yet there is cause to attempt to do this. Studies of 
institutional membership often assume a connection between the 
characteristics of individuals (their social class or socialization 
experiences, for example) and a pattern of institutional activity. 
Mediating behaviour in the particular case is hard to document; 
I would prefer to make my attempt in an anecdotal way. For the 
present it is still useful to see that not all aspects of the commission's 
work were available to be divided up: some questions were not on 
the writing agenda and so lay beyond the reach of any particular 
person (or, if preferred, any particular set of interests). 
An example was the access research programme. The full 
commission was won over to the value of the work by oral 
presentations at an early stage but no one ever had time to read 
all the voluminous written material available. Nor did RCAGA have 
on call a group of people who were conversant with that material 
and able to interpret its theoretical bases. Certainly Australian 
academics were poor mediating agents because access was new to 
them too. The commission instead accepted assurances, earnestly 
given by the staff, that the access report itself would be assimilable 
directly into the main report. And so it happened: the particular 
reforms of the access report were added to the recommendatory 
mix, undoubtedly to its great improvement. But there was no 
attempt to apply the perspectives of access theory across the whole 
field of the report. 
In short, internal methods of work made some questions dis-
cussible and others not. The preferences of individuals were 
contained within procedural rules, many of them never stated 
directly but universally understood. Thus the passage of time, to 
repeat, made some questions simply too hard to approach in a 
thoroughgoing way, as with access. Other questions could not be 
divided up in a way which would satisfy all those with a stake in 
the question: at one point, for example, the subject of information 
was being analysed for or by three commissioners, but from 
different perspectives which proved impossible to combine. The 
subject shrank. 
The revision of draft material was in some ways the more difficult 
because RCAGA as an organization had acted upon its earlier 
expectations about its timetable by releasing many of its staff 
members. Changes were then difficult to bring about since it could 
not undertake some of the patching and filling work it later found 
it needed. Yet this irreversible process had its happier consequences. 
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As Staff disappeared, the mediating barriers which had existed 
between commissioners disappeared also and they were forced into 
direct argument over the content of the draft and so, at last, to 
finality. It is hard for a participant to see that this would ever have 
happened if RCAGA had remained a whole organization. The need 
to reduce but intensify the use of resources of people and of time 
had always been foreseen, to be sure, but it took place in a way 
that was not planned and perhaps could not have been. 
The commission had begun to dissolve itself well before the 
presentation of the report. By that time only two commissioners 
remained working full time to make the final editing changes. 
Contrary to earlier expectations, no one from the commission 
transferred to the implementation unit in PM & c in keeping with 
the department's desire to have a free field for its own operations. 
The recommendations of the commission passed to departments and 
politicians for action. Thus took place the long anticipated shift 
which had moulded RCAGAS whole approach. There is no reason to 
think that the implementation of the report, such as it has been, 
is any less powerfully influenced by procedural limitations than was 
the creation of the report. 
The report showed well the influence the two most potent forces 
in the commission's environment had upon the internal processes 
which led to it. The report was more widely accepted within the 
public service than most observers had thought possible. Though 
the Treasury and department of Science were unhappy with specific 
findings, and though a few departments or senior public servants 
did not welcome its description of the inertia at the top of the 
service, the report in general crystallized departmental concerns in 
an acceptable way. Its criticisms and proposals were worded loosely 
enough to win an approval conditional at any rate upon further 
thought and action by the managers themselves. It was a report 
which reflected well the anxieties and moderate reforms which 
departments had communicated to the commission. 
The large reforms of the report were conditional upon political 
activity. Reforms to the forward estimates and economic planning 
machinery, for example, called for commitment by politicians; so 
did proposals about freedom of information legislation, tenure in 
the service, the institutionalization of a programme review capacity 
and the relationship between the local member and his constituents 
and very many more recommendations. This emphasis was accep-
table to the service, even welcomed by it. The report said, by 
inference but never directly, that changes in the service waited upon 
political will and that there was no reason to suppose that the service 
would not respond. This was a comforting conclusion for public 
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servants. It meant that RCAGA had defined the agenda for the 
politicans which it had not confronted during its life. 
Yet we know that the division really is not as clear or as 
comfortable as that. The report was a product of the forces in 
RCAGAS environment as well as of its own internal processes, and its 
inability to make a final assimilation of them left its report 
incomplete. The commission's balance between administrative and 
political perceptions was surely the diligent and energetic product of 
difficult choices, but it is not a balance with which other critics 
should now rest content. 
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Putting it Together and 
Keeping it Together 
David Corbett 
5 
So far there have been three academic reviews of the report of the 
committee of inquiry into the South Australian public service. One 
was by the two organizers of the present conference. It appeared 
in the Newsletter of the ACT Group of the Royal Institute of Public 
Administration, it said some nice things, and its criticisms were 
mild. The next to appear was Jean Holmes' brief note in the 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, and it was particularly 
gratifying that she complimented the report on looking and working 
like a book, with an orderly structure and proper index. 
That took a bit of doing. The book is no great beauty, but it 
was pushed through printing and binding in three weeks. Nothing 
could kill a report's usefulness quicker than not to have it 
immediately available to the public servants for whom it was 
written. The committee members saw their work as a sort of 
consultancy, not just to advise the minister but also to help public 
servants themselves to make the changes which they, the public 
servants, know to be needed. For that strategy to work, the report 
had to be written in agreeable style, and there had to be no delay 
before the readers could get hold of it. 
Contract permanent heads 
Elaine Thompson, who reviewed the report in the Australian 
Journal of Public Administration (35(3), September 1976), is also 
laudatory about nine-tenths of the report's contents, but she does 
take the authors to task for not discussing the political implications 
of one of the report's most important recommendations. This was 
that "permanent" heads of department be appointed for terms of 
seven years on a contract basis. Dr. Thompson sees a danger that 
this will politicize the public service because a government will have 
more chances to fill departmental headships, and will probably use 
these chances to choose people who agree with it. This in turn will 
induce the ambitious people lower down in the departments to show 
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their political colours in order to get on. Dr. Thompson goes on 
to say: 
it is very odd that nowhere in its discussion of the contract system for 
permanent heads does the committee mention the problem of politic-
ization, even to dismiss it. This is a major shortcoming. 
Without presuming to speak for the other two members of the 
committee, I can say on my own behalf that Dr. Thompson is 
perceptive as usual in this comment, and deserves an answer. One 
can make excuses—for example, that a brief, positive report is 
better than one which tries to answer every possible objection as 
it goes along. Or one can point out that this very issue is discussed 
in only a slightly different context in the report at paragraph C 
5.64, one paragraph before we take up the question of permanent 
heads. At that point we discussed the problem of contract appoin-
tees in general, and advised that such appointments be made in 
only a minority of positions, in order to protect "fearless impar-
tiality in policy-advising". Dr. Thompson herself notes this passage 
and comments on it. She agrees there is a problem, but comes down 
on the side of even freer use of contract appointment because 
"people under contract may well work harder, pay more attention 
to flexible solutions and, generally, be more efficient than tenured 
public servants". With this I, for one, agree, but where does Dr. 
Thompson really stand when it comes to applying this reasoning 
to departmental headships? If she is worried about "politicization", 
how much of it is she willing to accept in order to gain more 
efficiency and flexibility? 
To begin with, there is no reason to take it for granted that a 
government will have more departmental headships to fill in a 
three-year period under our recommended system than it does at 
present. Dr. Thompson points out that if all headships were filled 
on seven-year contract terms, about forty per cent of them would, 
on average, fall vacant within the three-year term of office of a 
government. One wonders what the percentage would be as things 
stand at present. Certainly, there are departments where the 
headship has been filled by a youngish person who has remained 
in the same position for twenty years or more; but there are many 
departments where the headship is routinely filled by the next in 
line, a few years before retirement, and where the turnover is 
quicker than once every seven years. The total effect of our 
recommendation to appoint them younger, but for a limited term, 
might well be to reduce the number of headships falling vacant 
in a three-year period. We were confident that it would also make 
for more vigour at this level, a point with which Dr. Thompson 
agrees. 
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In the second place, why assume that a government with 
numerous appointments at this level to make will choose people 
who agree with it? If the governments we have had for the past 
hundred years or more had chosen to do this, they could have, and 
no doubt they quite often have. But in spite of this, we have retained 
a conventional expectation that those chosen will be, first and 
foremost, fit for the position, and whether they are supporters of 
the government in power will be a secondary consideration, or, we 
hope, not a consideration at all. This is a sort of convention of the 
constitution, and it has been upheld, in the main, because it is useful 
to the system of government, helping to maintain its stability, a 
matter of importance to those who hold power. 
Imagine a cabinet which comes back into power after a time 
in opposition. It is likely to be particularly aware of the advantage 
of continuity and professionalism at the top of the public service. 
This cabinet may find some of the department heads biased against 
it. What does it do about it? It can play tit for tat, and pack the 
departmental headships with its friends, not caring what its 
opponents think. That would perhaps be safe if the cabinet has no 
expectation of ever being defeated. But if it does look ahead to 
the possibility that its opponents will be in power again one day, 
this imaginary cabinet will quite probably play the game according 
to the conventional rules. It would fear that to play obvious politics 
with top appointments would only invite retaliation the next time 
around, and probably cause an outcry from the press, the public 
service unions, and of course the opposition. 
A cynical political analyst would say, perhaps, "Don't give me 
this folklore about conventions of the constitution: we all know how 
feeble they can be when they get in the way of the politicians' 
ambitions". While there is every good reason to take this warning 
seriously, nevertheless my argument is that the convention of 
impartiality at the top of the public service will be maintained by 
cabinets mainly for their own self-interest, not for any piety about 
the sanctity of conventions in general. In support of this proposition, 
one might look at what ministers have done rather than attack the 
convention head on: they have instead increasingly appointed 
additional ministerial staff", to bolster their political strength in 
dealing with the permanent administration. Career public servants 
will often say that much as they dislike the idea of ministerial 
appointments they tolerate it as the price that has to be paid to 
protect and preserve the integrity of the professional public service 
itself. And career public servants will generally acknowledge that 
a minister's political tasks are important, that the pressure on his 
or her time is enormous and increasing, and that he or she needs 
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help in his or her political roles. Better to give the minister a 
political ministerial staff than to encourage him or her to foist 
partisan political work on the departments. 
RCAGA said more about the political bias of the public service 
than did the South Australian committee of inquiry. The Coombs 
report in its second chapter argues that the public service may be 
politically complacent and insensitive because it is drawn from the 
privileged classes of the society. Dr. Coombs and his colleagues 
propose that this be remedied by making the public service more 
representative, by drawing into it more of the immigrants, the 
aboriginals, more women and more whose early background was 
disadvantaged. 
Security of tenure and conservatism 
Another way of explaining conservatism in the public service is to 
focus on security of tenure. People who need not worry about 
unemployment as long as the political system remains fundamen-
tally unchanged are indeed likely to feel strongly protective toward 
the system which gives them this boon and cautious about policies 
which could change it. Security of tenure may be an even more 
powerful source of conservative bias in the public service than the 
socio-economic origins of public servants, for it does not take much 
imagination or observation of our surroundings to see that a person 
from socially deprived circumstances often becomes ultra-con-
servative once he or she has been admitted to the ranks of the 
privileged. If one were designing reforms intended to inject more 
social imagination and sympathy with struggling fellow citizens into 
the minds of policy-advising public servants, one might well decide 
against the RCAGA recommendation of more representativeness and, 
instead, go for the South Australian committee's recommendation 
of more reliance on contract employment. 
In fact, however, it does not seem clear that RCAGAS analysis of 
the Australian public service would hold good for the South 
Australian public service. Does insensitivity predominate among 
South Australian public servants at the levels where policy advice 
is formed? It would be an exceedingly difficult judgment to make 
and no quantitative attitude survey would be of much help in 
making it. An observer's impressions, based on only a slight 
acquaintance with a quite unsystematic sample of the perhaps three 
or four hundred people being considered here, would be that pockets 
of pro-establishment bias and insulation from the community would 
be found, if at all, among older and less qualified senior officers. 
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or in departments which do not have an exciting policy role in any 
case. One would not expect to find conservatism dominant in a 
modern social welfare department; in a modern education depart-
ment one would expect to find a fairly even division between 
progressives and conservatives—division much the same as one finds 
among participants in educational debate in the community at large; 
in an agriculture department one could expect to find rural pressure 
group attitudes reflected—a mixture of mild radicalism where 
agricultural interests are concerned and conservatism where other 
social values are in question; and in departments concerned with 
engineering, construction of roads, running utilities and the like, 
one might well expect to find a typical engineering-professional bias, 
a hard-nosed realism often amounting to conservatism on social 
questions but only significant for policy-making in so far as the 
social implications of the work done may be neglected or given too 
little weight. These are not so much observations, however, as 
hunches about what one would expect to find, and I can think of 
several individual officers who seem to contradict these stereotypes 
as well as individuals who seem to confirm them. 
Keeping a watchful eye on the political balance of all branches 
of a public service calls for much more care and subtlety than has 
been suggested so far. It surely is not a matter to be dealt with 
by proposing one or two across-the-board recommendations such 
as contract appointments, or more representativeness, or keeping 
politicians' hands off. One would have to begin with some definition 
of the objectives. Is the objective to keep the public service 
politically pure and sterile—to exclude from it everyone who 
manifests any political enthusiasm? Is it to keep out those whose 
partisanship is so unrestrained that they are incapable of working 
for or with people who do not share their political convictions? Is 
it to create a balanced mixture of political predispositions within 
each agency, or across the public service as a whole? And, since 
most public service appointments are made at a young age and last 
for many years, how would one judge the "right" political propor-
tions to build into the intake so that, in twenty years' time when 
the recruits are at a career peak they reffect what has happened 
in the meantime to the political predispositions of their contem-
poraries and the community at large? These and other related 
questions can soon become so thorny that one can well understand 
why public service commissioners and their advisers would generally 
prefer to have nothing to do with them and would try to wish them 
away by chanting the ritual phrase "public service neutrality". But 
if they do that, and act accordingly, are they not likely to produce 
a public service neutral in favour of conventional middle-class 
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values? Is that what the public service should be—a system-
maintainer, not a system-modifier? 
The latter question used to be answered confidently by both 
realist and idealist political scientists. Realists would confidently say 
that a bureaucracy is a conservative force in society—nothing else 
should be expected of it. Even idealists, those who espoused 
democratic values and believed in the supremacy of elected repre-
sentatives, would confidently say the bureaucracy should not modify 
the system—that should be left to the electoral process, the 
executive and the legislature. But, in the late twentieth century do 
these confident answers still ring true? We know about the extent 
to which important decisions, including many quite major decisions, 
have shifted into the hands of the appointed, career officials. To 
say that this body of officials should as a group dedicate themselves 
to maintaining an existing social, economic and political system and 
its values would seem to lock us all in. Public services need to be 
creative as change-agents, or at least some parts of them need to 
have that sort of capacity, the capacity to respond to, and even 
to generate system-modifying ideas and policy proposals; for if such 
capacities exist nowhere in the public service our political social 
and economic systems may well suffer the fate of the dinosaur. 
Which may, of course, happen anyhow; but one ought to be thinking 
about how to prevent it. 
The State Inquiries 
The South Australian B 
Inquiry 
Dean Jaensch 
The committee of inquiry into the public service of South Australia 
was set up by cabinet on 14 May, 1973. The chairman of the three-
man committee was Professor D.C. Corbett, an authority on public 
administration, "seconded" on a half-time basis from Flinders 
University; the members were D.M. Martin, director of D & J 
Fowler Ltd from the industrial sector, and a representative from 
one of the core policy-making areas of the South Australian 
government—R.D. Bakewell, the director of the Premier's depart-
ment. From the beginning, then, there was promise of action on 
whatever proposals the committee arrived at: Mr Bakewell undoubt-
edly would have had the issues of cabinet and public service 
acceptability and implementation in mind at all stages of the 
inquiry. 
To this extent, the inquiry was "locked in" to the broad political 
process from the start. Cabinet's views were well understood. The 
presence of the permanent head of the increasingly important and 
ubiquitous Premier's department gave the inquiry status and, more 
importantly, provided for the "voice" of the service to be heard 
directly on the committee. Bakewell brought to the inquiry a clear 
knowledge of what was needed to make the service more efficient, 
and what would be acceptable to the service, particularly to its top 
echelons, and to the government. Radical changes were therefore 
unlikely. 
During the inquiry, the cabinet set up a planning and priorities 
advisory committee (PAPAC) to act as a "steering" committee under 
the chairmanship of Dr. Don Hopgood M.P. (replaced in 1976 by 
H.R. Hudson M.P.), with a membership of R.D. Bakewell (director: 
Premier's department and member of the committee of inquiry), 
E.J. Carey (under-treasurer), and G.J. Inns (chairman: PSB). PAPAC 
would "make recommendations to Cabinet as to the manner of 
degree and of acceptance and implementation of the proposals 
contained in the Report".' The membership of this committee 
reinforced the central and direct involvement of the government 
and especially of the Premier's department in the process and 
implementation of the inquiry. 
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Background 
The public service in South Australia had its genesis in the small 
civil service established at the proclamation of the colony in 1836. 
When the colony was granted a limited measure of responsible 
government in 1850, the civil service came under the partial 
direction of the legislature rather than the governor. By 1857, when 
full representative and responsible government was achieved, the 
civil service already played an important role in a rapidly developing 
colony. During the following 60 years, it slowly developed the form 
and functions of the modern public service, and various committees 
and inquiries brought minor modifications in the structure of the 
service. In 1916, following criticism that the public service was 
inefficient, mismanaged and generally chaotic, the government 
passed a new Public Service Act. This established the foundations, 
basic structures and formal functions that lasted until the 1973 
committee was formed. In 1967, the single public service com-
missioner was replaced by a full-time Public Service Board of three 
members, but this change did not significantly affect the provisions 
of the 1916 Act. 
The formation of the committee of inquiry began the first detailed 
study of the public service for 58 years. The explicit "reason" for 
the inquiry was that the number and complexity of government 
departments had burgeoned to a degree where reforms were 
essential, but the "environment" in which the committee of inquiry 
was inaugurated was one of general agreement that major and wide-
ranging reforms were necessary and that constructive criticisms 
would be welcome. Premier Dunstan, announcing the committee, 
said "we have an excellent Public Service in South Australia, but 
it is a long time since anybody really considered its structure and 
conditions as a whole". Liberal leader Eastick welcomed the 
inquiry, saying that "a constant review was essential", but he also 
warned that the inquiry "must not be turned into a witch-hunt". 
The Public Service Association also welcomed the "spring-
cleaning".^ 
In 1955, one observer noted that 
the last twenty years have witnessed certain developments in the public 
service which seem worthy of comment. First, the great increase in size; 
second, the steady improvement in conditions of employment; third, a 
decline in efficiency; and finally, the signs of a "progressive" attitude 
on the part of those in control.' 
During the "Playford era" (1938-65) there was some evidence of 
the.se developments, especially in terms of size, conditions and a 
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slow change in governmental and public attitudes to the public 
service. The number of employees subject to the Public Service Act 
was 2,563 in 1939; in 1955 this had risen to nearly 5,000, and by 
1966 to 8,348. In 1974, when the committee of inquiry was meeting, 
there were no less than 14,169 public servants. The growth in this 
last decade was due, in no small part, to the policy initiatives of 
the Dunstan Labor government, especially in areas of development, 
public services, consumer affairs and community welfare, areas 
which had languished or had not been acknowledged under Play-
ford. Conditions of employment had improved slowly under Play-
ford, and received further impetus from the Dunstan government 
which also recruited more professional and semi-professional mem-
bers into the service. Amendments to the Public Service Act were 
constantly carried out, especially in relation to conditions of 
employment. However in the broad area of "efficiency" there were 
evident problems, created in part by the explosion in the size of 
the service, the development of new policy fields and the consequent 
formation of new departments and the rapid growth of others. The 
decision to set up the committee of inquiry was a recognition of 
these problems. 
The public service in 1974 
In 1974 the 14,169 members of the public service constituted 3.1 
per cent of wage and salary earners in South Australia. These public 
servants were employed in a total of 49 departments which ranged 
in staff numbers from three in the Agricultural College department 
and six in the Public Actuary department to 1,446 in the depart-
ment of Education and 1,797 in the Hospitals department. These 
49 departments were grouped under eleven ministers of state and 
under 22 separate portfolios. Hence, not only had the large 
departments become equal to the largest undertakings in the state, 
requiring management which was complex and demanding, but the 
proliferation of departments coupled with the number of depart-
ments under the umbrella of a few ministers had created problems 
of efficiency, management and inter- and intra-department ac-
tivities. 
Within this structure, a senior administrative group had emerged. 
Originally developed under Playford, it had slowly changed in 
membership and character under the Dunstan government. In 1955, 
S.R. Davis characterized a typical senior member of the public 
service in the following terms: 
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He will have entered the service as a junior clerk . . . he will have served 
his apprenticeship in his first department . . . he will have acquired the 
knowhow of government on the job . . . he will have had little or no 
formal training in the service . . . he will have earned his promotion 
fairly slowly by patience in the queue, by diligence, reliability and length 
of service . . . he will hold inflexibly to the convictions of his own 
administrative experience and will have little patience with novelties." 
However, in South Australia in the 1970s there was a growing 
core of senior administratiors who refuted the portrait in almost 
every way. Thirty-two of the 116 senior administrators in South 
Australia in 1971 had less than ten years' service in the public 
service; they had joined and had been appointed to their existing 
senior positions since the election of the 1965 Labor government. 
Further, only two of the 116 had occupied their present senior 
position for more than two years. The age structure of this senior 
group did not reflect the usual picture of the "senior citizen" in the 
senior position; 75 of the 1 16 were under 55 years of age, and 14 
were below 40 years of age. Of the 126 members of this senior 
administrative group in 1974, over 40 per cent were below 50 years 
of age, 27.8 per cent had occupied their positions for less than ten 
years and all but three held at least one tertiary degree.* 
Terms of reference 
The committee of inquiry was given wide terms of reference: 
To examine and report to the Minister on the role, structure, man-
agement and staflfing of the South Australian Public Service and to 
recommend any action which may be considered necessary to improve 
the effectiveness, economy and efficiency of the service in the discharge 
of contemporary public business, having particular regard to any: 
Improvements that should be made in the machinery of Government 
relating to the organization, co-ordination and control of departments 
including the possible redistribution of functions. 
Methods by which the efficiency of the use of resources might be 
improved. 
Changes in conditions of employment, recruitment, development and 
accommodation of public servants which may be necessary to ensure 
comparability with general community standards and equality of 
opportunity for further personal development and promotion. 
Provision for classification or divisional structure of groups or 
categories of officers. 
These terms were interpreted broadly by the committee as 
requiring us to make a general appraisal of the South Australian Public 
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Service and the framework within which it operates with a view to 
suggesting any immediate changes considered necessary and to provide 
for future needs." 
However, despite these broad terms of reference and the wide-
ranging aims of the inquiry, the report's scope and its implications 
were relatively narrow and essentially conservative. The latter point 
was recognized by the committee. While the existing form and 
structure of the public service were open to examination and reform, 
there was no "unqualified confirmation of the pessimistic theorists' 
strictures". The committee described its recommendations as 
by no means radical or drastic, nor do they require fundamental 
restructuring of the role of the public service in the system, because 
we have found that the situation in the South Australian Public Service 
does not call for changes of that degree of severity (C 1.36). 
The relative narrowness of the findings is implicit in this quotation, 
but it was partially derived from two other factors—the membership 
of the committee and the impact of three major submissions. 
Methods of operation 
The conventional wisdom about bureaucracy is that its inertia 
resists change and that any changes implemented will occur very 
slowly. When the degree of implementation of the proposals of the 
committee of inquiry in South Australia reached by March 1977, 
almost two years since the release of the report, is considered, it 
appears, at first sight, to be relatively slow progress. However, as 
the chairman of the inquiry pointed out, while "it is a slow process, 
. . . I submit that the test is the results, not the delay".' One reason 
for the "delay" is that PAPAC must sort out the recommendations 
and advise cabinet whether they are consistent with government 
policy. This process has provided a valuable "filter", if a time-
consuming one. Another reason for relatively slow implementation 
is that recommendations have not been "imposed from above" 
without consideration of reactions "from below". There has been 
a serious and relatively successful attempt to implement the 
recommendations "by consensus", through involvement of those 
concerned with the changes. The process, while slow, has been 
steady. 
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One early decision by the committee, to hear evidence in camera 
if requested, was intended to "encourage frank, and if necessary 
critical, submissions by public servants (C 0.8)". This may have 
achieved its aim, but there is no doubt that an "in-service" 
submission had the greatest impact. The committee invited persons 
and organizations to make submissions; it received over 250, and 
over 200 persons appeared before it. Among these submissions were 
three from the Public Service Board which obviously had a direct 
interest in the outcome of the inquiry. These submissions were 
detailed, valuable to the committee and important political studies 
in their own right. The first submission explained the functions of 
all departments, their historical development, the ministers to whom 
they were responsible, the main acts they administered, and staff 
statistics. Details were also given of the Board's responsibilities and 
policies and the objectives and structure of each of its divisions. 
The second submission outlined the areas which had been identified 
for review, following visits of two members of the PSB to five overseas 
public services. The third submission contained a number of detailed 
recommendations and proposals by the Board. The tenor of the final 
report, and many if not most of the detailed proposals, were 
obviously based on these submissions. 
The breadth of reform 
The committee based its recommendations on certain assumptions 
about the purpose and role of the public service. 
The Public Service, in its traditional role, exists to put into effect 
decisions, regulations and enactments of the Government. In more 
recent times, another role has become increasingly important, that of 
advising the government of the day on policy (C 1.2). . . . We have 
assumed that this [Westminster] system will continue . . . the system 
seems to us to be relatively stable and durable (C 1.31). 
Further, there was the necessity to insure "impartiality and non-
partisan objectivity" in relations with the public and ministers, to 
guarantee "honest and courageous" advice, and to avoid "the 
hallmarks of bureaucracy". In summary, the committee aimed to 
strengthen the "potential benefits" of the system— 
professional, impartial service, courageous advice based on devotion to 
the public interest, and obedience to the Minister's will which reflects 
the voters" choice (C 1.35). 
The recommendations of the committee took many factors into 
account: the apparent stability of the governmental system; the 
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necessity for a "flexible, adaptable and rapidly responsive organiza-
tional form"; the need for expert knowledge and consultation in 
the policy planning process; the need to reexamine traditional 
"hierarchical authority patterns" in the light of demands for 
broader experience; the expected demands in the future for "more 
complex, more precise and more far-sighted action"; and, not the 
least important, that the existing public service was essentially 
sound, efficient, available to ministerial authority and carrying out 
its functions well (C 1.31-1.36). 
Hence the report made many suggestions for change, but at the 
same time emphasised that the South Australian public service was 
sound enough, small enough, sufficiently amenable to Ministerial 
authority and sufficiently imbued with professional responsibility and 
traditional public service values so that it can, by suitable reforms, be 
made to live up to the Public Service's proper role in the Westminster 
model and can be prevented from degenerating into the arbitrary, 
irresponsible bureaucracy which the system's pessimistic critics fear 
(C 1.36). 
If the terms of reference were interpreted at their broadest, they 
could have led to discussions of three major areas. These could be 
categorized as "efficiency", "accountability" and "effectiveness". 
"Efficiency" would cover managerial functions within the public 
service, the organization of the machinery of government, the means 
of making and executing decisions, departmental structures and the 
general competence of the service. The area of "accountability" 
would encompass political relations between the service and the 
political institutions, between ministers and department heads, 
between the Public Service Board and the cabinet and between the 
major elements of the bureaucracy itself. The heading of 
"effectiveness" would concern the interaction of the public service 
with society and included such aspects as delivery of services, 
availability of information and the ability and willingness of the 
service to adapt to social pressures and changes. 
A narrower interpretation of the terms of reference places almost 
exclusive emphasis on "efficiency". Despite the committee's own 
interpretation as "requiring us to make a general appraisal of the 
South Australian public service and the framework within which 
it operates (C 0.2)", the recommendations were limited. While the 
report did encompass aspects of "accountability" and to a lesser 
extent "effectiveness", the main thrust of the recommendations were 
concerned with internal "efficiency". The emphases in the report 
are on structure, restructuring, internal accountability and relations 
on both "vertical" and "horizontal" planes. 
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Devolution . . . and control 
In administrative (rather than policy) terms, the public service to 
1975 was controlled by the Public Service Board. As the committee 
of inquiry noted: 
the current Public Service Act stresses rigid centralized control over 
the whole Public Service through the agency of the Public Service Board 
and prescribes in detail the forms of such control. The major emphasis 
of the Act is on control by specific direction, by detailed approval, by 
close examination and by constant referral. The Act makes no mention 
of coordination, or control by the setting of guides and standards, and 
the comparison of performance with objective (C 2.01). 
The committee considered this to be "an inappropriate management 
philosophy". 
The committee proposed two basic changes to the role of the 
Public Service Board. From 1967, the public service was controlled 
by and wholly responsible to the PSB; equally, the PSB was formally 
separated from any attempt by the cabinet to provide policy 
directives. The inquiry recommended modifications in both areas, 
which by implication required a reduction of the authority of the 
Board. The first recommendation stated that 
the Public Service Act be revised to provide for the Governor in 
Executive Council to be able to issue written directives on policy to 
the Board, and to require the Board to adhere to such directives 
(C 2.00). 
This was a formalization of what had been part of the informal 
political process since 1967. The proposal was examined by PAPAC 
and rejected, but cabinet overruled it and endorsed the proposal. 
In the past the PSB, while formally distinct from cabinet control, 
worked closely with cabinet and sought its guidance in matters of 
policy. The new, formal situation is unlikely to lead to any 
significant use of authority by cabinet. The relatively smooth 
relations will probably remain, now that the actual situation has 
been formally recognized. 
The inquiry appeared to make significant proposals for changes 
in the role of the PSB within the public service, when it recommended 
greater responsibility for departmental heads and, in essence, 
suggested delegation and decentralization of powers. However, this 
devolution was qualified by other sections of the report. 
The inquiry proposed that in revising the present Act, detailed 
responsibility for ensuring the efficiency of departments be trans-
ferred to permanent heads. This matched the submission by the 
PSB, that its "function should be less regulatory and more of a service 
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role". To achieve this devolution, the PSB was "convinced that it 
is necessary for permanent heads to be held more accountable for 
the efficient and economic operation of their departments".' The 
committee agreed. 
It also followed the submissions from the PSB in terms of the 
structure and functions of departments. In 1974, there were more 
departments in South Australia than in other states, in the 
Australian government or in any comparable government overseas. 
The reasons for this proliferation include the unique breadth of 
function of the South Australian public service. Functions per-
formed in other states by statutory corporations or by commissions 
completely outside the public service were administered by public 
service departments in South Australia. The number of separate 
departments had decreased in recent years, from 64 in 1920 to 47 
in March 1974, but many of these departments were small—13 
of the 47 employed less than 50 staff each, seven of these less than 
25. 
The committee proposed "fewer, stronger departments so that 
they can manage their affairs and be held accountable for managing 
them" (C 6.00). It also recommended a regrouping of departmental 
functions and an emphasis on the development of regionalization 
and regional coordination in the public service. The basis for 
departmental reorganization "inclined a little more toward 
pragmatism than theory", and the result was not "an elaborate 
restructuring of the cabinet's machinery or an elaborate committee 
apparatus for handling its business". The overall emphasis was "on 
the functionalist theory heavily weighted by other, more pragmatic 
considerations arising out of this State's history and its particular 
administrative needs" (C 6.01). The possibility of creating more 
statutory authorities to reduce the number of departments was 
rejected. Despite the advantages of such authorities, including less 
frustrations and financial restrictions, wider representation at man-
agerial level, economy and efficiency of management and adminis-
tration, the committee was concerned that independence of action 
could lead to problems in, or even conflict with, government policy. 
At one stage the committee requested existing departments to 
"state their objectives, the purposes for which they exist". The 
report noted that "only a small minority could point to authoritative 
statements of their objectives, readily available and recently re-
viewed". As a result it proposed that the objectives and functions 
of departments should be "clearly set out" and be "available to 
serve as terms of reference" to staff and public (C 6.60). 
The main argument of this part of the report seems to be that 
authority should be devolved and decision-making and responsibility 
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decentralized. As the report put it, "the responsibility for the overall 
success or failure of departmental operations should move towards 
departmental management" (C 8.37), and away from the PSB. But, 
at the same time, the inquiry stressed the "important role" for the 
PSB—a duty "to adjudicate and make decisions on public service 
matters" (C 2.00), pointed out that the issue was "not whether but 
how this control and coordination should be exercized", and stressed 
that a power of revoking delegations of authority should remain 
with the board, to be used 
if departments fail to comply with the broad requirements of Board 
policy . . . if methods of standard-setting, consultation and persuasion 
fail . . . [and] only as a last resort (C 2.13). 
Hence an apparent emphasis on devolution was "balanced" by 
an equal emphasis on central power and authority. Departments 
and department heads were to be given more authority and 
responsibility but, at the same time, an ultimate authority over 
efficiency and accountability was placed firmly into the hands of 
the Public Service Board. Is it then a matter of "change without 
change"? The detailed responsibility for the efficiency of depart-
ments was transferred to permanent heads, but with the PSB 
retaining the functions and the authority of monitoring the per-
formance of departments, providing the support necessary for 
efficiency, advising department heads, and reporting to the cabinet 
and parliament on the levels of efficiency achieved. Whether this 
notional devolution and decentralization will lead to greater 
efficiency and effectiveness and to real dispersion of power remains 
to be seen. Under the terms of the report, the "independent 
authority" of individual departments is limited both by the PSB 
which will have the power to monitor the efficiency, economy and 
operational effectiveness of departments and periodically conduct 
joint reviews in these areas with departments, and by the PAPAC 
which will oversee the conduct of those reviews. 
A corollary to the recommendations concerning devolution of 
authority to individual departments was the emphasis on financial 
management of the departments. The inquiry recommended that 
the financial management advisory committee (established in July 
1974) should reconstruct the budget of at least one department 
along "modern management accounting lines". By November 1976, 
this advisory committee had carried out, or assisted in, the 
restructuring of the financial systems of six major departments. Not 
unnaturally, the Treasury is closely concerned with such changes 
to government accounting systems, and is perhaps even more 
concerned as these changes place greater power and more responsi-
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bility and accountability with individual heads of departments. In 
July 1976, the Treasury produced major proposals for service-wide 
financial systems, including intra- and inter-departmental econom-
ics and accounting. These are under review by departments and 
will probably be implemented in 1978. The overall purposes of the 
scheme are to achieve a closer reflection of policy objectives, to 
facilitate the review of policy and finances by departments and by 
government, to improve the quality of financial information for 
comparative purposes and forward planning and, not the least 
important, to increase the capability of department heads to manage 
and control their departments' activities 
Apart from the changes in formal relationships which have been 
modified only slightly by the inquiry, the success of any proposals 
for devolution of authority depends to a degree on subjective factors 
such as the attitudes of the "managers" themselves. Hence, even 
with the "limited" devolution suggested by the Corbett committee, 
one problem may be an unwillingness of department heads, regional 
authorities and the upper levels of the public service as a whole 
to accept their new responsibilities. Are these "devolved authorities" 
ready to undertake the new role? In the past, with the Public 
Service Board holding a "policeman's role", with departments 
entrenched in a relatively stable and unchanging system and, 
especially under Playford, with initiative almost totally in the hands 
of the cabinet, if not the premier alone, such changes might have 
found the recipients of the new freedom unready for autonomy. 
However the "administrative elite" of the South Australian public 
service is notably young in years, new to their positions and, we 
can assume, less entrenched in the "system". Also, the members 
of the Public Service Board are backed by an efficient and keen 
department and, most importantly, have produced the framework 
of the plan for the reconstruction which the inquiry recommended. 
The inquiry devoted a major chapter of its report to "Efficiency 
and Accountability", and had some critical comments, summed up 
by the statement that 
much of the Service, however, gave us the impression that it was not 
concerned with efl^ iciency at all. We have found too many examples of 
work being done where no form of efficiency or productivity control 
whatsoever was in existence, and some of the work we have seen being 
done, at what level of efficiency no-one knows, should in all probability 
not be done at all (C 8.03). 
Equally, the committee saw a "need of reform" in terms of 
"accountability" which it defined as "the acceptance of the moral 
responsibility for actions and decisions [which is] . . . valueless 
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unless the individual is called upon by management to give an 
accounting of his actions" (C 8.11). Whether the "devolution" 
discussed above will improve "Efficiency and Accountability" 
remains to be judged. 
The process of communication 
The Public Service Association of South Australia held a long and 
exhaustive seminar on the report of the inquiry. One of its criticisms 
was that 
while appreciating that the Report devotes considerable space to 
questions of communication, information-giving and other "public 
relations" issues, it seems to us that inadequate attention has been given 
to the interaction between the Public Service and the community; to 
a system whereby each becomes actively involved in the interests of 
the other.' 
This is a valid criticism and springs from the emphasis by the 
inquiry on "efficiency" rather than "effectiveness". 
The committee reported a clear sense of unease about the state 
of communications both within the service and between the service 
and the public. The report commented that "in South Australia, 
there is evidence of widespread confusion and ignorance of govern-
ment activity", and it devoted a brief chapter to government 
information services on the ground that there was evidence of "poor 
communications at the level of public contact" (C 9.10). It proposed 
the formation of a state government information service which 
would explain government responsibilities and services to the public, 
and an information-receiving centre which would "glean informa-
tion relating to the Public Service and the quality of departmental 
services" (C 9.324). 
Implementation of these proposals may improve the public's level 
of information and understanding, but the thrust of the committee's 
recommendations in this area can be subsumed under the heading 
of efficiency rather than effectiveness. As the PSA noted, the 
recommendations are unlikely to achieve much in terms of a two-
way interaction between public and public service. That is, there 
were no specific recommendations and solutions to the problems 
of responsiveness. 
The inquiry also stressed the need for more intra-service com-
munication and consultation, especially at the upper levels of the 
service. The important job of encouraging this was given to the 
PSB. A programme is already under way, including formal and 
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informal contacts between the PSB and departments and regional 
offices, expansion of the board's monthly Bulletin, delegation of 
increased powers over organizational and personnel matters and the 
formation of a research and resources unit. 
Towards internal "democracy"? 
The committee of inquiry devoted a considerable amount of its time 
and its report to such topics as personnel policies, staff participation, 
job satisfaction and discrimination within the service. Proposals 
ranged from those that were relatively uncontroversial and simple 
to apply, such as delegation of authority for recruitment of 
employees from the PSB to departments, through a plea for increased 
formal and informal consultation by managers at all levels, to 
themes which have produced controversy and strong dissent, 
especially the issues of "industrial democracy" and contract ap-
pointments. 
The committee's proposals concerning "Women in the Public 
Service" were innovative and, except for one specific point, were 
welcomed by all interested parties. The Public Service Association 
felt that the appointment of a female as adviser on women's affairs 
was "an act of discrimination", but the proposal went ahead. The 
recommendations have either been implemented, or have been taken 
to a point where only the necessary legislation is required, and they 
complement the overall policy of the Dunstan government in terms 
of "equal opportunity". An equal employment opportunities ad-
visory panel, headed by PSB commissioner Stephens has been set up, 
Deborah McCuUoch has been appointed to the position of women's 
adviser in the Premier's department, selection tests for prospective 
public servants have been changed to exclude any sex bias, 
anomalies are being examined and the cabinet has approved 
maternity/paternity leave provisions for public servants. There is 
little doubt that pressure for the implementation of these and 
further reforms will continue. 
The report recommended a modified form of industrial de-
mocracy for the public service. Although limited in scope, it 
extended earlier recommendations of the committee on worker 
participation in management formed by the government in 1973. 
The report also noted that implementation of the recommendations 
of the 1973 committee had hardly proceeded in the two years since 
the report, and that action had been limited to the establishment 
of joint consultative councils in some departments. The report 
therefore urged that departments and the PSB "get on with it". At 
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the same time, the chairman of the inquiry stressed that the 
extended ideas 
do not come from a belief that a government department can be or 
should be a fully-fledged democracy in itself. How could such a belief 
possibly be combined with the idea of a subordinate public service which 
carries out the will of Ministers who, in turn, must have the backing 
of the majority of the people's elected representatives.'" 
The Public Service Association examined this section carefully 
and recommended caution. It was "generally in favour of various 
forms of worker participation", but it noted that there was an 
evident degree of confusion as to what the term meant in practical 
terms. The PSA therefore called for "education and consideration 
rather than action", for explanations from the government and from 
the unit for the quality of work life of their intentions, for a long 
period of dialogue, and then for a further inquiry and report "to 
lessen fears held in some quarters that worker participation is a 
threat to unionism". By October 1976 the PSB, the government and 
the premier had begun the formal and informal processes 
requested". But progress will be slow in this area and the hesitation 
is not at the "employer" level; while the government is committed 
to industrial democracy in both public and private sectors, it is the 
"employees" who have doubts. 
The inquiry endorsed the "general philosophy" of "worker 
participation in management", but not suggestions that this should 
apply at the level of the Public Service Board. It rejected proposals 
that members of the PSB should be elected by public servants or 
that one member of the board should be nominated by the PSA. The 
inquiry was convinced that not only should "the merit principle [be] 
. . . the overriding consideration here", but that there were "prac-
tical considerations": 
the opportunities for "sweetheart agreements" inherent in such a 
situation would be difficult to resist . . . we consider it inappropriate 
that any members of a Board called upon to act in a deliberative, or 
quasi-Judicial, capacity should consider themselves to be the nominees 
or representatives of the parties which appear before them (C 2.21). 
Hence, while the inquiry accepted the "general philosophy", it did 
not accept the final stage of the Dunstan government's programme, 
as set out in general terms by the premier, that "eventually workers 
should . . . elect some Directors to the Board of Management . . . 
workers should be represented at the policy-making level."'^ 
Although at the time of writing PAPAC had not considered all 
recommendations in these sections of the report, the PSB and the 
departments had moved some considerable distance in the spirit of 
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the report. Joint committees are examining specific programmes to 
implement detailed recommendations concerned with job en-
richment, management styles, consultation, semi-autonomous work 
groups, career counselling, graduate and non-graduate entry to the 
service and part-time study release. On the last point, it should be 
noted that the South Australian service has continued an important 
programme of part-time release for study. In 1975, the latest date 
for which detailed information is available, a total of 2,323 members 
of the public service were involved in part-time studies. Of these, 
677 already held post-secondary qualifications. Further, a scheme 
to provide for full-time release on full salary for tertiary studies 
was introduced in 1974 and 31 such awards had been granted by 
1976. 
Two recommendations in these sections were innovatory. The 
inquiry proposed that staff appraisals should be introduced, with 
self-appraisal as a basic part of the process, and that this process 
should apply to all staff, including permanent heads who would be 
assessed annually by PAPAC. The PSB and the departments are 
cooperating to work out the details of this scheme. The second 
innovation concerned the formation of consultative councils at 
central, departmental and regional levels of the public service— 
in effect, the further implementation of internal consultation in the 
state public service. The evidence from the service is of strong 
interest and a high level of activity in the planning stages. In 
November 1974 the PSB inaugurated a policy on worker participation 
in the public service, and this plan has been assisted by the unit 
for industrial democracy (in the Premier's department) and the 
PSBS special projects branch. The recommendations in the report 
therefore support a process already well under way. The cabinet 
has already approved the appointment of industrial relations staff 
in larger departments to provide direct advice and assistance in 
intra-departmental industrial matters. 
Careers and contracts 
One major emphasis in the Public Service Association's submission 
to the inquiry was on the necessity to retain a "career service". 
The PSA was firm in the view that the public service should develop 
in its own ranks the skills and talents needed to fill promotional 
positions. The inquiry agreed, "in general" but also felt that "an 
infusion of new people in carefully chosen positions has an 
invigorating effect" (C 5.327). To achieve this, tfie inquiry recom-
mended modifications to the concept of a "closed" career service. 
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This was justified as an attempt to ameliorate the problems of 
"tapering ofT', that is, the irrationality of basing "a whole system 
on the assumption that everyone improves steadily in ability until 
retirement age" (C 5.60). 
To deal with the problem, the inquiry recommended some minor 
changes, such as the appointment of permanent heads by PAPAC, the 
appointment to positions immediately below permanent heads by 
the PSB and the head with no right of appeal, and the removal of 
any right of appeal against appointments from outside the service. 
The inquiry also agonized over the issue of contract appointments 
and the effects of such appointment on a "career service". While 
committed to the concept of contract appointments the inquiry 
worried over: 
how to combine contract employment with the fearless impartiality in 
policy-advising and decision-making which is the prized characteristic 
of the best public servants (C 5.64). 
Hence, while recommending "that more extensive use be made of 
contract appointment to the Executive Officer ranges and specialist 
positions", every department or division should have "a majority 
of career officers near the top". 
Contract appointments at the level of permanent head were given 
special emphasis; the position requires "great energy, resilience, 
capacity to make decisions under pressure", and these qualities 
would more likely be found "among young or middle-aged ex-
ecutives". Hence all appointments at the level of permanent head 
should be "in the form of a seven-year contract", and appointees 
"should preferably be within the thirty-five to fifty years age 
bracket" (C 5.65). 
The Public Service Association reacted strongly; it admitted that 
a few contract appointments might be justified, but rejected the 
concept of contract appointments for career public servants as being 
"contrary to the principles of the independence and integrity of the 
public service".'^ Since the election of the Labor government in 1970 
there has been a trend towards "outside" appointments at the top 
levels of the public service. The application of the recommendations 
of the inquiry will not significantly modify this trend. But the 
introduction of contract appointments would be a further radical 
change. 
Implementation and implications 
Was the Corbett inquiry a successful one? If judged by the extent 
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to which the report and the recommendations have and will be 
implemented, then the inquiry was a success. The government 
announced its "acceptance in principle" almost immediately and 
implementation is proceeding slowly but surely. One reason for this 
"success", of course, is the nature of the report. As Professor 
Corbett stated, "we came down finally in favour of modest, 
marginal changes and no radical departures from Westminster 
principles"." Given the presence of R.D. Bakewell on the commit-
tee, it was understandable that the recommendations would be 
towards aims and along lines that the government would accept. 
A basic premise of the committee of inquiry was that the South 
Australian public service was already relatively efficient, effective 
and responsible. Given this, radical proposals for change which 
would have brought controversy and conflict were not likely to be 
made. 
The traditional power centres in a government bureaucracy are 
the Treasury, the Auditor-General and the Public Service Board. 
Until 1965, the Treasury was the dominant department, under the 
control of Playford, who was served by a minuscule Premier's 
department with the sole function of offering a secretarial service. 
From the advent of the Dunstan Labor government in 1970 there 
were seemingly contradictory developments in the South Australian 
administration; a slow decentralization of power and authority, with 
individual departments and senior administrators having a some-
what greater degree of freedom of action and decision-making, but 
at the same time an increased central coordination of all adminis-
trative activity through the Premier's department. The formal 
instruments of coordination, checking, auditing and directing re-
mained in the hands of the PSB; there is always the need to check 
that departmental resources are properly apportioned, to ensure that 
duplication does not occur, to maintain proper management of 
departments and administrative functions, to oversee government 
works and construction, and to maintain accurate drafting and 
interpretation of laws and regulations. But the Premier's depart-
ment had become a "super-coordinating" body. 
Under Playford, who was the premier, treasurer, and held varying 
positions from 1938 to 1965, the Premier's department was the 
premier. Under Dunstan, the new department burgeoned from 
twelve staff in 1965 to 198 in 1976, with an ever-widening range 
of activities and responsibilities, encompassing economic, planning, 
development, trade, administrative services and arts policy. There 
was little policy development which did not, at some stage, involve 
this ubiquitous department. 
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In December 1976, following a recommendation of the inquiry, 
a department of Economic Development was created comprising 
four divisions which were hived off from the Premier's department 
(shown * on chart) and a statutory corporation division. This 
division of the original Premier's department is unlikely to modify 
the focus of policy-making, as the two departments are under the 
ministerial authority of the premier. R.D. Bakewell has become 
head of the new department while G.J. Inns, former chairman of 
the PSB, has succeeded him in the Premier's department. 
In 1977, then, there were three important loci of power in the 
public service, and the implications of the Corbett report provided 
for potential tension between them. The parallel developments of 
devolution of authority from the PSB to the individual departments; 
and the centralization of policy, planning and development in the 
Premier's department and the department of Economic Develop-
ment; and the assumption by the governor in executive council of 
the authority to issue policy directives has created, in effect, "a 
new ball game". 
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Over the past 120 years there have been six formal inquiries into 
the Victorian public service, four in the last century and two within 
the first 25 years of the twentieth century. Thus for the last 50 
years, the geography of the Victorian bureaucracy has been largely 
unmapped, and Sir Henry Bland found himself exploring what was 
virtually virgin territory in his inquiry. It was a journey which he 
undertook (if the analogy can be extended delicately) with evident 
enthusiasm and, one suspects, much enjoyment! 
Background to the report 
The first Victorian public service legislation was the Civil Service 
Act No. 160 of 1862.' It made little impact on the rampant 
patronage characteristic of the first state self-governing adminis-
trations and it was not until a further act was passed in 1883, 
establishing a board of three commissioners to administer a "merit" 
system of recruitment and promotion that any real headway was 
made towards abolishing the patronage system. 
This is not to say that a traditional Westminster structure of 
government with a minister served by his department immediately 
replaced the existing arrangements. A royal commission in 1917 
recorded that the Victorian strategy of setting up separate in-
strumentalities and agencies, thereby by-passing the public service 
commissioner (the board had been reduced to one commissioner 
in 1901) was already well established. The 1926 inquiry reinforced 
the royal commission's report, and deplored the absence of flexible 
machinery whereby officers from the instrumentalities could be 
transferred to the public service and vice versa. 
The persistence of this tradition of personal recommendation as 
the prevailing style of Victorian administrative arrangements has 
led to an Oakshottian perception of conservative politics as one of 
"attending to the arrangements of government" prevailing in the 
Victorian political and administrative scene up to 1949.^  Its 
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practical effect was to allow Sir Henry Bolte, when he captured 
the levers of political power in Victoria in 1955, to show how easily 
a regime of paternal political "bossism" could be superimposed on 
the Victorian machinery of government, set up as it was around 
personal domains. 
It was 1946 before the powers of appointment and promotion 
in the public service were transferred from the Governor in Council 
(i.e. the premier) in Victoria, and a Public Service Board set up, 
with wage and salary fixing responsibilities. Small wonder then that 
in his first report Sir Henry Bland commented scathingly that the 
present-day procedures of the Victorian public service in many 
instances continued to conform to the principles and practice of 
a century-old vintage, when quills and high stools were sufficient 
equipment. 
The present premier, R.J. Hamer, waited only to consolidate his 
leadership of the Liberal party with a handsome win in his own 
right at the 1973 elections, before appointing a board 
to inquire into and report upon the role, organizational structure, 
management and staffing of the Victorian Public Service, and to 
recommend action considered necessary to improve the effectiveness, 
efficiency and economy of the Service, having particular regard to— 
(1) Improvements that should be made in the machinery of govern-
ment relating to the organization, co-ordination and control of 
departments, including the possible redistribution of functions. 
(2) Methods of improving the efficiency of the use of human and allied 
resources; with particular emphasis on staff training and develop-
ment. 
(3) Possible changes in conditions of recruitment, employment and 
accommodation of public servants to ensure comparability with 
general standards elsewhere in the community and equality of 
opportunity for further personal development and advancement.' 
The Victorian inquiry was thus initiated in an orderly and 
systematic manner by a new premier, succeeding to office in a tidy 
and well-programmed transfer of power when Sir Henry Bolte 
resigned after seventeen years in office, the longest period for any 
premier in Victoria's political history. There was no hint of 
maladministration or corruption, just a suggestion of stuffiness and 
old-fashioned procedures dating from the last century, overdue for 
review and reform. It was a most appropriate way of initiating a 
Victorian board of inquiry, and the choice of Sir Henry Bland as 
its sole member was an equally "proper" decision. He had just 
completed an inquiry into the administration of Victorian transport, 
he was familiar with the temperate corridors of Victorian govern-
ment power, and he was known for his strong commitment to the 
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ministerial traditions of cabinet government. Rarely indeed have 
the circumstances for a fruitful inquiry been so favourable. 
Methods of working 
Sir Henry confessed to some doubts as to how best to conduct his 
inquiry {B 1.1.10). He argued that in his experience of the ways 
of public services, nothing much really came of public sittings, and 
in this situation there were no contending parties eager to present 
their cases. Thus if his inquiry was to be productive he saw himself 
as needing to sift through the voluminous public documents 
available, and actively seek out and encourage contributions from 
all those who might help. He began by addressing questionnaires, 
requesting information and seeking advice from the Public Service 
Board, the departments themselves, the Victorian Public Service 
Association, the Federation of Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union, those holding offices involved in relationships with the public 
service, and finally by public advertisement from the public at large. 
He also held lengthy discussions with parliamentarians, members 
of the Public Service Board and the service itself, and with officers 
of the Australian public service, the United Kingdom civil service, 
and with the Canadian public service commissioner. He preferred 
those discussions to take place in the interviewees' own offices, 
saying that this gave him greater insight into working conditions, 
and made for more flexibility in meeting less senior staff. His 
working style as a federal bureaucrat was always one of seeking 
out information for himself, and this personal preference undoubted-
ly set the pattern for the methods of working adopted by the 
Victorian inquiry. Sir Henry operated with a small personal staff 
only, producing his four voluminous reports at a minimum formal 
cost. The accounts might of course look rather different if the cost 
to the service of complying with his bombardment of questionnaires 
and requests for information were to be included; but Sir Henry 
Bland clearly preferred the style of the one-man investigator, and 
it is unlikely that cost factors were significant in determining the 
conduct of the inquiry. 
It was Sir Henry Bland's inquiry from start to finish, and the 
reports are clearly his personal documents in a way in which RCAGA 
reports could never be those of the chairman. They reflect his 
administrative strengths and weaknesses, developed during a long 
professional career as a public servant which culminated as 
permanent head. Born and educated in NSW, he nevertheless seems 
to have absorbed the Victorian "administrative style" which values 
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the personal and direct methods which are a legacy from the 
development of the patronage system in the service. Its persistence 
today is reflected in the unwillingness of structures in Victorian 
government to adapt to a more centralized administrative pro-
cedure, and as such is one of the important factors differentiating 
the state's fragmented machinery of government from that of the 
federal government and of the other states. In a curious sense the 
Bland inquiry throws into relief the administrative folkways of the 
Australian federal system, still so largely unexplored. 
Identifying the problems 
Sir Henry Bland found that his first problem lay in "delineating 
the ambit of the inquiry". For instance, it was not possible to define 
simply the subject of his terms of reference—the Victorian public 
service. If "the service" described only those employed under the 
Public Service Act, 1958, it meant that teachers, policemen, the 
staff of Victoria's great public utilities, and those working within 
geographic confines would all be excluded from the inquiry. What 
in fact do we understand by "the public service" in Victoria? It 
seemed to Sir Henry Bland that his first task was to describe the 
nature of employment under the Crown in Victoria over the past 
50 years, and the diligence he brought to that task has earned him 
the gratitude of those who have in the past sought such descriptions 
in vain. 
This diversity of public employment in Victoria is set out in Sir 
Henry's first report. There are those employed in the sixteen so-
called "departments", some of them dating back to the granting 
of responsible government; those employed in five special depart-
ments to all intents and purposes subsumed in their attached 
statutory corporations; those employed in the more recently created 
coordinating ministries; those specifically exempted from the Public 
Service Act or employed outside it; those employed in the teaching 
service, the police force, and in the great public instrumentalities; 
and finally the judiciary and office holders appointed by the 
Governor-in-Council. 
As a consequence, those employed under the Public Service Act 
in Victoria, about one sixth of the total, constitute but a minor 
proportion of the officers in Crown employment in Victoria. 
Whatever the reasons that have led Victorian governments, min-
isters, officials and parliaments to choose this fragmented, com-
partmented arrangement for their machinery of government, said 
Sir Henry, public administration in Victoria is clearly unrelated 
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to any philosophical framework or desire for consistency of decision. 
He therefore set about laying down the missing principles and 
concepts, a task clearly close to his heart and one he obviously 
relished for its own sake. 
Shaping the reports 
Reform in the conditions of public service in Victoria was seen by 
him to be urgent, and he therefore presented his report in four 
stages over several months. His first report, based on more than 
100 submissions, was about 200 pages long, and was presented to 
parliament on 30 September 1974, less than twelve months after 
he had been commissioned. It is thus a considerable achievement 
on its own, particularly in view of the fragmentation of government 
structures in Victoria, and the difficulty of threading a path through 
its labyrinth. He prepared chapters on staffing procedures, training 
and promotions procedures, the nature of the relationship between 
ministers and permanent heads, the structure and composition of 
the Public Service Board, and regulatory practices and employee 
participation. He concluded with about 150 recommendations, 
ranging from proposals for completely restructuring the existing 
service divisions to minor points concerning the introduction of a 
dynamic suggestion scheme. 
The second report presented some two months later was directed 
towards the premier's major concern with conservation, environ-
mental and land use planning and the administrative arrangements 
centring around them. Although Sir Henry decided to deal with 
this subject separately, he did not tackle its investigation as a 
separate task, nor did he adopt a different strategy in his investiga-
tions. 
Aware that it was a contentious and conflict-ridden area, he was 
careful in his introduction to point out that his terms of reference 
precluded him from responsibility for commenting on the ap-
propriateness or otherwise of policies already determined by 
parliament and the executive; his inquiry was directed to adminis-
trative arrangements for the implementation of existing determined 
policies. This did not mean that he saw himself as having nothing 
to contribute to the area, for while he did not wish to arbitrate 
between "the rights or wrongs of the new evangelists and prophets 
of doom", and despite the "difficulty of even comprehending just 
what conservation, environmental protection and land use planning 
was about", he felt that a number of relevant points followed as 
a consequence of the general deficiencies of the service noted in 
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the first report. However exotic the policy area, in Sir Henry Bland's 
view the proper administrative procedures for implementing it 
differed very little from those pertinent to more pragmatic functions 
of government. He applied his litmus tests to the newcomers to 
government policy-making accordingly. 
Not surprisingly, he was highly critical of the fragmentation of 
activity among agencies in the area, which as he saw it prevented 
the formulation of a comprehensive set of policy objectives and 
consistent decision-making and gave too little opportunity for 
ministerial control and responsibility. As a cabinet government 
traditionalist, Sir Henry Bland felt that the lack of opportunity 
reserved to the Victorian government to set its own policies in the 
light of its reading of community wishes was one of the most 
unsatisfactory consequences of Victoria's plethora of commissions, 
boards, authorities, committees, councils, corporations and agencies, 
protected from direct ministerial control by statute. 
Thus the second Bland report's 20-odd recommendations for the 
organizational and administrative arrangements for conservation, 
environmental and land use planning in Victoria were directed 
towards his objectives of ministerial control and accountability in 
this area, in accordance with Sir Henry's basic principles of central 
direction of policy-making and its implementation by a career public 
service. 
The inquiry's third report presented some months later was again 
directed towards an examination of the organizational structure, 
management and staffing of the administrative sectors of the 
Victorian Education department. The teaching service itself had 
initially been excluded from the jurisdiction of the inquiry by Sir 
Henry Bland, but he discovered in the course of his investigations 
that there were "deep-seated problems in the Department that 
needed resolution if it were to discharge its future responsibilities 
in an effective, efficient and economical manner". The challenge 
was obviously irresistible as the department is the biggest single 
employer under the Crown in Victoria and has a typically Victorian 
collection of statutory authorities attached to it, the most important 
being the Teachers' Tribunal. 
Again the problem as Sir Henry saw it was one of divided 
responsibility. As a political response to sectional pressure in 1946, 
the Teachers' Tribunal had been given jurisdiction over a class of 
"professional officers" recruited from the teaching service for 
administrative duties, leaving the remainder of the administrative 
staff within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Board. 
it was from this fateful decision of Parliament that many of the ills 
of the Department derive'' 
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said Sir Henry, and a later extension of the dichotomy in 1967 
added to its unworkability. A 1973 parliamentary extension of the 
tribunal's powers to cover professional appointees qualified as 
psychologists, speech therapists, librarians and so on, brought 
opposition from the Public Service Board, which quite rightly 
pointed out that the proposed legislation opened up another avenue 
for competition between salary fixing and appointing authorities 
within the area of Victorian government employment. The whole 
issue of who are, and who are not "professional officers" within 
the jurisdiction of the Teachers' Tribunal is shrouded in mystery, 
according to Sir Henry's report, and a matter for the Crown law 
authorities to unveil to allay the disquiet and concern expressed 
by the Public Service Board and the Victorian Public Service 
Association (VPSA). The possibility of serious industrial unrest over 
the issue was thought to be very real by Sir Henry, a fear events 
in 1976 and 1977 proved to be well-founded. 
In dealing with the problems facing the Education department 
in administrative terms of personnel, buildings, finance and general 
administration, the third Bland report pointed out that the terms 
of reference did not extend to a wide-ranging analysis of the schools 
and the community. Predictably, Sir Henry regarded the most 
pressing need as one of establishing a single "integrated 
homogenous administration, so that all personnel . . . have a 
common purpose and a single allegiance" {B III.7.10), and he 
directed his 30 or so recommendations towards establishing the 
clear lines of authority and responsibility, leading upwards towards 
the ministerial head he deemed desirable. 
The fourth and final report was not presented until the end of 
1975. Its content is something of a miscellany, picking up matters 
touched on in previous reports, and adding unrelated chapters on 
women in the public service, standards of accommodation, etc., in 
a kind of "clearing the desk" operation, rather than providing an 
overall summary of the inquiry. The most interesting material is 
to be found in Appendix A, an interim report dealing with the 
higher machinery of government specifically requested by the 
premier. Here Sir Henry made some attempt to grapple with the 
problems raised by the nature of the policy process in the modern 
administrative state, and examined the ramifications of the contem-
porary debate on how policy priorities are to be determined in 
Westminster style democracies. 
Such is the character of government these days and what governments 
affect to imagine is expected of them, that it is virtually impracticable 
to catalogue at any one time the needs that should be met, and to fix 
time frames for their satisfaction. . . . Thus it is virtually impracticable 
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to identify the totality of policies and programmes that a Government 
will aspire to inaugurate, let alone in fact do so.' 
He goes on to suggest ways in which the machinery of government 
in Victoria can be improved to equip and assist cabinet and 
ministers to reach the optimum decisions, and in so doing reaffirms 
his faith in the procedures of responsible government. 
The thrust of all the proposals made in the foregoing is simple and 
direct. It is to maximise the prospect of Cabinet having before it all 
relevant material when it comes to the point of decision-taking. 
Summing up the framework of values within which the Bland 
inquiry reports were shaped, it is clear that Sir Henry did not see 
his task as that of exploring the alternative ways whereby democrat-
ic governments might arrange their administrative structures today 
in the light of the new climate of policy-making in which experts 
are central to formulating feasible policy options. His belief that 
a cabinet system of government, "properly" administered, could 
meet the policy needs of contemporary governments was un-
shakeable, and his inquiry was directed wholly towards defining and 
solving the problems that he saw as preventing it from operating 
efficiently in Victoria. His reports reflect this belief, as well as being 
the outcome of the political expectations of the premier who 
instigated them (to whom Sir Henry gives a separate acknowl-
edgement "for his continuing support and interest"). The terms of 
reference were set and interpreted accordingly. The Victorian 
inquiry into the public service is thus the creation of its one member 
board of inquiry, Henry Armand Bland, Kt., CBE, a retired federal 
permanent head, and a man whose family background and life-long 
personal interest has been in the principles of public administration. 
Recommendations and implementation 
The first report 
The most voluminous report, this met with an immediate and direct 
legislative response to its recommendations. Bland considered that 
the existing Public Service Act was in fundamentals the 1883 Act, 
amended many times admittedly, but never completely refashioned 
so that it contained many provisions of detail philosophically 
inconsistent with provisions of substance. 
The Public Service today is hardly changed in fundamentals from that 
inaugurated a century ago: fragmentation of activity, with its concomi-
tant ill consequences is evident; communications between departments 
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are unsatisfactory so much so that in framing proposals full considera-
tion may not be given to their implications in relation to the functions 
and interests of other departments; there is some ignorance of, and 
aloofness from, industry and commerce; in place of anxiety to try to 
understand new social forces at work, there is some resentment of their 
consequences for the added burdens they place on departments; the 
partnership relation between Ministers and their senior officials leaves 
much to be desired; there are major staffing deficiencies in key 
administrative areas; far greater attention must be given to the 
management and personnel functions; the Public Service Act is outdated 
and the approach to its administration leaves much to be desired. 
Corrective action is needed in all of these areas . . . The starting point 
must be reform of the Public Service Act {B 1.6.72-74). 
Thus the first report contains a comprehensive and detailed 
account of the workings of the Victorian public service over the 
past fifty years, and, with its 150 recommendations arranged under 
a number of broad headings, presents a blueprint for its reform. 
The most important recommendation was that the old divisional 
structure, which restricted entry to the important administrative 
division to school leavers, should be abolished and replaced by a 
simplified, open three-divisional structure based on qualifications 
and merit. So that the quality of the grossly under-equipped (in 
educational terms) administrative division, with less than three per 
cent of its members graduates, could be improved. Sir Henry 
recommended that a graduate recruitment target of ten per cent 
should be set (roughly corresponding to the educational distribution 
of the population). As he rightly said, such certificates are no 
passport to administrative success, but modern public services make 
increasing intellectual demands on administrators, and Victoria's 
present administrative division was depressingly lacking in "ade-
quate numbers of qualified staff competent for higher policy and 
advice support work . . . there must be a programme for the 
resuscitation of what is now the administrative division". 
The Victorian Public Service Board also came in for criticism 
from Sir Henry, who concluded that "the manner in which the 
Public Service Board has been conducting its business leaves much 
to be desired." He blamed this partly on its antiquated promotion 
procedures, whereby it acted as an appeals board as well as a 
promotion authority, and partly because, involved in minutiae and 
detail, it had been unable to perceive "the full dimensions of the 
role of a central personnel agency" for the state, including the 
guardianship of its public administration. The board had taken 
almost no initiative in proposing administrative reform, he said, and 
had given little attention to the problems of overall management 
of the service, thus completely eschewing what Sir Henry called 
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a positive custodial role for securing the optimum in the adminis-
tration of the state of Victoria. 
Recommending the setting up of a separate promotions appeal 
board with an independent chairman. Sir Henry Bland went on to 
devote a special chapter in his report to the Victorian idiosyncracies 
of board composition. There are two boards in Victoria in fact, he 
said, one operating in the mental hygiene division, and the other 
in the general services division. Both divisions have a common 
chairman, and a common appointed government member, but the 
third member is elected, on the one hand by the permanent officers 
of the technical and general division of the mental hygiene branch 
(known as the mental hygiene representative), and on the other by 
the remainder of the permanent officers (the public service repre-
sentative). The concept of a representative element on the Victorian 
Public Service Board was originally introduced by Sir Albert 
Dunstan, Victoria's notorious Country Party minority premier of 
the 1930s and 1940s, but the provision only became law in 1946 
under the Cain Labor government. Sir Henry Bland sharply 
disapproved of the whole notion of employee representation on the 
administrative board of a career public service, and described the 
Cain bill as "a gem of sardonic irony." It transferred powers 
previously held by parliament and the Governor-in-Council to a 
Public Service Board composed of an independent chairman, and 
three other constituency members—a "government" member ac-
countable to the government of the day, and two elected members 
each with an electorate to please. Sir Henry said that his inquiry 
was left in no doubt . . . that the view is widely held in the Public 
Service that the "public service" representative is "instructed", 
"influenced," "leaned on" or "follows the VPSA line", and that this is 
reflected in the decisions of the Public Service Board {B 1.12.22) . . . 
To claim that the Public Service Board is independent and should 
remain independent is utterly irreconcilable with the representative 
status of its elected member. 
The Bland inquiry made a strong recommendation that the pro-
visions of the Act relevant to the elected representatives should be 
discarded. 
There is no place for representative status or election of a member of 
the Public Service Board. . . . There is no room for conflict of duty 
or interest in any member of the Public Service Board, for any possibility 
that the credibility of his dedication to his corporate responsibility to 
the Public Service Board might be questioned or for any compromise 
of the rapport that must exist between the Government and the Public 
Service Board (B 1.14.144). 
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Conflicting loyalties and a compromise of position are all that could 
be expected of such a board composition. There should be only one 
Public Service Board, composed of a chairman and two members 
appointed by the Governor-in-Council as the most "suitable" and 
"efficient". 
A new Public Service bill was introduced into the House on 19 
November 1974, only six weeks after Sir Henry had presented his 
first report. Speaking to the second reading debate,' the premier 
said that the government endorsed all the major recommendations 
save one, but 
in view of the increasing trend overseas towards employee participation 
however, it was not possible to accept the recommendation removing 
the elected member from the board, and the existing arrangements 
would be retained. 
It was a major triumph for the Victorian Public Service Association 
which had campaigned strongly against Sir Henry's stand, and 
proof that the VPSA retained its 1946 grip on the machinery of 
Victorian government. 
Hamer accepted the soundness of the Bland proposal to abolish 
the old administrative division. In its place, the bill set up a new 
structure which separated out the permanent heads in one group, 
and provided for the creating of a new first division, comprising 
"administrative and professional officers with important responsi-
bilities" who are the likely permanent heads and senior executives 
of the future. A new second division catered for most of the 
remaining professional and administrative officers, and the technical 
and general division officers made up a new third division. Along 
with the new structure went the revised recruitment procedures 
recommended, new and more flexible procedures for transfers, 
promotions and appeals (including the setting up of the separate 
promotions appeal board), revised discipline procedures and the 
consolidation and modification of a number of general public service 
regulations relating to long service, women in the public service, 
and so on. Hamer finished his second reading speech by compliment-
ing Sir Henry on the diligence and despatch with which he had 
completed his first report, albeit with a modicum of caustic humour, 
and the chief parliamentary counsel for his speedy preparation of 
the bill. 
The opposition did not oppose the passage of the lengthy bill,' 
and as a non party-political measure, the second reading and a 
number of minor amendments in committee went through the 
House without delay. Such a smooth, almost frictionless progress 
from the commissioning of the inquiry to legislation in a little over 
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twelve months may well have set something of a record for an 
inquiry of this nature, suggesting perhaps that it may constitute 
a blueprint for similar types of investigations. However, when the 
acceptable recommendations are examined carefully, it is clear that 
they are incremental proposals in line with contemporary career 
public service expectations, and politically easy to initiate given the 
parlous condition of the Victorian public service revealed by the 
Bland inquiry. The recommendation to change the status quo by 
doing away with what the VPSA called "the right of officers in the 
Service to elect their representative on the Board" was a very 
different matter. It would have led to political confrontation on an 
issue out of tune with the present-day social climate which favours 
worker participation. A "consensus" premier, Hamer tends to avoid 
unnecessary (as he sees it) and divisive conflict. Modest and 
politically acceptable reform is one thing, restructuring of the status 
quo likely to lead to political conflict something else, even if it is 
strongly recommended by eminent advisers. 
The second report 
The inquiry's second report received a very different reception. It 
was Sir Henry's firm behef that sensible comprehensive, integrated 
and coordinated public policies were only possible in Victoria if the 
functions of government came under the Public Service Act, and 
he viewed the plethora of agencies responsible for conservation and 
land use planning with particular disfavour. Victoria has certainly 
used the device of statutory corporations to deal with the functions 
of government with vigour, he said, but 
it is to be doubted whether any dispassionate observer of the fragmenta-
tion of public administration in Victoria that has occurred could be 
found to remark that it has been an unmitigated success. 
In fact, controversy has also surrounded the Ministry of Conserva-
tion since it was first set up in 1972, and there certainly seems 
to be no guarantee that the extension of ministerial control will 
dampen political conflict in the as yet undefined area of conservation 
and environmental planning. 
Ad hoc legislative responses to the new demands, spawning a 
series of statutory boards and associated advisory and appeals 
committees, councils and tribunals was the problem in the adminis-
tration of conservation and planning policies, as Sir Henry Bland 
saw it. Coordination was the answer. This is indisputable, but as 
Sir Henry wrestled with the difficulties of inducing agencies to 
coordinate in the Victorian administrative maze, he slipped further 
and further away from his ideal of one centralized administration. 
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Eventually he recommended that the three most important separate 
agencies, the Soil Conservation Authority and the Noxious Weeds 
Destruction Board, both set up in 1958, and the Environment 
Protection Authority set up in 1970, be brought together within 
a department so that responsibility for policy could be vested in 
a minister. 
Because the divergent views and arguments on land use planning, 
arising out of a variety of community responses, had in Sir Henry's 
view so far produced little more than amorphous uncertainty and 
controversy, he considered that the principles of ministerial respon-
sibility for planning had to be underlined. It was for the minister 
alone to essay an interpretation of the community's purposes, and 
to determine policy, including deciding the objectives to be achieved 
by the relevant administering agencies.* Picking up the policy/ 
administration debate characteristic of academic literature. Sir 
Henry attempted to lay down the principles which might govern 
the interplay between the two areas where land-use planning is 
concerned. However he was unable to add anything fresh to this 
perennial debate and ended by reaflfirming his conviction that 
a Weberian hierarchial structure was the most satisfactory 
{B II.4.18). In the crunch it is the man at the top who decides 
in Sir Henry's administrative world of reports. 
The problem is that the real world of political conflict is 
somewhat different, and it is not always possible or desirable to 
screen the public administration world from the political envelope 
which surrounds it. The second Bland report hints at this difficulty 
and acknowledges that the existence of a number of independent 
agencies in the area, with a developed web of internal and external 
relationships, had to be taken into account. In recommending that 
a coordinating committee made up of representatives from these 
agencies be set up. Bland fell back on a device similar to the federal 
government inter-departmental committee mechanism. In addition, 
a commission for conservation, environment and land use planning 
was to be created, with the broad function of advising the minister 
and keeping something of a supervisory eye on the agencies for 
him. Its membership was to be varied, with regular members coming 
from the public agencies. Trades Hall, and local government; it was 
even to have a sociologist. Other utility members would attend on 
an ad hoc basis when matters relevant to their functions were to 
be discussed. 
Bland was concerned to prevent each agency from acting 
independently of the others; the whole thrust behind his recommen-
dations was 
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to provide integrated coordinated machinery to embrace the totality of 
conservation, environmental and land use planning 
and to prevent the proliferation of separate authorities which, as 
he saw it, carried with it such heavy administrative penalties 
{B II.5.55). Yet despite his concern with administrative fragmenta-
tion, the effect of the second Bland report was to add two more 
tiers of responsibility, so that ministerial differences of opinion 
concerning jurisdiction in this sensitve area could be resolved. These 
were first, a standing ministerial committee to consider papers 
prepared by the Commission which could have a bearing on the 
responsibilities of more than one minister, providing a kind of pre-
cabinet digestion process. Second, Sir Henry felt that the problem 
of strategic planning, largely unconsidered in Victoria, was urgent, 
and he therefore recommended that a state planning board be set 
up to service cabinet, made up of a small, highly competent, inter-
disciplinary staff. Such a board would need to be situated within 
the Premier's department to ensure its authority, and it would also 
need a nucleus membership of high officials for the same reason. 
The Bland structure depended almost entirely on strong political 
leadership, something of a rarity in state politics, and he did not 
really face the problem of how central direction could be achieved 
in the face of entrenched agency separation and fragmentation. 
It is more difficult to point to policy outcomes from the second 
Bland report, although Sir Henry himself commented recently that 
he thought Victoria's planning legislation was beginning to work. 
Hamer's main thrust has always been into planning programmes 
necessary to give substance to his "quality-of-life" values, and as 
such his government's objectives have been completely different 
from the concern with economic growth and development which 
motivated the previous premier. Sir Henry Bolte. His 1976 budget 
speech began with a statement of his "softer" goals, and he went 
on to declare himself to be 
somewhat dismayed by the modern jargon of economists—inputs and 
outputs, macroeconomics and microeconomics—and the tendency to 
forget that man, his fulfilment and his destiny is what life is all about." 
An important reason for his haste in bringing forward proposals 
for public service reform was the necessity to improve "quality-
of-life" stemming from the changing role of government and its 
involvement in these new areas which had added to the already 
onerous responsibilities of the public service.'" Taken together his 
comments are clear indications of the distance which separates him 
from earlier premiers. 
Sir Henry Bland's second report on conservation and environmen-
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tal planning recommended a bureaucratic planning structure, with 
most of the policy inputs coming from the public service. After 
collating, sifting and examining alternative options, public servant 
advisers would present the choices available to cabinet for the 
government to make its decision {B II.7.13, 14). Hamer on the other 
hand has constructed an elaborate planning hierarchy extending 
over the state, centred on the premier's office. It includes Sir 
Henry's cabinet coordinating committee as one of four cabinet 
standing committees, along with a cabinet policy and priority review 
committee which the premier chairs, and a companion policy and 
priority review board, bringing in experts from treasury, conserva-
tion, development and planning, as well as private sector represent-
atives. This is also chaired by the premier. He oversees statements 
of planning policy which emerge from cabinet as a result of the 
planning process and provide the guidelines, and keeps a weather 
eye on the activities of the town and country planning board, the 
regional planning authorities, and the state coordination council, 
the agencies responsible for implementing his planning statements. 
It has therefore become a much more political process than Sir 
Henry Bland envisaged, and there is little evidence that the public 
service inputs are significant. Whether Sir Henry was responsible 
for putting the instruments to further his policy goals into the 
premier's hands, or whether Hamer with his judicial administrative 
mind shaped the outlines of Victoria's planning machinery, is 
uncertain. The second Bland report is only 57 pages, and its "tone" 
throughout is less confident, while its recommendations make few 
major suggestions for change. Only three small agencies, the 
Environment Protection Council, the Land Conservation Council 
and the Port Phillip Authority are eliminated, and the additional 
machinery proposed more than offsets these, while the fragmenta-
tion of agencies remains. The outcome of the inquiry into the 
administrative arrangements for conservation, environmental and 
land use planning in Victoria seems to suggest that while stable 
administrative structures can be set up where policy priorities are 
settled and the major conflicts of interest have drained away, 
administrative arrangements by themselves are unlikely to do much 
to resolve political conflict. Bland's recommendations do not really 
support his conviction that even in a contentious and conflict-ridden 
area proper administrative procedures can overcome the difficulties, 
and the divided environmental scene, fuelled by what Sir Henry 
describes as "the fervour of the new evangelism, focused on the 
quality of life and the prophets of doom", still generates highly 
political issues in Victoria. The effectiveness of the inquiry's 
bureaucratic solutions for subduing this conflict has yet to be 
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demonstrated, despite Sir Henry Bland's optimism for their efficacy, 
and political consensus on planning issues still has to be worked 
out as Hamer has found to his cost. His own Liberal party members 
are beginning to oppose his planning decisions and what seems to 
be needed is policy-making machinery to resolve the political 
conflict planning programmes provoke among experts and special-
ists, as well as among the general public. To the devising of these 
kinds of administrative structures the Bland inquiry makes almost 
no contribution." 
The third report 
It comes as no surprise that the recommendations of the third report 
were also directed towards integration and eliminating the dichot-
omy within the Education department arising from the cleavage 
between the teaching service administration and the public service 
administration, and the dual powers wielded by the Public Service 
Board and the Teachers' Tribunal over non-teaching personnel. A 
single homogeneous, integrated administration was a necessity in 
Sir Henry's view if the effective, efficient and economical function 
of the department was to be attained.'^ One of the more telling 
illustrations which underlines the inefficiency of the departmental 
procedures is a chart setting out the twenty different administrative 
steps necessary to get approval to undertake minor repairs and 
alterations to schools. It concludes 
The whole process takes months before any work can be started 
{B 111.5.89 and 111 Appendix B). 
Staff members at schools would only agree wholeheartedly. 
In terms of the Bland recommendations, the Victorian Education 
department is still largely "unreformed", a situation likely to prevail 
given the strength of Victoria's militant teacher unions and Hamer's 
consensus rather than confrontationist political style. Education has 
always had top political priority in Victoria, with a greater 
percentage of the state budget being devoted to its provision than 
in any other state." The Victorian premier however is more 
concerned with environmental planning policies and their implemen-
tation, and if his 1976 budget speech is any guide, he intends to 
stay with the tried and true staples of education policy— 
pupil/teacher ratios, increased grants, education allowances and per 
capita payments, and a building programme. Administrative re-
forms which might provoke the conflict-prone education sector into 
confrontation seems an unlikely nettle for the present Victorian 
government to grasp. 
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The fourth and final report 
Sir Henry finished his inquiry by stressing the "human" aspects 
of the personnel functions of a career public service, saying that 
public services depend for their purposes essentially on their human 
resources and the way in which they are managed . . . and much leeway 
must be made up before the Service can regard itself as comparable 
with the practice of the broad run of industry and commerce employing 
like staff (5 IV.8.2, IV.8.9). 
Amenities needed to be upgraded, counselling services developed, 
and broad staff development policies established. The creaking 
machinery of the Treasury clearances system required overhauling, 
and the misuse of temporary employment needed prevention. 
Formal discriminations against women in the public service had 
been abolished in the 1974 Act, but Sir Henry felt that attitudinal 
problems remained, and 
it will be some years before [women] appear in the higher echelons 
of the service in numbers approaching, for example, the Commonwealth 
service. 
He also made a number of functional redistributory proposals, 
but saw 
little point in discussing the various bases on which the functions of 
departments [in the Victorian government] might be distributed. On 
the whole in public administration coherence of function is the normal 
criterion, and if this was pursued in Victoria, the state should be able 
to manage very well with no more than half the present number of 
departments. However pursuit of logic has very little force where purely 
political considerations determine the number of Ministers to whom the 
departmental structure must be accommodated, and where the existence 
of small and relatively unimportant departments have positive value 
when Premiers face the task of allocating portfolios {B IV:6.6). 
In the end. Sir Henry Bland, an archetypal Westminster bureau-
crat, bowed to the realities of the political forces in a democratic 
system. It was a fitting finish to his inquiry, which he concluded 
by juggling the pieces of the Victorian administrative jigsaw around 
to bring about a tidier outcome. His final recommendation was that 
a Victorian Directory, containing information about the Parliament and 
the Courts, and under each department and agency, the legislation 
administered by it, and its functions, whereabouts, telephone, telex, etc. 
details, structure and principal officers 
be compiled. If no more ever came of the Bland inquiry than the 
continuing existence of such a map and glossary, it might still come 
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to be regarded as a sufficient justification for his efforts by those 
lost souls who have sought in vain for so long to find their way 
about the structures of Victorian government. 
Overall relevance of the inquiry 
Sir Henry Bland himself said in his preface to his final report that 
he did not 
pretend that every aspect of the Board's terms of reference has now 
been covered. Pursuit of every aspect would be a never-ending commit-
ment. Moreover the outcome of the Inquiry is not simply to be measured 
by what has happened or may happen as a direct consequence of the 
successive Reports: much has occurred in departments and agencies as 
a result of the free ranging discussions and exchanges the Board has 
had with Ministers, Permanent Heads, heads of agencies, senior officials 
and others. 
He went on to say that he felt the service needed time to digest 
and implement the new Public Service Act and his many recommen-
dations, and that when this had been done he had every confidence 
that sensible solutions to the problems discussed would be found. 
Is this the ultimate measure of the eff"ectiveness of the Victorian 
board of inquiry into the public service? It may well be that the 
catalyst function of such inquiries is their best achievement, 
supplemented by a modicum of long overdue reform legislation as 
political leaders seize the opportunity to bring in the changes which 
inquiry reports offer. Given the incremental public policy climate 
of contemporary western democratic societies it is unlikely that 
initiatives for radical reform will flow from formal inquiries and 
their "establishment" membership. Moreover Victoria is the state 
least likely to provide the exception. It is something of a quirk of 
the state's administrative history that in the context of the state's 
ramshackle and fragmented structures of government, an inquiry 
which recommended the conventional extension of ministerial 
control and cabinet responsibility under an integrated Public Service 
Act was in one sense putting forward radical proposals, if by radical 
is meant seeking to change the status quo. Sir Henry Bland's 
recommendations were wholly traditional in their substance but this 
should not blind us to the political difficulty of implementing them 
in a state where "the Statute Book bulges with legislation establish-
ing commissions, boards, authorities, committees, councils, corpo-
rations and other agencies, and where Divisions within them 
function as separate principalities, going their own way within a 
relationship akin to that between England and Wales". 
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Ultimately administrative reform is an outcrop from the per-
spectives on social change that take hold, more likely to follow such 
changes than to lead the way. 
Administrative reform and social change 
Ideally administrative reforms would seek to structure changing 
social perspectives and values as well as follow on them. However, 
as Professor Self remarks, we once thought that the problem facing 
inquiries into the public service was one of ensuring that "the 
bureaucracy is sufficiently responsive to the political will". Today 
we have only to state this clearly to know that it is no longer 
credible. 
The implications which follow from this dual expectation about 
the outcomes of administrative reform were something Sir Henry 
Bland never really came to grips with in his inquiry. Convinced 
that bureaucratic responsiveness and responsibility in public policy-
making is best achieved by extending ministerial control, he was 
unable to see that in Victoria the comparative weakness of the 
state's ministerial structures is partly the result of state politicians' 
direct understanding of the nature of political responsiveness. 
Electoral ferment arises: political leaders, desiring to meet the 
pressures directly, bypass the Public Service Board and Treasury 
control and legislate to set up direct agencies of government. Policy 
outcomes in turn become the responsibility of those agencies: the 
politician has a buffer between him and subsequent electoral 
pressures. 
State political leaders understand intuitively that the structures 
of responsible government—ministerial departments staffed by 
career public servants—can be real stumbling blocks to such a 
direct political response and Victorian cabinets have shown no 
particular desire to find themselves rendered impotent by their own 
structures of government. Thus it seems likely that the creation of 
autonomous agencies will persist as an administrative response to 
political demands in Victoria, however much it runs counter to Sir 
Henry Bland's principles of public administration. 
Administrative reform and political reform are therefore inex-
tricably mixed in the state. The present premier has superimposed 
upon the state's multiplicity of administrative structures, not super-
bureaucrats but super-ministries, served by bureaucracies much 
smaller than those of the agencies with which they interact. For 
example, a tiny ministry of Fuel and Power is linked to the State 
Electricity Commission of Victoria, with its 8,000 employees, and 
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also the Gas and Fuel Corporation and the Victorian Pipelines 
Commission. A Transport ministry has attached to it the giant 
Railways Commission, and the Melbourne and Metropolitan 
Tramways Board. A ministry of Conservation attempts to reconcile 
the clashing agencies of land use in Victoria. The state's planning 
machinery consists of a network of committees and commissions 
which has bypassed traditional ministries and statutory corporations 
indiscriminately, and has developed an advisory and executive 
framework which owes little to the conventional precepts of public 
administration. 
The real crux of Hamer's arrangements lies not so much in their 
structure—whether they are departments or autonomous agencies 
—as in the validity of his interpretation of Victorian citizens' 
expectations of political and social response. Do they want their 
environment to be more closely controlled than it has been in the 
past, and are they desirous of having their cultural life upgraded; 
or are they still concerned with the outcrops of economic growth 
—with better transport facilities, adequate electricity supplies, and 
so on? If the premier is correct in his assessment of the directions 
of social change in Victoria today, then his administrative arrange-
ments will meet with electorate approval whatever they may be, 
but if he is wrong, then the administrative sector will share with 
the politicians the community's disapproval of the policy outcomes. 
Administrative reform cannot be considered in isolation from what 
Professor Self has styled the "social agenda", and the major 
weakness of the Bland inquiry was its determination to confine itself 
to a bureaucratic agenda for reform. 
One of the contemporary tasks facing administrative sectors of 
government is the need to monitor social change to be able to select 
out those shifts in opinion which are relevant for public policy 
decisions. The traditional political transmission belts of party and 
pressure groups, dependent as they are on social categorizing 
developed in the nineteenth century, are severely limited as sources 
of policy inputs in a world where issues are often understood only 
by experts. Only by mobilizing expert opinion and subjecting it to 
open democratic scrutiny so that it too can feel the currents of social 
priorities for itself, can we hope to ensure the responsiveness of 
the modern administrative state. Sir Henry Bland's policy advisers 
hidden away behind a ministerial facade—the "faceless mandarins" 
—are no longer acceptable to contemporary democratic political 
opinion. 
An inquiry which looked at the structures of the Victorian 
government as case studies in political responsiveness or as examples 
of the relationships that exist between social, political and bureau-
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cratic agendas would seem to have much to offer to modern public 
administration. Often those who have headed its autonomous 
agencies in the past. Sir Harold Clapp at the turn of the century. 
Sir John Monash in the 1920s, and more recently J. Fraser in the 
1970s, have been articulate spokesmen for the new social values 
which their agencies were set up to serve. They were politicians 
as skilful as those elected directly by the "people", administrators 
fully aware of the link between their organizations and their social 
clienteles, and as such masters of the art of administrative reform. 
The major weakness in Victoria's autonomous agencies has been 
the absence of machinery for disbanding them when they no longer 
articulate and implement significant social values. Goal displace-
ment of the kind exemplified by the Victorian Housing Commission 
in the early 1970s"' leads to a hardening of the arteries in the 
organizations as they age, a lack of responsiveness perhaps even 
more wilful than that of the entrenched career bureaucrats of 
contemporary folklore. How can we retain the impetus to social 
change which led to the establishment of the agencies in the first 
place? How can we build an element of responsiveness into their 
structures and maintain it? These are the key questions brought 
to mind by the Victorian administrative scene, the answers to which 
must surely throw some light on possible solutions to the adminis-
trative dilemma to which Sir Henry Bland's recommendations for 
more centralized ministerial structures only turn a blind eye. 
There is something of a common thread of disappointment 
running through the reactions to and comments on Australia's 
present crop of administrative inquiries. Criticism of their unwilling-
ness to confront squarely the problem of fitting the traditional 
administrative structures to changed social expectations is an 
underlying theme, and apart from some cosmetic reforms there is 
a sense that little has really been achieved as a result of the 
investigations. Have we expected too much of the inquiries? Is a 
catalyst function all that can really be looked for? 
It seems likely that unless we regard such inquiries as a political 
activity, and appoint to them commanding political spokesmen with 
skills of articulation and leadership, we cannot hope for much more. 
For if the inquiries really were to act as agents for social reform, 
the members themselves would need to be social reformers, activists 
involved in the social issues raised by the inquiries and adminis-
trative agitators rather than representatives of prevailing social 
attitudes. If we put the problem into its context of social reform, 
we can see how unreasonable it is to expect demagoguery from the 
establishment figures conventionally appointed to conduct such 
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inquiries. We will in fact be fortunate if they perform even the 
catalyst function. 
Professor Self suggests in his concluding paragraphs that Aust-
ralia may have missed the opportunity provided by the recent 
inquiries to look into the future. "Are Australians too prosperous, 
phlegmatic and introverted to want to look ahead?" he asks. 
Perhaps the answer to his question lies in the intellectual strait-
jacket that confines Australia; isolated and distant from the cultures 
of the other western democracies which are received at second-hand, 
we have never engaged much in comparative intellectual thought 
about the nature of Australian society. We may well pay too little 
attention to the kind of society in which we live, and too much 
to the pragmatic details of its day-to-day arrangements, a per-
spective which the recent inquiries reflect all too accurately. 
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The New South Wales Machinerv 8 
of Government Review 
Ross Curnow 
The 1974 machinery of government review in NSW has already been 
described in three articles published in the Australian Journal of 
Public Administration.^ The first, by H.H. Dickinson and G. 
Gleeson, chairman and member respectively of the Public Service 
Board, contrasts the 'in-house' machinery of government approach 
of NSW to administrative reform with the wider more open and 
tribunal-like RCAGA and the South Australian inquiry into its public 
service. The second, by Barry Moore, then secretary to the cabinet 
sub-committee on machinery of government, outlines the way in 
which the sub-committee operated and the changes in the structure 
of state government which resulted from the review. The more 
recent, by B.R. Davies, then permanent head of the Premier's 
department, describes the reorganization of cabinet following the 
work of the sub-committee. 
This chapter necessarily traverses some of the ground already 
covered in these articles, but it also speculates upon some of the 
political factors at work in the review; "speculates" because 
relatively little of the data is publicly available as yet, and not all 
of the key protagonists are willing to be interviewed. The paper 
is thus in many respects premature. However, in an attempt to 
provide the speculation with some substance, in the final section 
the review has been related to certain of the more popular notions 
about the character of government in NSW as well as to one or two 
issues in the field of administrative reform. 
The origins of the review 
One individual more than any other is credited with having initiated 
the review—T.L. Lewis, Liberal member for the country electorate 
of Wollondilly, then minister for Lands and Tourism, later premier 
but subsequently deposed and relegated to the portfolio of local 
government. As minister for Lands and Tourism he acquired a 
reputation as a reformist minister, particularly in terms of the 
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administration of his department. Lands, an "old line" department 
which traces its origins to the foundation of the colony, had 
something of a Dickensian image, reinforced by its location in an 
historic unfurbished Victorian building.^ It had an unenviable 
reputation for paperasserie—a single transaction requiring the 
minister's approval was often supported by documentation so 
voluminous that it was wheeled into his office on a trolley.^ Although 
Lands administrators had from time to time worked to simplify 
the procedure, a reformed system had never been pushed beyond 
the administrative level to cabinet. Rightly or wrongly (wrongly, 
as events later proved), public servants perceived Country party 
interests as immovably opposed to any change in the existing system 
of land tenure and its administration. No minister, they felt, would 
be able to alter the political status quo; yet Lewis did argue 
successfully for change and his reputation as an activist minister 
interested in administrative reform was launched. His influence also 
extended to the lower levels of the organization. When a disgrunted 
member of the public complained that to purchase a map from the 
department it was necessary to go to three separate counters (one 
of which was the cashier's office on another floor), and suggested 
what would now be termed job enrichment in the interest of client 
satisfaction, Lewis was quick to agree. Within two days procedures 
had been revised; purchases in future were to be made at the one 
counter and Lewis thanked the writer for drawing his attention to 
this antiquated procedure. 
Here then was a textbook case of the "administratively oriented" 
minister sought by RCAGA—a point which will be taken up later, 
as will the question of misperception by senior public servants of 
what is politically feasible. For the present it is sufficient to note 
that it was the image of Lewis as an activist minister clearing 
administrative infarctions which differentiated him from his col-
leagues. Capitalizing on this image, he apparently pushed for a 
thoroughgoing investigation of the whole government machine—a 
no-nonsense, efficient, businesslike review which would tidy up the 
anomalies and illogicalities in structure and function resulting from 
1 18 years of "ad hoccery". This investigation, however, was to be 
in the form of a cabinet review, thus locking the political element 
into the process of administrative reform. Another consequence— 
although this would not necessarily have resulted from cabinet's 
involvement as such—was the speed with which decisions were 
taken and implemented. 
It is not clear whether a Coombs/Corbett style of inquiry with 
relatively wide terms of reference was considered as an option by 
cabinet; although RCAGA had been announced only one month 
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previously, the South Australian inquiry had been at work for over 
a year. By July 1974 Sir Henry Bland in Victoria also provided 
another model. One factor contributing to the "in-house" decision 
(apart from the political necessity to differ from the approach of 
the federal government) may have been a feeling on the part of 
cabinet that the administrative machine lacked central coordination; 
that "the fast flowing currents" of powerful state authorities needed 
their power regulated by a political master control; that cabinet 
no longer directed and monitored public policy in NSW (indeed if 
it ever did). On the other hand this "power distribution" dimension 
of the review could well have been as much an unintended 
consequence of, as a reason for, the investigation. The major forces 
leading to the review may still have been the current fashion for 
public service inquiries and the interest of Lewis in machinery of 
government issues. The political state of play in cabinet at that 
time was conducive to the personal projects of ministers. The 
premier. Sir Robert Askin, was within six months of retirement 
and, according to his critics, was more concerned with establishing 
the record of the longest serving NSW state premier and his 
forthcoming overseas trip than with the day-to-day business of 
government. Then too the Public Service Board welcomed such an 
inquiry, as one of its long standing concerns was the lack of any 
effective central mechanism which viewed and directed NSW govern-
ment as a whole, particularly the powerful statutory bodies. This 
"policy vacuum" aspect of NSW government will be taken up later. 
Understandably the press gave only limited coverage to the 
announcement of the review, despite the enthusiastic claim that this 
was the first full scale analysis of state functions and structure since 
responsible government, and that greater efficiency would result 
from the sub-committee's recommendations and the consequent 
streamlining of state machinery—or "the Knives are Out—State 
to Cut Public Service", as the Telegraph put it." (The opposition's 
criticisms, which centred on the closed nature of the review, were 
virtually ignored.) No alleged or proved scandal led to the review 
—this at least would have ensured good media coverage; it was 
announced in relatively placid circumstances. And if public adminis-
tration is a subject which lacks sex appeal, then machinery of 
government questions are likely to leave readers in a comatose state. 
Even in parliament the matter was raised only once during 1974 
(apart from a brief factual statement by Askin during debate on 
an appropriation bill); that was in the form of a question by Neville 
Wran, then leader of the opposition, who asked the deputy premier 
how he reconciled his assurance, when announcing the review, that 
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it would in no way undermine the public service with a recent threat 
by the premier to stand down public servants.^ 
The one group which did react strongly to the announcement 
was the Public Service Association of NSW. Its general secretary 
wrote to the Sydney Morning Herald criticizing the government 
not for the review itself, but for ignoring the association in the 
selection of members of the study groups.' He went on to urge that 
the opposition also be represented, and the criticisms were repeated 
in the August issue of Red Tape, the association's journal.' The 
government did not accede to either demand. 
The operation of the review 
Details of the way in which cabinet went about the review have 
already been outlined by the former secretary to the sub-committee 
on machinery of government.* Essentially its method of operation, 
as befitted the style of such an inquiry, was one which stressed 
efficiency in the classical sense of the term. Very few resources were 
allocated to the review, the first and major phase of which was 
completed within four to five months. Its one concession to 
"participation" was the co-option of ten business executives to the 
various study groups. On certain criteria the review was an 
irrationally conducted piece of "ad hoccery"; for instance, its 
methodology seemed to "emerge" as the investigation progressed. 
On others it was a relatively sophisticated exercise in rationality; 
witness the decision to involve ministers heavily in the review, thus 
committing them morally at least to implementation of the recom-
mendations. 
The review was overseen by a committee of four—Lewis (con-
venor); Wal C. Fife, minister for Mines and Power and assistant 
treasurer; G.F. Freudenstein, minister for Conservation and Cul-
tural Activities; and F.M. Hewitt, minister for Labour and Industry 
and Consumer Affairs. It was known as the cabinet sub-committee 
on machinery of government. Under this sub-committee were eight 
"study groups", each chaired by a minister as follows: 
Area of study Minister 
Education, health and welfare E.A. Willis 
Justice and legal J.C. Maddison 
Construction and industrial L.A. Punch 
Energy and resources T.L. Lewis 
Regulatory, planning and development Sir John Fuller 
Finance Wal C. Fife 
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Government services G.F. Freudenstein 
Other business undertakings F.M. Hewitt 
A later addition was: 
Controlling agencies (Public Service Board, 
Treasury, Auditor General's) Sir Charles Cutler 
This grouping differed from the existing allocation of portfolios 
and possibly owed something to earlier machinery of government 
studies undertaken by the administrative research committee of the 
PSB. Each study group, in addition to the minister, comprised the 
heads of about six departments and statutory bodies, two or three 
representatives from middle management and a senior business 
executive. The ministers were those regarded as the most influential 
and/or active at the time, and the business executives were current 
or past heads or directors of such companies as CSR, Unilever, 
Brambles and the AMP Society—"the doyens of the business world", 
according to the leader of the opposition.' The study groups thus 
justified the adjective "high-powered". It is also worth noting that 
the deputy chairman of each group, a public servant who in some 
cases played a central role, was deliberately chosen from outside 
the area of study to counterbalance, to some extent, the influence 
of "insiders". 
The terms of reference laid down by cabinet were that the study 
groups examine: 
1. the necessity for the various functions of government being 
carried out and whether any can be eliminated, 
2. whether the machinery at present existing for carrying out the 
various functions is the most appropriate, 
3. whether any re-arrangement or rationalization of services would 
achieve better utilisation of resources, and 
4. ways and means of effecting greater economies.'" 
The modus operandi of the groups has been described as: 
First to require each participating organization to identify the principal 
and subsidiary functions it performed, to define the nature and extent 
of staff engaged, and their allocation on a percentage basis to the 
department's or to the authority's activities, and finally to show the total 
expenditure for each organization and broadly how it was allocated in 
relation to the identified functions. 
The Government then formulated questions which it invited each group 
to study. While placing no limitation whatever on the range of matters 
that could be considered, these questions were intended to ensure that 
each group gave consideration to the fundamental issues which the 
Government had in mind in setting up the study. These fundamental 
issues related directly to the quality and efficiency of the outputs being 
produced by the New South Wales public sector as a whole." 
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Within three months the study groups, which met twice each 
week, had reported to the sub-committee. Not surprisingly the key 
member of each group varied; in some cases ministers played an 
important role, in others deputy chairmen, although it appears that 
each of the business executives also contributed significantly to 
advancing the work of the groups. In monitoring the progress of 
the groups, the sub-committee (advised at its weekly meeting by 
a small band of important officials, particularly the chairman of 
the PSB and the under-secretary of the Treasury), encountered issues 
which could be resolved only after further studies had been 
completed. The majority of these were carried out by the public 
service, but some were completed by outside consultants on a 
contract basis. Even within this contract group of researchers, many 
were recently retired public servants with specialized knowledge in 
the field. This policy, although ensuring expert consultants, at the 
same time reinforced the closed nature of the review. 
One striking feature of the whole operation was the shoestring basis 
on which the committee structure was serviced. Each study group 
had an "executive officer", a middle ranking public servant who 
undertook the secretarial work in addition to his normal job (in 
some cases, of course, allowances for this extra load were made 
by the officer's department). Even the sub-committee itself for some 
time had only one full time official, a former PSB inspector who acted 
as secretary, although this nucleus was later to grow to four as 
a machinery of government unit within the board. A good indication 
of the extent to which such husbanding of administrative resources 
was carried was the preparation of press releases outlining the 
changes flowing from the review—the entire inspectorate of the 
board was mobilized for one day to complete the releases. 
The sub-committee's method of working, then, appears to have 
been very much the empirical, pragmatic approach of "sensible" 
administrators who were recommending changes in structure and 
functions on the basis of their experience to provide a "logical", 
tidy whole. But as has repeatedly been pointed out there are any 
number of alternative structures, each of which is "logical". Herbert 
Simon elaborated upon the difficulties of "principles" for the 
practitioner faced with reorganization proposals over 35 years ago,'' 
and in answer to the question "why divide the functions of New 
South Wales government into eight groups?" the response "why 
not?" is not as glib or facetious as it would first appear. But to 
members of a sub-committee faced with the problem of imposing 
a pattern on governmental activities, and who were supposedly 
"natural order" men, "abstracted empiricism" oflTered little gui-
dance or satisfaction. In its search for the philosopher's stone of 
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machinery of government reform, the sub-committee discovered the 
1972 report of the committee on government productivity (the 
"Cronyn committee") of Ontario, Canada, and for a time it seemed 
that here indeed was the agent for turning the base material of 
the study groups into a pristine whole. Two members of the sub-
committee (Fife and Freudenstein), the chairman of the board and 
the permanent heads of the Treasury and the Premier's department 
visited Toronto to study the Ontario system, which the premier of 
that province had called "the most comprehensive restructuring of 
Government in this country".'^ 
The Cronyn committee, which consisted of an equal number of 
"outsiders" and public servants, operated on a broader basis than 
did the NSW sub-committee. It invited submissions, for instance, 
"from the public at large, from special interest groups and from 
public service employees".'" But of course the NSW delegation was 
interested primarily in the operation of its recommendations on the 
restructuring of government as well as in discovering the provincial 
advantages of Canadian tax sharing. The Cronyn committee 
recommended in addition to the existing management board of 
cabinet, the establishment of a policy and priorities board, com-
prised of senior ministers, which was to develop "strategic policy 
frameworks into which all government programmes would fit"'* and 
to advise cabinet on overall government priorities. A more con-
troversial recommendation was the creation of a new kind of 
minister, the provincial secretary, who would be a policy developer, 
evaluator, coordinator and communicator. He would have no 
"executive" responsibility for programmes but would derive his 
authority from membership of the policy and priorities board. 
Finally, to improve coordination, three policy fields were to be 
established, namely social development, resources development, and 
justice, with four to six ministries included in each field. Three 
ministries remained outside these fields. Treasury, Economics and 
Inter-governmental Affairs, Revenue and Government Services, 
thus reducing the previous 22 departments to 17 ministries. Policy 
field committees under the chairmanship of a provincial secretary 
and consisting of ministers within each field were created to resolve 
conflict at a sub-cabinet level. 
Some of the Ontario thinking is apparent in the structure of 
government finally recommended for NSW, a structure which reflects 
the report of the sub-committee and its adjustment to the political 
realities of late 1974, including the Liberal-Country party under-
standing as to the distribution of cabinet posts." (Of course the 
work of the study groups was also, to some extent, "political", but 
more in the sense of bureaucratic than partisan politics.) Cabinet 
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was structured along committee lines with the policies and priority 
committee at the apex. Comprising the premier and treasurer 
(chairman); the deputy premier; minister for Federal Affairs; and 
the chairman of four newly created standing committees, it 
considered the more important policy matters from the standing 
committees before referring them to cabinet as a whole. The four 
"policy" standing committees were: 
Social Development: (Education; Housing and Co-operative Socie-
ties; Health; Youth, Ethnic and Community Affairs; Culture, Sport 
and Recreation). 
Justice and Consumer Affairs: (Attorney General and Minister of 
Justice; Labour, Industry and Consumer Affairs, and Minister for 
Federal Affairs; Police and Services; Minister for Revenue and 
Assistant Treasurer). 
Natural Resources: (Local Government and Tourism; Planning 
and Environment; Lands and Forests; Agriculture; Decentralization 
and Development). 
Industrial Resources: (Public Works and Ports; Transport and 
Highways; Mines and Energy). 
Each committee was chaired by a minister from within the group; 
NSW did not opt for the Canadian provincial secretary or "super 
minister" solution, probably because of the political difficulties 
associated with these positions. These problems have been amply 
documented especially by Canadian writers." 
The changes in ministerial portfolios—too numerous to detail 
here—were in many ways "bureau shuffling". On the surface four 
departments were abolished and three new ones established, but 
few, if any, functions appear to have been eliminated. Briefly the 
major changes in portfolios were: 
Local Government and 
Highways — Local Government and Tourism 
Lands and Tourism — Lands and Forests 
Transport — Transport and Highways 
Police — Police and Services 
— — Revenue and Assistant Treasurer 
The major function of the former Registrar General's department 
(Land Titles) was transferred to Lands and Forests; the Water 
Conservation and Irrigation Commission reappeared as the depart-
ment of Water Resources, embracing also the water supply 
activities of the Public Works department; the anachronistic Chief 
Secretary's department, with its delightful miscellany of activities, 
was abolished, but many of its functions survived intact under the 
new department of Services. Another new department, that of 
Revenue, was to manage the revenue agencies, such as the 
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superannuation funds, which were brought together from various 
portfolios. There were, of course, a host of minor changes, such 
as the transfer of the Prickly Pear Destruction Commission from 
Lands to the department of Agriculture wherein it was absorbed. 
Reactions to the restructuring were understandably subdued, 
given the nature of the subject matter and the low—some would 
say subterranean—profile of the review. The most passionate (and 
inaccurate) report occurred two weeks prior to the formal announce-
ment when the Telegraph announced "Lewis Gets Out the Axe— 
Blitz on 'Useless' Departments", and in its editorial claimed that 
Lewis "admitted what most citizens have either known or suspected: 
that government departments are more often than not in a muddle, 
that some are completely unnecessary and wasting public money".'* 
But when the reorganization was announced, where were the 
functions which had been abolished, the waste which had been 
eliminated or even the decimation, in the literal sense of the term, 
of public service numbers? There was little over which journalists 
could enthuse, although the Sydney Morning Herald did pay tribute 
to the "sweeping reorganization of the way NSW is run" and 
followed this with a generally laudatory editorial headed "New 
Broom"." The Australian was less impressed, viewing the changes 
as sensible and logical, but not radical.^" In terms of the history 
of NSW government, the Herald's assessment was probably reason-
able; in terms of the extent of change the Australian's comment 
was not unfair. Even in parliament references to the review were 
few and sober, such as "it cannot be expected that major benefits 
in a financial sense will result in the short run", although it was 
claimed that in the longer term the "review would lead to improved 
efficiency and economy in a wide range of services".^' 
At one stage it appeared that the staff associations would again 
provide the strongest reaction when the water resources engineers 
in the department of Public Works passed a vote of no confidence 
in their minister. Their objection, however, was not to the creation 
of the department of Water Resources as such but to their being 
"kept in the dark" about the proposed reorganization; the incident 
was short lived. However by May 1975 the Public Service Associa-
tion was arguing that some structural changes would have "a 
profound effect on the careers and promotional opportunities of 
hundreds of Association members", and announced that following 
representations to the premier and a conference with the chairman 
of the board, union and board representatives would meet fortnight-
ly to consider all matters arising from reorganizations affecting 
public servants.'' Apart from salary questions, however, the Associa-
tion appears to have taken little interest in the outcome of the 
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review. A contrasting perspective was provided by Rydges, the 
business monthly, which conceded that the "shake-up" offered a 
model for any organization wishing to modernize its structure, but 
was also interested in whether the public service would allow a 
smaller volume of work to fill the space available." 
Implementation 
Given the current interest of the discipline in implementation, the 
review is worth studying on this score alone. "Instant implementa-
tion" is the phrase which best characterizes the review, as the 
processes of formulation and implementation of recommendations 
were often contemporaneous. This was due partly to political 
chance, for Lewis the initiator became Lewis the implementor when 
he was unexpectedly elected late in 1974 to succeed Askin as 
premier on 3 January 1975. It was unlikely that a project with 
which he was so closely identified would be shelved, especially as 
the reorganization had considerable symbolic value, announced, as 
it was, on the day of Lewis' assumption of the premiership. Here 
was evidence of the proverbial new broom, of a style different from 
that of Askin, an indication that NSW was to see a period of reform. 
However the person of the new premier may not have been crucial 
to implementation of the recommendations, as not only was there 
political kudos to be gained from announcing the results of the 
review but most of the political trade-offs, exchanges and bargaining 
among the influential ministers had already occurred in the study 
groups and sub-committee. Certainly the only immediate major 
changes which appear to have been made to the recommendations 
in their implementation were the transfer of the Housing and 
Cooperative Societies portfolio from the Social Development to the 
Industrial Resources Standing Committee, and a decision not to 
create a department of Revenue to manage the revenue agencies. 
The year 1975 saw the mopping up phase of implementation of 
the reorganization and here it should be noted that certain agencies 
did fight a successful holding action against the political incursion 
into their palatinates, assisted, it seems, by the political changes 
following the review. Certain sections of the department of Public 
Works, for instance, apparently were not incorporated into the 
Maritime Services Board, nor was the Protective Office amalga-
mated with the Public Trust Office. The year 1975 also saw the 
beginnings of what might be called phase two of the review. The 
sub-committee on the machinery of government continued to 
function under the chairmanship of Hewitt, supported by the 
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machinery of government unit within the Public Service Board. 
Project teams or task forces were also set up to examine issues which 
had been held over as too complex to solve within the short time 
allowed for the review—issues such as "make or buy", but the range 
of questions was now broadened beyond machinery of government 
matters to include "job rotation" for permanent heads, corporate 
planning and the use of project teams for matters involving two 
or more governmental bodies. In short, "management" questions 
generally now became the focus of the sub-committee. 
To complete the descriptive section of this paper, a note on the 
demise of the sub-committee is necessary. At the May 1976 
elections the Labor party came to power, but with an effective 
majority in the lower house of only one. Machinery of government 
reviews were thus not visibly high on the new government's agenda 
—political survival, casinos and nude bathing were. There were 
some changes in portfolios of an instant nature, as is usually the 
case when governments change. Although the cabinet committee 
system, after a brief lapse, was resurrected more or less along the 
lines of the Lewis model, a counterpart of the sub-committee has 
yet to appear and the machinery of government unit within the 
board has been disbanded. Also disbanded were those project teams 
of which a minister was a member; those comprised exclusively of 
public servants, however, are still operating. 
Because the reorganization was in operation for little more than 
twelve months, it is difficult to assess the outcomes of the review. 
It has been claimed that the cabinet committee system worked 
reasonably well, despite some questions about its implications for 
the Westminster model.'" But overall, the impact on public policy 
output may have been limited. Tinkering with structure does not 
always produce tangible improvements, especially in the short term. 
And even politicians, in extolling the worthiness of the review, spoke 
about long term effects on efficiency and economy rather than any 
immediate savings.'" There may have been some improvements in 
service to the public in certain areas, and many public servants may 
have seen decisions made more quickly in various programs, but 
for the average citizen there was probably no discernible effect on 
his relationships with state government. It was, of course, a "tidier 
looking" structure, and one public servant observed in private, 
somewhat cynically although perhaps accurately, that "it is now 
easier for ministers to find their way around the machine and it 
is a much less arduous task breaking in new ministers". 
The one area where the review could have had dramatic 
implications for state administration, had the Liberal-Country party 
government remained in power for a longer period, is in the entry 
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of ministers into the policy vacuum which appears to exist in many 
areas at the higher echelons of state government. Ministers were 
surprised to find how many agencies were pursuing relatively 
independent lines in the various programme areas and in asking 
the question "how do we control them?" found one of the ironies 
of state government. Statutory corporations have long had the 
image of powerful independent satrapies which determined much 
of public policy in NSW; yet in most enabling acts is a provision 
that "in the exercise and discharge of its powers, authorities, duties 
and functions" the corporation shall "be subject in all respects to 
the control and direction of the Minister".^' Many statutory 
corporations in NSW thus provide a striking contrast between the 
formal and informal in government. With this blanket provision 
already in existence, some ministers began to call upon its authority 
to coordinate policy; Fife, for example, was reputed to "have made 
life difficult" for the department of Main Roads." Despite its title, 
the department is in fact a statutory body, and a good index of 
its autonomy is the recent expose which revealed that the cost of 
cleaning the department's offices was three times that of the average 
for the public service, and higher than the cost of cleaning hospital 
operating theatres." 
The review and public policy 
Although the foregoing descriptive account has in places been 
related briefly to more general issues, this final section of the 
chapter concentrates on bringing these issues together. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the review is that it occurred 
at all. Previous inquiries into the public service—the abortive royal 
commission of 1887, the royal commission of 1895 and the Mason 
Allard commission of 1918—had also concentrated on economy and 
efficiency, but through the reform of the personnel system rather 
than through a review of the machinery of government. Patronage, 
nepotism and the quality of the public service were high on the 
list of areas to be investigated, as was the "scientific management" 
field of work simplification: 
In my reports upon departments I propose showing where, in my opinion, 
work can be simplified; how duplication may, in certain instances, be 
avoided, and generally, as occasion demands, how modern business 
methods may be adapted to Public Service requirements.-' 
In his first sectional report. Mason Allard catalogued in two pages 
the reasons which had led to public service growth, but he accepted 
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this state of affairs as given. Professor Ken Knight has argued that 
the 1895 Commission's mistake was to look for inefficiency through 
patronage and nepotism as such, rather than through lack of 
coordination in the governmental machine.^" In fact it appears that 
the last time an outside inquiry examined the functions and 
structure of government was in 1822-23, when Commissioner Bigge 
reported on the administration of the colony under the governorship 
of Lachlan Macquarie. At that time the Sturm und Drang of 
colonial politics and the convict question itself were responsible for 
the inquiry, but in the environment of 1974 there were no 
comparable factors at work. Certainly the standard criticisms of 
the public service had not declined, but their intensity was no more 
than usual. If an inquiry were to be held then the prediction would 
have been that its form and content would approximate those of 
the two earlier royal commissions, especially in view of the recent 
precedents of South Australia and the commonwealth. The review 
thus provides a useful addition to the Corbett/Coombs and Bland 
(Victoria)/Bland (commonwealth) models. 
The second notable feature of the review is that it was a very 
"efficient" and speedy inquiry in terms of its research, deliberation 
and implementation. Most work was done within the public service, 
either on an honorary basis or as part of the normal job; relatively 
few outside consultants were engaged. Its six months duration 
compares very favourably with the Corbett and Coombs inquiries. 
It involved ministers directly in the process of administrative 
reform; political commitment to the outcome was likely. It is thus 
a model in the area of the methodology of inquiries on three counts. 
First, problems of non-implementation were minimized, given the 
high level composition of the study groups and the fact that it was 
a cabinet review. Second, implementation was monitored and up-
dated by the sub-committee on machinery of government which 
continued to function after phase one; the topic was not to be 
studied once and then ignored. Third, the review had the political 
support which writers have argued is so necessary for the success 
of administrative reform.^' It was a textbook case on this score. 
Yet ironically this political dimension of the review also high-
lights its shortcomings as regards long-term eflfectiveness. The 
structure and functions of government, as the following typical 
Caiden quotation reminds us, will at any one time result from 
political compromises, personal preference of Ministers, historical 
tradition, continuity, bureaucratic in-fighting, pressure-group, and clien-
tele demands, experimentation, deliberate fragmentation, the major 
tasks confronting the . . . Government, cycles of growth in particular 
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areas, vested interests, bureaucratic inertia, constitutional issues, inter-
governmental agreements and so on." 
Thus, had the Liberal/Country party coalition under Lewis re-
mained in power for a long period, the review and the continuing 
sub-committee may have proved their worth in contributing to the 
more efficient and effective running of the governmental machine. 
But even a change of premier within the coalition a few months 
after the review, when Willis succeeded Lewis, resulted in changes 
such as the resurrection of the chief secretary, a portfolio which 
Willis had previously held. And when the Wran Labor government 
came to power in May 1976, the machinery of government was 
again altered, this time markedly. For instance, the premier no 
longer held the Treasury portfolio, but he did assume responsibility 
for Ethnic Affairs, which probably provides as good an illustration 
as any of Caiden's argument. Of course this is not to claim that 
all of the work which the sub-committee initiated, including projects 
within the public service, was necessarily futile. 
This in turn raises two complex questions neither of which can 
be developed fully here. The first is to what extent the restructuring 
of the machinery of government, while functions are held constant 
(which is essentially what happened in phase one of the NSW review), 
will result in a significant change in output. It is trite to say that 
the reform of structure in no way guarantees the reform of output, 
but it is still worth repeating. This was probably the case in NSW, 
although the time scale and other obvious methodological problems 
mean that the foregoing statement is little more than a guess. 
Second, to what extent was the review "rational" if its outcomes 
were marginal? In terms of the most crude of the social science 
definitions, "the appropriateness of means to ends", the review was 
highly rational given that machinery of government questions are, 
empirically at least, as much a matter of politics as of principles 
or organization. However in the debate on administrative reform 
there appear to be at least two dimensions involved in the rationality 
question which at times may conflict. On the one hand there is 
the "political" rationality element which argues that the adminis-
trative structure of government should be "politicized" to varying 
degrees (the more sophisticated versions are in the "partisan mutual 
adjustment" tradition); on the other is the "administrative" ration-
ality thrust advocating a "managerialist" approach, ranging from 
fairly traditional remedies which are in eifect claiming that 
organizations should be more bureaucratic (although the word 
bureaucracy is never used), to the various systems approaches." The 
NSW review, despite its membership, began with notions of adminis-
trative rationality which were finally modified by political considera-
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tions. This is understandable; are there clear answers, for instance, 
to the question of whether Consumer Affairs should be a separate 
portfolio or attached to Justice, or to Labour and Industry? Or 
to the problem of how to arrange the functions of agriculture, 
conservation, water resources and lands? If political considerations 
do become the final arbiters then it is not surprising. And, of course, 
arguments can be advanced that in the allocation of functions a 
more effective and even efficient government can result from a 
balance of coalition or party factions or from giving an incompetent 
minister little to administer. 
One final point of relevance to the political aspects of the review 
ought to be made. The case of Lewis suggests that very little 
political credit is given for administrative reform unless success in 
this field is accompanied by other talents. The common view is that 
Lewis' elevation was a prime example of the Peter Principle; this 
may or may not be too glib an explanation, but it is true that the 
review counted for little when weighed politically against, say, the 
ten cents per gallon petrol tax. Thus the arguments which are put 
forward for administrative dedication on the part of ministers (and 
there are good normative arguments on this score) ought to take 
into account the fact that the system at present contains very few 
incentives for ministers to devote their time to administration. 
Ministers do become keenly involved when politically they cannot 
ignore an "administrative" issue, such as a departmental scandal, 
but why tamper with a machine which is reasonably effective when 
the resultant difference in performance is likely to be below the 
limen of the public? In any case the public is quickly bored with 
minutiae of administrative reform. Even the arrival of the Bigge 
report in NSW, Ritchie points out, was upstaged by the sighting of 
a giant serpent near Liverpool.'" 
Returning to the characteristics of the review, while it was a 
success according to the criteria of efficiency, political involvement 
and implementation, it was a failure according to the yardsticks 
of participation, public debate and range of issues considered. As 
David Corbett pointed out at the 1975 annual conference of the 
Australian regional groups of the Royal Institute of Public Adminis-
tration, in any comparison of the NSW and South Australian inquiries 
the NSW review wins out in terms of rapid action but not in terms 
of participation. Thus a broader look at NSW government might have 
considered questions such as the relationships between parliament 
(as distinct from cabinet) and the bureaucracy; the satisfaction or 
otherwise of the clients of various programmes; and the divisional 
structure of the public service which was commented upon adversely 
by Mason Allard in 1918. And finally, was it a failure according 
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to its terms of reference in that publicly no mention was made of 
functions having been eliminated or of immediate economies in 
either staff or expenditure? It may have been an efficient review, 
but still an ineffectual one. 
One defence against such a charge would be that for the 
Liberal/Country party coalition at least, it laid the basis for the 
central control of state government. The powerful independent 
statutory corporations were to be brought into the ambit of overall 
policy. In this sense the whole review fitted well with the notion 
of NSW government as strong executive government concerned with 
the management of services, an image, incidentally, which did not 
always sit happily in the past with the autonomous and powerful 
statutory corporation stereotype. 
But given the difficulty of the department/corporation dichotomy, 
another way of looking at the review would be to view it as an 
attempt to fill the policy vacuums which are believed often to exist 
at the upper levels of state government. Put crudely, these vacuums 
result from senior public servants waiting for ministerial initiatives 
while ministers wait for initiatives from the organizations under 
their aegis, and both wait upon pressures from various interest 
groups before adjusting existing programmes. (And would this 
differentiate NSW markedly from other states?) In such an environ-
ment the empire building public servant should have ffourished. 
Some have, but surprisingly few, and probably for two reasons. The 
first is a risky generalization, that senior state public servants place 
greater emphasis on the normative aspects of the politics/ad-
ministration distinction than do, say, commonwealth public ser-
vants. After all, many were taught or inffuenced by the late F.A. 
Bland. This stance is probably reinforced by the notion that the 
functions of state governments are concerned more with "managing 
things" than with glamorous "policy" matters, in contrast to the 
federal government. They may thus either mis-perceive what is 
politically possible, or regard their intrusion into "policy" as 
improper. The introduction of Sunday sport and changes in the laws 
relating to obscenity are two examples. The second—again put 
forward on impressionistic evidence—is that the state public service 
has been influenced markedly during the past decade by a "manage-
rialist" ethos, or more colorfully it has become part of the 
managerialist hegemony, which stresses the communality of admin-
istration. "Let the managers manage" may have become the catch 
cry; but very little has been said about public servants helping to 
shape policies at the political level. Nor, incidentally, is it clear 
how the "let the managers manage" bent of the sub-committee— 
particularly in phase two of the review—was to square completely 
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with the idea of bringing the straying statutory corporations back 
under the ministerial control. However NSW was conforming to the 
view which seems to be emerging from the recent inquiries (with 
the possible exception of those of Sir Henry Bland as inquirer, not 
as chairman of the ABC) that the statutory corporation pendulum 
has swung too far to the side of autonomy and a strengthening 
of accountability is required to counterbalance this effect. However, 
if Roger Wettenhall's theory is correct, a decade from now may 
see moves for freeing these bodies from what are then seen as the 
shackles of restrictive controls.'- The move to bring the corporation 
back to the centre could also be regarded as an attempt to halt 
the regression which has occurred over the past few decades. 
Finally, the NSW review was both efficient and speedy, yet unlike 
the lengthy Corbett and Coombs inquiries no academics were 
involved. The question of coincidence or causality is left to the 
reader. 
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The Victorian and 
N.S.W. Inquiries 
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9 
Jean Holmes and Ross Curnow have produced two interesting and 
lively chapters. Each contains so many points that it would not be 
possible to traverse them in detail. I will therefore identify four 
or five strands which are common to both, and seem to have 
continuing importance. In drawing out the strands, I have relied 
on my own experience with RCAGA and on what I have picked up 
about other inquiries, both here and overseas. The five strands I 
have identified relate to 
The origins of inquiries 
Proposals related to machinery of government 
Statutory corporations 
The effectiveness of public service inquiries 
Output 
Origins 
Public service inquiries seem to be fairly few and far between— 
not only in NSW and Victoria, where the previous inquiries were in 
1918 and 1926 respectively. Why is this? Some obvious and rather 
rude answers are unlikely to be the real ones. Is it that public 
services are, although the frequent butt of criticism, on the whole 
not too badly run? Is it that, rather like democracy, they are bad 
—but one can only imagine worse ones as the outcome of inquiries? 
Is it that public services themselves are so resistant to outside 
scrutiny that governments only prevail every half century? Is it that 
the products of an inquiry are so long in developing that, in the 
press of other events, only an urgently reformist government, or 
an extremely safely established one, get round to mounting such 
an inquiry? Whatever the reasons—and there is probably an 
element of each of the foregoing in the answer—inquiries in NSW 
and Victoria are not exceptional in their infrequency. 
Both the recent state inquiries apparently had the personal 
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support of the premier, and the strong support of the head of 
government seems an important element in the holding of such 
inquiries. This involvement raises the issue whether the elected head 
of government is the right person to be primarily responsible for 
administration or whether that person should be especially al-
located. The British post-Fulton arrangements, although untidy, 
may be worth more serious thought in the world of administrative 
reality than we have sometimes been prepared to concede. 
Does the linking of public service and public policy suggest a 
new portfolio at a time when government employees represent a 
very substantial proportion of total employment? It may be that 
this is more significant at federal than state level, but in the two 
most populous states what is done for and with the public service 
has important implications for other areas. 
Machinery of government 
The NSW inquiry was successful, by the measure of acceptance of 
its findings, in machinery of government terms. The cabinet 
reorganization appears to have been precisely what was recom-
mended. Curnow's assessment is highly cynical— 
In terms of the history of NSW government, the Herald's assessment was 
probably reasonable; in terms of the extent of change the Australian's 
comment was not unfair. 
The main Bland report on reorganization—the second report on 
organizational and administrative arrangements relating to con-
servation, environmental and land use planning matters, appears 
to have been much less successful than the other reports in terms 
of implementation. Holmes suggests that this was because divergent 
political views embodied in a somewhat bewildering range of 
institutions proved not susceptible to recommendations relating to 
administrative coordination. 
This dilemma is perhaps a central one and goes to the distinction 
between politics and administration. Both theoretically and 
pragmatically it is arguable that there is a distinction. It can also 
be argued that unless one accepts that there is a distinction, even 
if not always readily seen, then one ends up in a blur of confusion 
and, in the case of public service inquiries, in a pile of unadopted 
recommendations. 
Applying this to the NSW and Victorian inquiries, it seems that 
machinery of government matters need a specific political initiation 
and that their outcome is determined by political rather than 
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administrative factors. For obvious reasons, NSW succeeded in this. 
But Bland failed. Holmes suggests that one of the reasons for his 
failure is probably that he did not don the political activist's cap, 
open his eyes and ears to the many interests and try then to come 
up with a solution. I wonder whether there is not something of a 
resolution to be found by typing machinery of government matters 
as very much political issues, requiring answer in political (or public 
policy) rather than in administrative terms, and other issues as 
administrative in nature. 
It was this distinction which led RCAGA after a great deal of 
thinking and discussion to recommend that there not be a separate 
machinery of government unit, but that instead the Public Service 
Board should have a collecting function and the department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet a policy advising responsibility. 
Statutory corporations 
The plethora of statutory bodies was clearly an aspect of state 
administration which worried both the NSW inquiry and Sir Henry 
Bland. Nonetheless neither report appears to have done much to 
reduce the numbers. Nor did either suggest criteria for the 
establishment or abolition of statutory bodies. In this RCAGA went 
a long way further and it is a little disappointing to find that the 
only comment about its handling of this important subject is a 
derogatory one. 
Curnow writes about a pendulum. This is probably not only true, 
but may be desirable rather than undesirable, as he seems to imply. 
A pendulum effect would serve neatly the need for functional 
efficiency, in the "corporation" phase, and for accountability and 
political influence on policy or other matters in the "departmental" 
phase. In this, I find myself more attracted to continuing change 
than to a search for some final and all-embracing synthesis. It is, 
of course, this continually changing pattern of requirements and 
acceptable solutions that makes the practice of public adminis-
tration so fascinating, just as it makes the theory so intractable. 
A strand of particular interest in the Holmes chapter is the 
discussion of the role of the plethora of statutory corporations. 
Extending her point, it might be said that the large number of 
statutory bodies in Victoria might well be coming back into their 
own, as a means of involving the community rather more effectively 
in the outworking of administration. That is an important point, 
and one which we would all do well to bear in mind as we discuss 
the vexed question of statutory bodies (the issue is also raised, but 
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without resolution, in the Curnow chapter). However, her warning 
also needs to be heeded: if you cannot readily abolish statutory 
bodies (and this seems to have been the outcome in both NSW and 
Victoria), then perhaps you had better not be too carried away 
about creating them. The other side of the coin is of course the 
Coombs recommendations that departments themselves should 
develop ways of improving consultative relationships with the parts 
of the community they serve (RC 6.3)—an aspect on which, to 
judge from the Curnow chapter, the NSW inquiry was probably not 
too keen. The commission also noted that it is possible to use 
statutory bodies to facilitate open interaction between the adminis-
tration and the community, for example the Grants Commission, 
the Universities Commission, the Schools Commission, the Social 
Welfare Commission and the Regional Councils for Social Develop-
ment (the latter non-statutory). 
Output 
In terms of output, the Victorian inquiry was clearly much more 
satisfactory to the intelligent citizen than was the NSW inquiry. The 
reports were quickly prepared and were soon made public. That 
is as it ought to be. However, neither of the reports contains very 
much in the way of supporting material. 
I have often said to the staff" engaged on work for public inquiries 
that the appendices they produce—usually left reasonably un-
touched by the commissioners themselves—are likely in the longer 
term to be of more interest and possibly to have more effect than 
much of the reports themselves. This simply supports what I 
remember Professor Parker saying to a RIPA seminar in Canberra 
last year that the four Appendix volumes to the RCAGA report will 
in the longer term possibly be at least as influential as the report 
itself.' 
It is to be regretted that in the case of the NSW inquiry there 
is a total absence of background material and that in the case of 
the Victorian inquiries the background material is relatively limited 
in scope and depth. 
The effectiveness of inquiries 
Jean Holmes concludes that— 
Administrative reform is an outcrop from the perspectives on social 
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change that take hold, more likely to follow such changes than lead 
the way 
and asks whether the catalyst function of public service inquiries 
is their best achievement. Curnow suggests that the outcome of the 
NSW inquiry was good in terms of the recommendations, but poor 
in terms of participation. He has the somewhat circular proposition 
that 
Problems of non-implementation did not really arise, given the high level 
composition of the study groups and the fact that it was a cabinet review 
but one is tempted to ask what was accomplished apart from some 
bureau shuffling and the cabinet committee structure. These, for 
reasons suggested in the preceding note on machinery of govern-
ment, are perhaps hardly what public service inquiries are about. 
In all the papers it is possible to detect a little disappointment. 
I find myself asking whether this is because there have been 
unreasonable expectations of public service inquiries. Are they not 
condemned to working within the framework? Does the feeling of 
disappointment really go to some illusory benefit that, for political 
purposes, usually of a short term character, we were led at the 
outset of the inquiry to believe would be achieved by it? 
A further point to remember in assessing efl"ectiveness is that 
apparently very small changes in existing arrangements may often 
have quite significant effects. For example, simply dropping the 
clause requiring all public servants to be British subjects will, over 
the years ahead, have a profound effect on the structure and possibly 
the working of the commonwealth public service. So also, in the 
longer term, may an apparently small change like dropping seniority 
as an element in promotions and leaving only "superior efficiency". 
What is perhaps needed is closer attention to the longer-term effects 
of these smaller changes. One of the points one has to keep very 
much in mind as one is making recommendations in the public 
service field is the danger of overkill. It is often quite small changes 
which will produce all that is required—large changes, or even a 
number of changes directed at the same end, will almost certainly 
produce a result that is exaggerated in some other direction. The 
carefully balanced changes suggested to the arrangements for the 
employment of departmental heads in the RCAGA report are an 
example of the outcome of a very complex set of considerations 
—unspectacular, difficult to understand but if implemented of 
considerable significance in years to come. 
As a final comment, it may be worth drawing attention to the 
essentially pragmatic nature of the two inquiries. In relation to NSW, 
it is left to our imagination to draw that conclusion, but Curnow's 
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comment would certainly confirm any inclination one had in that 
direction. The same is true of the Victorian inquiry, where Holmes 
on several occasions mentions the hard-headed and practical style 
of the four Bland reports—a point which is underlined by reading 
the text itself. Perhaps the essentially pragmatic nature of the 
discussion and recommendations contained in the reports of public 
service inquiries is another illustration of the difficulty of being sure 
that there is an academic discipline of public administration. 
Note 
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Kenneth Wiltshire 
The precise meaning of the term "career service" has never been 
clear. Nor have the alternatives to a career service ever been 
delineated with sufficient clarity to enable a proper analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages of this particular form of adminis-
tration by contrast and comparison. It is one of those terms with 
which everyone would claim a general familiarity but few would 
be willing to list its specific characteristics. 
Most students of public administration would realize that a 
career service has something of the physical appearance of a 
military pattern, and that, in commonwealth countries at least, its 
origins owe something to the evolution of the Westminster model 
of government, especially the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, 
set in the gradual evolution of modern constitutional monarchy. It 
is also commonly accepted that the notion of a non-politicized 
government bureaucracy, again an outcome of Westminster tradi-
tions although more specifically the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms, 
was a major element in spawning the idealized virtues of a career 
service. 
But beyond this what can be regarded as the essential features 
of a career service seems to vary from country to country and from 
author to author. Neither the McCarthy report on the New Zealand 
civil service, nor Fulton in Britain, nor Glassco in Canada, came 
to grips with any fundamental reappraisal of the contemporary 
relevance and composition of their career services, although each 
was swift to reaffirm the importance of the concept and its 
essentiality to the functioning of government.' Australia's record 
is no better: for example, Spann points out that public services in 
Australia share some common characteristics which grew out of 
reforms commencing in 1859 with the Victorian commission 
inquiry, and especially the 1895 NSW and 1902 commonwealth 
Public Service Acts. These set a pattern for our public services 
which traditionally incorporated the desire for a career service. 
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However, 
it was a pattern not without interesting variations, and which never 
extended itself to all positions. But it came to be the norm, departures 
from which, however numerous, have been felt to need special 
justification.-
In the commonwealth public service other important milestones 
in the evolution of that career service included the McLachlan royal 
commission of 1918-20 which recommended inter alia that all staff 
be brought under the Public Service Act to be controlled by a single 
public service commissioner, that the service be subjected to a 
general reclassification and grouped into four new divisions, and 
most importantly, that appointments be made by the commissioner 
directly instead of by the governor general.' The Bailey report on 
promotions in 1943-44, the Boyer report on recruitment, the 
Vernon economic enquiry, the Vernon post office enquiry, the 
Coombs report on government expenditure, the Tange report, and 
a host of reports on superannuation, employment of handicapped 
people, the future of the ACT and probings of the public accounts 
committee of parliament, all tacked on a little more thinking to 
our notions of a career service in commonwealth government 
employment." However none of them paused to consider the concept 
in depth, to question its suitability or relevance. Instead each report 
commenced from the fundamental proposition that a career service 
was the best form of administration and then sought to tinker with 
it to suit revealed conditions within its sphere of investigation. 
The result is that the commonwealth Public Service Act and 
regulations contain no specific definition of their career service and, 
indeed, the term does not appear anywhere in the legislation at 
all.' For about a decade the best authority we have had to rely 
upon has been Gerald Caiden's perceptive analysis of the com-
monwealth public service and his interpretation of the type of career 
service it was.*" 
Consequently one would hope that the advent of such an all-
embracing inquiry as RCAGA would at least afford the opportunity 
for a complete reappraisal of the relevance of this notion within 
the commonwealth administrative system, RCAGA hoped so too. In 
notes prepared for a press conference on 24 October 1974, a number 
of provocative questions were raised as pointers for discussion. They 
included: 
What employment should the career service cover—departments only, 
departments and authorities, Australian government and also state or 
even state and local government which deals with the related problem 
of mobility? 
Should the career service concept apply to all categories of employees? 
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Does the career service concept mean different things to different 
categories of employees? 
Would a study of the "culture" of the public service in comparison with 
service in one or more large private companies be desirable? 
More particularly RCAGA asked whether there was scope in a career 
service for lateral recruitment, part-time employment, the use of 
consultants and exchange schemes with non-public service em-
ployment. It then went on to question various conventions including 
neutrality, anonymity, tenure, mobility, classification and the 
divisional structure, concluding finally with these words: 
What are the marks of a career service in the late 1970's and the 1980's 
and what emphasis should be placed on permanence and mobility, 
flexibility, participation and service?' 
Unfortunately this represents the only apparent attempt by 
anybody to query the fundamentals of the career service concept. 
If the commission had sought to throw down the gauntlet with this 
welcome attack on humbug and conventions, it was to be disap-
pointed at the response. In their submissions to RCAGA the various 
public service staff associations strongly favoured retention of the 
career service without defining it in their own terms and without 
any attempt at a rational reappraisal of the principles. Perhaps this 
is not surprising given the fact that so many elements of the concept, 
for example, security of tenure, promotion by merit, absence of 
lateral recruitment are so close to the raison d'etre of these staflT 
associations. Witness for example this extract of terse staccato 
reaffirmations contained in the submission of the Administrative 
and Clerical Officers' Association 
6. We support the concept of a career public service with open entry 
at the base level. We see security of tenure as a vital prerequisite 
to the concept of a career service. 
6.4 We accept the principle of an entry examination to provide an 
"order of acceptance" list. 
6.5 We recommend that all recruiting should be under the direct control 
of the central body, with standard entry to the administrative and 
clerical sectors . . . 
6.8 We strongly oppose appointments to higher levels from outside the 
public service; we believe such recruiting denies the right for career 
opportunities to those who have entered through fair and open 
competition at the base level. We also strongly oppose the use of 
lateral appointments as a device to avoid the high educational 
standard requirements set for various positions in the service.' 
One might have expected a more original response to RCAGAS 
provocation from the Public Service Board. But this also was not 
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to be. In its first submission the board admitted that the term 
"career service" varied between diflTerent services but felt that it 
would generally embrace such characteristics as neutrality and 
anonymity associated with ministerial responsibility, open merit 
competition in recruitment, promotion on merit, a code of conditions 
of employment and security of tenure. But the key statement from 
the board was as follows: 
At this stage it should be said that the Board regards the basic elements 
of a career service as stemming in a fundamental way from our system 
of government and, while some evolutionary developments may be 
justified (and indeed have occurred), the basic features of a career 
service remain valid—any major departure from these features would, 
in the Board's view, present a risk of the most serious kind to the 
continuing availability of effective administration of ministerial 
departments.'' 
The board gave no supporting argument for this view except to 
say that Fulton had said much the same thing (although Fulton 
gave no supportive material either). A glance at this statement will 
reveal serious inadequacies. The board concedes that "some evolu-
tionary developments may be justified". How is a change to be 
defined as simply an evolutionary one rather than a revolutionary 
one, and how many such evolutionary changes (which the board 
admits have occurred) are necessary before the so-called "basic 
features of a career service" begin to disappear? In other words 
how would the board determine whether some change represented 
one of its so-called "major departures" presenting a "risk" of a 
"serious" kind? There are far too many value judgements implicit 
here and one can only suspect from the tone of the submission that 
the board would see itself as the sole arbiter of the degree of 
"evolutionary" change permitted to the system. Despite these 
shortcomings, it is important to realize that the board obviously 
saw the "career service" as a dynamic rather than a static concept 
and the rest of its submission in this field acknowledges the 
desirability and inevitability of many changes to the career service 
notion. 
What did RCAGA make of all this? Very wisely it commissioned 
a study to determine whether public servants themselves perceived 
they operated in a career service. This was significant because 
reality and an employee's perception of reality often do not coincide. 
The survey was a remarkable logistical effort which pounded 20,000 
commonwealth public servants with a long questionnaire. The 
results of the "Career Service" survey are published in appendix 
volume three of the RCAGA report. It is a severe shortcoming that 
no analysis of the data is provided: space does not permit an analysis 
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of the copious tables but it is safe to say that this survey 
demonstrated that the attitudes of commonwealth public servants 
towards career service concepts are now far distant from original 
notions of the elements of a "career service". Indeed, many of the 
traditional institutional hallmarks of a career service thought to be 
so important in the early part of this century are now ranked much 
lower in importance by the present day public service. These 
observations are equally true of the findings of a Public Service 
Board induction survey which is also published in the appendix. 
However in the absence of any published analysis from RCAGAS 
research staff, it is difficult to ascertain which factors were dominant 
in determining its final recommendations in this area of its activity. 
It is not possible to say whether the results of the empirical research 
outweighed the conservative stance of the unions and the board. 
The royal commission has at least provided one major service 
to future students of this element of public administration with its 
attempt at a definition of a "career service" [RC 8.1.12). 
In the commonwealth administration, the general concept of a career 
service has come to mean: 
(i) recruitment by merit (however defined and determined) to a 
(ii) unified service (intended to mitigate the evils which result from 
a fragmentary service) subject to 
(iii) independent, non-political control of recruitment and of the 
conditions of employment; and where the rights of career public 
servants are protected by 
(iv) regulations which discourage the recruitment of "strangers" 
to positions above the base grade, and by 
(v) legislated protection against arbitrary dismissal (termination 
being only for cause and by due process). 
This unified service is characterized by 
(vi) a hierarchical structure of positions defined by 
(vii) a regular system of position classification of salaries (with 
incremental advancement within the salary ranges of particular 
positions), with the career public servant rising through this 
hierarchy of positions according to 
(viii) a system of promotion by merit subject to 
(ix) a system of appeals against promotions (designed to ensure 
that justice is seen to be done)—the final reward for long and 
loyal service being 
(x) a distinctive retirement and pension system. 
More importantly, the report added 
The Commission feels that various elements of the "career service" 
concept have over time mistakenly been allowed to become inflexible 
dogma of public service employment. We feel that there are cases where 
these "principles" have come to be used to justify practices no longer 
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relevant to any discernible need; or which produce results in fact 
inconsistent with the objectives to which the principles were directed; 
that no assessment has been made in contemporary conditions of the 
costs incurred in terms of reduced efficiency and unfair treatment of 
certain categories of staff by the uniform application of these principles. 
The Commission, having studied submissions and other material before 
it, believes that there is justification for a reconsideration of these 
characteristics of a career service as a necessary and sufficient basis 
for the efficient staffing of the commonwealth administration in contem-
porary conditions. 
Despite this healthy scepticism, the published reports do not give 
any further evidence of debate about the "career service" concept 
as a whole.'" This is not to say that it did not occur within the 
commission. We know that it did." However RCAGA chose instead 
to present its recommendations for each of its criteria for a career 
service separately so it is best to examine the recommendations 
seriatim or in clusters. 
Recruitment 
The commission has recommended changes in the eligibility require-
ments to the service including abolition of almost all nationality 
restrictions, more realistic standards for health, character and 
security, abolition of the ten per cent limitation on non-technical 
graduate intake and removal of the special provisions for ex-
servicemen. All of these are sensible changes which will merely serve 
to bring the rules governing recruitment practices into line with 
modern conditions and towards more equal opportunity for all 
members of the Australian public to gain entry to the com-
monwealth public service. 
However a few other recommendations will probably prove 
unworkable. For example it is recommended that the Public Service 
Board should delegate more extensively to departments the power 
of recruitment, including lateral recruitment, and should itself only 
set standards and monitor procedures. The board will find it difficult 
to release its grip on the control of recruitment and especially on 
lateral recruitment. The most that could be hoped for is some 
delegation of authority with reserve powers remaining with the 
board for each appointment. Australians are too afraid of political 
and administrative nepotism in government appointments to give 
each agency carte blanche in recruitment, particularly at senior 
levels. 
In this respect RCAGA should have been more definite and stated 
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whether its research and deliberations had shown a great or small 
need for an increase in lateral recruitment because the issue is of 
considerable contemporary concern and lies at the heart of the 
whole question of the future of a career service. A move towards 
more lateral recruitment would be welcomed by most people outside 
the service but there can be no doubt that fierce resistance would 
be encountered from the public service staff associations. These 
associations would probably not be as violently opposed to the other 
related recommendation, that officers with more than three years' 
experience who leave the service should regain their benefit 
entitlements should they return. 
The final recommendation in relation to recruitment is that less 
weight be given to educational qualifications in selection and 
advancement, that mandatory qualifications be prescribed sparingly, 
and departments be delegated the power to specify such 
qualifications subject to the board's power to determine 
"equivalent" qualifications. Whilst most would agree that educa-
tional qualifications alone are a poor guide to administrative 
potential, in the absence of any superior substitute it is difficult 
to see government agencies responsible for recruitment abandoning 
their use in setting standards for entry to various positions and 
grades. Nonetheless, one can envisage isolated cases where previous 
work experience should certainly be regarded as a substitute for 
formal educational qualifications. 
Equal opportunity or equality 
Recommendations here relate to special programmes of re-
cruitment, training and career development to overcome past 
discrimination or lack of opportunities for women, aboriginals and 
the handicapped; legislation prohibiting discrimination in govern-
ment employment, and the establishment of an office of equality 
in employment within the Public Service Board. 
The abolition of discrimination in public service employment is 
an admirable ideal. In the past there has been an excessive degree 
of discrimination in all Australian public services on the grounds 
of sex, race and religion. The problem is that nearly all the formal 
rules and regulations which were discriminatory have gone within 
the past decade: discrimination now remains mostly as an attitude 
of mind. No decree from any royal commission will remove this 
immediately. For example, the marriage bar for females was lifted 
ten years ago, but there is still a widespread lack of acceptance 
of working married women in permanent government employment 
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and more particularly in public service superannuation schemes and 
leave entitlement provisions. Even promotion procedures are still 
conducted in a way that primarily benefits males and single women. 
Because these things are for the most part covert rather than overt, 
it seems unlikely that the proposed office of equality in employment 
could do anything about them—if it is established. There are also 
many inside and outside the service who admit that discrimination 
has occurred but oppose any move to compensate for the sins of 
the past. They argue that the only practicable solution is to ensure 
equal opportunities from the present. Otherwise, so the argument 
goes, for how long will you perpetuate compensatory retrospective 
provisions—for one generation or a decade, or longer? A related 
question is "Can any proposals for special measures to secure 
adequate advancement of disadvantaged groups be implemented 
without engaging in reverse discrimination?" 
Motivation, rewards, penalties 
The commission recommends that the system of reclassification of 
positions according to the performance of the occupant should be 
extended to all professional areas where there is scope for personal 
initiative. The idea was to placate lawyers who complained that 
they sat at the top of their scale for too long and, because of a 
lack of promotional opportunities beyond that limit, were being 
underpaid for their expertise, RCAGA has been too glib in accepting 
this solution as the only means to rectify this anomaly. Even the 
lawyers have mistaken their problem. They argue that the incremen-
tal scale is too long but the real answer is that professional scales 
are not long enough. Professionals in all Australian public services 
have scales which take them so far, but to advance beyond that 
point they must leave their profession behind and become adminis-
trators. To do this they must compete with clerical/administrators 
who have an inherent advantage. The result is that there are many 
ex-professionals making bad administrators since the required 
qualities of both groups are often diametrically opposed, and the 
incumbents would rather have remained as professionals anyway. 
The answer is not personal classifications which would simply be 
unworkable and unwieldy, but rather an extension of all professional 
scales upward, perhaps with efficiency barriers at certain levels. The 
professional who wants to remain in his profession in the public 
service should have a career structure he can follow almost to the 
permanent head level. Otherwise we shall drain away the best 
professionals into administrative positions and end up with the worst 
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people in both areas. It is surprising that RCAGA was not lobbied 
more heavily on this aspect by the professional associations. 
If staff assessment reports are to be made available to the staff 
themselves, as is recommended by the commission, and also to be 
made available to promotion, selection and appeal committees, some 
strict guidelines for the writing of these reports will need to be laid 
down, and a tight system of counterchecking will be necessary to 
prevent discrimination by supervisors. It is worth noting that some 
of the state public services have had difficulties with defamation 
proceedings where a third person saw a derogatory staff report. 
Legal implications of this aspect will have to be clarified. 
Perhaps one of the most contentious of RCAGA'S findings relates 
to the definition of "efficiency" for promotion purposes. Here is one 
of the key elements of any career service, and the one dearest to 
the heart of serving employees. The recommendation is that 
efficiency be defined as "suitability for the work to be performed" 
and that this should be the sole criterion for promotions and appeals 
throughout the service. Selection for promotion is also to be by 
committee. The word "suitability" is vague. Does it incorporate the 
number of years in the service or in a specific area, that is, seniority, 
and how will educational qualifications, general demeanour, and 
past records be weighted to determine this "suitability"? But it is 
the second element which gives cause for concern: "the work to 
be performed". Does this include potential for advancement to 
higher ranks or is a person's suitability to be determined solely in 
relation to the particular position to be filled? This is significant 
because there is a growing feeling in Australian public services that 
promotability itself should be a component of the test as to whether 
a person can be promoted—their potential to ascend further up the 
hierarchy. But if this is taken into account in making promotions, 
would it not wreak havoc at promotion appeals with one candidate 
endeavouring to pit his "potential" or "suitability" against 
another's? 
The commission has recommended a number of salutory reforms 
to the mechanism of promotion appeals making them more open 
and accountable to all participants. This should ensure a greater 
measure of justice and make for speedier hearings. These reforms 
include notification of unsuccessful applicants, reporting on commit-
tee activities, advertising all vacancies, limited appeals for non-
applicants, better documentation by applicants, limited use of 
interviewing and different forms of appointment of chairmen of 
committees. 
The commonwealth public service has, since the war, become 
softer in its approach to unsuitable and recalcitrant employees. The 
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benefit of the doubt has tended to be given to the staff member 
in most cases. There has been a lessening in the number of 
probationary appointments annulled and the incidence of dis-
ciplinary procedures is so small as to be almost non-existent. The 
Public Service Board would like to believe that this is attributable 
to changes in probationary procedures since 1971, resulting in 
supervisors taking more interest in new recruits. But the seeming 
lack of discipline in the service has become an issue with the 
Australian public who have always become restless when public 
servants, whose salaries they are paying through taxation and who 
are given security of tenure, seem to be able to get away with 
various forms of misconduct. The commission has recommended 
changes which on the surface would seem to point to a toughening 
of discipline in the service. These, however, for the most part involve 
a devolution of power from the board to departmental management. 
Whilst it can be conceded that a permanent head and his senior 
officers should be able to run a tight ship and ought to be more 
familiar with the individual problems and inadequacies of particular 
staff members, one suspects that the old cries of favouritism may 
arise again. For the serious offences at least, the board should be 
the schoolmaster applying punishment. After all, there is nothing 
in anybody's definition of a career service about having an easy 
ride through a soft system. 
As part of this package, the commission has also recommended 
changes to procedures for voluntary and compulsory early retire-
ment and moves are already under way to implement these 
suggestions. The board however prefers to use the more euphemistic 
language of voluntary and "management-initiated" early retire-
ment. The unions want the former but not the latter and a trade-
off seems the most likely result. Greater emphasis on early 
retirement was long overdue. There have been too many square pegs 
in round holes in the commonwealth public service for which a lack 
of mobility around the service is mostly to blame. In these cases, 
the general public, the public service, and not least of all the 
employee concerned would all be better off if he or she retired early. 
However there are other aspects of this issue. This reform ought 
to be accompanied by a national superannuation scheme for 
Australia to encourage mobility in and out of the public sector at 
any age and to remove the pressure for early retirement. We ought 
also to be thinking about education and retirement planning for 
those who will be leaving the service when they are fifty-five. These 
matters go well beyond RCAGAS terms of reference but they are 
worth mentioning because the government will grasp these early 
retirement recommendations eagerly as a means of keeping un-
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employment down and expanding opportunities for young people, 
but will probably overlook the needs of those retiring. Of course 
the whole assumption behind these moves is that it will be only 
the ill, maladjusted or inefficient who will depart early; time alone 
will prove or disprove this assumption. 
Abolition of divisions 
Undoubtedly one of the major recommendations is for the abolition 
of divisions in the commonwealth public service. It is true that the 
presence of divisions is fundamentally incompatible with all notions 
of a career service since the barriers so created inhibit freedom 
of movement from bottom to top of the pyramid. 
The actual recommendation is that the divisions be abandoned 
and replaced by a system of categories and occupational groups 
to be developed by the board and departments but not set down 
in the Act. The main opposition to the abolition of the divisions 
will come from the public service unions whose membership has 
been geared to the divisional structure. But divisions have long been 
an anachronism perpetuating false and harmful distinctions of 
status and pay with little relevance to ability, and too much false 
respect for the old pre-Fulton British civil service class system. 
However, the alternative being suggested is too vague to be fully 
comprehended and smacks of the board having "snowed" the 
commission. What are these occupational groups? How will their 
relativities be determined and what effect will this have especially 
for industrial relations? What provisions will exist for cross-
movement between occupational groups? Will the top public 
servants be drawn equitably from each of those occupational groups 
or solely from within one of them? And what of that ubiquitous 
and enigmatic occupational group, "clerical/administrators", who 
might come to dominate the others? Admittedly the commission 
had limited time to develop an alternative structure, but such a 
profound change required more positive direction than simply 
leaving the whole reform to the Public Service Board to devise. 
All these remarks apply with equal, if not stronger, force to the 
proposal to abandon the second division and replace it with a "senior 
executive category". The second division is meant to perform the 
thinking function of the service and it contains many fine people 
as well as a lot of over-rated overpaid fast talking egotistical con-
men. It has been a source of great contention from the time of 
its inception, through reforms suggested by Professor Parker in 
1942,'- and the Boyer committee. Then it was moulded quietly by 
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Sir Frederick Wheeler while no-one was, watching. It was always 
intended to be an elite, and consequently was regarded suspiciously 
in Australia. Whilst it remained fairly small it could be tolerated, 
but the Labor government undoubtedly focused attention on it by 
allowing it to increase its size by over fifty per cent in three years. 
How large can a select group become before it ceases to be an 
elite? 
This recommendation for a change in the title of the second 
division seems to be merely a change of name. Instead of the second 
division we will now have the "senior executive category" with all 
its existing problems, unless there are harsh attempts to prune its 
membership: and this will be fiercely resisted. Elites are hard to 
abolish; they tend to reappear under different guises, as has been 
demonstrated in Britain despite the Fulton committee's determina-
tion to revamp the executive class. We must accept the inevitability 
of elites in human organizations for there is too much theoretical 
and pragmatic evidence to hand to allow us to do otherwise. But 
they must be kept small and accountable and be selected as far 
as is possible on merit and personal characteristics of imagination, 
intellect, leadership and even an amount of "fantasy" which the 
French regard as a virtue in their top public administrators. But 
this proposal and the accompanying argument in the text of the 
report do not signify any major departure from the status quo. 
A unified service 
The recommendations for a unified service are welcome and long 
overdue, although it should be realized that the commission's 
findings add virtually nothing to the Public Service Board's 
submissions on this aspect. Since the war semi-government bodies 
outside central administrative control and on the fringe of parlia-
mentary scrutiny have proliferated. The same is true for the states, 
and inquiries there have also expressed concern about this matter.'^ 
Critics within the statutory bodies and "quangos" will no doubt 
point to a seeming contradiction between the desire expressed by 
RCAGA for the decentralization of decision-making and grouping 
them under the one Public Service Act. But if they think the 
implication through they will see that these two notions are not 
incompatible. All that RCAGA is saying is that the de facto political 
controls over statutory bodies should now be made explicit and that 
there exist few reasons for affording these bodies preferential 
treatment over the traditional departmental form. More importantly 
this will facilitate mobility within the service and, since pay and 
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conditions in many statutory bodies have always been monitored 
by the board, there will be no problem in equating terms of 
employment. Within these overall common conditions of em-
ployment there is still ample room for devolution of decision-making 
in personnel administration for permanent heads. 
Another recommendation relates to the redefinition of permanent 
and temporary workers according to the length of time for which 
they are engaged. This too was suggested by the Public Service 
Board and was a wise recommendation because false and 
inequitable distinctions had arisen, and the phenomenon of the 
"temporary" employee who had spent nearly all his or her working 
life in the service was all too common. 
Industrial relations 
This area bears on career service principles to the extent that public 
service conditions lead or lag behind those in the private sector and 
the states and thereby affect movement in and out of the com-
monwealth public service, RCAGAS recommendations in this field 
have but one object, to make the public service's industrial relations 
procedures identical with those applying in the private sector. No 
doubt many would mourn the passing of the public service 
arbitrator, the veto powers of the commonwealth government over 
public service pay rises and the restrictions on striking. It is true 
that there were many benefits in having procedures and bodies 
suitable for and expert in public sector problems. But in the 1970s 
it has become more important that public servants be seen to have 
equal treatment with their private sector "counterparts" to avoid 
further accusation of privilege (or retardation) for the public sector. 
For the advocates of worker participation the recommendations 
on the joint council and consultative councils will appear far too 
tame. The joint council, until very recent times, has been an 
ineffective body, but it could lead to a genuine involvement by 
commonwealth public servants in the management of their own 
departments. Surely RCAGA could have been more venturesome here 
and given a lead to the private sector and state governments. 
Tenure 
This is probably the most fundamental element of the career service 
concept and it is one aspect which has come under intense public 
scrutiny in the past decade. However RCAGA confronted the problem 
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tangentially. Relevant recommendations are scattered around the 
report. Permanent heads are to remain permanent although more 
scope for mobility and broader selection processes are proposed. 
Staff exchanges are envisaged with the private sector, state and local 
institutions, academic institutions and larger voluntary agencies but 
always with "adequate safeguards for employees and the institutions 
concerned". Changes to probationary and early retirement proceed-
ings have already been mentioned as have the redefinition of the 
permanent/temporary dichotomy and reforms for handling of 
grievances. Officers in management services are to be moved out 
periodically on rotation. 
The overall impression given by the report is that security of 
tenure for commonwealth public servants remained largely unques-
tioned. The commission seems to regard intra- and extra-service 
mobility as a substitute for any wholesale reform of the permanent 
tenure convention, despite the fact that the career service survey 
revealed permanent tenure to be only one of a number of elements 
regarded as important by public servants and certainly not always 
the most important. The suggestions by RCAGA about the 
permanent/temporary problem seem to imply that they would 
favour more public service work being handled by staff on a fixed 
term contract basis—"a permanent organizational structure beyond 
which the fluctuating margin of work is met by temporary 
employment" as Gerald Caiden said in 1967."* The subsequent 
statements of one of the commissioners confirms that this thinking 
was in the mind of the commission: 
The Royal Commission has I hope paved the way for an interesting 
development. It has suggested that employees should be able to decide 
whether they wish to sign on for long term tenured employment or to 
join on a shorter term basis when contract employment would apply 
. . . The classical argument for granting tenure to public servants is 
that it gives the senior public servant the kind of certainty which enables 
him to withstand political pressures. There is a good deal to be said 
for this but it clearly applies only to a relatively small group of senior 
people. . . . If the link between tenure and occupancy of a particular 
position can be broken without prejudicing the rights of the public 
servant, new fields are opened up for the use of the tenured form of 
engagement." 
However well intentioned RCAGA may have been one remains 
sceptical about the scope of application of these reforms. Would 
these new contractual provisions apply across the whole second and 
third divisions for example? Consider the following conservative 
remarks of the board in its RCAGA submission: 
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Undoubtedly there has been increasing mobility in employment and a 
lessening tendency for employees to spend a full working life in one 
organization. This trend does not, in the Board's view, provide a strong 
argument against having an appropriate degree of security of tenure 
for those who desire it and those whose particular skills, built up over 
lengthy service in the public sector, may not be readily translatable into 
other employment . . . The Board sees merit in an increase in en-
gagement from outside the Service of persons with special skills and 
expertise on a form of contract, provided that the numbers, along with 
separate lateral recruitment, do not unduly damage the prospects of 
the career staff. . . . The Board would have strong reservations about 
adoption of a 'contract type' scheme, in the Australian administrative 
environment, for all senior staff, even if the renewal of contracts were 
a matter for a central personnel authority. 
And then the final dampener— 
It is not clear to the Board that there are persuasive reasons for 
advocating such a basic change, to offset the significant risks involved. 
It is doubtful if much would be achieved in terms of a 'spur' to individual 
performance improvement compared with the damage that could be 
done to recruitment and retention of suitable staff. 
No supporting argument was given for the above-mentioned out-
look. The so-called "significant risks" were not elaborated upon 
and the doubts about a "spur" to improvement remained simply 
doubts. Clearly this is inadequate on an issue which is vital to the 
Australian public. Why, for example, can't the whole of the fourth 
division and the bottom two-thirds of the third division be placed 
on contract? As Bailey says, do they really require security of tenure 
to withstand political pressure? 
Far too little is known to make bold assertions proposing radical 
change or advocating conservative stagnation. We do know now that 
only about one-third of those who join the service on a permanent 
basis stay in it until retirement'^ but it does not seem to have 
concerned the board that it has no comprehensive information about 
the reasons why people leave the public service. As usual in most 
large organizations much more attention is paid to the entrance 
door than to the exit. 
RCAGA has given some opening to the view that tenure should 
be removed. Tenure has been the special privilege of the public 
sector in an age when special privileges for public servants are no 
longer justifiable. Of course it has to be conceded that the events 
of the past few years have demonstrated that if the board and the 
government really want to, they can sack public servants: the rules 
do allow it. Or in the more characteristically blunt words of Sir 
Henry Bland: 
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There is no difficulty in firing public servants in Australia. All it takes 
is the intestinal fortitude to do it." 
Retrospect 
The evidence tendered to RCAGA demonstrates that in terms of actual 
experience with staff movements and in relation to the feelings and 
aspirations of its members the commonwealth public service is a 
long way from being a pure career service. 
While the RCAGA recommendations are not sweepingly innovative, 
they would move that service even further away from the old ideal, 
so far in fact that this process of evolution will have made the 
service sit most uneasily within traditional Westminster conven-
tions. This is especially true as RCAGA failed to come to grips with 
the question of ethics for public servants. It is difficult to visualize 
the sort of "career service" the RCAGA report would produce. For 
example, can there be a regionalized and decentralized career 
service composed of occupational categories, with a fair degree of 
lateral recruitment, management-initiated retirement, staff ex-
changes, and contractural appointments? Presumably so. At least 
it can be stated that RCAGA did endeavour to answer the questions 
it raised at the early press conference. 
For the most part RCAGAS recommendations in relation to the 
career service concept tend to rectify past anomalies, to take 
account of objections raised by public service unions, and to seek 
that magic point of balance between the need for efficient adminis-
tration and the requirements of justice for public servants— 
"efficiency and equity" as the main chapter is called. These two 
concepts are in many ways mutually exclusive because the demands 
for equitable treatment of public servants are in many cases a 
hindrance to efficiency. The private sector in Australia has long 
been amazed at the internal trappings of public service personnel 
systems which are time-consuming and seem to protect the lazy 
and the unproductive. Predictably the result has been a compromise 
between efficiency and justice for public servants. 
A number of these recommendations are vaguely worded which 
has the advantage of allowing flexibility in implemention but suffers 
from the disadvantage of allowing government bureaucrats to 
manipulate or ignore the intent of the recommendations. Most of 
the changes will require amending legislation and so change will 
inevitably be slow. 
One is little wiser, after wading through a report, four appendices 
and a host of evidence as to what form of career service is in the 
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"public interest". In fact the general public has barely rated a 
mention in the sorts of aspects considered in this paper. This royal 
commission has probably fallen for the problem of all royal 
commissions: they rely too heavily on oral and written submissions 
for the "public viewpoint" or the "consumer viewpoint". Some 
commissioned research into the general public's attitude to the 
public service might have thrown a little more light on whether 
Australians desire a career service in the commonwealth govern-
ment. For this reason it is more a bureaucrat's document than a 
citizen's document. At least we have a new definition of a career 
service, although it will still continue to mean diff"erent things to 
different people. 
A few questions remain to be answered even after all RCAGA'S 
investigations and submissions by various bodies. The most impor-
tant one concerns the implications for public policy of having a 
career service. Is it still true that the career service tends to produce 
top public servants able to offer sound, neutral, fearless advice in 
the public interest because of their long timespan in the service, 
their anonymity, and their protection behind the screen of min-
isterial responsibility? Is that advice superior in any way to that 
given by qualified advisers appointed laterally and/or on a patron-
age basis? Has the quality of Australian public policies suffered 
as a result of the infusion of these outside advisers especially during 
the 1970s? Does the traditional career service produce elites isolated 
in Canberra, unrepresentative of the nation's demographic struc-
ture, income distribution, and cultural character? More specifically, 
can a top commonwealth public servant really come to grips with 
the problems of ethnic minorities living in the slums of industrial 
cities? If not, is this a case for more lateral, more representative, 
recruits? Where would such recruits come from and how could they 
be identified? More importantly, would they produce "better" 
public policies which were just and which reflected an efficient 
allocation of resources? 
The answers to these questions can only be found through 
experimentation. However this will not occur as long as agencies 
like the Public Service Board operate on the assumption that the 
old-style career service is still intact and still desired by public 
servants themselves and the people they are supposed to serve. 
Finally, it is, of course, easy to criticize the career service ideal-
type but not so easy to suggest an alternative—a "career service 
mark II" suitable for present day Australia—although RCAGA'S 
findings when grouped together do convey the grey outline of such 
a potential model. 
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Permanent Heads 
R. N. Spann 
The position of permanent heads was one topic considered by RCAGA 
which attracted much attention. Many submissions, apart from my 
own consultant's report, made reference to the matter, the Public 
Service Board put up a number of proposals, and in July 1975 the 
then prime minister specially asked the commission to look into 
the relations of permanent heads and ministers. 
Permanent heads do indeed play a key role in the Australian 
public services. They have, especially in Canberra, considerable 
power and prestige. It is true that they became more vulnerable 
to displacement after 1972, and the RCAGA' report thinks we should 
stop using the word "permanent". Still as one permanent head (with 
business experience) said during my survey, many company man-
agers would welcome a permanent head's discretion. It is true that 
major reorganizations involve the PSB, but the board also protects 
permanent heads from many troublesome staff problems. They have 
a large say in the fortunes of their subordinates. They have a fairly 
extensive control of communications to the outside world and the 
minister. They find it hard to get rid of inefficient staff, but can 
do a lot of moving around if they want, and legislation may make 
"management-initiated retirements" easier. The RCAGA report 
wishes to give them greater discretion than they have at present 
to vary the organization of their departments {RC 4.5.4), in 
financial matters, and in relation to common service agencies, 
though at the same time subjecting them to efficiency audit, and 
insisting that there should be more delegation and less rigid 
hierarchies. 
Some critics have said that I have too rosy a view of permanent 
heads, and of the public service generally; this view may seem to 
be confirmed by the fact that the 1976 report of the PSB gives 
prominence to remarks of mine saying inter alia, that I believe "that 
the Public Service, and permanent heads in particular, have served 
this country well during the years since World War II" and that 
A know "of no alternative model" which could be "claimed with 
great confidence to work better than the present arrangements".' 
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The Coombs commission left this bit out of my report when they 
printed it, an action in which I had acquiesced; it is no doubt the 
kind of windy generalization people who abridge reports find it 
easiest to cut. I quote it here only to say that I stand by it. One 
complaint that I have about the RCAGA report is its inadequate 
recognition of some of the merits of the public service, and of ways 
in which it has been adapted to new needs. 
Actually although the tone of the report sounds broadly unsym-
pathetic to the bureaucracy, its proposals are much more cautious, 
at least when it comes to firm lecommendations. 
Some background considerations 
Articulating the conventions 
This is a matter on which I feel a bit querulous. I made the point 
in my report (stimulated mainly by discussions with Sir Arthur 
Tange, a public servant who has not lost his liveliness) that there 
was a case for "articulating the conventions"—developing a reason-
ably up-to-date body of doctrine about the character and role of 
the public service, and of top public servants in particular. My point 
was that a good many of the old conventions or "understandings" 
about the public service were widely thought to be out-of-date, yet 
we had not found much to put in their place. So lip-service continues 
to be paid to the old conventions, yet in practice a change of 
government, as in 1972, or even a change of prime minister, as 
in the case of John Gorton, may be followed by a period of fairly 
arbitrary upset and "ad hoccery". This in turn tends to become 
discredited without bearing any of the fruits of thoughtful experi-
ment, much less of planned development. My own remarks on this 
matter were written before the change of government in 1975; but 
they seem to be borne out by what has happened since.^ 
I applied this idea particularly to the relations of ministers and 
permanent heads. But my notion attracted almost universal snub-
bing. People seem to resent the thought of any halfway house 
between utter vagueness and the most rigid of legalistic for-
mulations. The RCAGA report cited Hasluck as saying that such 
agreed formulations would be too rigid. Bland as saying that they 
could only be platitudinous, views not perfectly consistent with each 
other. 
However, having indicated that in general it was a bad idea to 
formulate such understandings, RCAGA goes on to say that there are 
some matters on which it would be useful to have a few conventions. 
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1 must admit that they do not use that word; they refer to "a body 
of knowledge and experience of normative developments in adminis-
trative practice" {RC 4.2.11), but I think that was broadly what 
I was talking about. The report lists a number of examples, 
including cases whether the minister has asked a public servant to 
do something illegal or in conflict with cabinet understandings. It 
is proposed that the PSB gather a body of case-studies on similar 
matters, available to guide future action, and to enable "well-
recognized procedures" to be developed. 
The report also states a few principles of its own. For example, 
it sees no reason why a minister or a public servant should not 
be allowed to discuss certain matters with the chairman of the PSB, 
the prime minister or (in the case of a public servant) the secretary 
to cabinet. The matters are defined as "problems which emerge in 
the course of administration of a kind which, because of their 
sensitivity, cannot readily be handled through the normal machin-
ery". The wording is cautious, and does not mention the secretary 
to the Attorney-General's department. Perhaps this would have 
come too close to endorsing the behaviour of Sir Frederick Wheeler 
in the loans afl"air {RC 4.2.12).* 
There are various other matters in which the report, without 
using the language of conventions or of "understandings", enun-
ciates "the practices, procedures or principles which we consider 
exist or should apply" {RC 4.2.12). Let me give examples: 
we consider it is appropriate for departmental heads to obtain the 
approval of their ministers for any significant changes in organization 
(RC 4.2.13). 
In relation to appointments of senior staff, it would normally be 
appropriate for a departmental head to let the minister know what he 
had in mind so that he might take account in his final decisions of 
any views the minister might care to express {RC 4.2.13). 
staff should not be confused by potentially conflicting instructions from 
minister and departmental head. This will not prevent a minister 
indicating to his departmental head that he wishes, for example, to 
receive advice from individual officers or have them assigned to certain 
tasks, but the arrangement of [decision on?] these matters should clearly 
rest with the departmental head {RC 4.5.6). 
where there are differences of view within the department . . . practices 
(should] be adopted whereby the minister becomes aware of those 
differences {RC 4.2.14). 
It is necessary to clarify the relationship of the head of a department 
to statutory bodies which are in the minister's portfolio {RC 4.5.5). 
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Interdependence 
The pre-eminent fact that has to be taken account of, in discussing 
the problems of modern government, is increasing interdependence. 
Governments are more and more involved in very complex systems 
of cooperation and ramifying networks of mutual influence, in which 
it is becoming harder and harder to assign specific powers and 
responsibilities. The RCAGA report recognizes this with one eye, not 
always with the other. 
Various things seem to me to follow from this. One is that, 
however we divide up functions, we must expect a great deal of 
overlap and the need for much close and sympathetic interchange. 
This is relevant to the whole question of relationships between 
ministers and departments, as it is to their relations with one 
another, of commonwealth and state governments and so on. 
In particular, the distinction between policy and administration 
is becoming harder to make. Policies need devising in relation to 
an intricate context of machinery for implementation and often with 
close reference to what is going on elsewhere in government and 
society; they also need continual modification in the light of 
changing circumstances. As the people in the closest touch with 
this feedback are commonly the day-to-day administrators, policies 
and plans with which they have no sense of close association will 
not work. 
This makes it difficult to think in terms of rigid demarcation lines, 
even when we recognize that ministers and permanent heads have 
at the same time distinctive functions—on the contrary, there is 
a need on both sides to work towards a sympathetic and intelligent 
understanding of how the worlds of politics and administration 
interpenetrate. 
As the RCAGA report makes very clear, we also have to reckon 
with increased interdependence between departments. Today many 
policies overpass departmental boundaries, both in their making and 
their implementation. They are the responsibility of the government, 
not the minister. So the context of permanent heads includes the 
prime minister and cabinet as well as the minister, and also 
coordinating agencies such as the Treasury, the department of 
Finance, the PSB, inter-departmental committees. This kind of 
interdependence has all kinds of implications. How far should senior 
public servants and ministers be brought together collectively, in 
cabinet and other committees? How far must the prime minister, 
as leader of the government, have a concern for its administrative 
arrangements, as part of his general concern for all the larger 
matters of government business? 
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As I said in my report: 
One of the hardest tasks of modern government is to create the 
appropriate machinery and to evoke the required attitudes that will 
make this central concern a reality. Yet if political direction of the 
administration is to mean anything nowadays, it cannot mean twenty-
odd ministers each pushing his own barrow—if that were the only 
prospect, one would seek, I think, to maximize the influence of non-
political mechanisms of central coordination, and simply hope to insulate 
the public service as far as possible from political caprice and ill-judged 
intervention.' 
This passage was written in 1975, in a period of gloom about the 
weaknesses of the Whitlam administration, perhaps in the very 
period when some corrective processes had been set on foot. 
The RCAGA report recognizes the facts of interdependence: 
We can see no way by which the precise roles of ministers and 
departments can be defined . . . it is not possible to separate 'policy' 
from 'administration' (RC 4.2.15-6). 
Interdependence between departments 
In the area of policy-making, the report has some specially 
interesting remarks on the "Collective Problem",'" the tendency of 
modern government continually to raise issues overpassing de-
partmental boundaries. 
While the collective power of ministers is much more far-reaching than 
the sum of their departmental responsibilities, the administrative 
machinery supporting them is not designed correspondingly to promote 
collective knowledge and consciousness among them but for the most 
part is naturally engaged in developing distinctive approaches bearing 
on items of policy. 
Indeed more and busier ministers and top public servants means 
that contacts between them are often less than they used to be in 
earlier days. Thinking "in aggregate terms" tends to get left to the 
prime minister and treasurer and their departments, and to such 
bodies as Public Service Boards, while other departments pursue 
their own narrow interests (and simply giving ministers bigger 
personal staffs might only intensify rivalries and second-guessing). 
How can this situation be improved? Not all the Coombs 
formulations seem to be helpful. 
Each minister has a continuous teaching function to perform in his 
department, pointing out where and how his government needs to be 
served as a collective entity (RC 4.1.6). 
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There is an implication here that the horizons of ministers are 
regularly broader than those of senior officials, because of cabinet 
and party contacts (and fear of losing office); whether this is 
generally true in practice, I rather doubt, but it may be so. 
The report attaches much importance to the development of 
collective bodies including both ministers and senior officers, such 
as the mixed ministerial-official committees which are to plan 
forward expenditures (RC 11.2.). It also refers to the possibility 
of grouping departments on functional lines, each group to be 
presided over either by a senior cabinet minister, or by "a Policy 
Board, consisting of the relevant ministers with support from their 
senior advisers" (RC 4.3.34).' 
Some of this enthusiasm may have stemmed from the apparent 
success of such arrangements in Canada and of some latterday 
experience of the Whitlam government, such as the expenditure 
review committee. In my own report I expressed surprise that after 
some fruitful use of departmental officers by cabinet committees 
in the days of Chifley, and even in the early days of Menzies, it 
became a rare event for permanent officials to attend ministerial 
committees, both under Liberal and Labor governments. (There 
seems to have been some revival under Fraser). It may be a function 
of the insecurities of our ministers. There is also a view among 
officials (which I have met in the Treasury) that regular ap-
pearances of senior officers before committees "tend to cut across 
responsibility to the minister, which is primary". However, it has 
been said that in Canada such participation strengthens the hand 
of ministers by leading to more 
probing of officials by ministers; less monolithic advice from the 
bureaucracy; more consideration of issues beyond departmental bound-
aries; and a greater ability of ministers to send a matter back to a 
department for further work or for the development of a different 
proposal." 
The report has another line of attack on the problems of 
interdependence between departments—greater rotation of staff", 
and better career planning. I touched on this in my own report. 
The best way to encourage a broad approach to the problems of 
government is to place an officer for a period in a department from 
which he may observe, and where he has to some degree to cope with, 
the whole range of governmental activity, in which there regularly arise 
policy questions touching on the concerns of many other departments.' 
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Interdependence within departments 
Here RCAGA takes a fairly conservative line, so far as formal changes 
are concerned. It firmly rejects most proposals for collegial or 
statutory bodies that might incorporate significant functions of 
ministers or permanent heads: or for special "policy units" on 
Swedish or other lines, that might tend to split policy-forming too 
much from operations. It envisages a modest role for ministerial 
staffs, mainly as facilitators of communication. It approves of 
assistant ministers for the larger departments, as a way of reducing 
the minister's workload and as a training-ground for promising 
backbenchers (RC 4.3.33). 
The report accepts the fact that the traditional departmental style 
of organization is "generally the most appropriate for giving effect 
to programmes reflecting the policies of particular ministers and 
governments" (RC 10.5.16). An important reason for this is that 
it believes that the ministerial department is a very flexible 
instrument, which can be adapted to many purposes. 
The whole thrust of our thinking is rather towards reintegrating the 
management and the policy functions and using the flexibility of the 
departmental structure to avoid excessive resort to the creation of 
separate statutory bodies [my emphasis] (RC 4.3.39). 
As in the case of interdepartmental relations, RCAGA attaches 
importance to the greater interchange of staflTs within departments, 
and as between policy and operations. Otherwise, the report is 
disappointingly vague about how to improve modes of policy advice 
to ministers. One feels that there must be more to be said about 
this by experienced insiders or ex-insiders, who might (for example) 
analyze some of the more successful ways in which, under Labor, 
permanent officers and short-term advisers or staff" units were 
brought together in complementary fashion. 
I was also surprised how summarily the report deals with the 
proposal for departmental boards and similar devices designed to 
produce a more "collegial" or corporate approach to policy-forming 
and management, though I agree with what they say. I had had 
the impression that this was regarded as a fairly important issue, 
and spent more time than I otherwise would have done looking into 
it.'" 
It seemed to me that a crucial point, if one is talking of a board 
of any consequence, is that one cannot imagine most ministers 
agreeing to work through boards. When a minister wants to go 
beyond the permanent head, he wants to talk to the individuals 
concerned with particular matters. In any case his life is so hard 
to plan ahead the chances are, if there were such a board, the 
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minister would attend only intermittently. It would be the per-
manent head's board. Even this, if it were a main source of policy 
advice or management decision, would be a clumsy and time-
wasting instrument. It is true that ministers already have dealings 
with statutory bodies, but these are commonly either bodies with 
final decision-making powers on most matters or concerned with 
formulating long-term policies (as is the universities commission), 
not with the many immediate problems that face a permanent head. 
So my own conclusion was roughly the same as, and as unexciting 
as, that of RCAGA, that (in their words) departments should "explore 
various methods of collective decision making, and that ministers, 
from time to time, [should] involve themselves in the work of the 
groups concerned" (RC 4.3.12). Quite a bit of collegial machinery 
already exists in fact. If sometimes called "executive", it seems to 
be mainly of an advisory and informational kind, and the permanent 
head can still go away and do something different if he wants to. 
One trend that may make formal provision less necessary is that 
in the normal course of events "authoritarian and hierarchical 
features are being steadily drained from higher administration"." 
A small piece of evidence bearing on this is that most permanent 
heads 1 talked to (perhaps I had a biased sample) seemed 
remarkably relaxed about direct access of their senior colleagues 
to the minister, though they reasonably wished to be informed in 
a general way of what was going on. I noted in my report the 
comment by a senior officer that, if a modern permanent head tried 
to monopolize access, it would be mainly felt as an indication of 
his own inadequacy. 
The permanent head and the minister—roles and relationships 
If one accepts the conclusion that the formal structure of depart-
ments remains broadly unchanged, and that they continue to be 
the main instrument for advising ministers and governments, and 
for implementing their policies, what can be helpfully said about 
the roles and relationships of permanent heads and ministers? I 
touch here on some points not very fully dealt with by RCAGA. 
Neutrality and impartiality 
One problem area is the whole question of the "neutrality" of the 
top public service. Some people think the concept is meaningless, 
or deleterious, or so imperfectly realized in practice as to be a very 
misleading bit of ideology. I do not agree with this, though I agree 
it is not at all easy to formulate the doctrine in a clear way. 
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However, some things can be said. There are certain things that 
it clearly does not mean. As the former head of the British civil 
service has said, the whole system would break down if a permanent 
head were asked to be neutral as between the government and the 
opposition. His impartiality lies in loyal support of the government 
in power, whichever government that happens to be. More 
significant, I think, is that this loyalty means more than giving good 
advice when asked and faithfully implementing instructions when 
received. As I expressed it in my report: 
A permanent head has a duty to promote and protect the minister's 
and the government's interests just as he would if they were wholly 
acceptable to him personally. 
One can argue (I would) that a modern permanent head should 
go a long way in easing his minister's path, and be prepared to 
take the initiative in creating and maintaining good relations, if 
only because the minister is liable to be increasingly at a disadvan-
tage as government gets more technical. Senior officers have to 
make even greater efforts to make clear not only their own views, 
but also the various options, their likely consequences and how they 
are related to the apparent political aims and general outlook of 
the government. I think it a dangerous doctrine that permanent 
heads are guardians of the public interest, though in a certain sense 
this is true. Certainly ministers have no sole right to determine the 
public interest, but the effectiveness of the permanent head seems 
to me in the long run to depend on what I have called an "intimately 
reciprocal" relation with ministers, and the balance seems to me 
to depend on their being allowed a very full mobilization of expertise 
and professional skill, in exchange for a virtually unquestionable 
loyalty to their political superiors, in the active sense I have 
indicated. Though 1 have in general been a defender of Australian 
permanent heads, in the Treasury and elsewhere, against some 
scapegoating that has gone on, I concede that in relation to the 
"high" doctrine of loyalty outlined above, there may have been 
shortcomings. 
Of course, such close relationship between minister and public 
servant is extremely hard to achieve, and is only possible under 
certain conditions. 
First, it involves great freedom for the permanent head and senior 
officers to argue with the minister in private, and in a certain sense 
as equals. Walter Bagehot put it best a century ago: 
Important business can only be sufficiently discussed by persons who 
can say very much as they like to one another. The thought of the 
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speaker should come out as it was in his mind, and not be hidden in 
respectful expressions or enfeebled by affected doubt.'-
There are some important conditions of such a relationship, quite 
often not fulfilled in Australia. They are partly a function of 
intelligence, partly of psychological and moral factors such as 
defensiveness, lack of personal compatibility, and so on, partly 
deeply rooted in social background. This would be an interesting 
area for further research. 
Second, if a permanent head is expected in the end to subordinate 
his judgment, he is entitled to some protection from outside 
criticism. It seems to me a regrettable feature of recent years that 
some ministers have been ready to turn on their departments or 
permanent heads (or the prime minister has done it for them). This 
certainly does not mean that top public servants should be exempt 
from criticism. Indeed, I think we need recognized ways in which 
a minister can register dissatisfaction with the general record of 
his permanent head. One simple point I made in my report is that 
the PSB should regard one of its tasks as being to communicate 
periodically with ministers, from whom it seems to me unduly 
isolated. If a minister persistently doubts the quality of advice or 
executive performance he is getting, I see no reason why he should 
not make this known in the proper quarters, including the PSB. The 
RCAGA report thinks that departments should be able to use annual 
reports to reply to criticism (4.3.27). 
Finally, there is the knotty question of what happens when loyalty 
to the minister seems to conflict with loyalty to the government 
of the day. The modern conventions, in a world of interdependent 
departments and cabinet committees, should certainly allow for 
this." 
Attitudes to (and of) ministers 
What attitudes to ministers in fact emerged from my discussions 
with permanent heads? A few were very critical of them. One 
complained that they got away with incapacity and incompetence 
more readily than public servants do, and that it was astonishing 
(perhaps a credit to official loyalty) that journalists seemed to know 
so little about their failings as seen from the department's point 
of view. More generally, I think it significant that most of the 
adverse comments made to me about ministers related not to 
hyperactivity, overbearing behaviour or interference, but to inac-
cessibility, indecisiveness, laziness or doubledealing. 
So far, at least as the policy-forming function goes, there is not 
the least evidence that senior officers prefer weak ministers, or 
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people who will accept everything that is put in front of them. Most 
clearly prefer a capable minister, who can advance the interests 
of the department in cabinet and elsewhere, and make clear and 
consistent decisions on policy questions. Typical comments by 
permanent heads are: 
X was a difficult minister in many ways. But he was searching, and 
had the capacity to interrogate his department. He asked sensible 
questions, threw out suggestions . . . 
In my official career 1 had dealings with ten ministers; we had real 
problems with five. Two created great difficulties in managing the 
department by underhand methods, one was utterly dependent on the 
department, one was a "slow reader"; and so on. 
It is true that such attitudes relate mainly to the policy-making 
area. When it comes to departmental management, commonwealth 
permanent heads seem mostly to believe that ministers should only 
have a very limited power to intervene. This is especially true of 
personnel questions, but largely true also of questions of adminis-
trative structure and methods of implementation; section 25(2) of 
the Public Service Act is widely held to give statutory force to this 
view. 
This view has not led to great conflict between ministers and 
permanent heads, because it is consistent with the view of many 
ministers about their role. In Canberra a minister tends to be a 
very "political animal"—more so than in the state governments, 
where ministers are more liable to see themselves in a management 
role. And, as the RCAGA report and others have pointed (Jut, there 
are special factors in Canberra which encourage this. Ministers are 
usually operating far from their home base, so there are many 
instances where they try to conduct much departmental business 
from home, outside parliamentary sessions or at weekends; and the 
continual need for their presence at parliamentary divisions during 
the session encourages them to do what they like to do anyway, 
which is to make their parliamentary office their base. 
Personal contacts with permanent heads seem to vary enormously 
between ministers. My own responses on this point varied from the 
permanent head who spent part of most days with his minister, 
or who saw him 
about ten times a week, except when the House is sitting, then at least 
once a week (late evening 9 p.m. to early a.m.). Hardly a week-end 
goes by without a two-hour telephone conversation from his home-base. 
to permanent heads who were "lucky to see him once a week", 
or one whose minister was "hard to see at all". Many contacts are 
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in the unpeaceful surroundings of parliament house, or in conversa-
tions on the way to airports. 
As a result of all this, ministers not merely do not have, but 
usually do not claim, much say in matters of departmental 
management. Many such matters are doubtless best left to officials. 
All the same, if it means that ministers get little say (even in a 
broad sense) in how policies are implemented, this is a serious 
limitation on their power. First, it puts them in too weak a position 
in relation to officials. 
What usually counts is how policy hits the ground, and it may not be 
too difficult to run the department so that things do not really happen 
as the minister intends. Then the minister can jump up and down, but 
there are always twenty-four good reasons that the permanent head can 
give for acting as he did, reasons that are hard to refute. 
This argument may not appeal to those who think it best that public 
servants should run the country. They may be impressed by another 
argument—that under the present system ministers and cabinets 
remain more unsophisticated than they need be about adminis-
trative problems, and that this has deleterious effects on policy-
making. To quote from a submission by two public servants to 
RCAGA, ministers "need to give greater attention to ensuring that 
their policies are workable and that they work".'" 
There are no easy remedies, but my own conclusions and the 
RCAGA report agree that one can give one or two pushes in the right 
direction. I suggested that it should be made unmistakeably clear 
that a minister is entitled to concern himself with all departmental 
matters except those specifically reserved by statute (some personnel 
matters) or by well-recognized convention (such as access to cabinet 
papers of a former government). The RCAGA report seems to agree, 
though I believe that it pulls its punches about this, partly because 
it also wants to preach the gospel of accountable management, 
which depends on assuming that the bureaucracy is an independent 
power in the land. I cite some representative passages from the 
report on the subject of ministerial-bureaucratic relations in the 
section below on accountable management. 
Permanent heads and their roles 
If ministers see themselves as "political animals", more permanent 
heads than I expected saw themselves as primarily managerial. I 
was surprised to find that, although some important permanent 
heads think of their primary role as providing policy advice to 
ministers, including guiding the steps of new ministers'^ and 
continuing to protect them, many of those whom I interviewed saw 
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their most important task as "management"; though they might 
see policy-formulation as something that is itself part of the 
management process. Correspondingly, the real constraints they felt 
on their power were often management constraints, including such 
things as lack of power to dispose of inefficient staff; or their own 
lack of management skills or management experience. 
At any rate there is a fair amount of variety in the way 
permanent heads see their roles. Nor does it seem necessary that 
they should be good at all of them; even if they were, in most 
departments they do not have the time to carry them out adequate-
ly. Sir Henry Bland (who has seen both worlds) correctly said 
recently that few senior businessmen "work with anything like the 
pressure that the top civil servants do"," and for complex reasons 
this is hard to change. Is there any reason why a permanent head 
who prefers to concentrate on policy should not delegate a good 
part of the management function to another senior officer? I quote 
from a former senior officer of Foreign Affairs: 
Two permanent heads I have known in Foreign Affairs were both very 
able International Affairs men but poor administrators—one of the two 
was not prepared to recognize the fact, and that did create problems. 
Conversely, the British Fulton committee's proposal for a separate 
senior policy adviser of deputy secretary rank arose at least in part 
from the belief that a permanent head who gave really adequate 
attention to the management function—they thought that British 
permanent heads neglected it—would simply not have enough time 
to devote to policy matters, especially forward planning. I referred 
in my report to the interesting situation in DURD, where the main 
policy adviser to Mr Uren was a member of the department "on 
contract", with broadly the status of a deputy secretary, and I added 
that one or two other departments might be encouraged to 
experiment. 
However, it is all very tricky, at least for those who see the 
undesirability of dividing policy and implementation, or planning 
and operations. Again, we need more intelligent comment from 
experienced insiders. 
A glance at accountable management 
A good deal of what RCAGA says about the need for ministers and 
senior officers to become more mixed up together, both departmen-
tally and interdepartmentally, seems to me (as I have indicated) 
very sensible. However, there are certain problems about it. There 
are various other tendencies in government with which it comes 
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into some conflict: in particular, various "managerialist" concep-
tions of the role of permanent heads; and along with this the effort 
to move certain policy areas out, or partly out, of the sphere of 
"politics" by such devices as the statutory authority. I shall confine 
myself to the first point. 
The RCAGA report sees the problem: 
On the one hand, if ministers involve themselves in decisions to a degree 
necessary for them to accept responsibility for them, officials are less 
likely to feel personally responsible and the outcome may therefore be 
less efficient. On the other hand, attempts to acknowledge and give 
precision to the responsibility of officials and to hold them accountable 
for its exercise may be seen as weakening direct ministerial accountabili-
ty and therefore political control (RC 2.1.8). 
The report says that it is necessary to "hold the balance" between 
these competing principles. But it seems to me that the thrust of 
the report, at least where questions of administration and implemen-
tation of policy are concerned, is "managerialist", though it is an 
odd anti-bureaucratic form of managerialism. 
A satirical way of putting it would be to say that RCAGA is so 
set on making bureaucrats accountable that it is determined to find 
them an independent field of action to be accountable for. They 
do not of course put it that way: 
the realities of contemporary government require that the bureaucracy 
be seen as exercising some powers in its own right; that the independence 
of those powers requires that those exercising them should be held 
accountable. 
On this view the administration is a separate estate of the realm, 
with a definable role. 
Indeed, one senses that the RCAGA report is not pushing hard for 
most ministers to take an active interest in the administration of 
their departments. The following seems to sum up their position: 
the structure should not be such that an energetic and able minister 
cannot, if he so chooses, play a very active role in departmental 
operations. Nevertheless, the more usual need seems to be for arrange-
ments by which ministers can be relieved of some of the instant pressures 
of management so that they can provide general and political leadership 
and get on with their other jobs—and so that departments on their side 
are not continually hampered by being unable to proceed for want of 
authority. 
Unless they are simply thinking here of matters of petty detail, 
I cannot help feeling that this last sentence consorts ill with the 
two paragraphs which follow, where we are told that ministers 
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need to be encouraged to concern themselves with problems of adminis-
tration and implementation, and to understand these problems better 
. . . One of the obstacles to ministers becoming more involved with their 
departments is that they have very little opportunity, particularly when 
Parliament is in session, to spend time in them (RC 4.2.16-7). 
Perhaps I am juggling with words. What we all want, I suspect, 
is simply a minister with enough intelligence and administrative 
capacity and powers of executive leadership to "be able to state 
clearly what service he expects from the department, and to get 
what he wants"; and to have an informed and sympathetic 
understanding of his department's problems and constraints. Pro-
fessor Parker interpreted my view correctly when he wrote that, 
by my account, 
the difficulties lie far more on the side of politicians (specifically, 
ministers) than of the law, the public service, or the permanent heads 
. . . The personal qualifications, experience, idiosyncracies and strength 
of character of ministers determine whether they give the departmental 
leadership that permanent heads appreciate." 
I add only that I am doubtful about the effectiveness of efficiency 
audits, at any rate so far as controlling permanent heads is 
concerned. I believe, as I said in my report, that 
much will continue to depend on broader forms of check, including care 
in initial appointments, greater concern of ministers and Cabinets for 
administrative matters, more "open government", better peer-group 
control, and so on." 
Appendix I—Appointment and removal of permanent heads 
Appointments to commonwealth permanent headships are made by 
the government, normally from within the public service. Though 
the wording of the Public Service Act suggests that the PSB will 
normally be consulted, it is also made unmistakeably clear that 
"appointments to the office of Permanent Head may be made by 
the Governor General without reference to the Board". In its 
submission to the RCAGA commission, the board expressed the view 
that the final decision should remain with the government, though 
it would like to see firmer conventions about consultation 
established." 
My own main impression of such appointments was how "care-
lessly" some of them are made—I use the word advisedly, meaning 
without the lack of haste, formality, attention to detail and 
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sometimes considerable heart-searching with which, in my ex-
perience, senior university appointments are made. This seems 
weird, when one considers that good permanent heads are a vital 
part of our system of government. 
I said in my own report that there should be an agreed set of 
conventions about procedures, though the final right of the govern-
ment to make its own choice should be preserved. I thought that, 
in particular, limitations needed putting on the rights of individual 
ministers, who seemed to me to be on the whole bad choosers of 
permanent heads. Nor did I think the PSB should be the sole 
authority (as it has tended to be in states like NSW), though its 
chairman should play a significant role, and the board should be 
a much more efficiently organized information centre about talent 
than it has been in the past. I thought that there was a place for 
a fairly large formal committee of top officials (including rotating 
members) which might also include one or two outsiders. Such a 
body might also be used for some statutory appointments. I thought 
that permanent headships should very often be advertised, though 
I am shaky on this point. (Commonwealth heads have occasionally 
been appointed from outside the service, but never as a result of 
advertisement.)^" If outsiders were appointed, I saw no reason for 
giving them a tenure any different from insiders. 
Long before RCAGA could express a view on the matter, Mr Fraser 
had made a statement, on 9 November 1975, about what a Liberal-
Country party government would do about this matter. This did 
spell out certain broad procedures for producing a short list. Final 
discretion should be with the Government, but if the choice was 
not made from the final short list, "the succeeding government 
would be free to review the appointment".^' The Public Service Act 
was to be amended accordingly. 
The RCAGA report did not go into detail about procedures; it 
approved of advertisement, but only "whenever circumstances 
allow" and when the prime minister approved; it approved of a panel 
(nature unspecific) to draw up a short list, but thought that this 
panel should be chosen by the prime minister and the minister 
"after consultation with the Chairman of the Public Service Board". 
The final selection would need the approval of the minister 
concerned; and of the cabinet (as was said to be already the case). 
A crucial point here seems to be free choice of an apparently ad 
hoc panel by the politicians." It saw no advantages in legislating 
(or being much more precise) about procedures; but later on the 
report does envisage a statutory distinction between insiders and 
outsiders.-' This is not, of course, the distinction Fraser had drawn, 
which was between candidates, inside or outside, appointed from 
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the final short list (in later jargon, "established candidates") and 
others. 
The Fraser legislation has been slow to appear. In mid-1976 it 
was reported that the chairman of the PSB had been participating 
in a review of procedures for selecting permanent heads in the light 
of the prime minister's 1975 statement, presumably in consultation 
with other senior officers. The enquiry apparently also included 
appointments to full-time statutory office,^ " though these are not 
dealt with in the legislation. No doubt there was argument on a 
number of points, which one may guess included how much 
provision should be made for the possible appointment of outsiders, 
how important a role various individuals, such as the chairman of 
the PSB, should play, where exactly the line should be drawn between 
tenured and less-firmly-tenured heads; and so on. 
Legislation was finally introduced by the prime minister in 
November 1976." Its most important provision is the distinction 
drawn between "established candidates" and others. An "estab-
lished candidate" for a permanent headship is, broadly, one who 
has been shortlisted by either the chairman of the board (who has 
some independence in this matter) or by a committee of permanent 
heads appointed and chaired by him (after consulting with the 
prime minister). But any permanent head, or ex-permanent head 
still in the service, is also "established", even if not shortlisted. If 
the prime minister—and it is made clear that it is the prime 
minister, not the cabinet, who advises the governor general— 
recommends anyone else, then it is to be for a maximum of five 
years, subject to reappointment, and a new prime minister can get 
rid of him earlier if there has been a change of party government 
(carefully defined). Provision can be made at the time of appoint-
ment for compensating outsiders; non-established insiders who are 
removed are to be found an "appropriate" lesser office by the board 
or have the option of retirement. 
The bill goes into some detail about the procedures required to 
become "established". The main initiative rests with the chairman 
of the board and his committee of permanent heads, but the prime 
minister can insist on advertisement, and he or the minister 
concerned can suggest additional names. The prime minister, in his 
second reading speech, made clear some procedures not covered in 
the bill, such as the right of the prime minister and the minister 
concerned to interview shortlisted candidates at any stage. He added 
that the term "permanent head" was possibly now "inappropriate" 
(as RCAGA thought), but would be kept for the time being; and that 
in his view it would be "most unlikely" that positions would be 
advertised. He also said that his government's appointments to 
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permanent headships had "been made in conformity with the 
principles of the legislation", though no formal committee had been 
established. I have little information about Fraser appointments, 
except what has appeared in the press. The PSB was said by the 
prime minister to have been "fully and adequately" consulted about 
Mr Alan Carmody; Mr Tim Besley was chosen for the department 
of Business and Consumer Affairs from what was described to the 
Canberra Times as "quite an extended short list". Most Fraser 
appointees have already been permanent heads, so they would have 
been "established candidates" anyway, whether shortlisted or not. 
If there has to be discrimination between some permanent heads 
and others, I think the Fraser formula is better than the RCAGA one; 
an internal appointment can be just as arbitrary, political and risky 
as one from outside. One difficulty with the Fraser scheme is that 
a new "non-established" permanent head who will often (one 
imagines) have been recommended for the short list but failed to 
make it, can hardly be expected to be on good terms with the 
leading permanent heads, nor will his minister. 
It has been commonly held that a permanent head could not be 
removed from his position without his consent, unless his depart-
ment (and hence his position) were abolished. The latter possibility 
is nowadays not academic, when departments are regularly re-
constituted under new names—or even under old ones.^' Of the 
permanent heads serving when Labor came to power in December 
1972, under half were still permanent heads two and a half years 
later. 
All the same the PSB attached importance, in evidence to RCAGA, 
to the principle that a permanent head's agreement to his own 
transfer was needed. There seems little justification for this, and 
in some cases it has held up desirable change; or tempted 
governments into the device mentioned above. At the same time, 
permanent heads need some protection from the arbitrary demands 
of particular ministers, especially new ministers. I attach im-
portance, as RCAGA does, to the old-fashioned argument that 
reasonable security makes it easier for a permanent head to give 
objective advice to a minister, and not be "tempted, even sub-
consciously, to withhold or moderate unpalatable advice for fear 
of incurring displeasure and putting his job at risk" (RC 4.5.13). 
My own recommendations and those of the RCAGA report differ only 
in minor respects—both suggest in effect that if the prime minister 
recommends compulsory transfer it should be only after consulta-
tion with a panel. The RCAGA report also agreed with many 
submissions that permanent heads should normally expect to be 
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moved after five to seven years, and that regular machinery was 
needed to review appointments and recommend relocations. 
I was myself struck by the number of senior officers prepared 
to agree that after five to seven years in a department even very 
good permanent heads have often "spent their intellectual capital" 
and their powers as initiators begin to fall off. The work is often 
very exacting—indeed not a few permanent heads, especially in 
their later fifties, get bored, even burnt out, and would welcome 
a different sort of job or retirement on reasonable terms. The report 
agreed with me in rejecting a proposal which at first seemed to 
attract some favour, and which was one of the recommendations 
of the South Australian committee of inquiry, accepted by the 
government of that state—that all permanent heads should have 
fixed term contracts. They say—rightly in my opinion—that a 
universal system of this kind 
would introduce a degree of rigidity . . . which governments could find 
highly inconvenient and an impediment to the execution of their policies. 
A fixed term may have the effect of lengthening the period a person 
should serve, just as it may arbitrarily cut a period of service too short 
(RC 4.5.16). 
There is, I might add, a strange belief in some quarters that a more 
mobile and politically "responsive" group of permanent heads would 
necessarily promote responsiveness in their departments. I believe 
that it could equally well lead (as has often happened in America) 
to the growth of many inbred and resistant sub-empires within 
departments. A good permanent head and his deputies, who carry 
with them the respect and loyalty of divisional and branch heads, 
but are also attuned to the policy desires of ministers, can be 
excellent instruments for injecting more drive and coordinated 
movement into a necessarily somewhat conservative machine. 
Appendix II—Background and career patterns of permanent heads 
The following analysis is based on information obtained from the 
Public Service Board and from Who's Who in Australia, and relates 
to 28 permanent heads serving in mid-1975. 
Age 
Average age on appointment to a permanent headship: 48 
Average age in mid-1975: 53 
Average age on entry to Australian Public Service: 27 
(14-19: 9; 20-24: 5; 25-29: 7; 30-39: 2; 40 and over: 5). 
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Outside career and war service 
Only five of the 28 had a substantial career outside government. 
Another four had a few years' outside employment as young men. 
Nineteen had no appreciable employment outside government. Of 
21 old enough to have served in World War II, 13 were returned 
servicemen, eight were not. 
University degrees 
All but one had university degrees. Of first degrees, 17 were degrees 
in economics and commerce, or BAs with a strong economics 
element. Five were in science or engineering, two in arts, two in 
law, one in medicine. 
About half the university courses for first degrees were attended 
directly after leaving school, with the first degree completed by the 
age of 23. The other half were after some career already started, 
and were usually part-time degrees, though they also included one 
or two full-time cadetships. About ten degree courses were attended 
after entry to the public service and four after starting some career 
outside the service (as teacher, bank officer and so on). 
Number of government agencies served in (on a full-time basis) 
Including their present Department, of the 28 permanent heads, 
seven had experience of only one Commonwealth government 
agency." Four had served in two agencies, five in three, and twelve 
in four or more. 
These figures include about ten who had some significant period 
of service with statutory bodies (CSIRO. Universities Commission, 
NCDC, Australian Atomic Energy Commission, etc.). 
Special experience 
I have tried to collect below some information, relevant to the 
discussion in the main text of the report, on experience of special 
relevance to a permanent headship. Unfortunately I have had to 
rely on imperfect data, supplemented only partially by personal 
inquiry. So the information below is not precise, though I believe 
it is not seriously misleading. 1 include it only with this reservation, 
(a) Service with Public Service Board. Treasury or Prime 
Minister's Department. This is intended as a rough index of 
experience in agencies that try to look at governmental problems 
"in the round". 
Treasury: 6'* 
Public Service Board: 1 
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Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet: 5" 
However, it is clear that not all this service gave experience of the 
type indicated—some of it was in very specialized branches. A truer 
conclusion might be that about a quarter of all permanent heads 
have had some significant experience in departments concerned in 
overall coordination, personnel and financial management. One or 
two of these also had "management" experience of other kinds 
before they became permanent heads. 
(b) "Management" experience elsewhere. At least six other per-
manent heads had significant "management" experience in other 
government agencies before they became permanent heads (as, for 
example, managers of statutory bodies, or in personnel, finance and 
management services units in departments such as Air, Works, 
Supply). Two others had substantial management experience out-
side Australian government. 
Almost none appear to have formal "management" qualifications, 
though they included a Harvard MPA, an FAIM, and several with 
specialized accounting qualifications. 
Appendix III—Section 25(2) of the public service act 
This is the section of the Public Service Act stating that 
The Permanent Head of a Department shall be responsible for its 
general working and for all the business thereof, and shall advise the 
Minister in all matters relating to the Department. 
Two questions have been raised about this. The first is what is 
its legal status; the second is, should it be amended and, if so, how? 
The first point is discussed both in my report and in the RCAGA 
report. The solicitor-general, who gave an opinion at the former 
prime minister's request in June 1975, agreed with Dr Evatt that 
it was not a legal limitation on the minister in his direction and 
control of administration. I queried this view, which is partly based 
on some dubious analogies between Australia and the United 
Kingdom. The RCAGA report (though extremely cautious in its 
language and writing without direct reference to my discussion of 
the point) seems also to query it. Its final word, after referring to 
this section and others, is: 
Taken as a whole, the Public Service Act can be said to represent a 
deliberate decision by the Parliament to confine ministerial authority 
in relation to the employment and management of departmental 
personnel (RC 4.2.6). 
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"Management of departmental personnel" is a somewhat am-
biguous term. 
My own view—though by no means a firm one—was that the 
section might well be amended by adding "to the minister" after 
"responsible", and deleting "and for all the business thereof. 
Parker thought there could be a case for redrafting the phrase "shall 
advise the minister in all matters". The RCAGA report does not 
propose a precise form of words, but finally says that the section 
should "incorporate direct references to the responsibility of the 
departmental head to the minister (provided there is recognition 
of the broader setting of senior officers' obligations to cabinet)".'" 
It points out that a departmental head has also to take account 
of 
the decisions of other ministers . . . for instance. Cabinet decisions. 
Treasury rulings and Board advice . . . Occasions can arise when a 
departmental head senses conflict between a proposal of his minister 
and the understood intentions or policy of the Cabinet. 
The commissioners recognize the difficulties of saying this in 
legislation, and leave any necessary redrafting to others." 
The report makes a firmer proposal that section 25(2) include 
clear reference (as is true of the New Zealand State Services Act) 
to the permanent head's responsibility to ensure "the efficient and 
economic administration" of his department. 
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Central Coordination 1 L 
and Control 
R F. I Smith 
In this chapter I am concerned with the range of RCAGAS discussion 
of central coordination and control as well as with its specific 
proposals. On such a topic a commission's ability to ask interesting 
questions, clarify issues and bring information to bear on them is 
probably as important as its actual recommendations. The 
commission's wide terms of reference gave it a clear opportunity 
to be adventurous. But having a wide field within which to choose 
topics for analysis and recommendation also carries the risk that 
the less tractable topics will, consciously or unconsciously, be edged 
to the side. 
This seems to have happened with the commission's treatment 
of coordination and control. Whatever the considerable merits of 
its report in opening up discussion on topics such as access and 
devolution, and in collecting and publishing a vast amount of 
material, it does not bite hard on coordination and control. Two 
reasons for this may be considered. First, despite the commission's 
wide terms of reference and the explicit invitation in them to 
examine relations in government between politicians and public 
servants, conditions at the time made this invitation a daunting 
prospect. It would have been tempting for some politicians, includ-
ing ministers, to accuse the commission of trying to tell ministers 
how to run their own affairs. The abrupt change of government 
in November 1975 introduced a further complication. Second, 
whatever the political situation, questions of coordination and 
control lead rapidly into intractable topics. In these the questions 
to be considered can be defined in many different ways and 
institutional solutions to some problems themselves become the 
source of trouble if problems are defined differently. 
Institutions of government and public policy 
At their most general these questions can include ones like the 
following: what can governments control? when and in what 
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circumstances do they get overloaded? which sorts of institution 
should be responsible for particular tasks of coordination and 
control? Responses to such questions vary. Some analysts have 
concluded that there is no theoretical foundation for prescribing 
how administrations should be ordered. In their view problems of 
administrative structure are situational and changeable. While 
generalizations about problems and structures may still be useful, 
it is wise to be sceptical when talk of blueprints begins. Such 
arguments have been presented for many years and recent studies 
of policy-making structures and processes have tended to give them 
further weight. By contrast some economists, management special-
ists and scholars of public administration have more faith in 
institutional engineering and the effects of rationalistic management 
techniques. Theirs is the language of strategic planning, specifying 
objectives, rationalizing budgetary procedures and measuring per-
formance. This holds out the promise of a more controlled and 
predictable machinery of government and a stronger connection 
between intention and effect in official policy. Yet another view, 
also influenced heavily by the thinking of economists, proposes that 
the institutions of government have little effect on public policy. 
More important influences are social conditions and levels of 
economic development. Naturally this view is subversive of any 
extended discussion of machinery of government questions. 
The view presented here is that while the shape and construction 
of governmental institutions are indeed important for public policy 
it is by no means clear that the scope and direction of institutional 
influences can be readily controlled. Policy processes are often 
diffuse and confused. Bernard Schaffer has put it this way: 
"Decisions are convenient labels given post hoc to the mythical 
precedents of the apparent outcomes of uncertain conflicts".' 
Moreover the incentive systems of organizations and the circum-
stances in which they work play tricks with their stated objectives 
and with the way they respond to developing situations. Reflections 
of this may be seen in Hugh Heclo's characterization of the process 
of social learning as 
a maze where the outlet is shifting and the walls are being constantly 
repatterned; where the subject is not one individual but a group bound 
together; where this group disagrees not only on how to get out but 
on whether getting out constitutes a satisfactory solution; where, finally, 
there is not one but a large number of such groups which keep getting 
in each other's way." 
Both Schaffer and Heclo make one aware of the blinkering effect 
of seeing policy-making in terms of a neat setting and gaining of 
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objectives. A similar point, the more compelling in this case because 
it comes from one who does not see policy processes largely in terms 
of confusion and conflict, is made by Sir Geoffrey Vickers. He states 
"1 have described policy making as the setting of governing relations 
or norms, rather than in the more usual terms as the setting of 
goals, objectives or ends. The difference is not merely verbal; I 
regard it as fundamental".' Further, he states: "The goals we seek 
are changes in our relations or in our opportunities for relating; 
but the bulk of our activity consists in the 'relating' itself." Vickers 
does not present his notion of policy-making in the context of 
complex governmental arrangements but the relevance of his point 
is clear. If relations are more important than objectives many of 
the commonly accepted ways of looking at government institutions 
suggest misleading diagnoses of their problems. 
Such perspectives do not allow the formulation and resolution 
of central machinery of government problems in simple and 
unchanging terms. In any review of a particular situation the 
discussion and proposals, however appealing, will be contingent. The 
problems faced cannot be solved. They have to be re-defined and 
re-solved as events proceed. Ministers and senior public service 
officers rarely have the time or inclination to reflect on the bases 
of the arrangements they work with. They meet difficulties as they 
come and make changes incrementally. They have to act as if they 
know more than they do; otherwise they would do very little. In 
discussing topics such as coordination and control a commission of 
inquiry has the opportunity to make it possible for busy officeholders 
to consider more aspects of their situation than they ordinarily have 
time to do. A critical examination of relationships between central 
institutions and the activities and aspirations of the groups of people 
involved would not necessarily lead to immediate changes but would 
provide a source of information and argument for use in the 
continuing struggle to keep such institutions in working order. 
However understandable RCAGAS failure to take this course, that 
it has failed to do so is to be regretted. It has settled for the safe 
and uncontroversial. Rather than explore difficult fields of inquiry 
it has assumed them away or shaved out of the report references 
that might bring them to the forefront. In its concern to produce 
"justifiable and practicable" recommendations it has produced ones 
that break little new ground. It has failed to see that, even if the 
times made bold recommendations impolitic, a cogent discussion 
of the central machinery of government problems facing contem-
porary governments could have been more useful than what it has 
done. 
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Ministers and public servants 
How RCAGA handled relations between ministers and public servants 
gives an indication of its timidity. By and large RCAGA suggests that 
public servants are indeed the loyal and obedient servants of the 
ministry in office. This is particularly strong in the chapter on 
coordination and control, where the first sentence links ministers 
and their departments inextricably together: "The minister and his 
department together form the basic standard unit which wields the 
executive power of government" (RC 11.1.1). While earlier RCAGA 
reported some criticisms of prevailing relations between ministers 
and public servants which suggested that the "standard unit" was 
not quite so indivisible, it brought its discussion to a close with 
a bland affirmation: 
The Commission is convinced that an effective partnership between the 
elected government and its senior officials is fundamental to effective 
government, that significant elements in this partnership have in recent 
years been defective, and that blame for these deficiencies lies with all 
the parties involved (RC 2.3.9). 
It does not explore the ambiguities inherent in relations between 
senior officials and ministers, the power-plays which can originate 
within departments, the difficulties of deciding when public service 
work stops and party politics begins, and the difficulties that some 
senior public servants who are used to working with ministers from 
one party may have in adapting to ministers from another. 
Ascribing blame for deficiencies to all concerned does not tell 
anyone how to make the relationship better and leaves the 
traditional model of the relationship, which RCAGA elsewhere ac-
knowledges can be questioned, intact. 
Two quotations from a recent interview with Lord Armstrong 
show how a senior British civil servant saw the issue: 
We, while I was in the Treasury, had a framework of the economy 
basically nco-Keynesian. We set the questions which we asked ministers 
to decide arising out of that framework and it would have been 
enormously dilficult for any minister to change the framework . . . I 
think we chose that framework because we thought it the best one going. 
We were very ready to explain it to anybody who was interested, but 
most ministers were not interested . . . 
And, 
The only time when I felt that 1 simply had to step out of line was 
when it really came to the final crunch and it was a question "do we 
have an election or not". Now the question of an election or not is 
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a highly political matter, something on which no civil servant would 
dream of having an opinion and yet it seemed to me it was a move 
in the chess game that I had been playing with the Prime Minister 
and I couldn't refrain from giving him my opinion.' 
Despite Lord Armstrong's meticulous concern to maintain a sense 
of detachment and neutrality his views illustrate succinctly several 
elements of the problems that may arise: the sheer weight and 
persuasiveness of civil service advice; the lack of interest by 
politicians in the intellectual underpinning of the advice that they 
receive; and the interweaving of administrative and party political 
issues. Even if politicians managed to be formidably curious about 
the advice that they received, and personal relations between 
ministers and senior civil servants were always impeccable, the other 
two questions would lose little of their force. These points are highly 
relevant to the situation in Australia. Although in both Britain and 
Australia the distribution of points of friction and ambiguity in 
ministerial/official relations is not the same across the whole 
ministry, the ever present potential for disruption as well as for 
smooth working relationships should be given its full weight in any 
discussion of problems of coordination and control. 
Cabinet arrangements 
The commission is also hesitant and tentative in its approach to 
problems of cabinet arrangements and their implications for public 
service work. It does not present a consolidated discussion of the 
topic although it has said enough in various places to suggest that 
it either had the material in hand for a more extended discussion 
or at least had thought seriously about trying to collect it. For 
example, at an early stage of the report it suggests that, in turning 
an incoming government's ideas into specific programmes, public 
servants should be actively associated with the ministerial commit-
tees which do this (RC 3.4.3); it proposes that ministers need more 
information presented to them not as individuals but as a group 
(RC 4.1.3); it reports the view that a cut in the number of 
departments would allow the formation of a smaller cabinet (RC 
4.3.28); and in a more extended discussion of arrangements in the 
social welfare field it suggests that a system of coordinating and 
subordinate ministers could be appropriate (RC 10.3.19, 10.3.23). 
But except in the last case it does not present its proposals with 
much elaboration or force. 
In discussing the relations between ministerial committees and 
associated teams of public servants, either in the case mentioned 
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above or in other places, the report does not review at any length 
the variety of ways in which public servants may be asked to make 
contributions and the problems associated with some of these ways. 
For example, should public servants be drawn only from the 
departments of the ministers involved? should they be grouped in 
standing committees or in less formal and more changeable task 
forces? should ministers and public servants meet together? and, 
if so, should public servants take part in ministerial discussions and 
on what basis? These are important questions, the more so when 
the task in hand is not as RCAGA says "converting the generalities 
of the political programme into a blueprint for action" (RC 3.4.3), 
but responding to situations in government on which the party 
machinery as such has produced no specific or helpful views. 
Relevant Australian experience which could have been discussed 
does exist and Canadian experience in this field is not only rich 
but much of it is readily accessible. 
The commission's suggestion that ministers need a common pool 
of background material is followed by a statement that the details 
of appropriate administrative machinery would be a subject for 
"evolving review", a reservation that is unimpeachable. But again 
the commission is reluctant to discuss relevant experience. It is quite 
forthright that departments should not be built up to provide advice 
to ministers on cabinet affairs not directly affecting the departments 
concerned, but then recognizes that departments may nevertheless 
have a role to play in the process. When it comes to discussing 
other possible sources its remarks are allusive rather than substan-
tive. Ministerial staffs are cautiously and briefly mentioned as are 
bodies like the central policy review staff (CPRS) and priorities review 
staff (PRS) (although these are not named). The commission's 
language only becomes more positive again when it exhorts min-
isters to make more use of the resources of administration for 
collective purposes. 
Each minister has a continuous teaching function to perform in his 
department, pointing out where and how his government needs to be 
served as a collective entity (RC 4.1.6). 
But how ministers might be motivated and organized to do this 
is subject to even less comment than the institutional devices that 
they might want to experiment with to secure collective advice. 
Discussion of the number of departments and the size of cabinet 
is brief. The commission refused to endorse arguments advanced 
in favour of less departments and a smaller cabinet but does suggest 
that "on the whole" the number of departments should be reduced 
rather than increased (RC 4.3.32). It also suggests that departments 
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have no ideal size and that there could be some quite large ones 
as well as rather small ones. Where large departments are created 
it argues that there would be a case for having more than one 
minister. It notes the important paper*" by one of the commissioners. 
Professor Enid Campbell, stating this is probably constitutionally 
possible, but does not suggest that there is any urgency about testing 
whether her view would be upheld. Its comments do however 
introduce the whole question of coordinating and assistant ministers, 
and this is taken up again in its discussion of social welfare 
arrangements. The commission's analysis of problems in relating 
the affairs of the departments of Health, Social Security, Repatria-
tion, Aboriginal Affairs and, for some purposes, the department of 
Environment, Housing and Community Development to each other 
and to the numerous statutory commissions also in the field is 
detailed and draws on the work of the task force on the subject 
set up by RCAGA in 1975. Here it is possible only to discuss the 
ministerial arrangements proposed. 
The commission recommended the appointment of a minister for 
social welfare, supported by a small policy department in the 
Swedish style, who would chair a committee of other ministers from 
the welfare group. It also suggested the establishment of a 
consultative council to advise the minister and a bureau to sponsor 
and conduct research on social policy. The minister for social 
welfare would be a senior minister and, where there were an inner 
and outer ministry, the only one from the group in cabinet. He 
would have either no other departmental commitments or another 
portfolio outside the welfare area. The commission recognized, as 
is often said, that such a minister might have an inadequate power 
base, but argued that his responsibility for research, policy reviews 
and the preparation of a welfare budget would probably give him 
a good chance of success. But it did not explore this at any length 
although the difficulties involved where a coordinating minister 
reaches into another minister's territory, especially on "access" 
matters which are so important in the social welfare field, are 
considerable.' It is also unfortunate that RCAGA did not relate these 
proposals to other cabinet arrangements or canvass the possibility 
of similar committees for other policy areas. This would have taken 
it into the whole question of cabinet and cabinet committees. 
The commission's failure to consolidate and extend its discussion 
of cabinet arrangements allows it to avoid a number of critical 
problems in connecting political and public service institutions. One 
of these arises from the reputed role of cabinet itself as a means 
of coordinating government activities and making strategic de-
cisions. The mystique of cabinet, fostered by ministers, cabinet 
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officers and generations of academic writers, has a practical value 
in maintaining some privacy for cabinet members as they go about 
their business. But it has also hindered understanding, even by 
participants, of how cabinets actually behave. 
Available empirical material on cabinets in Britain, Canada and 
Australia suggests that they fulfil much less than the heroic role 
customarily ascribed to them. For example, they get too big, include 
the wrong people, avoid strategic discussions and depend 
significantly on the role assumed by the prime minister. Cabinet 
committees fluctuate in importance. Much of the most sensitive 
business is transacted informally by ministers and their associates 
rather than actually in cabinet and its committees. This is where 
the role of the prime minister is so important. He has more political 
resources available to him than any of his colleagues and if he wants 
to change cabinet committees or ignore them and conduct business 
by talking to select and changing groups of his own choice, there 
is little to stop him. 
In Australia the problems of the post-Menzies coalition cabinets 
and of the Whitlam Labor cabinet are well known. Whitlam's 
cabinet committee system underwent an important metamorphosis 
in 1974-75 which illustrated the difficulties of designing and 
sticking to specific cabinet arrangements. The experience of the 
Fraser coalition cabinet has also suggested that such arrangements 
may be fluid. It is easy to deplore this and to concentrate attention 
on devices for restraining prime ministerial discretion and channel-
ling ministerial activities along a more rational course. On the other 
hand it may be necessary to accept that frequent fluctuations will 
take place. Thus RCAGAS proposed arrangements in the social 
welfare field might work in one situation at one time but not in 
another. Further, the connection between cabinet and the elaborate 
process proposed for the making of forward estimates could be 
eroded. The commission proposes that the forward estimates would 
be brought together in the economic committee of cabinet and 
comments that in the Whitlam governmeht the appropriate commit-
tee would have been the expenditure review committee (ERC). But 
it overlooks the strain under which the ERC would have been placed 
had restraining expenditure not been so important in 1975 and 
assumes that the economic committee has indeed had an effective 
life. Some doubt can be cast on this assumption.* If these points 
have any weight then RCAGA has skirted around a central problem. 
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Coordination, control and discipline 
To the extent that RCAGA deals with such issues it proposes 
rationalistic solutions. These can only apply uneasily in a situation 
where mutually supportive cabinet and public service arrangements 
are hard to organize while mutually disruptive ones seem to be self-
generating. The Commission's views are put forward in the introduc-
tion to the chapter on coordination and control which comes near 
the end of the report. The problem is defined in terms of the need 
to acknowledge discipline and constraints. The constraints are the 
collective responsibility of ministers, limitations on available re-
sources, and electoral forces. Coping with these constraints is a 
matter for coordination. Thus RCAGA states: 
The machinery of government, in both its ministerial and administrative 
aspects, will need to be designed to make effective the discipline of these 
constraints. This process can briefly be referred to as "coordination" 
(RC 11.1.5). 
This makes coordination synonymous with control and in the next 
few pages the word "discipline" appears as often as in the hortatory 
utterances of a newly inducted head prefect. But RCAGA does not 
like discipline that is externally imposed. It argues "that a serious 
effort must be made to base coordination to a greater extent on 
voluntarily accepted discipline at all levels" (RC 11.1.10). The core 
of the disciplinary process would be the participation of ministers 
and departments in a revised budgetary process with improved 
forward estimates. The aim of this seems to be control without 
controllers. The framework in which government institutions are 
set, rather than selected and powerful institutions, would exercise 
control. 
It may be useful to set RCAGAS approach to coordination in the 
context of other conceptualizations of the term. Coordination is a 
protean word and the process itself has many manifestations. The 
commission has pinpointed some of these but left others to one side. 
First we may recall Lindblom's sparse definition of the term: 
A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in it 
such that the adverse consequences of any one decision for other 
decisions in the set are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, 
reduced, counterbalanced or outweighed.' 
He explicitly leaves out any implication that the more the adjust-
ment the greater the coordination. As is well known, he then makes 
a persuasive case that coordination may take place by partisan 
mutual adjustment as well as by central direction. Pressman and 
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Wildavsky extend the discussion when they point out that coordi-
nation has different meanings depending on whether participants 
in proceedings agree on common purposes, are in conflict over basic 
goals, or have to share responsibility with others who can neither 
be ignored nor coerced. Coordination can thus be a process of 
adjustment within an agreed framework, the exercising of a form 
of power, or another word for consent. They conclude: 
Telling another person to coordinate . . . does not tell him what to do. 
He does not know whether to coerce or bargain, to exert power or secure 
consent. Here we have one aspect of an apparently desirable trait of 
antibureaucratic administration that covers up the very problem— 
conflict versus cooperation, coercion versus consent—its invocation is 
supposed to resolve.'" 
Leon Peres narrows the' discussion down again when he offers a 
forceful definition which, like RCAGA, equates coordination with 
control. 
Coordination is one of the fraudulent words of politics and adminis-
tration. It dresses neutrally to disguise what nakedly is pure political 
form. Coordination is a political process by which the coordinated are 
made to change their value positions, their policy conceptions and their 
behaviour to conform with the conceptions and expectations of the 
coordinator." 
The number of underlying assumptions (and their permutations) 
which can be specified when evaluating recommendations about 
coordination is thus considerable. 
What RCAGA tries to do is to avoid making coordination either 
a cloak for coercion or simply a matter for partisan mutual 
adjustment. It seems to envisage a situation where the different 
elements in the process of government would be induced to accept 
a common appreciation of the need for budgetary discipline. Shared 
values combined with the opportunity to participate in the making 
of decisions would lead to voluntary and orderly adjustments. This 
is ingenious but not convincing. It overestimates the possibility of 
diffusing shared values and underestimates the incentives for 
politicians and public servants to corner resources, drive hard 
bargains and exert power. Further, too much depends on the 
forward estimates process. Despite the ever-present importance of 
budgetary considerations, and their present intensity, government 
is about more than budgets. Moreover the practicability of making 
useful forward estimates both in principle and in the form proposed 
by the commission is open to challenge. These points are taken up 
in Patrick Weller's chapter. Here I am concerned with what RCAGA 
says about the principal coordinating agencies in the public service 
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and with the way they work in matters extending beyond budgeting. 
The commission generally favours reducing the central control of 
the Treasury and the PSB and not building up the department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet too much. At the same time it 
favours the devolution of powers to operating departments and 
proposes increasing the role of the Auditor-General to cover 
efficiency audits and the creation of a major new economic 
department—the department of Industries and the Economy 
(DINDEC). While it does not question the established configuration 
of coordinating agencies its emphasis on reducing their relative 
importance is moderate but insistent. 
Central coordinating agencies 
The commission reports prevalent criticisms of Treasury's doctrinal 
attitudes to economic management and its poor relations with client 
departments in matters of financial control but does not support 
radical organizational changes on the grounds that however econo-
mic policy is conducted it is likely to lead to discontent and also, 
following Treasury's own arguments, that economic management 
and financial control are interlinked. It suggests that Treasury 
should be more forthcoming in relations with other departments 
but does not look closely at the internal arrangements which over 
the years have contributed to the department's stance. Similarly 
it sees a need for a source of alternative economic advice. This it 
would obtain from DINDEC which would be concerned with the 
medium and long term aspects of the industrial structure of the 
economy. In this respect it would provide a partial range of 
alternatives to Treasury advice. The commission explicitly prefers 
this course to building up the economic strength of the department 
of PM & c but its reasons are not entirely clear. Its advocacy of DINDEC 
has a "McEwenite" ring to it although in other respects its 
organizational conservatism is not hard to support. Some of the 
difficulties in economic policymaking in recent years may owe more 
to specific factors inside Treasury (and to a run of indifferent 
treasurers) than to its general structure. The commission's problems 
in trying to explore such factors are obvious and its inability to 
induce Treasury to be more open about them has prevented it from 
making this section of the report more incisive. Two other aspects 
of RCAGAS discussion of economic matters should be noted. The first 
is the explicit introduction of elements of partisan mutual adjust-
ment despite the attempt to avoid this in the chapter entitled 
"Coordination and Control". The second is that the government's 
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decision in late 1976 to divide the Treasury has opened up, whether 
by intent or not, the possibility of internal changes within two now 
separate departments. 
In discussing the department of PM & c, RCAGA wishes to dist-
inguish between the roles of the prime minister as leader of the 
government and chairman of cabinet and to see the distinction 
reflected in the internal organization of the department. This 
distinction can be made analytically to bring out different aspects 
of a prime minister's work but it is doubtful whether prime ministers 
themselves are sufficiently concerned about it to allow it to serve 
as a basic organizing principle for the department of PM & c. The 
commission refers to the "presidentialization" of the prime min-
istership in the Australian and related systems. This often-used 
characterization encompasses part of the truth at the cost of 
obscuring another equally important part. Recent prime ministers 
have indeed tended to draw more power more obviously to 
themselves, but equally they have done it by exploiting resources 
available to holders of the office for a long time. Once prime 
ministers do this it is not surprising if they require bureaucratic 
support from an integrated department. In Britain and in Canada 
no prime minister's department has been created but in Canada 
the pco and the PMO, although constituted and recruited differently, 
seem to have such close and overlapping working relations that one 
may ask whether there is a substantial functional reason for their 
separation. Similarly in Britain the amount of energy expended in 
squashing the notion of a prime minister's department suggests that 
the work of the prime minister and his support staff helps generate 
some support for the idea. 
As chairman of cabinet the prime minister has more to say than 
anyone else about how it conducts its business. Within the 
department of PM & c the dividing line between cabinet work and 
work in the policy divisions is no more than a fine one. At the 
top of the department the work of processing cabinet papers and 
recording decisions is inextricably linked with the wider tasks of 
advising the prime minister on policy, organizational and political 
problems. Such problems commonly resist disentanglement even 
into these three divisions and they have to be tackled by the prime 
minister not only in cabinet but elsewhere as well. In this context 
attempts to have separate components of the department divide up 
tasks on a firm and continuing basis seem unlikely to succeed. 
In its concern to separate out the functions of the department, 
RCAGA gives too little consideration to the role that the department 
may have in collecting information about the implementation of 
government programmes and suggesting that departments pursue 
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policies differently or in a more vigorous way. Nor does it consider 
the problems that the department may have in collecting ap-
propriate information and the antagonism that this may generate. 
It is not irrelevant to note that for its efforts in a similar enterprise 
the Premier's department in South Australia is sometimes known 
as the "Mafia" or "ss". The commission does however see a role 
for the policy unit that it proposes within the department in 
formulating "overall programmes for implementing the 
government's objectives" (RC 11.5.21b) and in evaluating the 
effectiveness of ongoing programmes. Of the other tasks for the 
department RCAGA considers, it sees a need for officers of the 
department as well as of the PSB to consider machinery of govern-
ment questions. However, it concludes optimistically that "substan-
tial changes are likely to be called for only intermittently" (RC 
11.5.29) and that there is therefore no case for establishing a 
machinery of government unit in the department. The amount of 
change in recent years, even under the Fraser government, suggests, 
though, that such a unit would rarely be short of work.'^ More 
positively, RCAGA sees a role for the department in monitoring the 
work of interdepartmental committees. The import of RCAGAS 
recommendations on iocs is to bring them much more to the notice 
of the ministry and to use other means where possible of settling 
policy differences between departments. It also suggests that where 
iDCs are not making appreciable progress the secretary to cabinet 
might make recommendations to the prime minister about how to 
deal with the issue. Finally, despite RCAGAS emphasis on the role 
that the department should play for cabinet as well as for the prime 
minister, it does not consider the problem that anything set up to 
provide more assistance for cabinet as a whole may ultimately have 
the effect of strengthening the prime minister even more. The recent 
evolution of the department suggests that as it has been given more 
tasks by activist prime ministers its responsibility to anyone but 
the prime minister has become even less possible. Overall RCAGA'S 
discussion of the department has lagged behind the development 
of the department itself. 
In discussing the three central agencies RCAGA gives its most 
detailed attention to the PSB. In broad terms it does not propose 
any diminution of the board's authority although it does suggest 
that on a wide range of staffing matters operational decisions should 
be delegated to departments. It proposes that the system of making 
bulk establishment approvals should be extended and that the 
board's main role should be focused on the making of forward 
estimates of manpower use. However, the board's responsibility for 
making checks on the actual use of staff within departments and 
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agencies would remain. Associated with this RCAGA suggests that 
the board's role as a source of consultancy services and advice 
should be greatly developed. This would entail a substantial 
reorientation of the board's activities. It would move away from 
specialized tasks of position creation into less defined areas of work 
calling for a substantial understanding of the functions of depart-
ments. The commission's stipulation that staff should be moved 
through the board on rotation from departments is of particular 
significance here. While in other areas of the report RCAGA some-
times tends to incorporate recommendations on increasing rotation 
of staff as a routine measure, in this case it has a distinct relevance. 
The commission also makes a large number of other suggestions 
about the future work of the board. These reflect the close contact 
between RCAGA and the board during the course of the inquiry and 
the board's own willingness to propose changes. This contrasts with 
the sparseness of detailed comment about desirable internal changes 
in the Treasury and the conservative nature of its recommendations 
for the department of PM & c. 
The commission's treatment of the coordinating agencies contains 
a number of interesting details but over all it does not have great 
impact. The forward estimates process as spelt out by RCAGA would 
have limited use in redefining the relations between the coordinating 
bodies and other departments and agencies. Just as RCAGA has 
avoided the hard questions posed by the fluidity of ministerial 
arrangements, so for the most part has it avoided the implications 
of bureaucratic politics. While the PSB may, if it wishes to, be able 
to devolve responsibility for staffing, the Treasury/department of 
Finance and the department of the PM & c have tasks which require 
the exercise of power as well as of persuasion. Whether relations 
between departments in the public service are adjusted in idioms 
of consensus or of conflict, bargaining and power plays are rarely 
far from the scene. 
Decentralization and federalism 
This chapter has been concerned with coordination and control at 
the centre. It has not dealt with RCAGAS discussion of these processes 
within departments, and between federal government agencies and 
other levels of government. But, in conclusion, it is relevant to note 
the difficulty that RCAGA had in working out consistent ideas on 
devolution in administration, and the brevity of its discussion of 
federalism. The problems with devolution are illustrated by RCAGA'S 
recognition that it may be easier to devolve responsibility from the 
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central coordinating agencies to operating departments than from 
the top, Canberra-based levels of these departments, downwards 
and away from the centre. It thus proposes the establishment within 
the department of PM & c of a coordinating unit to oversee the 
process of decentralization. Further, RCAGA had trouble in deciding 
what should be subject to uniform standards, what should be left 
to local initiative, and how disagreements about such questions 
should be resolved. The commission talks of decentralization in an 
open-handed way but when it comes to specific points it avoids 
issues of policy-making. It does not try openly to distinguish 
between policy-making and administration but gravitates to this 
position without discussing the restrictive implications that this may 
have for the kinds of decentralization that are possible." 
When it comes to the related question of federalism, the main 
point to be noticed is the gap. The commission does advocate 
increased cooperation between federal and state agencies, including 
the delegation of federal work to state officers, and it did set up 
the NOW shop as an experiment in integrating the welfare services 
of different levels of government. But it is reluctant to discuss the 
familiar problems federalism creates for a wide variety of expensive 
programmes. The political objections to such a discussion by RCAGA 
are obvious but the cost of not confronting them is also high. This 
may be illustrated by reference to RCAGAS brief comment that where 
the federal government provides money to the states for specific 
purposes it "should be able to assess how a programme is 
developing" (RC 7.4.13). The commission hopes that such 
assessments could be carried out by joint federal-state teams headed 
by independent assessors and that agreement to this procedure could 
be secured in the bargaining before programmes were begun. This 
modest and rational proposal would however be hard to implement, 
not least because it would sometimes not be in the interests of one 
or more governments for any detailed assessment to take place. 
Further difficulties could also be specified. On this topic the division 
of jurisdiction between federal and state not only makes the review 
of policy and administration difficult but it has also inhibited RCAGA 
itself from even discussing the ramifications of the problem. As was 
seen earlier this shying away from difficult problems has also 
characterized much of RCAGAS treatment of central coordination and 
control. 
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Towards a Professional 1 3 
Bureaucracy 
R D Scott 
In a remark made during discussion of another paper. Professor 
Wilenski offered a convenient three-point summary of the objectives 
and recommendations of the RCAGA report: improved central coordi-
nation, greater flexibility for the heads of departments, and more 
use of non-hierarchical structures of management. Each of these 
points can be equated with one of three analytical models which 
Professor Spann identified as relevant to the RCAGA recommenda-
tions: a "political" model based upon traditional notions of individ-
ual and collective ministerial responsibility; an "accountable man-
agement" model based upon establishing a clear area for internal 
bureaucratic control by the permanent head; and a "participatory" 
model aiming at responsiveness to the clients of the organization 
and the lower ranks of the organization in contact with these clients. 
The key problem was seen by both commentators to be the 
tension and contradictions which exist between these three models 
and the aspirations based upon them. In order to avoid repeating 
points made elsewhere, the focus of this chapter is on the .second 
model—the notion of internal, self-regulatory structures of man-
agement, according greater autonomy to the service in order to let 
it manage itself. This is related to a claim by public servants to 
have themselves regarded by the public and by politicians as 
trustworthy professionals—in Mill's terms, as "governors by pro-
fession, which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy". 
Prestigious bureaucracies have a need to maintain an air of pro-
fessionalism and this requires support for administrative reform. Such 
bureaucracies have often ended up sponsoring administrative reform 
activities that are carefully circumscribed and oriented so as to pose 
little threat to the bureaucracy's power and prestige . . . Alternatively 
prestige bureaucracies are likely to demand that the responsibility for 
operationalizing reform proposals be left to themselves in order that 
some control can be gained at that point.' 
I would not want to assert that Grove's comment is relevant to 
the Australian scene—he is obviously concerned with un-
sophisticated less developed countries—but his reference to "an air 
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of professionalism" can be a starting point for commentary on the 
three papers in this session and related discussion of the RCAGA 
report. Underlying the major reform proposals and directly linked 
with notions of a career service, neutrality and objectivity is a theme 
of the capacity of the public service to regulate itself in the public 
interest. In acknowledging the weakness of traditional assumptions 
about political control via ministerial responsibility, the report and 
its consultants all see the best alternative to be a strengthening of 
internal regulatory devices and the espousal of self-discipline and 
an independent code of ethics. As Spann notes, the report states 
the pious hope that ministers will pay more attention to their 
administrative duties but assumes that they will not and then argues 
from that assumption that accountable management is the only 
solution. 
Emy's report in Appendix I of the report links together the topics 
of the Spann and Wiltshire papers when he argues that 
there is a close relationship between the requirements of ministerial 
responsibility, as a doctrine of political control, and the separate concept 
of an impartial and objective career service. Both concepts, for rather 
different reasons, tend to emphasise the same values of anonymity, 
neutrality and impartiality on the part of the public servants.' 
Whereas Smith's paper concentrates on devices and institutions 
to improve the level of awareness of what is happening in the 
bureaucracy at the level of ministers and cabinet, the primary focus 
of Wiltshire and Spann is on the bureaucrats. Both accept that 
the nature of modern government is forcing a more positive role 
on bureaucrats and particularly on permanent heads who are 
becoming increasingly autonomous in the management of their 
departments. Spann is concerned about the implication of loss of 
anonymity (partly the product of insensitive ministers trying to 
dodge responsibility) and also seems a little unhappy about any 
doctrine of "high loyalty" which would allow bureaucrats to set 
their own standards of ethics in response to political direction. But 
the drift of his proposals, particularly in the longer report to the 
commission, would be towards decentralization of control into the 
hands of permanent heads and an acceptance of a wide range of 
discretion vested in the service itself. 
Wiltshire is mainly concerned with the implications of a strength-
ened career service (aided by greater internal mobility). He seems 
particularly concerned about the existence of elitism and ir-
responsibility which might be produced by permanence. While 
regretting the failure of the commission to gain knowledge about 
options outside the service, he hazards a few generalizations of his 
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own: "Australians are too afraid of political and administrative 
nepotism in government appointments to give each agency carte 
blanche in recruitment, particularly at senior levels . . ." but "a 
move towards more lateral recruitment would be welcomed by most 
people outside the service"; "the seeming lack of discipline in the 
service has become an issue with the Australian public who have 
always become restless when public servants, whose salary they are 
paying through taxation and who are given security of tenure, seem 
to be able to get away with various forms of misconduct"; and the 
elite of the second division has always been "regarded suspiciously 
by Australians", (perhaps because Wiltshire reckons it includes "a 
lot of over-rated over paid fast-talking egotistical conmen"). 
Wiltshire then proposes that it is necessary to accept the 
inevitability of elites but that the elite must be kept small, 
accountable and selected by merit. The last is unexceptionable, the 
first is rather illogical (since smallness has no virtue in itself) but 
accountability is the central concern. Wiltshire offers no magic 
formula to ensure accountability, and it seems from the evidence 
of the report and its voluminous appendices that none exists. There 
is the recurrent theme about the need for increased effectiveness 
in the supervisory activities of ministers, cabinet and parliament 
but an underlying pessimism about this possibility and, as Self and 
Smith both point out, the report is not really directed towards 
politicians. It is a "tame", "insider's" report, so it stresses internal 
arrangements which will offer the possibility of accountability based 
upon the bureaucrats' sense of "responsibility" and adherence to 
a code of ethics. 
And it is in this sense that the "air of professionalism" rises from 
the document and its consultants' reports. It occurs to Emy, for 
example: 
The function of the career service concept is to ensure that there will 
be men available of suflicient intellectual integrity to make objective 
advice a reality . . . A new system of control would need to recognize 
the professional responsibilities of public servants themselves to safe-
guard both standards of performance and integrity in the administrative 
process.^  
The same theme occurs in the edited evidence of several senior 
public servants commenting on Spann's report, all defending the 
proposition that there are significant areas of decision-making where 
the permanent head has final authority—summed up in Tange's 
comment that "Departments are not the possession of permanent 
heads; but they are not the possession of individual ministers 
either".^ Spann makes a similar point, with some equivocation: "I 
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think it a dangerous doctrine that permanent heads are the 
guardians of the public interest, though in a certain sense this is 
true. Certainly ministers have no sole right to determine the public 
interest". 
The theme of professionalism is made most explicit in the 
evidence of Hasluck concerning the appointment of permanent 
heads, when he argues that 
there seems to be a greater need than ever for a permanent head to 
have professional competence, which really means professional training 
and experience. 1 also believe that public administration is a highly 
specialized professional task different from either business management 
or the successful practice of politics. 
He then goes on to expound the widely accepted view that 
appointments to permanent head should be channelled through a 
committee of peers so that 
in effect all the officers who are considered by their own colleagues to 
have the capacity to become a permanent head should be listed for 
consideration by ministers.' 
Here we are getting close to one of the primary characteristics 
of professionalism, the notion of peer group control. Add to this 
the notion of a specialized technique and a sense of collegial 
responsibility based upon an ethical code (Spann's articulated 
conventions) and—a point implicit at several points in the report 
—"relative freedom from lay control and from lay judgments as 
to the quality of the professional service performed".' We are 
moving some distance along the spectrum of professionalization or, 
in Hoyle's terms, public servants are claiming a higher degree of 
"professionality".' 
Schott makes the point, already made some time ago by Crisp, 
that generalist public administrators still have a long distance to 
travel along that spectrum before full professional status will be 
accorded to the occupation in its own right. The whole question 
of professional training as a basis for accreditation is obviously still 
unanswered, not only because there is disagreement about what 
should be offered in such a training but because there is even 
disagreement about whether public administration itself is a genuine 
discipline appropriate for study in its own right. 
But, following Price,* Schott oflfers the following typology and 
explanation as a basis for analyzing the relationship between 
professionals, administrators and politicians: 
Towards a Professional Bureaucracy 197 








Don K. Price's study of the relationship between science and 
government led him to a consideration of the societal roles played 
by four basic groups or "estates"—science, the professions, adminis-
tration, and politics. These estates can be arranged along a 
continuum from the search for truth (science) at the one end to 
the exercise of power (politics) at the other. 
Science is concerned with the discovery of knowledge; the 
professions with the application of knowledge; politics with the 
selection of ends or values; administration with the translation of 
these ends and values into practice (thus setting the parameters 
for the activity of the professions where they intersect with 
government). Entry into the scientific estate requires the longest 
and most specialized training and is the most meritocratic and peer-
oriented; entry into the political estate requires no formal training 
at all, access to it being granted by the electoral market-place. In 
terms of career development, it is relatively easy to move from left 
to right along the continuum: a scientist may become a professional, 
a professional an administrator. But movement in the opposite 
direction is usually difficult, due largely to the time and eflTort 
required to gain the requisite knowledge for the adjacent, more 
"knowledge-intensive" estate on the left. Movement from left to 
right also involves a decrease in status: pure scientists look down 
on "applied" professionals, professionals on administrators, admin-
istrators on politicians. What is especially striking in Price's analysis 
is the hard distinction between the professional and the adminis-
trator. These for him are two separate activities, two worlds, two 
estates distinguished by their own norms and values. 
There are numerous points which can be made in relation to this 
typology and its limitations, but the boundary between politician 
and administrator is one which obviously reflects upon the dis-
cussion of accountability and the role of permanent heads and 
ministerial advisers.' 
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Where Schott was concerned about the infiltration of pro-
fessionals into the ranks of administrators in the us federal system 
and the consequent weakening of norms of political accountability, 
perhaps we should be concerned more about the tendency manifest 
in the evidence and encouraged by the RCAGA report for adminis-
trators to shift their norms towards those of professionals. 
The danger of course lies in the fact that administrators in a 
public bureaucracy can only strive for professional autonomy at the 
expense of external accountability. Other chapters in this volume— 
particularly those by Parker and Self—indicate that there are 
contradictions implicit in many of the specific recommendations 
relating to internal management, client responsiveness and min-
isterial responsibility. The danger is that these contradictions may 
be resolved in practice in favour of justifying non-interference in 
the actions of bureaucrats, legitimating masterly inactivity. It 
should not be forgotten who the masters are—as Parker's original 
statement to RCAGA reminded them, "departments should not exist 
for the benefit of the employees, but for the service of the public".'" 
There remains the problem of defining "the public". As Wiltshire 
points out, there was little eff"ort to find out what was the general 
public's attitude to the public service. It may be that it has no 
attitude, or that there are lots of partial "publics" with differing 
and conflicting views. And these views are more likely to relate 
to some specific activity of particular departments rather than to 
the public service as a whole. This raises the problem of client 
participation in decentralized decision-making, one of the subjects 
of the next group of chapters. The evidence provided by two 
consultants' reports cast doubt upon the virtues of participation as 
a device for accountability: Tom Smith noted that non-statutory 
boards such as advisory committees were often resented by public 
servants because they infringed bureaucratic monopoly over advice 
and were often criticised by outsiders because the committee's 
findings were screened and modified before they reached the 
minister." 
Matthews would have typed this participation as "ritualistic"'^ 
and was also critical of the extent to which access was differential, 
in that "public interest" spokesmen were often given less encourage-
ment because they had little to offer in return compared to sectional 
groups. He also noted the tendency for participatory exercises to 
lead to questioning of professional expertise and to a consequent 
bureaucratic response of resorting to devices which minimize the 
impact of these exercises. The danger remains that autonomy may 
be preserved by using ritualistic participation to offset the demands 
for political responsibility at a higher level. (This seems to be the 
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case in the ACT with the NCDC fending off the Legislative Assembly 
by conducting its own community consultation as a basis for 
physical planning.) The public servant is then able to decide which 
are the "real" interests being articulated and which are merely 
selfish, partial interests, which ought to be ignored. 
If on the other hand, the public interest is to be interpreted by 
political leaders in cabinet and parliament, then the problem of 
generality arises. How is it possible to create a system of accoun-
tability which will not be so general that it will be irrelevant in 
the particular? Throughout the report and its appendices, there are 
constant references to the unwillingness of politicians to interest 
themselves closely in the administrative process—what can we do 
about the politicians, Parker asks.'^ Smith's paper at least takes 
us some way along the road to accountability by emphasizing the 
essentially political and incremental nature of the policy-making 
process, but ultimately he can only offer structural changes rather 
than behavioural modification. Even the setting of audit and 
evaluation procedures does not seem to guarantee much, as recent 
us experience with guidelines would indicate.'" 
Ultimately, the pessimistic "solution" may have to be the 
acceptance of a very limited degree of external control over the 
vast public bureaucracy, an acceptance that the bureaucrats will 
be responsive to the professional norms which will be the only 
effective control mechanism in a wide area of public activity. This 
takes the findings of the commission in those aspects which rely 
on self-regulation of the bureaucracy firmly into the mainstream 
of the "new public administration", with its concern for the 
establishment of an autonomous value system for public servants 
able to impose their own (better?) view of the public interest rather 
than that provided by mere politicians. 
But, in reviewing the remarkably similar developments in Cana-
da, Kernaghan pointed out that 
the new public administration movement draws attention to the actual 
and potential power of the public servants and to the importance of 
their value system for decision-making in government; however, it does 
not resolve—indeed it complicates—the issue of finding an appropriate 
balance between the power of the public servants and that of elected 
representatives.'* 
The problem is, like much else in the "new" public adminis-
tration, a rehashing of arguments from an earlier era. The 
technology may have changed, especially in the field of communica-
tions which now gives credence to claims by bureaucrats to "know" 
what the people want. But the dilemma is the same as it was in 
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the 1940s as typified by the exchanges between Friedrich and Finer 
over the nature of administrative responsibility."^ Friedrich argues 
for "a dual standard of administrative responsibility", requiring an 
acceptance of the fact that 
there is arising a type of responsibility on the part of the permanent 
administrator, the man who is called upon to seek and find the creative 
solutions for our crying technical needs, which cannot be effectively 
enforced except by fellow technicians who are capable of judging his 
policy in terms of the scientific knowledge bearing upon it." 
Finer attacks such a dualism and urges the pre-eminence of political 
control over administrative discretion, which he sees as central to 
any notion of responsibility and not to be confused with subjective 
notions involving individual conscience or peer group assessment. 
He contests Friedrich's judgement that "technical responsibility" 
can only be effectively secured by granting officials considerable 
leeway and asserts that 
never was the political responsibility of officials so momentous a 
necessity as in our own era. Moral responsibility is likely to operate 
in direct proportion to the strictness and efficiency of political responsi-
bility, and to fall away into all sorts of perversions when the latter is 
weakly enforced. While professional standards, duty to the public and 
pursuit of technological efficiency are factors in sound administrative 
operation, they are but ingredients, and not continuously motivating 
factors of sound policy, and they require public and political control 
and direction.'* 
As a somewhat older student of public administration phrased 
it: 
We must decide whether our object in setting up the guardian class 
is to make it as happy as we can, or whether happiness is a thing we 
should look for in the community as a whole. If it is the second, our 
guardians and auxiliaries must be compelled to act accordingly and be 
persuaded, as must everyone else, that it is their business to perfect 
themselves in their own particular job.''' 
Perhaps the Coombs commission was more concerned with keeping 
the guardians happy, and shared Plato's faith in the guardians' and 
auxiliaries' devotion to the selfless pursuit of the common good. Let 
us not forget Lucas' warning that 
history has shown that even meritorious meritocrats may over the 
generations come to be more alive to their own interests than the 
interests of those they nominally serve 
and his appeal (largely unheeded by RCAGA) that 
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somehow, somewhere, sometimes the non-professionals need to be 
brought into the picture and allowed to have their say. For, after all, 
it is they, as well as the professionals, who are expected to obey the 
law, and whose cooperation is required if communal purposes are to 
be achieved.'" 
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Forward Estimates and the 1 4 
Allocation of Resources 
Patrick Weller 
The efficient use of resources was the first of the major problems 
considered by RCAGA. It proposed that "the conclusions we reach 
[on this topic] are relevant to our consideration of all the functions 
which the administration performs" (RC 3.1.2). The commission 
believed that efficiency could be achieved if six conditions were 
fulfilled. These conditions were: 
(a) the objectives to which work is to be directed and the priorities 
attached to them are stated clearly; 
(b) decision makers at all levels have scope to act entrepreneur-
ially; 
(c) officers are able to identify themselves with the objectives to which 
their personal efforts are directed, and with the ways in which 
these objectives have been determined and the related work 
organized; 
(d) staff involved are appropriately recruited, trained, organized and 
promoted; 
(e) managers at all levels have access to both the information upon 
which their actions should properly depend, and to the appropriate 
expertise in managerial and related techniques; 
(f) performance at all levels is regularly assessed and those responsible 
are held accountable for it in ways which ensure that the 
assessment bears upon their rewards, standing and future (RC 
3.2.12). 
These basic ideas illustrate one of the fundamental beliefs of the 
report—that management should be accountable and that power 
should be decentralized from the centre to departments and within 
the departments to the more junior officers. The report wants to 
reduce the detailed control by the central departments while 
retaining a general guidance of policy direction. Efficiency was to 
be achieved primarily at departmental level. 
But all these plans depend heavily on the first of those six 
conditions and, to a lesser extent, on the fifth. The report itself 
recognizes this fact. It refers to the development of the system of 
forward estimates as "the first and critical step in the achievement 
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of greater efficiency" (RC 3.3.14). If the system of forward 
estimates is defective, then the feasibility of important sections of 
the report can be thrown into doubt. 
Any discussion of the allocative processes of governments is 
fraught with danger—and faced with scepticism. Not without 
reason. Overseas examples in developed countries that follow the 
Westminster system of government are not encouraging. In Britain, 
the system of five year forward estimates (widely known as PESC 
after the Public Expenditure Survey Committee that prepares the 
annual white papers), has become well entrenched. Occasionally it 
has been praised; for instance, Heclo and Wildavsky declared 
No nation in the world can match the sophistication or thoroughness 
found in the British process of expenditure projection.' 
But more recently the whole system of PESC has been viewed more 
critically. In general terms there have been frequent large dis-
crepancies between the forecasts and the outcomes which have 
remained unexplained; in particular instances there has been a 
"failure to limit the monetary costs of expenditure proposals to 
planned levels".^ To some extent the ever-increasing growth in 
public expenditure in Britain can be explained by political and 
bureaucratic factors; PESC after all is merely a means of showing 
what future changes are envisaged. But it does show why the control 
of expenditure is regarded as PESCS Achilles heel, PESC is inadequate 
as a control mechanism primarily because it is intended as a 
planning system. The forward estimates are calculated in constant 
price terms, which in theory facilitate the choice of priorities 
between the various sectors with full knowledge of the implications 
of those choices over the next five years. But in an inflationary 
period the system does not determine precisely how much money 
should be spent on each programme for each year and, as the 
ongoing programmes have at least theoretically received govern-
ment support by their inclusion in the white paper, so departments 
have a case for seeking additional funds for their already agreed 
responsibilities. The failure of PESC to control monetary costs led 
in early 1976 to a cash-limits system by which departments were 
now given specific sums within which they had to operate. 
A second major weakness of PESC has been its failure to develop 
a comprehensive system of monitoring ongoing programmes. Only 
recently have the Policy Analysis and Review (PAR) procedures been 
increased in number. Yet one critic has argued that there still exists 
no suitably rational means of choosing which programmes should 
be cut and which should be increased.^ 
Notably both PESC and PAR are, at least in promise, done openly. 
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The PESC white paper is published annually and is the subject of 
parliamentary debate, although that debate has seldom been 
instructive. More scrutiny is achieved by the activities of the Public 
Expenditure Committee. In the most recent speech from the throne 
in the UK, the government also promised that twenty PARS a year 
would be published. Information at least may become more public. 
In Canada less is done. Departments do prepare their own 
forward estimates, but they are regarded with derision in the 
Treasury Board as little more than wish-lists. The Treasury Board 
works out its own three year estimates, based on the current year's 
expenditure; these forecasts include both financial and manpower 
demands and allow the Treasury Board to devise a public expen-
diture budget. Analysis of ongoing programmes is usually carried 
on only within the usual annual budgetary round, although some 
particular programmes may be subjected to the scrutiny of the 
technically high-powered planning branch of the Treasury Board. 
In the Treasury Board's public expenditure budget, which is drawn 
up independently of the department of Finance, a contingency sum 
is included to meet new demands or emergencies that may develop 
during the year. 
In Australia the forward estimates have so far scarcely been 
worthy of the name. As I have discussed elsewhere, they are in 
their present form little more than a wish-list on the departmental 
side and can be useful for the Treasury primarily as a means of 
increasing its information and for use for bureaucratic control 
purposes." The annual budget is devised by what one commentator 
described as the "hired gun" approach. Each department fights for 
its own allocation of funds with little concern for the overall picture 
or for the implications of its programme for those pursued by other 
agencies. As a result, at the level where implementation can be 
seen in terms of bricks and mortar, the lack of coordination and 
the incidence of unnecessary overlapping can be disturbing. 
In neither Britain nor Canada, for a wide variety of political and 
economic reasons, have the proposals for forward estimates been 
notably successful in allocating resources, controlling expenditure 
or developing more eflFective systems of planning. Other experi-
ments, such as the now-famous introduction of zero-base budgeting 
in Georgia and the across-the-board development of PPB in the USA, 
have been equally limited in their success. At the same time 
participants in budgetary processes argue instinctively that some 
planning must be better than the existing incremental "ad hoccery". 
But they have failed so far to devise a scheme that can bring 
political uncertainties, technical shortcomings and vague aspirations 
into a coherent and binding system—or indeed to illustrate that 
such a scheme is feasible at all.* 
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Any consideration of the RCAGA report must therefore be con-
sidered with this background in mind; it is not that Australia must 
follow overseas precedents or that a technique that is found wanting 
in the face of Britain's massive problems might not work successful-
ly in Australia's more prosperous economy. It is simply that there 
is sufficient similarity in the various systems adopted or proposed 
to pose comparable questions, even if not identical answers. 
The Report 
One problem with a detailed analysis of a report is to determine 
what the objectives of the commissioners were. At the one extreme 
a report may provide a detailed blueprint of what should be done; 
at the other it may merely suggest that, if a certain line of action 
is to be taken, then a variety of factors should be taken into account. 
It leaves the working out of the actual details to the practitioners 
or professionals. Criticism may miss the point if a report espouses 
the second approach and is then judged by the standards of the 
first. But that is the inevitable problem of a critic who does not 
know the inside story of the commission. 
In the case of RCAGA the situation is made harder by the tendency 
of the report to drift between these two positions, without explaining 
precisely how the report should be judged. At times it is extremely 
specific; on other occasions its recommendations are so vague that 
they provide no firm basis for being turned from policy into 
programme, an evolution whose problems they are aware of in the 
political arena. I shall therefore take the recommendations on 
forward estimates and related subjects as they stand and take the 
chance that my comments probably cover ground discussed and, 
for some reason, rejected in the compilation of the report. 
As we have seen, the report argues that the first requirement 
for the introduction of efficiency is the clear statement of objectives 
and priorities. It states that "it is only in the preparation of a budget 
that the determination of priorities becomes precise and realistic" 
{RC 3.3.3). It therefore proposes that, as the annual budget often 
does not include explicit ministerial decisions about the value of 
many ongoing programmes and as anyway it is seldom a blueprint 
for the government's plans, a system of forward estimates should 
be developed. 
These forward estimates were intended to achieve two objectives: 
to assist macro-economic management and to allow the use of 
resources to be planned efficiently. The report argued that to be 
effective the forward estimates had to fulfil five requirements: 
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a) The estimates had to be prepared within guidelines set by 
cabinet as to the level of resources—both financial and man-
power—to be allocated to the government's activities; 
b) they had to assess needs in terms both of money and manpower; 
c) they had to become the main vehicle for competitive bidding 
for resources between ministers; 
d) their preparation had to involve ministers, and their adoption 
became a matter for cabinet; and 
e) once adopted by cabinet they had to be seen to embody the 
government's priorities and be available for use as a basis for 
planning. 
The report accepted that the forward estimates would have to be 
revised annually on a rolling basis, but believed that the exercise 
would force departments and ministers to state their objectives more 
explicitly. 
In chapter 13 the report spelt out in some detail the procedures 
to be adopted—or al least the flow of information it considered 
desirable. A committee of cabinet decides the total proportion of 
potential GDP to be spent in the public sector, the general priorities 
and objectives for the period covered by the forward estimates and 
the marginal amounts to be reserved for contingencies or new 
programmes. These decisions are based on advice on broad trends 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Public Service Board, 
the Treasury, the department of Employment and Industrial 
Relations and the new department of Industries and the Economy 
(DINDEC) which the report proposed should give advice on long-term 
trends in the structure of industry and the economy. Within the 
constraints so determined—and presumably within the budgets so 
prescribed—departments then draw up their financial and man-
power needs for the next three years. These needs are to be prepared 
annually on a rolling basis. These bids would then be reviewed by 
a cabinet sub-committee, chaired by a nominee of the prime 
minister but containing mostly junior ministers. This sub-committee 
would be advised by the supply divisions of the Treasury on the 
financial implications, by the PSB on the manpower estimates, by 
DINDEC on the effects for the general distribution of resources and 
by PM & c on its consistency with government policy. The resulting 
paper would thereafter be considered by the economic committee 
of cabinet and by cabinet itself. 
The commission hoped that the paper produced by this process 
would then provide a framework for the planning of departments and 
agencies. The firmness and clarity of that framework would provide a 
context within which ministers and the heads of departments and 
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agencies could be allowed significant freedom to modify within the 
approved totals, the precise pattern of planned employment and 
expenditure (RC 11.2.14). 
The key elements of the process were the increase of ministerial 
involvement in the determination of priorities and in the review of 
the costs of ongoing programmes, and the desire to give the minister 
and his department the incentive to make economies. 
To help achieve these objectives the report made several other 
proposals. It argued that the existing system of manpower estimates 
should be integrated with the forward estimates and proposed that 
the use of staff ceilings be abolished. The manpower and financial 
estimates were to be brought together at the level of the officials' 
committee which supported the cabinet committee. 
The flow of information also received attention. The report 
asserted: 
Information is power. It gives distinctive strength to those who possess 
it: to public servants, to individuals or to groups who have access to 
it. The classical dictum of Lord Acton that all power tends to corrupt 
has applications to this as well as other forms of power. Because 
information is power and is capable of abuse, questions of access to 
it, of authority to withhold it and of the privacy of those who supply 
the data on which it is based are of much importance (RC 10.7.1). 
The report exhorted departments not to regard as "their own" the 
information they obtain. But it made no clear recommendations 
on how this inter-departmental traffic in ideas would be assured. 
In discussing these proposals of the report, I will concentrate on 
two questions which are central to the recommendations. First, I 
will consider whether the forward estimates as presented in the 
report are designed for control or planning purposes and what the 
implications of either choice are. Second, I will look at the question 
of the provision of alternative sources of advice to cabinet on a 
single topic. 
Planning or Control? 
When writing of the debate on planning, Wildavsky commented: 
If planning is to be more than an academic exercise, it must actually 
guide the making of government decisions. Government actions (and 
the private activities they seek to influence) must in large measure 
conform to the plan if it is to have effect." 
Similar comments could be made about methods of controlling 
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expenditure. If they are to mean anything, they have to ensure that 
expenditure can be restrained within prescribed limits—and they 
probably have to be seen to be binding. 
In Britain the PESC white paper is published annually. The first 
two years' forecasts are meant to be firm while the third year is 
regarded as the "focal year". As a result of the publication, 
outcomes can be compared with forecasts. It is true that the 
Plowden committee originally was sceptical about the possibility of 
the publication of the figures; it thought it doubtful 
whether any Government will feel able to place these surveys before 
Parliament and the public. To do this would involve disclosing the 
Government's long-term intentions for a wide range of public expen-
diture; and also explaining the survey's assumptions about employment, 
wages, policies and all the other main elements in the national economy. 
It would be surprising if any Government were prepared to do this.' 
W.J.M. Mackenzie translated this statement (with considerable 
relevance to the Australian scene) to read, "Unfortunately we can't 
believe that politicians would have the nerve to publish it; nor could 
we in our capacity as political secretaries, advise them to take the 
risk".* But the publication of the PESC white paper has not led to 
the undermining of executive power in Britain, even if it has not 
led either to the greatly increased scrutiny of the executive by 
parliament. Nevertheless many of those involved in public expen-
diture matters in Britain, particularly at the political level, argue 
that without publication the estimates would be meaningless. 
The RCAGA'S report never directly discusses the question—or even 
hints at the importance of the topic, although, hidden away in its 
lists of items to be included in departmental reports, can be found 
"information and comment on the forward estimates of the depart-
ment" (RC 4.3.27ff). While it is true that the report presents no 
timetable for the introduction of the system and would have 
considered it impractical to offer a particular date by which the 
estimates should be published (if that indeed was considered 
desirable), to avoid the subject altogether ensured that one of the 
main props of the system in Britain was ignored entirely. 
Further the report also chose not to discuss the question of how 
the estimates should be calculated—or rather it ignored many of 
the technical questions which may be crucial in such matters. In 
criticizing the report of one of the consultants to RCAGA, the 
Treasury commented 
there is no recognition of the precept that control over how a thing 
is decided is very close to control over H'hat is decided." 
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By declining to specify what technical factors should be involved, 
the report leaves its outline in procedural terms, assuming presum-
ably that any details based on this outline would abide by the spirit 
of the proposals. 1 would not be so confident. Not only will any 
group of senior bureaucrats who fill in those gaps naturally have 
their own conceptions of how, for what purpose, (and even if) the 
forward estimates should work but managerial feasibility—or at 
least managerial ease—may soon become dominant over the broad-
ranging conception of the report. 
A couple of examples may make the point. The report does not 
explain whether, as with the present forward estimates, departmen-
tal requirements should be calculated on a constant price basis. In 
an inflationary period this becomes important because of the need 
to calculate how much extra any programme would require. It is 
vague about whether the estimates include new projects that 
ministers might hope to introduce in two or three years time. Are 
these included in the estimates, in the "contingency" bid or 
subsumed in the proposal to give departmental heads greater 
flexibility in the management of their resources? Each year, the 
report recognizes, the forward estimates would have to be revised. 
It hopes that the revisions would be made within the parameters 
originally proposed by using the contingency sum to meet new 
commitments. But they also would be revised to meet the demands 
of macro-economic management. If public expenditure must be cut, 
if the estimates originally given to the cabinet committee were not 
met, then the whole structure of the estimates would have to be 
reconsidered. 
It is here that the major weakness of the report's proposals are 
most obvious. The forward estimates are annually adjustable; they 
are not binding—on anyone. They are not intended to force 
departments to live within their means, as they might if they were 
designed primarily as a financial control mechanism. Nor do they 
guarantee departments the use of an exact level of resources, within 
which they can plan and allocate their internal finances. 
The estimates, in fact if not in theory, must be renegotiated 
annually. Certainly the changes that occur would have to be 
marginal. But they have always been marginal. No-one can 
calculate exactly how much of a government's expenditure is 
"locked in", that is, how much is already committed by legislation 
and by programmes which are politically impossibly to reverse (like 
a reduction in pensions). Many estimates put it at well over 90 
per cent of the budgetary expenditure. The room for manoeuvre 
is therefore small. Already departments and the Treasury (or now. 
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the department of Finance) argue over their marginal amounts; they 
can usually assume a certain level of expenditure. 
Therefore the revision of the forward estimates will mean a 
marginal renegotiation. Departments will have no guarantees and 
no assurances of that marginal amount of their funds that they 
always compete for. This situation is at least in part the result of 
the report's own failure to explain clearly whether the system it 
proposes is for planning or control purposes. As Lord Diamond has 
remarked, control means restraint.'" Since treasuries would use 
any such system at least in part to improve their information about 
departmental intentions, it would not be surprising if departments 
regarded the proposed forward estimates with some scepticism. It 
is true that RCAGA recommends that the Treasury should com-
municate more freely with departments, that the relevant supply 
officer should "be seen as a helpful and friendly adviser and critic" 
(RC 11.3.21), and that there should be greater career mobility in 
and out of the Treasury. But exhortation is no substitute for 
prescription. To change the style of financial control in Australia 
would take longer and demand more fundamental changes even 
than the forward estimates themselves. Departments might reason-
ably expect that when the proposed forward estimates undergo their 
annual revision, any savings they have made in their original 
allocation will disappear in the cause of general austerity. 
In other words, if one of the objectives of the forward estimates 
is financial control or an introduction of discipline, more specific 
changes would be needed. Not only the current year but also year 
two of the estimates would have to be binding (given the need to 
revise the constant price basis and to calculate the relative price 
effect of public spending), with something like the PESC system of 
cash limits also being proposed. Certainly this was the general 
direction in which the Treasury was developing the existing 
estimates. 
Control and planning are not incompatible. Far from it. One 
man's limit is another's guaranteed sum. But many of the mecha-
nisms do differ. Since the report talks of turning policies into 
programmes, making priorities explicit and setting general parame-
ters for the government's directions, it obviously wants the forward 
estimates to be used for improved planning. But even in this area 
there are many areas of fundamental importance which its scheme 
ignores—or skirts around. 
First, the report recommends that the economic committee of 
cabinet should determine priorities, the amount of GDP and man-
power to be allocated to the public sector and the size of a 
contingency vote. Quite apart from the fact that the report takes 
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the existing cabinet committee system as given and fails to 
recommend an alternative ideal (why the economic committee, for 
instance? why not the priorities and planning committee?) the 
recommendations assume that cabinets have the desire or ability 
to delineate objectives, to relate them to programmes and to agree 
to those final marginal allocations of resources. Few democracies 
have shown that they have the capacity to be so explicit—indeed 
there is in fact a case for arguing that to be explicit for two to 
three years ahead is positively disadvantageous. It reduces 
flexibility. 
Generally all politicians favour planning; like motherhood, it 
sounds so virtuous. It is considered desirable 
because it is systematic rather than random, efficient rather than 
wasteful, coordinated rather than helter-skelter, consistent rather than 
contradictory, and above all, rational rather than unreasonable." 
But experience suggests that while politicians accept it as a theory, 
when it comes to limits on their own empires or ambitions, it is 
considered a nuisance. The Labor party has its platform, which does 
not contain any set of priorities; the Liberals, particularly in the 
last year or so, have deliberately avoided any but the most general 
and flexible priorities. Indeed politicians of both parties are not even 
prepared to accept binding decisions on an annual basis. The present 
budget, presented each August, is supposed to express the 
government's priorities. Yet every year ministers ask the Treasury 
for more funds for existing programmes within three months of that 
budget. If annual budgets cannot be made to work, what likelihood 
is there of politicians abiding by three year plans? 
Further, the proposed scheme takes no account of the pressure 
of federalism. Marginal adjustments to state grants are a major 
political resource which a federal cabinet might see itself losing 
if all its expenditure patterns are published in advance. 
But even supposing that a cabinet committee can be so organized, 
what are its capacities to make such plans? A successful allocation 
of resources must be based on a fairly detailed knowledge of the 
resources available. The report paints a grand picture of a cabinet 
being briefed on the growth of the workforce, on the developing 
industrial structure, on manpower demands and the future economic 
situation for the next three years. These estimates can be made, 
but whether they can be considered reliable is another matter, 
particularly when at present it seems diflncult to forecast economic 
trends a mere month or so in advance. These forecasts may well 
be based on a wide range of differing, even contradictory, evidence. 
For instance, the financial and manpower estimates would be 
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prepared in the Treasury and PSB respectively. Although doubtless 
there would be some cooperation between the two, as the report 
proposes (again exhortation only), the main coordination of the two 
would presumably take place at the level of the official committee 
which serves the cabinet committee. At that stage it would be far 
too late to ensure that the two schemes are based on similar 
assumptions. 
Further, and a fundamental failure for any discussion of the 
forward estimates as a means of resource planning, the report is 
vague about the way in which priorities are to be set and resources 
allocated. It proposes that general social, economic and political 
objectives be established (which is laudable), but does not say 
whether these objectives should be based on departmental, sectoral 
or any other schemes. In another section of the report, it suggests 
the establishment of a social welfare group of ministers, but does 
not extend that into other areas. Sectoral allocations may be more 
logical; so are functional classifications of expenditure (which the 
report supports). But the estimates are calculated on a departmental 
basis and there is no suggestion on how that allocative process can 
be made to work. 
Finally, the coordination required to fulfil all the needs of the 
scheme might well overload the coordinating capacity of the central 
departments. It would consume scarce resources of time, informa-
tion and manpower. Since the main supporting oflFicials are assumed 
to be senior, the system would reduce their ability to tackle other 
problems. To illustrate the point, it may be worth considering the 
steps that would be required for at least one of several possible 
scenarios. After the original cabinet committee has decided the 
basic parameters for the total budget, it must also determine what 
percentage of finance and manpower should be allocated to each 
department, or to each group of departments. Unless departments 
are given some indication of their own limits, their forward 
estimates may be no more than wish-lists that describe the 
maximum ambitions of each department.'^ If the allocations are 
sectoral, then the ministers involved or their officials must determine 
between themselves what share each should have. If this division 
of potential funds is not done in advance, it is difficult to see how 
priorities could be operationalized. Departments would then prepare 
their estimates within (or at least within range of) those outlines. 
Their forward bids would be reviewed by the Treasury, by the sub-
committee of cabinet and finally by cabinet itself. In other words, 
the report ignores two or three crucial allocative stages in the 
process. Even if it is done differently, some resource allocation is 
required before departmental estimates are drawn up. 
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The problem of excessive coordination requirements is made 
worse by the failure of the report to recommend any structural 
changes to the central institutions of government. Although it does 
propose that they should become more helpful, it does not explain 
how. The proposal to divide the Treasury was discussed briefly and 
rejected. (Perhaps fortunately, and certainly for the wrong reasons, 
Fraser has ignored the advice of the report, the economic task force 
and consultants in this respect). The report seems to admit no mid-
point in that argument. The choice seemed to be between a split 
and no change at all. There was no discussion of altering the 
internal arrangements of the Treasury or the PSB, or of shuffling 
their functions. For instance, manpower and financial forward 
estimates might well have been united along Canadian lines. 
The workload for these departments will be exacerbated if the 
forward estimates are in fact used more to control than to plan. 
The RCAGA report assumed that, while the forward estimates scheme 
would add to the workload of central departments, the additional 
workload would in part be offset by relaxing the detailed controls 
previously maintained by those departments. If all aspects of their 
proposals were accepted this might in part be true. But if, as seems 
more likely, the forward estimates are introduced without relaxing 
these controls, then the workload of those departments will be 
increased and the need for coordination more drastic. 
Further the report does not tackle the problem of how those 
central units which examine the new estimates are to operate. It 
regrets that many existing programmes are retained without regular 
scrutiny. But the same problem must exist with the forward 
estimates. To scrutinize all in detail, looking at their assumptions, 
performance and finance would require a counter-bureaucracy; 
merely sampling interesting topics or pilot projects is haphazard. 
The hope that the central departments will retain familiarity with 
the general outlines, while pretending to be interested in everything, 
is in effect the situation that already exists. These problems are 
much greater than the report seems to recognize. 
By failing to prescribe the procedures by which its proposals can 
be put into effect, the report runs the risk of its scheme being turned 
from one designed primarily to allow priorities to be translated into 
policies into one in which control functions will predominate. This 
is even more likely to happen under a government dedicated to 
cutting public expenditure. Departmental initiative would mean 
independence to find cuts, not to plan expenditure.'^ Since pro-
cedures may define outcomes, the devices and questionnaires 
adopted may determine whether the forecasts are used centrally 
to restrain expenditure or whether departments are guaranteed the 
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sums accepted, at least for year two, with equal guarantee for 
maintaining the programme at that level in an inflationary climate. 
That guarantee will be the minimum needed for useful departmen-
tal planning. In the existing climate I cannot see it occurring. The 
annual revision of the estimates, which is probably politically 
necessary, particularly after a change of government, may well 
reduce the system to a means of central control, in which the 
estimates are used as a limiting device alone. The revisions are 
anyway essentially incremental changes to an already existing, and 
largely discredited, system. 
Various Sources of Advice 
In discussing the formulation of economic policy, the report argues: 
Our proposals are . . . designed not to duplicate economic advice 
unnecessarily but to spread the sources of advice in a way which will 
ensure that, as far as possible, the viewpoints of those involved in 
different aspects of the economy and those who see the economy as 
a whole from a different viewpoint and with a different time horizon 
are presented in ministerial committees. Such an arrangement would 
provide the basis for a more balanced range of advice and at the same 
time reduce the possibility of one source of advice or one analytical 
or conceptual set of principles becoming unduly dominant (RC 10.1.10). 
The report then recognizes that there may be several formulations 
of a problem, all of which may be valid and should be presented 
to ministers. Further it advocates this multiplication of advisory 
channels as a means of avoiding the necessity for splitting the 
Treasury, which it considers would either fail to have the desired 
effect or weaken economic advice. It prefers to use other means 
"to reduce the 'monopolistic' character of Treasury" (RC 10.1.16). 
The main method it adopts is to try to spread information and 
access to ministers on key areas of policy. The forward estimates 
are clearly the key instrument. The Bureau of Statistics (made 
independent of the Treasury), the PSB, Employment and Industrial 
Relations, DINDEC and the PM & cs policy unit would all advise the 
cabinet committee on general trends. Treasury, PSB, DINDEC and PM 
& c would advise the subcommittee on the detailed estimates. Advice 
would come from a wider range of departments, a change that 
would be both desirable and necessary. 
Each cabinet committee would be served by a committee of 
officials chaired by PM & c. This group would presumably act as the 
filter for the various strands of information so that, although one 
submission might finally be presented to the cabinet committee, all 
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the information would (or should) be readily available to ministers 
who wanted the detailed reasoning behind the proposals. These 
committees would of course be important and the personalities 
involved would be crucial at particular times. The stature of the 
economic sections of PM & c would inevitably be enhanced and the 
Treasury's monopoly of advice would indeed be broken. 
But what is more difficult to accept is the view that the various 
departments could define their roles as neatly as the report seems 
to suggest. In dealing with the financial implications of bids, the 
Treasury traditionally has looked at the policy and manpower 
results. It will probably continue to try to do so. I doubt that the 
neat plan presented by the Commission will work in practice. 
Further I doubt that information will flow readily between these 
central departments as they compete for influence. Here the report 
is no help at all; it admits the importance of the problems, but 
except for vague exhortations fails to present proposals for ensuring 
that information is indeed shared. 
Nevertheless the proposals for broadening the range of economic 
advice are encouraging and significant. They would institutionalize 
a wider range of advice on broad ranging questions to more 
ministers. No longer would the treasurer and the prime minister 
alone get briefed on all the economic implications of present trends. 
It is easier for a department with its own set of principles to 
persuade one man than several; but it becomes difficult for one 
department to dominate economic policy and the allocation of 
resources if advice based on different formulations of the issues is 
also available. Despite the likelihood that committees would become 
bureaucratic battlegrounds, they would probably have greater 
effects on the development of public policy than the more grandiose 
system of forward estimates. 
When announcing his decision to split the Treasury, Prime Minister 
Fraser said 
Particular emphasis is being laid on improving capacity to service the 
Government's requirements for forward planning, priority setting and 
the strategic planning of government initiatives.'" 
Later, on 9 December 1976, when speaking in the House on the 
report's emphasis on forward estimates, he claimed that immediate 
action would be undertaken to examine these proposals. An IDC, 
chaired by Ian Castles of PM & c, had been established to make a 
report. But the emphases both of the government's decisions and 
of the personnel selected for the officials' committee suggest that 
the decentralization of power may not follow the introduction of 
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the forward estimates—if indeed they are taken seriously at all." 
The government's main emphasis has been on efficiency audits and 
expenditure cuts; the latter have often demanded across-the-board 
savings. The officials are exclusively from the central departments. 
Control of expenditure, not departmental planning, appears likely 
to be the main result. In 1976 forward estimates were drawn up 
for one year only (and as such they were early budget bids); they 
were used as a means to the May 1976 expenditure cuts. 
If this chapter appears pessimistic, it is only partly because of 
the report itself. Certainly the report left too many factors unstated. 
Many of its recommendations were interdependent, but were not 
satisfactorily coordinated; it was proposed, for instance, that the use of 
staff ceilings be abolished and that they be integrated in the forward 
estimates, but there was no timetable for implementing the latter. 
Indeed, as Fraser showed when misquoting the task force report 
to justify splitting the Treasury, the report and the supporting 
evidence can be used to justify almost any action. The report's 
vagueness on methods can easily mean that its proposals will be 
redirected. If RCAGA wanted forward estimates as a control device, 
it should have discussed subjects like cash limits; if, as is more 
likely, it wanted them to help plan resources allocation with greater 
departmental independence, it should have looked at the question 
of guarantees. One or the other will have to be taken up if the 
system is to get beyond the process of dreamtime wish-lists that 
at present exists. 
But other reservations are more general. First, I doubt that the 
information will ever allow the accuracy that RCAGA requires if 
major annual revisions are to be avoided. Second, I would question 
that the amount of coordination required is feasible. Finally, and 
most important, I doubt that politicians or bureaucrats would want 
in the last resort to be so explicit. Ambiguity has its political value. 
It can be used to appeal to more than one group at a time, to 
change direction less obviously, to avoid fulfilling promises and for 
a wide variety of other purposes. Rolling plans in particular sectors 
may work; the Defence department's five year rolling plans and 
the old-fashioned university triennia show that. But politicians and 
bureaucrats have fallen short of drawing up a system of binding 
allocation of resources across-the-board. The problems are institu-
tional, rather than personal. 
Given the likely problems and the prevailing political climate, 
it seems probable that the report's plans for the translation of 
political priorities into the allocation of resources and for the 
establishment of greater departmental initiative will become a 
means of restraining expenditure and even tightening central 
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control. And it will be done in the name of the RCAGA. This 
development might be better and more organized than the present 
system; it could scarcely be less so. It may give better indications 
of the trends of programme expenditure and of future commitments 
and hence better information. But it will not achieve what RCAGA 
desired. On such a grand scale, I doubt that any pluralist 
democratic society could. 
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Efficiency 
Jaflies Cutt 
Accountability for the use of scarce resources in both the public 
and private sectors may be seen as requiring the derivation, 
processing, and presentation of information on the costs and/or 
outcomes of activities or programmes. The process whereby that 
information is presented, assessed and reported on we shall define 
as auditing. The notion of accountability—and, correspondingly, 
auditing—has both positive and negative aspects. The positive 
aspects of accountability are apparent inasmuch as those responsible 
for particular programmes or activities can use information on 
previous cost and outcome performance to improve future per-
formance and is most frequently considered in relation to internal 
audit, where a constituent part of the organization in question has 
the responsibility of determining and assessing organizational cost 
and outcome performance. Here the objective of accountability and 
audit is performance improvement. 
Unfortunately, the negative aspect of accountability receives most 
attention. In this situation the person or organization has to account 
in various levels of detail for the use of scarce resources, and the 
objective of accountability and audit is to ascertain and attest that 
these scarce resources have been used in the manner specified; 
clearly such specification may occur in various forms and in various 
levels of detail. The negative aspect of accountability is most 
frequently associated with external audit, where the determination 
and assessment functions are vested in an organization external to 
the organization under assessment. 
In fact, both internal and external audit procedures may have 
positive and negative aspects, and the distinction between the 
positive and negative aspects of accountability and audit emerges 
most accurately as positions along a spectrum rather than in terms 
of two discrete categories. The other side of the coin of accountabili-
ty and audit—both internal and external—is control and, ultimate-
ly, the aspiration to improvement in performance. We shall be 
concerned in this paper exclusively with accountability manifested 
in external audit procedures, and we shall argue that the positive 
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aspect—or, at least, the potentially positive aspect—of audit is in 
direct proportion to the comprehensiveness of the audit procedures, 
which, of course, is a function of the objectives of the audit; these 
latter objectives, in turn, reflect directly the objectives and cor-
responding comprehensiveness of the organizational accountability 
under consideration. 
Efficiency I 
Accountability may be defined in a hierarchy of increasing sophisti-
cation and potential usefulness, but corresponding increasing opera-
tional difficulty. First, the lowest level of accountability may be seen 
as fiscal or fiduciary accountability, which is defined exclusively in 
terms of the actual expenditure of funds and procedures by which 
that expenditure is accounted for. In general, the question is likely 
to be defined in terms of accounting conventions and reporting 
procedures which demonstrate the propriety and legitimacy of 
expenditures within the activity or programme. This concept of 
accountability relates entirely to inputs, and does not deal, except 
by implication, with the outcomes attributable to these inputs. By 
definition, such analysis of the use of funds will occur ex-post, after 
the activity or programme has been concluded or at some discrete 
defined point in its life. Such analysis is clearly widely used in both 
the public and private sector. In the public sector, this type of 
accountability may be considered to correspond to the traditional 
control-oriented or input-oriented stage in budgetary evolution, 
where budgetary allocations were made with respect to detailed 
inputs or objects of expenditure, outcomes were ignored, and 
accountability was related to the checking on the use of funds in 
the detailed manner prescribed. These skills required for analysis 
under the first concept of accountability may be considered to be 
entirely those of conventional financial auditing, the only distinction 
worth noting relating to the varying degrees of detail with which 
financial auditing procedures can be carried out. Accountants and 
conventional accounting practices may thus be held to dominate 
this field. It is difficult to translate this first concept of accountabili-
ty into anything which might be called efficiency. More properly, 
it might be seen as regularity or financial propriety. Perhaps we 
might be allowed to say, however, that the performance assessment 
which is carried on in the context of fiduciary accountability has 
as its objective the determination of Efficiency I. Correspondingly, 
we use the term "financial audit" to describe the auditing pro-
cedures appropriate to the determination of Efficiency I; synonyms 
in the literature are compliance audit, regularity audit and tradi-
tional audit. 
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Efficiency II 
We now move up the hierarchy to distinguish a second and more 
sophisticated form of accountability which we call efficiency accoun-
tability, associated with the pursuit of what we call Efficiency II, 
and determined through what we call efficiency auditing—synonyms 
for which include performance auditing, management auditing and 
operational auditing. Efliiciency accountability (and thus Efficiency 
II) may be defined in terms of the ratio of some physical measure 
of output from the activity or programme to the costs of that 
activity or programme; the analogy to the idea of "productivity" 
is apparent. The crucial distinction between this level of accoun-
tability and the first level lies in the inclusion of outcomes, and 
their juxtaposition in one way or another with costs. Although we 
define the various concepts of accountability (and corresponding 
concepts of eflficiency) in a hierarchy, and have thus implied that 
less sophisticated concepts develop into more sophisticated—so that 
lower measures may be considered a surrogate, albeit an imperfect 
one for higher—it is important to stress that the definitions and 
procedures used under a less sophisticated concept may bring that 
concept into direct conflict with the more sophisticated one. 
Normanton summarizes the difficulty in this case: 
The most wasteful, extravagant, foolish and ill-planned activities are 
frequently regular in a technical sense.' 
We assume in the development of the set of concepts of 
accountability and corresponding concepts of efficiency and auditing 
that a more sophisticated concept entirely subsumes a less sophisti-
cated. This has, of course, two implications: first, the definition of 
and procedures used under the less sophisticated concept must be 
such as to be consistent with, rather than in conflict with, the 
corresponding aspects of the more sophisticated concept; but, 
second, the definition of and procedures used under the more 
sophisticated concept must include fully the (consistently defined) 
requirements of the less sophisticated concept—the point here is 
that Efl'iciency I must not be sacrificed to, or forgotten under the 
pursuit of. Efficiency II. 
We also stress that a more sophisticated concept, albeit one 
defined as required above, is vulnerable, through reversion to 
traditional, simpler and more tractable procedures to what might 
be seen as a collapse or disintegration into a less sophisticated 
concept. In this case Efficiency II might slip back into EflRciency 
I, and we argue then that a concept must not only be defined 
properly in the hierarchy, but have that definition, and the 
associated procedures, vigilantly maintained. 
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Analysis under Efficiency II will generally occur ex-post, but may 
be relevant in an ex-ante sense inasmuch as productivity targets 
etc. may be set. Too much should not be made of this ex-post/ex-
ante distinction; clearly, ex-post analysis of this year's activities or 
programmes contributes to decision making on next year's pro-
grammes in an ex-ante sense. Nevertheless, in general terms, the 
time at which it is considered important to do analysis with respect 
to an activity or programme is an important dimension in our 
classification of concepts of accountability and efficiency. Efficiency 
II clearly has a place in both the public and private sectors, but 
it must be apparent that it would be difficult to pursue in large 
segments of the public sector which do not produce physical outputs 
of any kind, or, at least, physical outputs which are directly related 
to the objectives of the organization in question. 
Again with specific respect to the public sector, the phase of 
budgetary evolution which corresponds to Eflficiency II may be 
called the management-oriented or performance-oriented phase, in 
which expenditure inputs were specifically related to outputs of 
public programmes defined in physical terms. This phase, first major 
reference to which can be found in the Hoover Commission reports 
in the USA in 1947-49 and 1953-55, emphasized the establishment 
of quantitative (physical) indicators of such outputs, and the 
development of work-cost measurements as a means of evaluating 
the efficiency of programmes. 
The analytical skills required under Efficiency II which, we have 
argued, must subsume EflRciency I, may still be considered to be 
dominated by conventional accounting skills, though now by a wider 
and deeper set of accounting skills which go beyond conventional 
auditing procedures to include concepts and procedures of cost and 
management accounting. Here too, we might expect the accountant 
to work closely with, or to assume some of the functions of, the 
engineer in the development and measurement of physical output 
indicators of various kinds. If we accept that the pursuit of 
Efficiency II and its examination through efficiency auditing require 
the analysis of organizational and technical matters (in addition 
to the financial matters embraced under Efficiency I)—and there 
is agreement in the Australian literature that this should be so^  
—then we may envisage that the skills of social psychologists and 
related specialists in personal and organizational behaviour would 
also be necessary. 
Efficiency 111 
The third and most sophisticated form of accountability that we 
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distinguish we call effectiveness accountability. This is associated 
with the pursuit of Efficiency III, and determined through 
effectiveness auditing—the most frequent synonym for which is 
programme auditing. There is a well known distinction between 
efficiency and eff"ectiveness. The efficiency of an organization may 
be defined in terms of its capacity to achieve results for the given 
expenditure of resources—in short, the ratio between organizational 
inputs and outputs. Effectiveness may be broadly defined to refer 
to the degree of success an organization enjoys in doing whatever 
it is trying to do. The two concepts are clearly related but need 
not always coincide; for instance, an organization's attempts to 
husband its resources in the interests of efficiency may seriously 
limit its effectiveness. Depending on the measures that are used, 
efficiency may be either complementary to or in conflict with 
effectiveness. The distinction lies in the fact that output is usually 
closely related to, but may not be identical with, the objectives of 
the organization. A corporation may have as its objective the 
maximization of profit, but have as its physical measure of output, 
say, the number of automobiles produced annually. Efficiency 
defined simply as productivity, or the ratio of physical output to 
dollar costs will be related to but clearly need not coincide with 
—indeed, in some instances, may conflict with—the objective of 
profit maximization seen as the measure of effectiveness. Similarly 
in, say, a tertiary educational institution we might contrast an 
objective defined in terms of production of excellent graduates, and 
an output measure defined simply in terms of the number of 
graduates or student credit hours. In this case the pursuit of 
efficiency, defined simply as the ratio of the number of graduates 
to total university costs, may not coincide with the pursuit of 
effectiveness defined in terms of excellent graduates. It is clearly 
possible to be ineffective efficiently, just as it is possible to be 
inefficient within the bounds of regularity. 
Returning to the question of Efficiency III it is clear that it 
requires, as does Efficiency II, the conceptualization and juxtaposi-
tion of both inputs and outputs; as distinct from Efficiency II, 
Efficiency III requires that the output measure used reflect the 
attainment of the objectives of the activity or programme in 
question. Retaining the corporate analogy, we might consider the 
automobile producer moving from an Efficiency II position in which 
he considers cost in relation to physical output to an Efficiency III 
position in which he considers cost in relation to the objective of 
the organization, which we might consider to be profit maximiza-
tion. The profit maximization analogy might be extended to those 
public sector programmes where outputs (reflecting objectives) may 
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be conceptualized in monetary terms. More frequently, the attain-
ment of a public sector objective will not be easily conceptualized 
in monetary terms, and will have to be defined in terms of an 
indicator specially designed. 
We stress that while Efficiency III and corresponding 
effectiveness auditing are concerned with the attainment of objec-
tives, they are not defined to include an assessment of the 
desirability of, or set of priorities among, these objectives. Efficiency 
III covers (1) the implementation of policy—looking at the ques-
tion, "Have the policy objectives been achieved?"; (2) consideration 
of alternative ways (programme designs) by which these objectives 
might be achieved—looking at the question, "Given these objectives, 
might they not better be achieved by a design of this nature rather 
than that?"; and (3) possibly also a re-definition of objectives— 
looking at the question, "Are these objectives feasible or at-
tainable?". It does not extend to an examination of the desirability 
or legitimacy of policy—looking at such questions as, "Are these 
objectives desirable, and are the weights or priorities appropriate?". 
Accountability for such questions is entirely political, and we 
exclude an assessment of the overall policy or strategy of govern-
ment from the scope even of our highest level of efficiency and audit. 
In many cases, it seems reasonable to consider Efficiency II and 
Efficiency III as lying in their appropriate positions in the hierarchy, 
with progressively better efficiency measures (i.e. efficiency meas-
ures which come progressively closer to a measure of the attainment 
of objectives) essentially developing into measures of effectiveness. 
Such a juxtaposition will not be appropriate, however, where the 
pursuit of an efficiency measure in physical output terms is in 
conflict with the pursuit of effectiveness. So again, we require a 
cumulative definition, and define Efficiency III to subsume 
Efficiency II, so that, on the one hand, the definition of and 
procedures used under the head of Efficiency II must be consistent 
with, rather than in conflict with, the corresponding aspects of 
Efficiency III, while, on the other hand, the definition of and 
procedures used in the name of Efficiency III must include fully 
the (consistently defined) requirements of Efficiency II. We also 
note that Efficiency III is a considerably more difficult concept than 
Efficiency II in conceptual and particularly in operational terms 
—and may be considered vulnerable, unless pursued with vigilance, 
to a collapse back into Efficiency II through a concern perhaps with 
more tractable physical measures of output, or a pre-occupation 
with "economizing" at the expense of the attainment of objectives. 
The stage in the evolution of budgetary practice to which 
Efficiency II corresponds is what is generally referred to in the 
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literature as programme budgeting as distinct from performance 
budgeting. The development of programme budgeting was closely 
related to the development of the whole range of analytical 
techniques during and after World War II including national 
economic accounting, increasingly sophisticated (if singularly un-
successful) macroeconomic models, more accurate data on public 
revenue and expenditure and the increasing use of microeconomic 
techniques to appraise competing public projects. It also sprang 
from the development of a series of decisional and informational 
techniques coming out of the operations research procedures 
developed during World War II and culminating in what has 
generally come to be known as systems analysis. That can be 
broadly defined as a continuous cycle of defining objectives, 
designing alternative systems to achieve these objectives, evaluating 
these alternatives in terms of their cost and effectiveness (which 
may or may not be in monetary terms), questioning the objectives 
and other assumptions underlying the analysis, opening new alter-
natives and establishing new objectives, and so on. Programme 
budgeting links the procedures of budgeting and planning, and may 
be generally defined as a long-term rolling planning system, under 
which budgeting is an allocative process between competing claims, 
and the budget itself as a statement of policy for the appropriate 
planning period—so that, for instance, in a five-year planning 
period, the budgeting statement in any year t will present cost and 
output information for the year in question and the subsequent four 
years, that is to say, till year / -I- 4; the budget for year t -F 1 
would present consistent data until year t -\- 5, and so on. In terms 
of formal definition the complete implementation of programme 
budgeting requires the development of a multi-year financial plan 
and a corresponding multi-year programme plan, the former 
specifying the estimated inputs or costs of the appropriate govern-
ment agency or institution in terms of its activities classified and 
displayed by a set of objective-oriented programmes, the latter 
specifying the corresponding outputs or benefits either in single-
benefit or multi-benefit terms. The number of years over which 
inputs and outputs are estimated will reflect planning practice in 
the organization in question. 
In sum, we envisage accountability and a corresponding notion 
of efficiency as defined in a hierarchy of increasing sophistication, 
the concepts being cumulative in two senses: first, in that definitions 
of and procedures under less sophisticated concepts are considered 
legitimate only insofar as they are not in conflict with the 
corresponding aspects of the more sophisticated concepts: and 
second, in that definitions of and procedures under more sophisti-
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cated concepts must embrace all the (consistently defined) require-
ments of the less sophisticated concepts. Clearly, these definitional 
constraints are frequently, perhaps even generally, breached in 
practice; our intention here is to establish a consistent set of 
definitions and a correspondingly consistent basis for evolution and 
improvement. 
The Auditor-General and RCAGA 
The existing statutory role of the Auditor-General in Australia is 
oriented primarily towards Efficiency I: 
The current provisions of the Audit Act 1901-1973 are designed 
primarily to ensure the regularity of financial transactions and to provide 
the Parliament with an assurance that the accounts of the Treasurer 
(which include the accounts of all departments) have been kept correctly 
and that the Treasurer's Statement is in agreement with those accounts.' 
In short, the Audit Act presently provides no specific authority to 
go beyond financial auditing to efficiency or effectiveness auditing. 
Numerous amendments have been made to the Audit Act since 
1901 which are directed toward increased audit sophistication, but 
. . . none of these [amendments] has altered or will alter the 19th 
century concept of "regularity" or "compliance" auditing as being the 
beginning and virtually the ending of the Auditor-General's role.* 
Section 51A of the Audit Act ("The Auditor-General shall include 
in any report made by him under this Act such information as he 
thinks desirable in relation to audits, examinations and inspections 
carried out by him in pursuance of the provisions of this or any 
other Act.") might be interpreted to provide the Auditor-General 
with scope to go beyond Efficiency I, and the Auditor-General has 
indeed been using Section 51A as the basis for pursuing "value for 
money" (effectively. Efficiency II) considerations in the course of 
both financial and what are referred to as "operational audits".^ 
He has, however, stressed the need for a "specific authority for the 
Auditor-General to evaluate whether expenditure, though regular, 
is nevertheless wasteful or non-productive"*" and, in his formal 
submissions to RCAGA has drawn attention to what he refers to as 
the "urgent need" for a statutory widening of the role of the 
Auditor-General into Efficiency II considerations.' In this sub-
mission he had the support of the PSB and other departments. 
Significantly the Auditor-General quite explicitly argued that his 
role should not be extended in Australia beyond Efficiency II to 
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Efficiency III; his argument, developed in the context of a com-
parison between his role and that of the Comptroller-General in 
the USA was based on the differences in the governmental systems 
in the two countries and the special role of the General Accounting 
Office as an "arm of Congress".' RCAGA found itself in agreement 
with the Auditor-General but, rather curiously, only after a firm, 
definitional embrace of Efficiency III: 
For the purposes of this Report, effectiveness is one of two dist-
inguishable elements in efficiency. Effectiveness is concerned with the 
relationship between purpose and result. Thus, an action or program 
is effective if it achieves the purpose for which it was initiated. But 
efficiency involves additionally a consideration of the resources used in 
achieving the result. A program is efficient only if its effectiveness is 
achieved with an economic use of resources. Efficiency is therefore also 
concerned with the relationship between resources used and the results 
achieved; between 'input' and 'output'. It comprehends both economy 
in this sense and effectiveness (RC 3.1.4). 
Having defined efficiency in this way, RCAGA then went on to place 
the major weight of analysis of public sector programmes on the 
extension of the role of the Auditor-General into efficiency audits 
(Efficiency II). The pursuit of Efficiency III was mentioned only 
briefly, and almost incidentally, as a function which might best be 
performed by a unit in the department of PM & c. No formal link 
of the revised roles for the Auditor-General and PM & c was 
proposed, though it was remarked that the latter would "draw 
heavily on the work of the Auditor-General as revealed in his 
reports" (RC 11.4.4) and that in the groups responsible for 
Efficiency III reviews in PM & c, "there would frequently be merit 
in including an officer from the Auditor-General's staff" since he 
would give the group access to a wide range of relevant information 
and judgment" (RC 11.5.20). The nature of such an information 
flow is, of course, crucial to the iterative, ex-ante/ex-post character 
of Efficiency III, and the almost casual reference is hardly 
satisfying. It is difficult to take much comfort from the further 
recommendation that the Auditor-General seek advice in the 
establishment of his new role from a committee comprising repre-
sentatives of the heads of Treasury, the PSB, PM & c, and Adminis-
trative Services (RC 11.4.13). 
No formal role for the Auditor-General in relation to Efficiency 
III appears to be envisaged, not even the role currently envisaged 
for the Canadian Auditor-General in ascertaining whether or not 
departments themselves are engaged in the pursuit of Efficiency III, 
and including such information in his report.' RCAGA did suggest 
that internal audit procedures in departments be improved, but only 
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to the Efficiency II stage. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that 
while RCAGA envisaged an extended and improved role for the 
Auditor-General it failed to make a serious commitment to the 
concept of a comprehensive (effectiveness) audit implied in its own 
definition of efficiency. A related failure to develop some of the 
detailed implications of its proposal might be considered more 
understandable. One such omission underlines, however, the more 
general difficulties experienced by RCAGA in coming to terms with 
efficiency. There is no examination in the report of the cumulative 
nature of efficiency, and of the importance of ensuring in a system 
oriented to Efficiency II, (1) that the set of output definitions used 
does not conflict with measures of effectiveness; and (2) that the 
pursuit of Efficiency II does not slide inexorably away from a view 
of efficiency which at least takes outputs of some kind into 
consideration, through a preoccupation with "economizing" back 
to Efficiency I. 
Despite the limitations of the proposal, the government appears 
to be impressed in general terms and has announced that it intends 
to proceed with the recommendation that efficiency audits be 
introduced. No announcement has yet been made on whether this 
role will be given to the Auditor-General, or what the relationship, 
if any, of efficiency audits will be to other processes of analysis 
of public activities. 
Some overseas comparisons 
Although the recommendation of RCAGA seems timid in terms of 
the apparatus developed in the first sction of this chapter, and is 
certainly incompletely argued, the general form of the recommenda-
tion accords with the expressed wish of the current Auditor-General 
and a range of other government departments. Before offering a 
few tentative suggestions on how the RCAGA recommendations might 
be improved, or at least placed in a wider context which attempts 
to follow the logic of a commitment to a comprehensive audit, it 
is perhaps worth reflecting briefly on the reasons for the Auditor-
General's wish not to go beyond Efficiency II, and the acceptance 
of that view in the RCAGA recommendations. This is particularly 
necessary since at least one serious study in Australia has recom-
mended that the Auditor-General be required to move to 
effectiveness auditing,'" and since such a role for the supreme 
national audit body is embraced and apparently vigorously pursued 
in the USA" and Sweden.'-
The classic and impressive argument is that the traditional role 
for the Auditor-General in countries with the Westminster system 
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of government would be inconsistent with his surveillance of 
Efficiency III. The executive and legislative arms of the governmen-
tal system are not formally separate in the Westminster system, 
and the government or executive is formed from the party which 
can find a majority in parliament. The majority vote of that 
parliament in turn provides legislative authority to government 
policy. The Auditor-General is an agent of parliament, and it is 
argued that he cannot fulfil this role—with parliament as his client 
—and at the same time oversee the pursuit of Efficiency III which 
would involve criticizing the implementation or indeed intrinsic 
nature of government policy, which has received legislative author-
ity in parliament. The respect accorded the observations of the 
Auditor-General is, it is argued, very much a function of his 
independence from what is at least in substantial part, a political 
debate on policy. Significantly the role of the Auditor-General in 
the other Westminster-type countries—the UK, Canada and New 
Zealand—is undergoing reform but in no case does it seem likely 
that the role will be extended to a major surveillance of Efficiency 
III. 
This argument seems to explain fully the different roles and scope 
of the Auditor-General in Australia and the Comptroller-General 
in the USA. In the latter case, the Comptroller-General at the head 
of the General Accounting Office has as his client the congress (the 
legislative branch of government) and his business the surveillance 
of the executive branch. The two branches of government are 
distinct and no conflict of interest is involved in Comptroller-
General's surveillance of Efficiency III. The argument also seems 
to go most of the way to explain the case of Sweden, where the 
role of the national audit bureau is to survey Efficiency III in the 
executive agencies which implement policies which are made in the 
ministries. The bureau audits the agencies, not the ministries, and, 
subject to the constraint that its auditing role does not extend to 
the making of policy in the ministries, avoids the conflict of interest 
problem. 
It seems likely that preoccupation in the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Australia with the independence—and thus sharply 
constrained role—of the Auditor-General is at least as convenient 
for the government as for the Auditor-General, and becomes a 
means of curtailing a comprehensive audit of public policy and thus 
blunting political criticism. What is interesting to reflect on is a 
role for the Auditor-General in Australia which, consistent with 
his present status and autonomy, nevertheless makes his role a 
fundamental and formal part of a continuing process of com-
prehensive audit or public activities. 
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Alternative strategies 
The first component of such a package is a commitment by 
government to a continuing, comprehensive process of analysis and 
evaluation of public programmes and activities, with a related 
awareness that such a process requires an ongoing cycle of 
interdependent ex-ante and ex-post analysis. The comprehensive 
process of analysis and evaluation refers to the comprehensive audit, 
or what we have defined as effectiveness auditing. Such a commit-
ment should be in terms of the cumulative definition of Efficiency 
III and the associated auditing procedures. Further, lest the 
important contributions of Efficiency I and Efficiency II be lost, 
the definition of Efficiency III must fully incorporate the (consistent-
ly defined) aspects of Efficiency I and Efficiency II. In short, 
analysis must be directed at making programmes efficiently effective 
in a manner consistent with regular financial procedures. The 
commitment of government should also involve vigilance against 
downward "slippage" of Efficiency II and Efficiency III. 
Given the first component of the package, there is no reason why 
the entire burden of analysis should fall on one institution or why 
the role of the Auditor-General in Australia should be changed in 
a way that appears to curtail substantially his traditional independ-
ent role. He might continue to operate primarily in an ex-post mode, 
but must surely, as the second component of the package, be given 
the primary role in the ex-post analysis of Efficiency II. Consistent 
with the part Efficiency II plays in the larger process of analysis, 
the definitions and procedures used must be consistent with 
Efficiency III, and further with a general set of analytical terms 
of reference which maintains consistency between the various forms 
of analysis of any one programme, and between the analyses of 
different programmes. Further, Efficiency II must not be allowed 
to slide back into Efficiency I. In short, we are arguing that the 
Auditor-General in Australia not move into Efficiency II in a 
vacuum as it were, but in the context of a comprehensive approach 
to analysis. 
Third, there also seems to be no reason why the Auditor-General 
cannot, consistent with autonomy, go at least as far as the 
Canadians propose to go, and monitor in his ex-post Efficiency II 
analyses the extent to which departments themselves are evaluating 
their own pursuit of Efficiency III; the corollary here is that 
departments be encouraged and ultimately required to pursue 
Efficiency III. The existing track record is very patchy indeed. 
More important, however, is the fourth component of the package 
which requires on the one hand, a body which will have primary 
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responsibility for ex-ante Efficiency III analysis on a continuing, 
systematic basis constrained, of course, within what was defined 
above as the appropriate limits of effectiveness auditing, and, on 
the other, the continuing movement of information and staff" 
between this body and the office of the Auditor-General. It might 
be possible for a unit in PM & c or in another of the coordinating 
departments to undertake the development and implementation of 
a methodology for analyzing public performance in terms of 
Efficiency III, but it seems unlikely that a body defined in almost 
residual terms, and without separate statutory authority, could do 
more than conduct a few, selective examinations which, although 
useful (say, by analogy with the Programme Analysis and Review 
(PAR) practices in the UK) cannot contribute seriously to, and be 
a functioning component of, a comprehensive approach to analysis. 
We argue that a new body, of the sort envisaged by Caiden in 
his proposal for an Office of Policy Analysis and Administrative 
Management (OPAAM)'' should be set up, adequately funded and 
staffed with the necessary range of talents, and given the statutory 
authority to develop and implement a methodology for examining 
the pursuit of Efficiency III. As part of the normal process of 
operation of this new office and the office of the Auditor-General, 
there should be a complete flow of information in both directions, 
so that each body, although pursuing a separate function, can have 
full access to the data and thus perspective of a comprehensive 
approach to analysis. There also seems no reason whatever why 
there should not be the frequent and systematic movement of stafl" 
between the two bodies, so that staff become familiar with the 
methodology of both bodies and overcome what appear to be 
problems of comprehension and ability but turn out to be mainly 
problems of communication and language. 
The fifth component of the package envisages a coordinating body 
on which representatives of the OPAAM-Iike body and the Auditor-
General (and such other coordinating bodies which continue to have 
a role in analysis) would sit, the function of which would be, in 
cooperation with but independent of government, to establish a 
consistent set of analytical terms of reference which would then 
be used by the various analytical bodies, including the internal audit 
units within departments, as a means of establishing consistency 
and comparability between analyses of various kinds and at various 
levels. 
We might also envisage a sixth component which recognises the 
movement along the negative/positive accountability spectrum into 
positive prescription and management consulting, and recommend 
formal coordination between the two major analytical bodies and 
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the departments such as the PSB and the department of Productivity, 
which have the function of providing advice and implementing 
change. Again, such cooperation would take the form of information 
flows and the movement of staff; the latter would seem particularly 
useful inasmuch as it would permit staff" to move between primarily 
negative and explicitly positive activities. 
The political context of the package must, of course, be stressed. 
The Auditor-General reports presently to parliament, and, in terms 
of detailed consideration, to the public accounts committee. We 
envisage the Auditor-General in the widened role described above 
as continuing to report to the public accounts committee. It would, 
however, be a public accounts committee with wider and deeper 
functions, embracing a general analytical supervision function and 
the specific review function presently assigned to the house of 
representatives committee on expenditure, and with a substantial 
supporting secretariat. The OPAAM-Iike body, and the body which 
coordinates the Auditor-General and OPAAM, are also envisaged as 
reporting to this transformed public accounts committee. 
With a technical staff of its own, we also envisage the public 
accounts committee as responsible for the effectiveness audit of the 
auditors, that is of the Auditor-General and OPAAM. It might be 
expected that this auditing of the auditing function would rely 
heavily on internal audit procedures within the two bodies under 
scrutiny, but would also involve an external auditing dimension 
which the public accounts committee would be responsible for, 
possibly using external consultants to supplement its own staff 
resources. 
Inevitably, there are problems of various kinds, and various 
degrees of difficulty, with the proposed package. The tools of 
analysis, in both the Efficiency II and Efficiency III areas, are 
imperfect and partial, and have tended to be heavily oversold. The 
public sector is not homogeneous, but, on the contrary, may best 
be seen as a multi-product firm producing and delivering in a whole 
variety of ways a wide range of goods and services. It is possible 
to think of the set of public goods and services as lying along a 
spectrum of diminishing amenability to existing tools of analysis, 
with commercial and quasi-commercial activities lying at the end 
of the spectrum most amenable to analysis and human resource 
and redistributive activities lying at the end where analysis is most 
difficult and where, furthermore, the temptation to use Efficiency 
II output measures which are in direct conflict with Efficiency III 
measures is greatest (one otherwise harmless Ontario minister of 
education distinguished himself in the mid-1960s by suggesting that 
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the appropriate efficiency slogan for universities should be "more 
scholar for the dollar"). 
To the problem of imperfect tools must be added the shortage 
of personnel with the required capacities to make the best of a bad 
job. The record of management training in Australia is recent and 
has neglected the public sector, and the current level of analytical 
sophistication in most public service departments must be con-
sidered on the average as unimpressive. The question of public 
service receptivity to new information requirements must also be 
considered; no matter how good the tools, or how able the personnel, 
a receptive and positive attitude on the part of those most affected 
by the changes would seem to be a precondition of successful 
introduction of the suggested new procedures. 
The moral to this point is that a new approach of the order 
suggested, or even indeed a new approach of the modest dimensions 
envisaged by RCAGA, cannot be introduced quickly, USA experience 
with all the panoply of PPBS in the mid-1960s should stand as a 
classic lesson to proponents of administrative and managerial 
change in the public sector. Change must be introduced selectively, 
consistent first with the availability of analytical tools which, 
although imperfect, nevertheless can be considered as useful means 
to a wider and deeper information base for public decisions; second 
with the availability of trained personnel; and third with the 
attitudes of public servants which, we may hope, will already be 
changing in a way more congenial to analysis. 
There are two other difficulties relevant again to both the modest 
RCAGA proposal and the more ambitious scheme. The first relates 
to the nature of a federal system, and the difficulty of extending 
analytical practices to the state and local spheres of government 
where the authority of federal bodies extends, if at all, only in a 
very loose sense. The authority of the Australian Auditor-General 
appears to be much more constrained, in practice if not always in 
law, than that of his American counterpart. Again the only hope 
seems to lie in gradualism, and in the establishment of cooperative 
relationships between state and federal Auditors-General, on the 
one hand, and state and federal bodies concerned with Efficiency 
III on the other. For what is beyond dispute is that a new system 
in Australia which gives extended authority to the federal Auditor-
General (and possibly also some other body or bodies of the sort 
suggested above) but in which the state Auditors-General (and, in 
the wider package, state Efficiency III agencies) do not follow suit, 
will be a reform of a very partial nature indeed. It is at the state 
level that the actual implementation of expenditure in a wide and 
increasingly important range of total government expenditure takes 
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place. Efficiency II or Efficiency III considerations which exclude 
this expenditure by the states, and indeed ultimately in important 
areas by local government, would not only be partial but possibly 
also of limited use even for the portion they cover in that they would 
lack the overall perspective required to give meaning to particular 
evaluations. To this point, it appears in Australia that state 
Auditors-General are without exception, but with varying degrees 
of enthusiasm, being drawn into Efficiency II considerations much 
like their federal counterpart. The full development of this role 
requires, as it does at the federal level, statutory authority. No such 
authority exists at present in any of the states, but the legislation 
currently under consideration in Queensland'"—which essentially 
assigns an Efficiency II role to the state Auditor-General indirectly 
by spelling out the accountability of permanent heads and making 
the Auditor-General responsible for ascertaining whether they have 
discharged their defined role—is an important precedent. 
The second difficulty that is raised from time to time is that the 
information requirements of a wider and deeper analytical system 
in the public sector are inconsistent with the attitudes and practices 
of an open, pluralist society. There might clearly be difficulties with 
an extensive new analytical apparatus and enthusiastic analysts, and 
these difficulties would have to be carefully guarded against; again 
gradualism would seem the best route. But the larger issue is surely 
that of ensuring improved performance in the public sector. In a 
world of scarce resources that sector which is unable to present 
an articulate defence of its activities is likely to lose at the margin. 
So also, within a sector, those areas which cannot or will not 
articulate a case for their existence and development would seem 
likely to lose relative to those which do. The case for the analysis 
of performance in the public sector is the case for the public sector 
itself. 
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Access: The Public 1 B 
Service and the Public* 
Martin J. Painter 
One of the main themes running through RCAGA'S report is a sense 
of unease about the way the federal public service interacts with 
the public. This unease is strengthened by a participatory sentiment 
that is clearly announced in the early part of the report, and 
reiterated in the sections dealing with relations between the 
administration and the community. The commissioners espouse 
greater delegation, more openness in the style of decision-making 
and the use of information, and a very cautious step in the direction 
of decentralization and regionalism. Concern is expressed about the 
"public face" of the bureaucracy in its relations with clients, and 
with the frequent dissatisfaction expressed by applicants for govern-
ment services. 
Although the sentiments appear sincere, the tone of the discussion 
and the recommendations are cautious. As with most committee 
efforts, the qualifiers and the sub-clauses are much in evidence. The 
general tone of RCAGAS approach is well summarized in the following 
passage, which follows a lengthy discussion of community partici-
pation: 
In the end the official must be guided by the weight his minister attaches 
to various forms of participation, but in turn it should be recognized 
that in making a judgment the minister will be influenced by departmen-
tal advice and that, in practice, much will be left to decisions by officials 
themselves. We suggest . . . that an official should see it as proper to 
be "responsive" to those who seek to participate: at least to perform 
his tasks in a more open style, to be accessible and to be a good listener; 
behaving in efi"ect as if his accountability to the minister required also, 
as does the minister's, an accountability directly to the community 
(RC 6.1.8). 
This statement precedes a discussion and recommendations concern-
ing service delivery, grievance procedures, the role of voluntary 
*Many thanks are due to former members of the Royal Commission staff who 
assisted me in collecting information for this article, and to staff and volunteers 
at the NOW centre. Coburg, who provided information and answered questions. 
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agencies, and the responsiveness of the administration to public 
pressure. Subsequently chapter 7 of the report discusses the issues 
of delegation, regional administration, and the "one-stop-shop" 
experiment. Separate sections, such as the recommendations con-
cerning service delivery, contain much which is very valuable. But 
as a whole, particularly given the promise held out by the "grand 
vision" that we are given a glimpse of in the more reflective, 
philosophical discussion that introduces these topics, the result is 
disappointing. We can attribute some of this to the signs of caution 
I have mentioned above, and it is quite clear that the commissioners, 
as a whole, were not a very radical body (trendy, perhaps, but not 
radical). But the shortcomings go further. The "vision" intended 
to unify these various aspects of the question of relations between 
the public and the public service does nothing of the sort. The 
approach is piecemeal and the recommendations are piecemeal. In 
the report, the relationships between problems of access to govern-
ment services, regionalism, participation, and delegation are not at 
all clear. In fact, the participatory sentiment as it is framed in the 
report is not sufficient to provide a coherent set of objectives on 
which to base recommendations for programmes of action. We are 
dealing with a much more varied, complex and, on occasions, 
contradictory set of ideas and objectives. 
A major aim of this paper is to clarify the distinctions between 
the various concepts included under the broad heading of "access". 
We shall also look at some of the research undertaken for the 
commission regarding the access problem, and some of the recom-
mendations arising from that research. 
Access to government services 
Schaffer's work on the access problem was the starting point for 
the commission's research stafl".' The problem of access is concerned 
with "relations between the administrative allocation of goods and 
services and the people who need them or for whom they are 
intended".^ Schaffer and Lamb isolate three elements in the access 
situation; "gate", or the ways individuals succeed or fail in meeting 
eligibility requirements; "line", or the order in which eligible 
applicants are dealt; and "counter", or the offices and counters 
where the outcome of the encounter is decided. How do individuals 
go about gaining access to a service; what happens to them at the 
point of delivery, and what do they have to do to show they are 
eligible? What are the rules of eligibility? What are the barriers 
set up by these rules and the way they are implemented? What 
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effect, for instance, does the physical location of an office, or the 
way counter stafl" treat applicants, have upon ease of access? Are 
there ways of jumping the queue? How do these factors affect the 
intentions of the programme in terms of pick-up rate, equity and 
so on? At what level in the institution is a decision taken on 
eligibility, or an appeal, or a complaint? What are the appeal 
procedures? And so on. 
Access in this sense is concerned more with the quality of delivery 
than the content of the programme being delivered. Thus we are 
not concerned directly with the distributional effects or impact of 
a programme, but with those aspects of any programme that 
concern how encounters between claimants and decision makers are 
initiated, what happens during those encounters, and how outcomes 
are decided. In these situations the use of different kinds of "voice" 
on the part of the claimant is a major consideration. Schaffer and 
Lamb distinguish between three kinds of voice. "Data and appeal" 
concerns the presentation of relevant information to prove eligibili-
ty, including via appeal or review procedures. "Mobilization" refers 
to collective political action on the part of claimants, and often 
arises from the failure of administrative "data and appeal" ap-
proaches. "Brokerage" entails the use of individual intermediaries 
to intervene in the administrative process, either for the purpose 
of queue-jumping or for the purpose of setting aside a normal 
process of determining eligibility.^ 
The commission's recommendations on access to government 
services arose almost entirely from a process of problem definition, 
research and analysis conducted by stafl" and consultants of the 
commission. Bernard Schaffer participated in defining the issues and 
framing the research programme. The research dealing with 
individual encounters with the bureaucracy is a self-contained piece 
of social science research. But as a source of recommendations on 
the access problem it has limitations, some of them admitted by 
the research staff.^  It was a fairly narrow investigation, focusing 
on that range of access problems that arise from encounters between 
applicants and officials at the counter. Observations of counter 
interviews, plus surveys of officials and applicants, provided the 
major sources of data. Additional descriptive material was collected 
on review and appeal procedures, and on breakdowns and delays 
in service delivery. 
The survey was conducted at the Melbourne offices of the 
department of Social Security, the Australian Taxation Office, the 
Australian Housing Corporation, and the Australian Legal Aid 
Office. The results were fairly critical of the quality of service 
delivery. Shortcomings were noted in the physical design and 
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location of offices and the manning of counters (for example, 
officials all leaving their counters for tea breaks at the same time); 
criticisms were levelled at information services and at the frequency 
of delays in processing applications and dealing with complaints, 
especially regarding lost cheques; disquiet was expressed at the 
apparent complexity of procedures for determining pensions, and 
so on. Some intriguing findings emerged: "each application for a 
social security benefit and papers associated with it are handled 
by up to 28 people and transported up to 27 times between 
different parts of the office"* while "85 per cent of all inquiry staff" 
respondents indicated that they sometimes needed to cut corners 
in order to get things done quickly or effectively";'' asked what 
applicants, if any, were given priority, 44 per cent of counter staff 
respondents replied that nobody received priority over others, while 
from the free choices open to all respondents the following topped 
the list: "referred from MPS" 24 per cent, "referred from departmen-
tal head/boss" 14 per cent, "trouble makers" eight per cent, 
"loudmouths" eight per cent, and "those who can apply enough 
pressure" six per cent;' on appeals against unemployment benefit 
determinations, of the 5,900 lodged from 10 February 1975 to 29 
September 1975, 65 per cent were conceded by the department 
without going before the Social Security Appeals Tribunal, that 
is the department changed its mind (admitted it was wrong?) in 
the majority of cases." 
Recommendations emerged aimed at making access easier. The 
report placed stress on greater delegation to avoid delays and 
frustrations. It recommended a review of procedures for determin-
ing eligibility. It recommended appointment of "office ombudsmen". 
But it went no further than the boundaries set by the access survey 
and its findings. For instance, it recommended that steps might be 
taken to make the services of MPS more accessible, as "client 
advocates", through better staff" support in constituencies and wider 
publicity of this aspect of an MPS role. This recommendation is odd, 
as the research found that of clients interviewed, less than one per 
cent had gone to an MP with any complaint or demand for 
assistance.' Everything we know about the distribution across social 
classes of political knowledge and the propensity to use available 
channels of political influence firmly suggests that those most in 
need are those least likely to avail themselves of this kind of 
opportunity. Intervention by MPS is a form of brokerage, in the 
language of Schaffer and Lamb, and a good case can be made that 
this is not a "legitimate" form of administrative voice. This question 
needs careful consideration, particularly in the context of other 
perhaps more equitable forms of client advocacy, such as the 
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employment of welfare rights officers. Other alternatives for opening 
up opportunities for individual expressions of grievance were not 
canvassed.'" The commission did not pursue these problems beyond 
considering recommendations for improving the existing arrange-
ments for access. 
The questions excluded from the access research were important 
ones. No work was done on what went on "behind the counter", 
nor what went on in the community prior to or instead of individual 
encounters with officials. Excluded were descriptions of the way 
eligibility rules and procedures were determined and reviewed, their 
justification as barriers to access, the characteristics of the decision-
making process within departmental hierarchies, and other ques-
tions bearing on making and interpreting rules of eligibility and 
their review. The limitations of this study would not have mattered 
so much if RCAGA had been prepared to take into account other 
avenues of inquiry concurrently being undertaken that had a bearing 
on this question. But connections were not made, and inter-
relationships of the various problems were not explored. Two 
questions come to mind in this regard. At what levels should 
decisions about rule-making and application be taken—at the 
centre, at a regional level or at a community level? Internal 
delegation, dealt with in the report, is one aspect of this, but another 
is the question of decentralization of power and authority. Addi-
tionally, what is or should be the role of consumer or client 
participation (or collective voice) in these processes of rule-making? 
These two issues—participation and decentralization—were 
touched on in the report, and it is to these that we now turn. 
Participation 
I am not concerned here with theories of participatory democracy, 
but with the phenomenon of participation, or the "participation 
movement", in a liberal democracy. There is a degree of newness 
and distinctiveness in this phenomenon. Demands for participation 
have arisen from a dissatisfaction with traditional channels of 
influence. Participation is a demand arising from institutional 
encounters by groups which are to some extent "outsiders" in that 
they have found that the political system has in some way failed 
them. Bureaucracies have been impassive in the face of protest; 
parties have attempted to redefine demands in terms of conventional 
issues and cleavages, trying to incorporate the movement and the 
groups associated with it in order to counter the threat to their 
position in the political process; and the pressure group arena has 
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been found to be dominated by opposing interests with cosy relations 
with government institutions with whom they share certain basic 
interests." Groups that have been prominent in seeking participation 
have been residents, environmentalists, claimants and the poor (if 
and when organized). 
As rhetoric and ideal, participation has roots in an alternative 
vision of society and polity, but as practice it is simply a demand 
for new forms of access to authority structures in the existing 
system. Groups demanding participation are expressing a grievance 
about politics, but this stems primarily from an unmet material need 
or a demand for policy change. Their dissatisfaction with politics 
is founded on a grievance about policy, and the demand for 
participation is secondary. This is not to underestimate the hold 
ideals about a participatory society, or a return to community and 
expressions of despair against the size and impersonality of author-
ity structures, can have on people's minds. But in all cases, groups 
seeking participation are also seeking changes to policy to improve 
their private life-styles. It is patently untrue that in most cases 
people want to be active political animals constantly engaged in 
participatory ferment. For most, political activity is a nuisance 
tolerated because some improvement to private life-styles—not 
public life—is envisaged. 
Institutional encounters arising from the outsider situation occur 
very frequently with the bureaucracy. Demands for participation 
have been particularly prominent when protesters have perceived 
government departments and agencies to have wielded power 
"irresponsibly", in the sense that conventional machinery for 
political control has not afforded a means of influencing outcomes. 
Participation in this setting is a demand for power-sharing at the 
point at which the bureaucracy interacts with the public, and in 
this way it is in direct contrast to conventional ways of asserting 
political influence through formal ministerial, parliamentary, or 
party channels, or insider pressure group relations with the 
executive.'' The institutional response to this demand for power 
sharing is co-optation. Just as outsiders seek to share power on their 
terms for their ends, institutions see advantages in embracing clients 
in their own organization, or in satellite organizations. Co-optation 
is a dirty word in the armoury of participatory rhetoric, because 
it is seen as embracing the enemy and being seduced. But it can 
signal success—"buying off"" is also "buying in". While it may 
hamper the ability of organizers to maintain a participatory 
ferment, co-optation can bring material benefits through incorporat-
ing some client demands as institutional goals. But the danger is 
ever present that the "buying off' process can set in train a vicious 
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circle of quiescence, maintained by symbolic reassurance, leading 
to a complete loss of leverage by the co-opted group within the 
institution. The irony in this situation is that demands for partici-
pation are the most easily satisfied by token or symbolic responses. 
A few representatives on a consultative committee comes to be seen 
as an achievement in itself, rather than a step in the direction of 
changing policy. Many groups fall into this trap themselves and 
participation becomes a primary goal, displacing the grievances on 
which the group has initially been organized. 
The commission's discussion of participation falls into this trap 
of treating participation as if it were a primary goal of outsider 
groups, and many of their suggestions could hence with some 
justification be considered as tokenism and symbolic reassurance. 
Discussion focuses on who should participate in what kinds of 
structures, and the problems that most worry RCAGA concern 
imbalance in representation or expertise. In discussing representa-
tion of client groups they are concerned to "keep the membership 
of the body under review" (RC 6.3.14). The report in other words 
concentrates on forms of participatory structures and on partici-
pation as an end, not a means to concrete goals. And even here, 
although they claim sympathies with participation as an alternative, 
their main allegiance is to tradition. The discussion of advisory 
groups in the policy process ends with the proviso that all their 
deliberations must be firmly locked into the central budgeting 
process and the normal procedures of accountability (RC 6.3.15). 
We seem to be back to square one. 
But we must give credit for the modest proposal to give financial 
aid to "associations which propose to make submissions to the 
government and which can show genuine hardship" (RC 6.3.22). 
This is the only recognition that the main problem facing outsider 
groups is not the lack of formal structures to give them a hearing, 
but rather a problem of political organization. Tenants' associations, 
claimant and welfare rights groups, etc. face their biggest problems 
in organizing their constituencies. However many structures we 
devise to give them a hearing, ultimately their influence in pursuing 
policy goals (again as distinct from pursuing participation) is going 
to depend on simple mundane things like numbers, possible threats 
of disorder, and even votes. There are a myriad of problems 
associated with officially-sponsored programmes which seek to assist 
in political organization among unorganized groups. The em-
ployment of community organizers (paid agitators) by government 
bodies causes problems of acute role strain and internal conflict, 
and naturally gives rise to fears of co-optation.'^ But measures like 
this, and others such as providing facilities for disseminating 
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information and recruiting group members, should have been more 
seriously considered. 
The reluctance of RCAGA to venture into such politically sensitive 
areas is understandable. But let us not ignore the implications. The 
commission is quite ready to improve channels for individual voices 
in ways we have already discussed, but these in themselves can be 
seen as a means of stifling collective voice. Indeed the whole basis 
of a government bureaucracy's treatment of categories of applicants 
is to deal with individuals as cases within categories prescribed from 
above, not individuals as members of political groups organized 
from below. The queue is the antithesis of the political organization. 
The administrative appeals tribunal and review processes aim to 
define agency-client relations in individual case-by-case terms. The 
commission did not acknowledge these contradictions and dilemmas 
that exist within the problem of access. Their tokenism, to be 
charitable, seems more a result of conceptual confusion than 
conscious design. 
A common call from groups dissatisfied with existing channels 
for expressing grievances is that political structures should be 
decentralized, in the hope that "bringing them nearer to the people" 
makes them more open to influence. Although decentralization and 
participation are different things, their common association is not 
unnatural. It is to the concept of decentralization that we now turn. 
Decentralization 
Many of the demands for "participatory structures" can better be 
seen as demands for political decentralization. Expressions such as 
"client control" and "community control" belong in decentraliza-
tion rhetoric rather than participatory rhetoric. Political decen-
tralization entails devolving power and authority from the centre, 
either on an area or a functional basis, and usually both. Disquiet 
about over-centralization has a number of different bases: hostility 
to bureaucracy per se, local patriotism, ease of democratic control, 
demands for "fine tuning" in planning and policy making to take 
account of local and regional variations, and so on. Political 
decentralization is normally thought of in terms of local self 
government, that is elected assemblies at a sub-national level, with 
control over resources, their own bureaucracies, some of the 
paraphernalia of sovereignty, and all the territorial jealousies and 
constitutional paranoias that go along with those things. 
This need not be the only model, of course. Given the concentra-
tion of power in the hands of government departments and agencies. 
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some decentralization on their part, mixed in with some new forms 
of local accountability as well as the old forms of central accoun-
tability, would be a step in the direction of political decentralization. 
This might entail regional or local advisory bodies with specified 
powers, or it could involve community involvement in particular 
services or institutions at the point of delivery, as in the community 
control of schools model. It is when thinking about these kinds of 
alternatives for political decentralization that we come up against 
the kinds of problems raised by RCAGA when it thought it was dealing 
with participation—what kinds of structures, what lines of accoun-
tability, what procedures for "representation" etc.? 
The commission did not thoroughly pursue these questions in the 
context of decentralization. For them decentralization, when not 
simply internal delegation, entailed only a very weak and cautious 
form of regionalism, which hardly qualifies for the label of political 
decentralization. The proposal for a Commonwealth Government 
Representative (CGR) at the regional level is an uneasy compromise 
between the idea of regionalism and the reality of centrally 
controlled autonomous departmental hierarchies. The terms of 
reference for a CGR "would make clear that his role was not to 
determine matters which are the responsibility of individual depart-
ments in the region". He would be expected to communicate with 
local authorities and groups, advise the centre on regional needs, 
"to watch over, and as desirable coordinate", the activities of 
departments in the region (we have already been told that granting 
real authority to impose coordination would in fact not be 
desirable), and to exercise some delegated powers with regard to 
local departmental administrative matters (RC 1.3.\\). So political 
decentralization to a regional level is effectively ruled out. Regions 
will not be making policy under RCAGAS proposal. 
Devolution within departments was seen solely in terms of 
administrative delegation. Neither this, nor the weak form of 
regionalism favoured, would have much impact on collective as 
distinct from individual access. Neither do they have much re-
levance for regional policy-making. No concrete proposals are made 
for increasing the ability of local and regional departmental staff 
and clients to influence a process of setting priorities at a local or 
regional level. This would have been the point for RCAGA to have 
considered a role for regional or local advisory bodies and con-
sultative committees, and ways of facilitating the organization of 
aggrieved groups of clients in order to exert influence on those 
bodies. 
One of my main criticisms of RCAGAS treatment of the access 
problem has been its failure to integrate or inter-relate the various 
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aspects of the question. This failure is particularly regrettable given 
the opportunity to attempt this afforded by the experience of the 
"one-stop-shop". A commission-sponsored experiment, this was 
where some of the problems of service delivery, delegation, partici-
pation and decentralization came together. 
The one-stop-shop 
The NOW centre (north west one stop welfare centre) was opened 
in Coburg in July 1975. It aimed to provide a single location for 
various commonwealth, state and local government departments 
and voluntary organizations to deliver services of various kinds to 
the community. A variety of expectations were at various times 
expressed about what the centre could or should achieve. Individual 
access to conventional government services such as pensions could 
be made easier; coordination between departments and levels of 
government could help with solving individual client problems on 
the spot; stafl" and volunteers at the centre could work as a team 
to develop ideas and policies in response to problems crossing 
departmental lines and emerging from community needs; the centre 
could engage in various kinds of "community work", attempting 
to get in touch with individuals and groups in the community to 
identify needs, encourage participation, and inform people of their 
rights; the centre could be used as a resource for community groups, 
a meeting place, with facilities available for disseminating informa-
tion, and so on; the centre could develop into an information and 
referral centre, concerned primarily with providing "access services" 
rather than "hard" welfare services. 
Experience has indicated that the centre has succeeded generally 
in providing a more pleasant environment for "fronting up" to 
officialdom. It has afforded some benefits in coordination of a simple 
kind between departments and levels of government—for instance 
in facilitating transfer from family assistance (state) to supporting 
mothers benefit (commonwealth). The centre has generated involve-
ment by some community groups, and this has helped its accessibili-
ty. It has provided additional resources for local community groups 
to pursue their activities. 
The failings are a longer list, mostly because of the high and 
varied expectations. Rather than list them, I want to refer to some 
of the dilemmas I have been discussing throughout the paper as 
they were experienced in the NOW centre. In the first place, although 
access has been eased somewhat by providing a more gentle, 
convivial environment, the provision of "hard"' services has been 
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greatly hampered by the small size of the centre. With regard to 
commonwealth benefits the centre does not have the files or the 
staff" to determine eligibility or issue pension cheques. It can process 
applications and follow up complaints, but not make many de-
cisions. The routine work required in fulfilling normal statutory 
duties placed strain on staff" members who held alternative concep-
tions of the role of the centre, and who were expected by other 
participants to play a role in evolving objectives and interacting 
with the community. At one point the staff" decided to close the 
centre as a service delivery unit for one day per week in order to 
pursue other objectives, but this created internal dissension and 
departmental ire, and the experiment was not continued. 
This was just one of several problems which emerged from a 
conflict between the role of the centre as a service delivery point 
and as a community centre. Additional problems arose with regard 
to the duties of Social Security stafl". Strong messages kept coming 
down the line that they should only do statutory work during office 
hours. This hampered some of the community-oriented programmes 
staff hoped to initiate in the area of "outreach", to inform, educate, 
and possibly mobilize members of the community concerning 
welfare matters, and to identify local needs and demands. Similar 
problems arose over commmunity involvement in the management 
of the centre. A policy committee, with a significant involvement 
by outsiders from community groups, was formed to make decisions 
about the use of the centre. Departments expressed concern that 
such a committee might attempt to direct their stafl", or that 
objectives formulated by that committee would interfere with the 
service delivery aspect of the centre. Indeed one particular decision 
highlighted that problem. The policy committee decided not to 
approve the establishment of a full unemployment benefits unit at 
the centre because it would take up too much space and hamper 
the work of voluntary groups using the centre. 
The confusion surrounding objectives of the NOW centre mirror 
the confusions discussed earlier over the various problems raised 
by the access question. There are also additional problems peculiar 
to this area of government activity, in particular the different 
strategies of welfare policy embodied in the centre. These will not 
concern us here. What is clear is that participation and community 
control have to be separated from service delivery.'" A proposal 
circulated in the NOW centre for a new service model suggested the 
centre should concentrate on its community-oriented role, providing 
access services and encouraging a high level of community partici-
pation. Staff would be seconded to assist the centre in identifying 
local needs, providing resources, and undertaking a community 
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development function. A strong element of "self-help" would be 
embodied in the centre's operations. The centre's community 
constituency would thus be provided with resources to articulate 
their collective and individual demands to government bodies, and 
to the rest of society. 
We have come a long way from the conception of access as a 
problem of individual encounters with specific bureaucracies. Clear-
ly though this kind of model is what may be required to maximize 
opportunities for collective voice (participation), and to move 
towards community involvement by client groups in welfare ser-
vices. Unfortunately RCAGA had nothing to say on this, in spite of 
the opportunities for pursuing these questions afforded them by the 
NOW experiment. 
RCAGA'S discussion of relations between the public and the public 
service raised a great number of issues which were ignored. No 
doubt this would be true of any attempt to arrive at recommenda-
tions on the issues entailed. Perhaps some would be outside RCAGA'S 
terms of reference, and others would be ignored or forgotten in 
its determination of priorities in relation to the size and scope of 
the overall task they were given. Nevertheless it is disappointing 
that, having raised our hopes with a seemingly firm commitment 
to a participatory sentiment, they let us down badly, both by not 
following through the conceptual issues involved and by not coming 
up with more far-reaching recommendations. Even if we or they 
remain sceptical about the value of participation, regionalism or 
community control, it is still a failing on the part of RCAGA that 
their discussions of the issues in the report do not go nearly far 
enough towards resolving the basic issues, on one side or the other. 
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So Where's the coordinating 1 7 
capacity coming from? 
Leon Peres 
The RCAGA report has disappointed the expectations of each of the 
writers of the previous three chapters. Each chapter argues its 
gloomy conclusions persuasively. I suspect, however, that each 
writer has set his expectations far too high, for each expects the 
administrative system to do much more than it is capable of doing 
at any one time. 
As I read them each of the chapters is very much concerned 
with the coordinating capacity of the Australian government. This 
must be so for the dominant theme of the report itself was the 
need to adopt effective coordinating techniques to achieve national 
objectives. At its highest level of generality, then, RCAGA has 
followed a long line of commentators who have seen coordinating 
as the essence of administration—within an organization or across 
the civil service system. 
You will forgive me for reminding you of some very simple 
rubrics from the classical writings about administration. The need 
for coordination arises from the complexity of our objectives. This 
complexity demands that, in some way, we divide the objectives 
themselves, or their associated agencies, to make the problems 
manageable at all. Having divided, it is necessary to bind the various 
pieces together again to ensure conformity with the original set of 
objectives. Coordination is the way of doing this. Earlier writers 
and reformers, thus, saw a very intimate relationship between 
division and coordination. They advocated the selection of a 
principle of division in accordance with its impact on the available 
capacity to coordinate. 
Irrespective of the prescriptions that followed, three notions were 
embedded in the folklore or proverbs of these earlier writers which 
seem to me to be of very great significance still. These are; 
a) that coordination holds together planning and control in a very 
unstable relationship; 
b) that there is a relationship between the way coordination works 
and the way the machinery of government is organized; 
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c) that in some way "coordinating capacity" is sensitive or delicate, 
that it must be used judiciously and conserved. 
The report and, in reaction, the chapters by Weller and Cutt are 
almost exclusively concerned with (a). As has been noted elsewhere 
in the volume, the report pays very little attention to the machinery 
of government. It is as if RCAGA was persuaded to believe that the 
technology of coordination is now so sophisticated, by comparison 
with those earlier days of primitive human process, that the problem 
of division is more or less irrelevant. The coordinating techniques, 
now, are capable of binding together bits and pieces of adminis-
trative apparatus no matter how scattered by the accidents or 
designs of politics and history. 
The report and again, the two chapters, stress effectiveness in 
resource allocation and utilization as the aim of the coordinating 
process. The report argues that its set of recommendations revolving 
around the forward estimates will do the trick. Given always, of 
course, that six major conditions are satisfied. The most important 
is that objectives be given and specified with great clarity. Only 
slightly less important are the requirements that the public servants, 
spread throughout the bureaucracy, responsible for translating these 
general but coherent purposes into programmes are: possessed of 
entrepreneurial spirit; adequately trained and informed; invested 
with as much power as is needed to take the decisions appropriate 
to their particular locations; and that they identify with the grand 
purposes. 
Although they share the aim of maximizing effectiveness, Cutt 
and Weller are severally critical of the RCAGA proposals. Their 
emphases differ, although they do make common cause in regarding 
the decentralization proposals as being dysfunctional to effective-
ness. Even accepting the scheme on its own terms (which he is 
prepared to do only for the sake of argument), Weller considers 
that bureaucratic obstacles and attitudes will upset the coordination 
balance, pushing it towards control and away from planning. This 
is especially likely if there is a disposition to economize in the public 
sector. To overcome these obstacles, coordinating mechanisms and 
procedures much stronger than those proposed would be required. 
Institutional innovations at the stage of establishing priorities would 
be needed also. But primarily Weller rejects the possibility of 
satisfying the major condition that national objectives be clearly 
articulated, and in a way capable of reduction to programme terms. 
This condition will fail and thus guarantee control rather than 
planning. Weller concludes that if the report's proposals were 
improved by the addition of a number of institutional innovations, 
then effective planning and coordination might be technically 
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possible, but this is politically unlikely in a pluralist democratic 
society. 
Cutt does not seem to be worried about the primary condition 
of goal clarity for he has already expressed the view in his 
consultant's report to the commission (Appendix IC) that any 
attempt to utilize policy analysis techniques can only proceed if 
there is such a clear cut s'^^tement of goals. He is gloomy, though, 
because the report does not go as far as the current state of the 
art would allow. The commission's proposals aim too low even 
though its consciousness might have been higher. He guesses that 
RCAGA may have done a mental implementation analysis and 
concluded that there were only slight chances that Efficiency III 
recommendations would be accepted. The commission produced 
Efficiency II proposals instead; and this concerns Cutt not so much 
because they aim too low but because Efficiency II might in fact 
damage the ultimate goal of effectiveness. Consequently, Cutt goes 
on to suggest improvements to the scheme to raise the level of 
effectiveness accountability to Efficiency HI (though if Weller is 
right. Cult's Efficiency III has no chance at all despite its superior 
technological potential). The two principal changes required are: 
a) the development of an effective analytical support system; and, 
b) a much higher degree of coordination at the ex ante stage of 
budgeting. 
So both Weller and Cutt argue that if the scheme is to work 
at all, no matter what else is needed, increased coordination is 
essential. Cutt puts it in these words in an extraordinarily loose 
sentence in an otherwise very tightly argued chapter: 
We argue that a new body, of the sort envisaged by Caiden in his 
proposal for OPAAM should be set up, adequately funded and staffed with 
the necessary range of talents, and given the statutory authority to 
develop and implement a methodology for examining the pursuit of 
Efficiency 111. [Emphasis added.] 
" 'A new body, of the sort' . . ."? What kind of coordinating 
body? Certainly not the example cited. Weller has disposed of that. 
Perhaps we can get some understanding of what is required by 
looking at what is supposed to happen at Level III, as drawn from 
Cult's present chapter and his earlier consultant's report. Overall, 
the system must plan, coordinate and control; it must assess 
performance, efficiency and effectiveness across the public sector 
which means taking federalism into account as much as possible. 
In the budget stages clearly formulated statements of goals must 
be elicited and associated guidelines transmitted throughout the 
system; the right values must be present at each critical decision 
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point as general guidelines are translated into particular pro-
grammes; adequate knowledge and information must be generated 
and distributed in all directions throughout the system. As parame-
ters are defined and specified and weights assigned in the analyses 
themselves, the coordinating system must provide for the ap-
propriate political inputs to guard against the likelihood that by 
default, the analyst's own value judgments will prevail. And all 
these things, or many of them, must be repeated in reverse in the 
implementation and ex post stages. Moreover, it is to be preferred 
that the system be a dynamic one. 
Clearly it is possible to conceive of a system that might do all 
these things although I am not persuaded by some of the foundation 
assumptions upon which such a conception would rest. This is not 
the place to argue those questions, nor a proposition: "As many 
of these actions, decisions, value judgments are present in a messy 
way already would it not be better to see that it is all done 
systematically?" the important question for the present is, given 
such a conception (and its desirability measured on some acceptable 
value scale) does our political system have the capacity to embrace 
i f 
In a way this is to repeat Weller's conclusion about the 
impossibility of planning for effective resource utilization in a 
pluralist democratic system. It also questions the underlying as-
sumption of those who advocate that more coordination will turn 
the trick, that coordinating capacity is abundantly available if only 
we had the sense to know what to do with it. 
Most discussions of coordination are about the technology of 
various coordinating processes. Occasionally there is a discussion 
of the nature of coordination. From this point of view the RCAGA 
contribution is valuable though limited in view of the dominant 
emphasis on coordination in the report. But as far as I am aware 
there is no great discussion of the capacity to coordinate. The 
classicists came close to it when they implied "sensitivity" or 
"delicacy" as characteristics of coordination, and when they ad-
vocated techniques that would conserve or, at least, not impair 
coordinating capacity. Perhaps, too, in the political development 
literature there might be found means to track and measure 
coordinating capacity as it expands across those geographical or 
functional areas over which a political system seeks hegemony. In 
the absence of established means of identifying and measuring "the 
capacity to coordinate" I want to suggest some very speculative 
propositions that might in turn yield useful ways of looking at the 
problem we are considering. First, two axioms: 
a) the power available to governments is scarce; 
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b) coordination is a function of power. 
From these I would suggest the general hypothesis that the 
coordinating capacity of government is scarce, irrespective of the 
nature of the political system. And from this one might deduce 
corollaries. The more power that is required for performance and 
the pursuit of objectives, the less power is available for coordination. 
Conversely, the greater the number of coordinating processes 
adopted, or the more a particular process is extended, the less power 
is available for performance. 
I would couple that set of hypotheses—and a number of others 
is possible—with conclusions which I believe can be drawn from 
discussions of the nature of coordinating. Coordination disseminates 
values, locates and protects values and secures compliance with 
values. But it does more than that. Often associated with the 
dissemination of values is the intention of squeezing out other 
unwanted, damaging or corrupt values. Hence, coordination dis-
seminates values, squeezes out values, or simply because the space 
is already occupied, blocks access to other, newer, values that might 
be of greater relevance to contemporary society than those already 
in the system. 
Consequently, it might be argued that the expanded and extended 
coordinating apparatus envisaged by Cutt and Weller as necessary 
for a planning and budget system more effective than the RCAGA 
proposals could do one or all of three things: 
a) diminish operational performance; 
b) force out other values presently occupying some of the coordi-
nating space; 
c) make it even more difficult than it is already for other social 
values to be introduced to, disseminated through and protected 
across the administrative system. 
In this a priori way, I would argue that RCAGA was certainly right 
in aiming at Efficiency II. The commissioners may well have had 
a pretty shrewd idea, not so much of the low chance of acceptance 
of more advanced proposals as Cutt suggests, but of how limited 
the coordinating capacity of the Australian administrative system 
really is. 
It is at this point that Painter's chapter is most relevant for it 
crystallizes the issues. If there are competing values and the 
coordinating space is scarce, which value is to be sacrificed? Painter 
makes it clear that RCAGA'S vision of community interaction and 
participation was just as grand as its hopes about effectiveness. In 
the end, by concentrating on effectiveness, the commissioners left 
themselves too little space in the coordination band to do much 
more than offer, piecemeal, the tokens Painter finds so disappoint-
ing. 
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Again one might with profit return to classical administrative 
theory, not for the prescriptions (indeed to reverse them) but to 
search for ways of looking at the problem. The place to look is 
in the intimacy of the relationships between coordination and 
division. If expectations are disappointed at the "coordination" end, 
perhaps manipulating the "division" variable might help. The 
commission shied off the direct discussion of division, but it had 
a partial indirect look that led to its general conclusion that decision 
responsibilities be located as close to the sites of operations and 
community interaction as possible. Although Painter finds this set 
of proposals, even when added to more particular ones, to be 
disappointing, it is nevertheless valuable to have a partial endorse-
ment of the virtues of fragmentation. 
Fragmentation, and the associated notion of high levels of 
autonomy for distant decision centres, has not been popular. Indeed, 
it has been frowned upon not only by the classicists and a long 
line of practitioners, but also by Cutt and Weller. One reason is 
"administrative", for fragmentation is seen to aggravate the prob-
lems of coordination. If, however, the technology of coordination 
has increased immeasurably, this objection should no longer hold. 
A second set of objections is political. First, executives want to 
control, as much as they can, the political risks that are involved 
in decision-making. Thus only the most unimportant matters are 
delegated or decentralized. Next, fragmentation increases the scope 
and opportunities for pressure to be exerted on the decision centres. 
Fragmentation exposes decision centres, they become more easily 
identifiable, and provide targets for criticism or even points of 
access. Those over whom decisions are exercized can more easily 
see a common interest that might constitute the basis for organiza-
tion. The most reprehensible principle of organization, aggravating 
both administrative and political problems, was seen to be organiza-
tion by client groups. 
I regret that RCAGA did not look more closely at this principle 
and some of the examples of it we have in our machinery of 
government. They may have found that the administrative disadvan-
tage no longer holds and that what were once seen as political 
disadvantages can now be seen as positive political benefits. 
Organization by client group and other modes of fragmentation are 
ways of providing access for the expectations of those community 
groups and individuals at present denied knowledge and informa-
tion, as well as understanding. 
Impleffientation 
Implementing the Coombs Report: 1 0 
The First Eight Months 
Trevor Matthews 
The report of the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration was presented to the government on 22 July 1976 
and publicly released ten days later. The press gave it a warm 
reception: "sound and sensitive", "a welter of well-thought sugges-
tions", "a formidable package of reforms" said the editorial writers. 
But many commentators had serious doubts as to whether anything 
much would come of the report's 337 recommendations. For it was 
common knowledge that RCAGA had made a number of powerful 
bureaucratic enemies during its career. Would their resistance seal 
the fate of the report? The commission recognized that as a real 
possibility. And it recognized the need to develop a strategy of 
implementation designed to counter bureaucratic resistance and 
inertia. For at least nine months before the publication of the report, 
commissioners and senior staff had been considering possible 
procedures for implementing the report. This paper begins by 
outlining those early proposals; it next describes how the govern-
ment—at the ministerial and bureaucratic levels—has handled the 
report in the first eight months since it received the report; and 
it concludes with a brief assessment of the strategy of implementa-
tion that has been employed. 
Implementation: RCAGAS proposals 
The commission began the task of preparing the first drafts of its 
report in September 1975. It also, at that time, took up in some 
detail the question of how it hoped its report would be handled 
by the government. Five specific aspects of the implementation 
process were canvassed and discussed with RCAGA.' These were: 
a) that RCAGAS report contain a section dealing with implementa-
tion. In this section RCAGA would assign responsibility for the 
implementation of particular recommendations to particular 
departments, spell out a time-table for implementation, set down 
the proposals which required legislative action, and specify what 
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it called the "dynamics" for generating continuous and auton-
omous adaptation to social change within the administration; 
b) that RCAGA hold informal discussions before the release of its 
report with key permanent heads, members of parliament, and 
trade union officials. These discussions were seen as having a 
number of advantages: they would enable RCAGA to explain to 
the main governmental agencies of implementation the steps 
that it saw as necessary for putting the recommendations into 
effect; they would help to stifle the charge that RCAGAS proposals 
were uninformed; and they would make it possible for RCAGA 
to hear and perhaps take account of the likely reactions of the 
major interests. The commission believed these advantages 
would, on balance, outweigh the one major risk the discussions 
entailed namely, that powerful bureaucratic critics of the report 
might use their foreknowledge of the report's proposals to 
organize opposition. Doubtless RCAGA also saw the discussions 
as a tactic in winning bureaucratic support for its recommenda-
tions; 
c) that the prime minister endorse the report in principle on 
receiving it; 
d) that a special unit be set up within the department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (PM & c) which would have the responsi-
bility for overseeing the process of implementation. The com-
mission favoured the immediate establishment of this unit, on 
a skeleton basis, so that its members could sit in on the final 
shaping of the report and familiarize themselves with the 
research and background material which supported RCAGAS 
various recommendations. The unit would consist not only of 
career public servants but also of outsiders, including some of 
RCAGA'S own staff. Indeed, it was RCAGAS belief that the opening 
up of the administration, which it was to recommend in its 
report, should ideally begin with the implementation unit itself; 
e) that the special unit within PM & c have the responsibility for 
ensuring that RCAGAS recommendations were made widely 
known at all levels of the public service and among the 
community at large. To some of RCAGAS staff" this was a priority 
task. According to one proposal that circulated within RCAGA, 
this job could best be done by commissioners, senior staff" and 
project leaders talking to target groups in the few months 
following the publication of the report. The coordination of this 
effort would be the responsibility of a full-time officer in the 
implementation unit. And, once implementation was under way, 
it would be a further responsibility of the unit to issue public 
progress reports every six months. 
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Implementation: the PM&C response 
The prime minister, Mr Whitlam, agreed in early October to 
the suggestion put to him by the chairman of the commission 
that a unit or secretariat be established within his own depart-
ment to coordinate the government's consideration of the report. 
The department, however, had already been giving thought to 
that question. It was aware that if the report were to be 
considered in the first instance by the normal device for securing 
bureaucratic coordination—the interdepartmental committee— 
it was likely that important initiatives would be lost in debates 
over details or else simply resisted. Instead it favoured having 
a small cabinet committee, headed by the prime minister, which 
would give ministerial guidance to the implementation process. 
That committee of ministers would be supported by a group 
of senior officials. This group would be based in the policy 
coordination unit (pcu) of PM & c, whose director (John Enfield) 
had been a member of the commission's health-welfare task 
force. Instead of being (and being seen to be) an advocate of 
RCAGAS report, the main task of the group would be to facilitate 
ministerial consideration of the report. 
Following a reorganization of PM & c in February 1976 (which 
saw the PCU absorbed into a newly created projects division) the 
responsibility for handling RCAGA matters was given to the 
government division. Unlike the PCU, the government division 
was a central functional division within the department and 
dealt, inter alia, with many of the topics RCAGA was expected 
to report on; for example, machinery of government, the 
administrative arrangements order, the organization and staffing 
of the Australian public service, conditions of service, statutory 
corporations, freedom of information, and higher appointments. 
In addition, the first assistant secretary in charge of the 
government division was expected to be involved in servicing 
the permanent heads' committee supporting the recently an-
nounced machinery of government (MOG) committee of cabinet. 
The terms of reference of the MOG committee authorized it to 
examine proposals arising from current inquiries into govern-
ment administration and to look at procedures for the appoint-
ment of permanent heads and statutory office holders. (The role 
the MOG committee played in the government's consideration of 
the RCAGA report will be discussed below). 
For the next four months an ad hoc RCAGA group of three 
existed within the government division: the first assistant secre-
tary (B.F. Cox); the assistant secretary, government branch 
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(N.F. Wicks); and a secondee to the department (T.V. 
Matthews).^ 
The group's first task was to obtain advance information on 
the recommendations RCAGA would be making and to become 
familiar with all the material RCAGA was likely to use in 
supporting its recommendations. A formal link was established 
with the commission in March when RCAGAS secretary and its 
research director outlined to the PM & c group the probable shape 
of the report and their views on how some of the major 
recommendations might be handled. It was agreed that the 
group would be sent drafts of each chapter as they were 
completed. Summaries of these drafts were prepared and given 
a limited and confidential circulation within the department. 
They were circulated, for instance, to the projects division which 
coordinated the government's consideration of the reports of the 
administrative review committee (ARC).' Coordination of the ARC 
and RCAGA exercises was crucial. The fact that ARC was expected 
to report by May raised the possibility that any early decision 
by the government to accept major changes to the administrative 
arrangements order (AAO) that ARC might recommend could 
eflfectively preclude the implementation of RCAGA proposals 
should the latter be predicated on an AAO status quo. In the 
event there were no major inconsistencies between the ARC and 
RCAGA proposals. 
The liaison between the RCAGA group within PM & c and the 
commission enabled RCAGA thinking to be injected into the 
process of policy development some months before the govern-
ment actually received the commission's report. This occurred 
with issues such as the procedures for appointing permanent 
heads, training for senior management, compulsory early retire-
ment, the role of the public accounts committee and the duties 
of public servants. On a number of such issues the government 
division was able to advise the prime minister to delay a final 
decision until after RCAGA had reported. 
During this period the one member of the group able to work 
fulltime on RCAGA matters (Matthews) spent considerable time 
assembling background data on the major recommendations the 
commission's final report was likely to contain. This involved, 
for example, going through RCAGA'S own working files, examining 
in detail all submissions sent to and research done for the 
commission, as well as checking relevant PM & c files which bore 
on issues RCAGA would be reporting on. 
A further task facing the group was to get departmental 
approval for the early creation of a full-time RCAGA unit. There 
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were two clear constraints on what could be proposed. These 
were the department's earlier thinking on the role of such a 
unit and the department's own staff" ceiling. What emerged was 
a unit to consist of four or five relatively senior officers. To give 
it muscle it would be led by a second division officer. In this 
context Canadian experience was referred to, especially the 
appointment there of the head of the department of Citizenship 
and Immigration to be director of the Bureau of Government 
Organization to facilitate the Diefenbaker government's con-
sideration of the Glassco reports. The leader of the unit would 
work through the head of the government division and would 
be assisted by three or four officers of class eleven level. One 
would be seconded from the Treasury to bring expertise into 
the unit on forward estimates and financial control; another 
officer (perhaps two) would be seconded from the Public Service 
Board to advise on the recommendations dealing with staffing, 
conditions of employment, industrial relations, and efficiency 
review. Letters were sent to the chairman of the Public Service 
Board and the secretary to the Treasury seeking the release of 
suitable officers. 
In June Tony Ayers was appointed to lead the unit. He was 
a level three officer in PM & c who until recently had been 
chairman of the interim council of the children's commission. 
With previous experience in the Victorian public service, PM & 
c, the department of the Environment, Aborigines and the Arts, 
and the department of Environment and Conservation, Ayers 
brought to the unit an extensive knowledge of the public service 
and a wide range of contacts. His appointment, incidentally, had 
the effect of making quite academic RCAGAS own recommenda-
tion—seen for the first time a few weeks later in the very last 
draft of the report—"that the Prime Minister nominate a senior 
official of departmental head status to act full-time as executive 
officer of the ministerial committee" and to head the RCAGA unit 
within PM & c (RC 12.2.10). 
Developing a strategy for handling the report 
Ayers was appointed in the middle of June; RCAGA was expected 
to have its report ready for handing to the government in mid-
July. That gave him barely a month to decide on and get 
departmental clearance for a provisional strategy for the 
government's handling of the report. Among the pressing 
questions were: (a) should the report be released by the 
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government immediately on receiving it; (b) what sort of public 
statement should the prime minister make at the time of receipt; 
(c) what procedures should the unit adopt to facilitate the 
government's consideration of the recommendations; (d) should 
decisions on implementation be taken early or should there be 
a period to allow the bureaucracy, the staff" associations and 
unions and the public to digest the report and respond to it. 
In chapter twelve of its report RCAGA set down its views on 
a general strategy for implementation. Recognizing the twin 
dangers of too much enthusiasm and haste in putting its 
recommendations into effect' and bureaucratic inertia and 
passive resistance, it suggested (RC 12.2.8) an implementation 
procedure designed: 
(a) to obtain cabinet approval for the principles which underlay 
the commission's main proposals; 
(b) to involve both ministers and officials in action to give effect 
to those principles, using the specific recommendations as a 
guiding framework; 
(c) to establish at both ministerial and senior officer level an 
authoritative group which would monitor the implementation 
of the reforms proposed; ensure that ministerial decisions were 
sought where necessary, that legislative action required was 
initiated where required, and that departmental action was 
taken with deliberate speed; and report progress at appropriate 
intervals to cabinet. 
To achieve this, RCAGA recommended (R. 337) the following specific 
procedures: 
(a) that cabinet approve in principle the main recommendations of the 
report and direct that action be taken to give effect to the principles 
which underlie them, taking the commission's recommendations 
(including the subsidiary recommendations in each chapter of the 
report) as a guiding framework for appropriate action; 
(b) that the attention of ministers and departments be drawn to this 
direction with a request that they proceed expeditiously to prepare, 
and where appropriate give effect to, specific proposals for reform. 
To this end departments should set up internal groups represent-
ative of staff and management to study the relevant recommenda-
tions from the commission; 
(c) that the prime minister nominate a committee of ministers, presided 
over by a member of cabinet, to expedite these reforms and to act 
as a point of reference to ministers and departments in matters 
concerning more than one minister and department; 
(d) that the prime minister nominate a senior official of departmental 
head status to act full-time as executive officer of the ministerial 
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committee, and that this officer be supported by a small secretariat 
in PM & c; 
(e) that the ministerial committee and its executive officer be author-
ized to establish working groups or task forces (not interdepartmen-
tal committees) to help the ministerial committee in matters 
involving a number of ministers and departments, and to call 
together groups of departmental heads where joint or related action 
is called for. 
From discussions in PM & c the following aspects of a strategy 
emerged: 
the committee of ministers to consider the report would be the 
machinery of government committee of cabinet, chaired by the 
prime minister; 
senior officials would be involved through the officials' committee 
(or as it came to be known later in 1976, the permanent heads' 
committee) supporting the MOG committee;^ 
the unit within PM & c would service the officials' committee; 
the report would be released publicly by the prime minister as 
soon as it was received; 
implementation should be tackled as speedily as possible; and 
the method used to handle the ARC report to be also used to handle 
the RCAGA report. 
The last two points need further comment. A tight time-table 
was an important element in the unit's strategy for putting the 
report before ministers. There were advantages in moving quickly, 
not least the risk that delay might see the pressure of more urgent 
business crowding the RCAGA report off" the political agenda. Delay, 
moreover, involved another risk: it could lay the government open 
to the accusation that it had in eff'ect shelved the report. It was 
for these reasons that the department argued against the suggestion 
that a period of two or three months be set aside to enable interested 
parties—for example, the public service unions—to make known 
their attitudes to the report. It believed that RCAGAS careful liaison 
with the unions and the generally favourable union response to the 
report meant that the number of industrially controversial recom-
mendations would be few. In any case, cabinet could always 
authorise the PSB to consult and negotiate with the unions on any 
issues which were contentious. 
The appointment of the unit's leader only a month before the 
RCAGA report's publication meant that time—or rather the lack of 
it—was important in determining how the report's 337 recommen-
dations would be classified and grouped for ministerial deliberation. 
Not surprisingly, a ready solution was turned to—namely, the 
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method that had been used to handle the ARC recommendations. 
According to the ARC approach, the RCAGA recommendations could 
be divided into five categories, each to be handled in a particular 
way: 
a) recommendations which would need to go to cabinet because 
of their policy or legislative significance; 
b) recommendations which would be decided by the prime minister 
because they involved the administrative arrangements order; 
c) recommendations which could be referred to current inquiries 
(whose terms of reference covered the same topics) and con-
sidered when the reports of those inquiries were to hand; 
d) matters which concerned only one or a few departments and 
that could be referred to the relevant minister(s) for action; 
e) recommendations which related to departmental procedures and 
that could be referred to all departments and/or the Public 
Service Board to follow up. 
This, of course, was a different approach to what RCAGA had 
proposed in recommendation 337; namely: 
that Cabinet approve in principle the main recommendations of the 
Report [fully 300 recommendations were listed in chapter twelve of the 
report as "main recommendations"] and direct that action be taken to 
give effect to the principles which underlay them, taking the 
Commission's recommendations as a guiding framework for appropriate 
action. 
This approach was politically impracticable. It was unrealistic to 
expect a government to approve in principle 300 separate and widely 
differing recommendations, many of which ran counter to its policy 
of pruning the size of the public service. Moreover, the "approve 
in principle" approach had another drawback: it provided an 
inadequate mechanism for dealing with the unresolved inconsisten-
cies between sets of recommendations (e.g., those relating to 
efficiency and those relating to participation). 
On the other hand one advantage of the ARC approach was that 
it permitted ministers to differentiate and discriminate between and 
within groups of related recommendations: they could, for example, 
fully endorse some bundles, modify and amend others and reject 
still others. Working to deadlines, the unit's analysis of the report 
and its classification of the recommendations was rushed. Ideally 
more time and resources should have been spent in analyzing the 
principles of the report, establishing a network of interrelations 
between the 337 recommendations, determining the objectives and 
policies to be pursued at short, medium and long term according 
to the logic of the report rather than political and administrative 
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expediency; and, when that had been done, developing a set of 
contingency plans to enable the implementation process to cope in 
a more or less calculated way with the more probable obstacles. 
At the end of August the machinery of government officials' 
committee accepted a division of the 337 RCAGA recommendations 
into the five ARC categories. But note how the timetable kept 
slipping. The simple problem of finding a mutually convenient time 
for meetings of senior officials needs to be added to any list (e.g. 
that of Pressman and Wildavsky') of why administrative implemen-
tation is often a slow grind. In August the officials' committee also 
accepted the framework for handling the RCAGA report that was put 
to it by PM & c. The main features of that scheme were: 
that ministerial consideration of the report would be a matter for 
the machinery of government committee of cabinet. This committee 
had eight members. They were: 
Prime Minister (Chairman) 
Minister for Administrative Services 
Minister for Industry and Commerce 
Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations 
Minister for Transport 
Minister for Social Security 
Attorney-General 
Minister for Post and Telecommunications and 
Minister Assisting the Treasurer; 
the MOG committee would be assisted by its associated officials' 
committee; 
the RCAGA unit within PM & c would serve as a secretariat to the 
officials' committee and would prepare draft submissions to the MOG 
committee for prior consideration by the officials' committee; any 
differences of opinion among heads of the officials' committee would 
be transmitted to the MOG committee; 
the 337 recommendations of the RCAGA report would be handled 
according to the five procedures that had been used to process the 
ARC proposals; 
the RCAGA unit would monitor the progress of recommendations that 
were put to further study; 
the monitoring role would be taken over by PM & c when the unit 
was disbanded (the unit was seen as having only a brief life, coming 
to an end when the recommendations that needed cabinet approval 
had been dealt with by cabinet). 
Cabinet endorsed this general plan in September. The RCAGA unit 
had now been given the political "steer" that it needed and it began 
to meet regularly in its full form. It consisted of: A.J. Ayers, first 
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assistant secretary, PM & c; R.J. Minns, assistant commissioner, PSB 
who had been the board's liaison officer with RCAGA; E .L . Knaus, 
assistant secretary, royal commissions branch, department of Ser-
vices and Property; K. Searson, Class eleven officer, employment 
conditions branch, the Treasury who had been involved in much 
of the Treasury work done for the commission; and T.V. Matthews, 
Class eleven officer, PM & c. Ayers, Minns and Matthews worked 
on the exercise full-time. So also did Bruce MacDonald, secretary 
of the PSB, who was seconded from that position to coordinate and 
oversee the board's response to the RCAGA report, including the 
preparation of papers by the board for the RCAGA unit. Although 
not originally planned, the addition was thought desirable to 
facilitate the clearing of papers between the unit and the secretary 
of that department in his role as a member of the MOG officials' 
committee. 
Ministerial and departmental consideration 
The foundations had now been laid for ministerial and departmental 
consideration of the report and its recommendations. The five 
categories into which the RCAGA unit divided the recommendations 
is a useful device for discussing what has been considered by the 
government and what was decided in the first seven months. 
The largest group—"category A"—contained the recommenda-
tions that required cabinet endorsement because of their policy 
significance or because they required legislation. Almost half of the 
337 recommendations were in this category. The unit's next job 
was to choose from among these 160 recommendations those which 
should go into the first batch of cabinet submissions. A number 
of the recommendations for the first package were selected largely 
because they were ready to run. For example, the Public Service 
Board by mid-September had prepared 16 papers (covering more 
than 40 separate recommendations) on topics that it had had in 
train for some time. These included widening the jurisdiction of 
joint council (R 260-261), the abolition of the ten per cent 
restriction on the annual non-specialist intake of graduate recruits 
(R 123), amending the disciplinary procedures as proposed by joint 
council (R 177, 186), and making relative efficiency the sole 
criterion for promotion (R 161, 163, 167). Likewise, the recommen-
dation proposing that the leader of the opposition be permitted to 
consult the Public Service Board and the secretary of PM & c in the 
period immediately preceding the election was included in the first 
package, for PM & c had already prepared draft guidelines for such 
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consultations. Important as these topics were, they were peripheral 
to the central recommendations of the RCAGA report. The package 
going to cabinet needed to contain some of these key recommenda-
tions. It was for this reason that the recommendations on forward 
estimates (R 2, 87, 201, 310 and 311(b)) and efficiency audits 
(R 4-8, 39-40, 96(b) and (c), 312-318 and 320(c)) were put into 
the first package. 
The papers prepared for the officials' committee by the unit were 
normally brief (four or five pages) and consisted of three parts: 
(i) a summary—or if that was not possible (as was often the case) 
a direct quotation—of the comrpission's actual recommendation(s); 
(ii) background data to the recommendation(s)—this usually in-
cluded the commission's own arguments for the proposal and the 
attitudes of the key interests involved (e.g. staff" associations) and 
it might also refer to other developments of relevance (e.g. reports 
of committees of inquiry) which might have occurred since the 
publication of the RCAGA report; and (iii) possible action—options 
were given in cases where there was inter-departmental disagree-
ment. 
The process of clearing the papers—both within the unit and at 
the officials' committee level—was completed at the end of Novem-
ber. The agreed papers then went to cabinet as submissions in the 
name of A.A. Street, the minister assisting the prime minister in 
public service matters. They were considered by cabinet in early 
December. Only one submission was not taken up. It proposed the 
dropping of the special statutory provisions for the preferential 
appointment of ex-servicemen. The decisions were announced by 
the prime minister in the house on 9 December. According to the 
prime minister's statement, the government had agreed: 
to approve in principle the commission's recommendations for the 
introduction of a system of efficiency audits; it appointed an inter-
departmental working party (chaired by PM & c) to report on how the 
system might be implemented; 
to note the particular significance which RCAGA attached to integrated 
forward estimates of both financial and manpower requirements; it 
established a task force (chaired by PM & c) to report on the commission's 
recommendations; 
to authorize the drafting of legislation to give effect to changes in the 
disciplinary provisions of the Public Service Act as proposed by RCAGA; 
to amend the Public Service Act to abolish the ten per cent restriction 
on graduate recruits; 
to accept the commission's recommendation that a practice should be 
established of permitting the leader of the opposition before an election 
to consult with the PSB and the secretary of the department of PM & c. 
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to accept the royal commission's recommendations that there should 
be guidelines governing the briefing of members and party committees 
by public servants and the handling of requests from members of 
parliament seeking information from departments and authorities; it 
adopted a set of guidelines drafted in the unit and endorsed by the 
officials' committee; 
to authorize the Public Service Board to consult with staff organizations 
and to report to the government on: 
possible changes in the divisional structure of the public service, 
the possible elimination of inappropriate distinctions between per-
manent officers and temporary employees, 
RCAGA recommendations relating to the promotion procedures in the 
Australian public service, 
the way in which the commission's proposals for expanding the 
jurisdiction of joint council and for meeting consultative councils 
within departments and authorities might be implemented; 
to ask the Public Service Board to continue its detailed examination 
of the desirability of developing arrangements for a unified civilian 
public service; 
to endorse the commission's conclusion in favour of adopting the 
departmental form of organization for government agencies except in 
those cases where there was a demonstrable necessity for the functions 
concerned being carried out by a body which was wholly or in some 
desired way separate from ministerial and departmental administration; 
it agreed to establish a working party of officials to formulate guidelines 
for the creation and continued existence of statutory authorities; 
to authorize consultations with peak councils on a number of the 
commission's recommendations relating to industrial issues (for exam-
ple. R 244-51, 253-4, 257-8); and 
to ask all departments to renew their existing arrangements for staff 
training and development and to report to the board by April 1977; 
in the light of those reviews, the board to report to the government 
by June 1977 on the desirable nature of its role in matters of training 
and personnel development. 
Two other decisions by the MOG committee should also be 
mentioned. They concerned early retirement from the public service 
and the procedures for the appointment of permanent heads. Both 
were embodied in legislation introduced late in 1976. But unlike 
the decisions listed above they were not handled by the RCAGA unit. 
Yet in both, the relevant RCAGA recommendations played an 
important part in shaping the final outcome. 
Three observations can be made about the "category A" min-
isterial decisions. First, they do not have much direct bearing on 
the topic that the editors of this volume gave to me to discuss, 
namely the implementation of the RCAGA report. Even if we 
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distinguish the adoption of a recommendation from the subsequent 
implementation of the policy embodying that recommendation, the 
fact remains that most of the above decisions precede even the 
adoption stage. They are at best prerequisites for the subsequent 
adoption of RCAGA recommendations. That is, they provide for 
further investigation and examination, for preliminary consultation 
with staff" organizations, and for approval in principle. This is not 
to belittle the importance of such decisions; nor is it to say that 
adoption and implementation will not take place. 
Second, the decisions demonstrate that the government and the 
administration took the report seriously. It was not simply pigeon-
holed. 
Third, while a good proportion of "category A" recommendations 
have now been discussed by the MOG committee (and its associated 
permanent heads' committee), many very significant recommenda-
tions have yet to be considered. In December and January the unit 
worked on the next "package" of papers covering items such as 
regional administration, information programmes, one-stop-shops, 
and existing character and nationality restrictions on eligibility for 
permanent appointment to the public service. These papers are 
currently (April 1977) awaiting consideration by the MOG commit-
tee. But it will not be until some time into 1977 before draft papers 
will be ready on the recommendation dealing, for example, with 
the powers and responsibilities of permanent heads, departmental 
annual reports, administrative appeals, equal employment op-
portunity and the role and charter of the PSB. AS the board would 
be preparing the first drafts of most of these papers (as well as 
papers incorporating some of the "category E" recommendations), 
it was decided in February 1977 to change the nature of the RCAGA 
unit. Henceforth all its members would be involved in RCAGA matters 
only on a part-time basis. The announcement in January 1977 that 
K.C.O. Shann would be replacing Sir Alan Cooley as chairman 
of the Public Service Board also influenced this decision, for the 
changeover at the board would no doubt delay the board's clearance 
of RCAGA papers. 
"Category B" consists of the recommendations referred to other 
current inquiries for consideration and report. The IDC on freedom 
of information was given recommendation /?.68; the health welfare 
coordination task force, 7?.83-5; the ASTEC inquiry, R.21%, 282, 283, 
284; the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee inquiry 
/?.289-91; and the CSIRO inquiry, /?.280. 
"Category C" are the AAO matters. They include recommenda-
tions on the bureau of statistics (R.113), CSIRO ( / ? .281) , the 
Compensation (Australian Government Employees) Act and the 
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Superannuation Act (R.333), DINDEC (R. 264), and department for 
Social Welfare (/?.285). 
"Category D" are the recommendations that have implications 
for particular portfolios. The prime minister on 12 October 1976 
wrote to the relevant ministers inviting their comments. Nearly 50 
recommendations were raised with ministers in this way. To 
illustrate, the minister for Health was asked to comment on ^.50; 
the minister for Aboriginal Affairs on R.292-1; the minister for 
Overseas Trade on R.224, the treasurer on R.59, 266-9, 271, 276; 
and the minister for Foreign Affairs on R.223, 225-7, 233-4, 235, 
286, and 288. Recommendation 75—a social welfare advisory board 
with local outposts—was referred to five ministers (Aboriginal 
Affairs, Employment and Industrial Relations, Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs, Social Security and Veterans' Affairs). 
The prime minister also asked ministers for their views on action 
which their departments might take in relation to 23 "category E" 
recommendations which have implications for most or all ministers 
and departments; the topics included staff" rotation, delegation, 
procedures for selecting staff" for promotion, registries, collective 
decision-making, counter staff", decision-making at the point of 
contact with the public and interest representation on advisory 
committees. The replies to those letters are currently being con-
sidered by the RCAGA unit for appropriate follow-up action. 
The rest of the "category E" recommendations (78 in all) were 
referred to the Public Service Board for comment. Many are 
recommendations that require action by the board; for example, 
that the board "monitor", "administer", "be responsible for", 
"delegate", "consider taking into account", "review", "pursue the 
initiative it has taken in", "give consideration to", or "prescribe 
guidelines for" certain programmes, procedures or policies. The 
board reported to the prime minister on these recommendations in 
November 1976. It also released a summary of its views to the 
press. This summary unfortunately gave the impression that the 
board was merely "reviewing", "examining", and "considering" the 
recommendations. It did not bring out the board's positive attitude 
to most of the recommendations referred to it; or to the number 
of recommendations which in fact endorsed new approaches that 
the board had taken in recent years; or to the recommendations 
which could not be effectively implemented until further research 
had been completed or until consultation and negotiation with staff" 
associations had taken place. What the summary did make clear, 
however, was the constraint that current restrictions on the size 
of the board's staff" were imposing on speedy action. This constraint 
in turn raised the question of the priority which should be given 
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to the RCAGA work in relation to the board's other commitments. 
The board was not alone in feeling the effects of staff" ceilings. 
Departments which might otherwise have experimented with RCAGA 
recommendations were also deterred by staff" shortages. 
Assessment 
After examining the outcomes of the major investigations into the 
organization of the British civil service which have been held since 
1850, Brian Smith concludes that 
implementation of reform has never followed automatically from the 
recommendations of a public inquiry or a Royal Commission. Reform 
seems to be much more a function of Government policy decisions which 
themselves are motivated by other factors. 
The reports of reform commissions "are in fact no substitutes for 
political decisions".' The literature on the implementation of 
programmes of administrative reform—in Westminster-type sys-
tems and elsewhere—makes the same point. A precondition of 
effective implementation is political will and commitment.' 
Take Britain. On the day the Fulton report was published, prime 
minister Wilson announced that his government had accepted two 
crucial recommendations: the creation of a civil service department 
(CSD) and the appointment of a member of cabinet to be responsible 
for the day to day ministerial control of the department. He also 
let it be known that the government wanted action on implementa-
tion. According to R.W.L. Wilding—the secretary to the Fulton 
committee and later a senior official in the CSD—the political 
commitment gave the civil service department "an essential im-
petus" and an "inestimable" advantage in its task of putting Fulton 
into effect.'' Similarly, ministerial support for the Ontario and South 
Australian inquiries has been invaluable at the implementation 
stage. 
By contrast, RCAGA reported to a government that was wary of 
what the report might contain, and not identified with its work or 
thinking. Ministerial interest, then, had to be created. This lack 
of a clear and definite political interest in the report, its diagnosis 
and its recommendations, among both government and opposition 
members, has been a major constraint on implementation. 
Moreover, the political impetus is unlikely to emerge. Reform of 
the public service is just not a political issue in Australia at present. 
There is little electoral mileage in it. 
The second major constraint on implementation has been re-
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sources. Public service reform requires finance, staff" and time. 
Under the present government's policy of restricting the growth and 
reducing the size of the public sector, those resources have been 
in short supply. 
It would be difficult to imagine an economic and political climate less 
suitable for any bureaucratic experiment that might require increased 
expenditure than the one that exists at the moment.'" 
This constraint affects not only actual implementation but the 
development of programmes for implementation at a later stage. 
It also affects efficiency—a key objective of the RCAGA report and 
of the government. Therein lies a problem. To quote Wilding again: 
Politicians certainly want a better civil service, but they want it free. 
So do the public: the idea of paying more—and especially of employing 
more civil servants—to improve the civil service strikes as a ludicrous 
paradox those whose idea of a better civil service is a smaller one." 
The sheer comprehensiveness of the RCAGA report is—or will be 
—a further constraint on implementation. All Wildavsky's ingre-
dients for delay, compromise and failure are present—ever changing 
participants; the sheer number of actors, clearances and decisions 
required; the growth of interdependencies; and the diversity of 
perspectives and priorities.'^ 
A fourth constraint on substantial implementation is the closed 
nature of the procedure for handling the report. The "staff"" work 
to facilitate cabinet's consideration of the report has all been done 
within the bureaucracy. Outsiders—e.g. businessmen, academics, 
leaders of client groups—and members and senior staff" of the 
commission have been excluded. In their absence, the job of 
assessing the report has been performed by those who were the very 
subjects of the inquiry." This can be contrasted with Ottawa's 
method of handling the Glassco reports. The Canadian implementa-
tion unit—the Bureau of Government Organization—had among 
its four senior operational staff" two who had been on the 
commission's central research staff". That was by design. It was to 
give the bureau and the numerous committees of officials set up 
to examine the reports a detailed and close knowledge of the 
commission's thinking.'" In a report as comprehensive as the RCAGA 
report, links between the commission and the planning of implemen-
tation could have added a vital dimension—the synoptic. I will 
return to this point below when I comment on the risks in piecemeal 
implementation. 
Despite these constraints of the sort of implementation the 
commission itself had hoped for, the RCAGA unit was aided by a 
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number of assets. The favourable press treatment of the report was 
one. The location of the unit within PM & c was another, particularly 
in its dealing with other departments. It gave the leader of the unit 
access to the department's network of bureaucratic and political 
intelligence which could be put to tactical advantage, and it gave 
the leader of the unit access to the prime minister by way of briefing 
notes. The nature of the report helped the unit secure quick action. 
Unlike the Fulton report, the RCAGA report is more a set of detailed 
and specific recommendations for the here and now than a blueprint 
for the future. That makes it relatively easy to put together a 
package of recommendations which will be bureaucratically and 
politically acceptable. After all, there are over 300 recommenda-
tions to choose from. Lastly, the size and composition of the MOG 
permanent heads' committee helped the unit. Its size—because it 
limited to four the number of actors from whom clearances had 
to be obtained (this lessened the risks of delay); and its composition 
—because agreement from the permanent heads of Canberra's three 
key central coordinating agencies increased the probability that 
cabinet would accept their verdict. 
By way of conclusion, I will list some critical observations of 
the strategy used in dealing with the RCAGA report. 
1. I have mentioned that the planning of an implementation 
strategy suffered through having to get a scheme devised and 
endorsed quickly. No overall set (or series of sets) of means-ends 
priorities among the recommendations was drawn up as a guide 
to immediate, medium-term and long-term implementation. Nor 
was much analytical thought put into examining critically the 
principles of the report. The result has been the consideration of 
the RCAGA report—at the bureaucratic and political level—without 
any clear sense of goals or priorities. The danger in this is that 
action on the recommendations will be not only piecemeal and 
directionless but that the outcome could easily be a set of decisions 
that will be—to quote Dror on the risks in not having a systematic 
reform strategy—"ill-considered, inconsistent, over-atomized and 
too short-range".'^ 
2. The striving by the RCAGA unit in 1976 for rapid results in getting 
recommendations placed before ministers ran the risk of elevating 
speed and the mere number of recommendations "dealt with" into 
the chief goals of the exercise. This exacerbated the likelihood that 
decisions will be short-sighted and inconsistent. 
3. Publicity was an important element in the Fulton, Ontario and 
South Australian strategies of implementation. Publicity, that is, 
within the public service on the decisions made and their implica-
tions; and, in the British case, publicity concerning the proposals 
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for change agreed to by the joint Fulton committee (which consisted 
of officials representing the civil service as employer and represent-
atives of the staff associations) or concerning the proposals for 
further development the official side had put to the staff side." 
Thought needs to be given to how the changes to the public service 
stimulated by the RCAGA report will be publicized within the service. 
(Cabinet has authorized consultation with the unions on a range 
of recommendations; joint council will be considering other 
proposals).'^ 
4. Securing cabinet endorsement for reform proposals (particularly 
"in principle" endorsements) and asking departments to take 
appropriate action to implement the recommendations of reform 
commissions is but the first step in implementation. The "hardest 
task has only just begun—that is, to keep at the operational units 
until the reforms are successfully implemented"."* That requires 
that the implementation agency has the authority to monitor 
implementation and that there is adequate feedback to enable that 
agency to keep track of and assess what is happening. Feedback 
is essential if reform policies are to be adjusted to take account 
of unforseen difficulties, if original intentions are to be followed, 
and if departures are to be corrected. In the absence of feedback 
and monitoring, as Caiden points out, 
operating units may mistake or misinterpret reform intentions. They 
may misunderstand reform requirements. They may change reform 
directions. They may go through the motions without effect. Worse still, 
lower levels in the operating units may deliberately sabotage reforms, 
or passively resist any change." 
To avoid receiving feedback which is misleading, it is necessary 
for the implementation agency to have a close working relationship 
with departments. A common device for this is to have an 
implementation cell within each department and agency. The 
commission was unsuccessful in getting this idea adopted. To be 
effective feedback and monitoring require time, staff and expertise 
as well as a continuing organizational basis, PM & c does not have 
these resources necessary to oversee effectively the monitoring of 
implementation. Nor is it likely to be given them. For that reason, 
and heeding the RCAGA exhortation that new structures should not 
be created to perform new functions, I believe the PSB is the obvious 
location for an implementation group with the follow-up responsi-
bilities outlined. 
5. That raises once again the argument whether implementation 
should be a more open, less exclusively intra-bureaucratic exercise. 
A daring solution would be for the government to establish an 
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equivalent of the Irish public service advisory council to evaluate 
implementation. Such a group could well have on it one or two 
members of RCAGA or its staff". And to ensure that its reports would 
not be used as electoral ammunition—and to give time for 
implementation to get under way—it could be appointed immediate-
ly after the next election. 
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19 Implementation: 
Some Lessons from Overseas 
R. J K. Chapman 
Royal commissions and committees of inquiry have formed part 
of the traditional institutions of Westminster government for a 
considerable period of time. Their appointment by virtue of crown 
prerogative or by the crown under authority of an act of parliament 
ensures them of a prestige which few other bodies possess. They 
have even been thought of by some critics as a potential threat 
to parliamentary scrutiny of executive action, because they provide 
a less partisan and expedient alternative. Their flexibility has, 
however, ensured their survival. They have been used for investiga-
tions into a wide range of matters since royal commissioners were 
first appointed by William I to complete the Domesday Book.' 
The heyday of commissions in Britain was the 70 years between 
1830 and 1900, during which time some 388 commissions were 
created. There was a revival of the use of commissions in Britain 
during the 1950s and 1960s when 70 enquiries were set up between 
1955 and 1960.^  These periods coincided with considerable social, 
economic and political upheaval in Britain. Commissions were used 
to investigate legislative, policy and social conditions in ways which 
parliament itself could not do. They were used as an adjunct to 
the parliamentary process in order to find specially acceptable 
compromises. In addition, the public services received considerable 
attention from commissions of inquiry during the 1960s in most 
developed parliamentary systems; particularly notable were India, 
Canada, New Zealand and Eire. These periods of activity had no 
counterparts in Australia until the recent investigations into govern-
ment administration.-
Writing in 1937, Clokie and Robinson were uncertain about the 
value of royal commissions and committees of inquiry for investiga-
ting the conduct of executive departments. They favoured legislative 
and parliamentary processes to control the executive. However, 
when discussing investigations into the administration of the law 
by the executive, they noted 
the Royal Commission procedure is so flexible and convenient, that 
occasionally, in the face of insistent demand, the government finds itself 
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forced to provide, in addition to the usual parliamentary controls, a 
further method or inquiry into its own conduct or into that of its 
subordinate officials.^  
The major inquiries into the activities and personnel of executive 
departments up to the period of the 1960s are represented by 
Haldane in the UK in 1918; Boyer in Australia in 1959; Hunt in 
New Zealand in 1912; and by the 1907 commission and the 1946 
classification commission in Canada.- Their influence on the respec-
tive government organizations does not appear to have been as great 
as may have been thought when they were created. Writing of the 
Hunt commission in New Zealand, Cornwall said. 
We believe that commissions of inquiry have done little to promote the 
improvement of Public Administration in this country. . . . it seems that 
the Hunt Commission and the 1912 Act, which are commonly regarded 
as proof of the important part Commissions play in Public Service 
reform, may really have been a 'political accident" arising from the 
rather unusual combination of a strong movement in the Service, support 
for the public, a favourable report from a Royal Commission, a new 
enthusiastic reform government, and an important Minister with a fetish 
for Public Service Reform, all coinciding at the one time.' 
Even the much lauded Haldane report was received with little 
enthusiasm and its major recommendations were not implemented. 
Hodgetts, on the other hand, referring to the 1912 report on the 
public service prepared by Sir George Murray at the invitation of 
the Canadian prime minister, noted with approval the flurry of 
activity which occurred to give eff'ect to the report.' 
Reasons for Formation 
Machinery of government inquiries seem to arise when, quite 
suddenly, a number of factors act in a catalytic way, dramatically 
causing public recognition of dissatisfaction with the performance 
of executive departments. One of the important, and perhaps 
primary, factors is a sympathetic "political" climate.' This was the 
case with the Fulton Committee in the UK. Richard Chapman 
suggests several factors which contributed to the creation of that 
committee; 
a) a consistent call for modernization from academic circles; citing 
such writers as Thomas Balogh and Brian Chapman, and noting 
the importance of the Fabian tract The Administrators; 
b) The Labor Party Manifesto for the 1964 general election, which 
promised to rectify the "philosophy of the past" by which 
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government affairs had been conducted and; most important 
c) the Report of the Select Committee on the Estimates "Re-
cruitment to the Civil Service" which was published in 1965, 
in which there was a proposal for such an inquiry. 
Chapman goes on to note 
the climate of self examination in the country at large was reflected 
in the political system, where, in some instances, it overrode party 
political considerations . . .' 
In Eire a sense of missed opportunities, following the limited 
benefits derived from the economic development of the early 1960s, 
led to dissatisfaction with the public service. The foundation of the 
Irish Public Service as it existed in the 1960s was the Ministers' 
and Secretaries' Act, 1924 and apart from one major inquiry, the 
Brennan commission 1932-1935,'° there had been no attempt to 
adapt its original structure. Writing of the period prior to the 
formation of the Devlin Group, Whelan said 
experience up to the mid 1960s then indicated that it was difficult to 
generate authoritative proposals for public service reform, let alone to 
effect such reform. In short, we have had no reform." 
A similar situation existed in New Zealand prior to the formation 
of the McCarthy commission. Problems of recruitment and loss of 
prestige accompanied by unsatisfactory performance of executive 
departments triggered demands for reforms. Attempts at indicative 
planning and creation of national advisory planning councils had 
been relatively unsuccessful. 
Robertson identifies the following five forces operating in New 
Zealand prior to the creation of the McCarthy commission. 
a) The New Zealand Institute of Public Administration argued 
that the last major inquiry into the public service had been 
undertaken in 1912, that the functions of government had 
changed beyond recognition since then, that organizational 
changes which had been made to meet different functions were 
piecemeal, resulting in a lack of overall design to meet the 
current needs, and that this had resulted in a lack of com-
prehensive planning. 
The Institute suggested that "a fair and impartial inquiry into the 
public service would help to restore prestige and morale, by making 
clear to the public the true position regarding government em-
ployment". 
b) The Public Service Commission disagreed with the Institute's 
proposal for an inquiry because it would be costly and would 
interrupt departmental activities. While the Institute's proposal 
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was theoretically valuable, instructive and interesting, it was 
unjustified since the Institute had not been able to pinpoint 
matters which might require investigation. 
c) R.J. Polaschek, a senior public servant, who was also a member 
of the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, pub-
lished a book on the New Zealand service. He suggested that 
changes were essential and that as a first step the government 
should appoint a committee of inquiry, composed in part of 
private citizens, to report to it at five yearly intervals on the 
desirability of reorganizing the machinery of government. 
d) Another written commentary, this time from the private sector, 
supported the Institute's proposals. A paper was delivered by 
a member of the Chamber of Commerce, D.J. Riddiford, to the 
Institute's annual convention in 1957. 
e) The political will to reform was present in the promise of a 
Royal Commission included in the National party's election 
platform in 1957 and again in 1960.'^ 
Such factors, however, only partially explain the concurrence of 
events which provide stimulus for the creation of a commission. 
More is required in order for the commission to function effectively. 
The climate of opinion in which it is created may well produce 
a sympathetic forum for debate. The reformist character of the 
governing political party will have its effect on the way the 
commission approaches its task. Other factors such as terms of 
reference, membership, methods of investigation and form of report 
will also be important. 
Effectiveness 
The question of effectiveness, the achievement of objectives, may 
depend upon any one or any combination of these factors since the 
definition of objectives will derive from any or all of these sources. 
It may be argued that where commissions in the past have been 
used for areas such as legislative policy or social conditions, the 
report itself has been the objective. The report, combining new 
sources of information, outside expertise and the non-partisan 
weighing of evidence, becomes public property and, it is hoped, 
raises the level of debate and awareness. It is a means by which 
a hard-pressed government can take pressure off, or, less cynically, 
an authoritative source on which reliance can be placed. 
However Chapman does not think that the current situation, 
where royal commissions are being created as only one of a 
multitude of working committees, interdepartmental committees 
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and Other such bodies, warrants the distinction now being made. 
He suggests reversing Clokie and Robinson's usage: 
it might be helpful to reserve Royal Commissions for dealing with 
matters of constitutional significance (i.e. matters affecting the struc-
tures and functions of the organs of central and local government), and 
to use the term "Commission" for all other advisory or inquiring bodies 
intending to contribute to the policy-making process. They would then 
still be types of committee within K.C. Wheare's scheme and definition, 
different from other types of committee, but they would have in common 
their role as potentially contributing to the policy making process." 
The effectiveness of royal commissions may, however, not be in 
their report, but rather in the process by which they address their 
terms of reference. Vickers feels that royal commissions are 
appointed 
not merely or even primarily to recommend action but to appreciate 
a situation. 
The activities of participants providing evidence to the commission, 
the rising public consciousness of problems previously hidden, and 
the introspection demanded of all concerned, contribute to that 
learning process, which it is suggested, is the benefit derived from 
the commission's investigatory processes. Vickers underlines this, 
by exposing what they [royal commissions] regard as the relevant facts 
and their own value judgments thereon and the processes whereby they 
have reached their conclusions, they provide the authority which 
appointed them and also all who read their report with a common basis 
for forming their own appreciation and it is to be hoped, with a model 
of what an appreciation should be. They are thus not only analytic but 
catalytic; and the knowledge that they are expected to be so leads them 
to expose their mental processes with a fullness which other public 
bodies seldom equal and are often at pains to conceal.'" 
The very nature of commissions is that they are ad hoc and 
transient bodies which are rarely involved in processes of implemen-
tation. When the report is written the members of the commission 
disperse. It is therefore inappropriate to regard the activities of royal 
commissions in the same way as those of an organization with 
objectives and means by which to achieve them. Complaints about 
poor implementation should not assume that this is the fault of 
the commission. It is more likely to be a defect of will on the part 
of those upon whose shoulders the responsibility for the policy-
making process lies. 
While this argument has an initial appeal, it is unlikely that 
commissions would have been used as much and for as long as they 
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have solely because they provide a useful way of raising the 
appreciation of the public. At least this seems so for investigations 
into the machinery of government. There must have been the hope, 
at least on the part of the commission members, that they could 
have a significant influence on the executive policy-making pro-
cesses. 
There is evidence to suggest that the most significant reforms 
have been initiated by such outside bodies, rather than derived from 
internally generated change. Administrative reform by definition is, 
as Smith suggests 
political rather than organizational. It has a moral content, in that it 
seeks to remedy an abuse or a wrong, to create a better "system" by 
removing faults and imperfections.'-
The objective of machinery of government investigations is more 
likely to be with better systems, and to this extent they have to 
provide solutions. Investigations debating social values or economic 
conditions do not need to go beyond diagnosis. 
Machinery of government reviews 
Relating this argument to royal commissions into the machinery 
of government indicates that where the context of their creation 
is of a reformist nature, the solution may be seen as administrative 
reform of the kind described, and some "better system" will be 
articulated. Where the organizational context is related to malad-
ministration of a specific kind such as corruption, or detailed 
matters such as salaries or classification, no wide ranging recom-
mendations would be countenanced, only narrowly defined solutions. 
If this is the case then commissioners, who must be aware of the 
expectations their audiences have of them, may bear in mind in 
formulating their recommendations the possibility of them being 
implemented. This alternative view is supported by Sheriff", who 
suggests that 
the achievement of a Royal Commission or Committee cannot be judged 
only on the basis of the intrinsic or "absolute" value of their recommen-
dations, but also on the extent to which the changes they propose are 
implemented.'" 
The interesting problem then is to look at what commissioners 
have in mind as they conduct inquiries. Three points demand 
attention: 
1. the factors that lead commissioners to a particular understanding 
of their task; 
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2. the way in which they phrase their recommendations and in 
particular the extent to which those recommendations derive 
directly from the evidence before the commission; and 
3. the extent to which the commission recommends mechanisms for 
implementation. 
The remainder of this paper deals with these three topics in 
relation to the Glassco commission in Canada, the McCarthy 
commission in New Zealand, and the Devlin committee in Eire. 
In doing so it uses the seven factors identified by Sheriff as being 
directly under the commissions' control and capable of influencing 
the implementation of their recommendations. These factors she 
listed as 
(a) the degree of consensus among commissioners; 
(b) the degree to which the recommendations reflect widely held 
opinions about desirable change; 
(c) the degree of specificity of a recommendation; 
(d) the extent to which information is available to the commission 
on particular topics, a matter related significantly to the 
research capacity of commissions; 
(e) the degree to which a recommendation is awkward, in that 
while the recommendation might be highly desirable it may 
have repercussions which may diminish its desirability and 
increase the possibility of it being ignored; 
(f) the extent to which the set of recommendations taken together 
appear to be ambiguous, which may in itself result from a 
lack of consensus or a desire to avoid minority reports; and 
(g) the degree to which political considerations result in recom-
mendations that provide the appearance of doing something. 
Sheriff suggests "one or two recommendations which require 
tremendous superficial upheaval but which do not run the risk 
of similar revolutionary effects are bound to be successful". 
Under the first main heading (1 above) tasks or objectives it 
is proposed to discuss the factors affecting 
(a) the commissioners' perception of their tasks derived from a 
degree of consensus amongst them, and 
(b) the extent to which they and the community at large hold 
similar opinions about desired changes. 
In relation to the second main heading (2 above) formulation of 
recommendations by the commissioners, the items 
(c) degree of specificity, 
(d) the research capacity of the commission, and 
(e) & (f) the ability of the commission to frame recommenda-
tions that are neither awkward nor ambiguous 
will be relevant factors. 
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Finally, the question of a mechanism (3 above), by which 
recommendations can be implemented will be significantly affected 
by item 
(g) a desire to appear to make a change rather than providing 
recommendations for a more lasting and solid effect. 
Objectives 
Of the three commissions under scrutiny, Glassco in Canada was 
by far the most successful in defining its tasks, if implementation 
of its recommendations is regarded as the major criterion of success. 
Within weeks of the first two volumes of the five volume report 
being published the prime minister had delegated a minister without 
portfolio to be "responsible for the appraisal and implementation 
of the Royal Commission Report." He also had the assistance of 
a special cabinet committee and Treasury Board." Early in the 
following year 1963, a task force of senior officials was designated 
to work full time on implementation. Why was it that "the largest 
management consultant organization job, albeit an ad hoc one, that 
Canada had even seen . . ."'* was apparently so acceptable? Its 
productivity, one may suspect, was one of the reasons: 
To compile the 24 separate reports on the 106 government departments 
and agencies surveyed, 40,847 man-days were required, about 55% of 
which were spent on research projects. The findings of the commission 
comprised 1,998 pages containing about 300 recommendations. The 
subject matter of the recommendations is diverse ranging from the 
incidental [transfer of activities between divisions in one department] 
to the fundamental as in the case of the General Plan of Central 
Authority: . . ." 
At least some of the multitude of recommendations were bound 
to be implemented. Yet a major factor must have been related to 
the understanding the commissioners had of their task derived from 
the terms of reference, membership and the way the commission 
operated. 
In comparison, although the Devlin group in Eire proposed more 
fundamental structural and institutional changes, striking at basic 
assumptions underlying the parliamentary system, its recommenda-
tions were not less detailed than the Glassco report, particularly 
in respect of departmental reorganization. Its management ap-
proach hardly dilfered, being concerned with similar management 
principles of efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. Yet it was not 
until five years after the publication of the Devlin report that any 
284 R.J.K. Chapman 
progress was noticeable in implementation of its recommendations. 
Both Glassco and Devlin operated in a similar manner. The 
minister of Finance in setting up the review group said 
it is a long time since any general look was taken at the Civil Service 
as functioning in a changing world. Every organization can benefit from 
periodic review. If a review of this kind is to be done well it will take 
time. Its procedure must be flexible. Close contact must be maintained 
with both management and staff concerned. A blend of experience of 
high quality of the working of both the public service and of business 
will help make it apt and effective. It would to my mind be best 
conducted by a special group combining representatives of the business 
and professional world and persons no longer serving who have had a 
broad experience in the civil service and in state enterprises.^" 
Ritchie's description of the way the Glassco commission operated 
is equally appropriate to the Devlin group: 
this Royal Commission did not "rumble about the country listening to 
briefs from special interests and subjecting them to some judicial process 
of analysis". This royal commission had a task which it felt was not 
particularly suited to that form of proceeding. This job was not what 
is so often the job of royal commissions, to get public debate on 
something which private debate in the government has not somehow 
settled. The job was much more analogous to the job of a management 
consultant firm called in to look at the operations of an organization, 
public or private.^' 
The difference between Canada and Eire regarding their terms 
of reference or membership was insignificant when compared with 
the McCarthy commission in New Zealand. New Zealand followed 
the more conventional procedures in appointing a judge to be 
chairman of its commission, although in the remaining membership 
they combined the public/private representation in a similar man-
ner to the Devlin group. The appointment of academics to the 
McCarthy commission was somewhat unusual but significant, in 
that it allowed their direct contribution to the discussions of the 
commission, rather than relying on academic research teams 
employed especially for specific tasks as was the case with Glassco." 
The procedures in New Zealand were also more directly con-
cerned with increasing public debate. The commission performed 
a workmanlike task stimulating such debate in the short period of 
nine months during which it heard evidence and prepared its 
report." The commission saw as its task 
providing practical recommendations for dealing with practical 
difficulties. . . . it is our aim, under imaginative leadership, the State 
Services may not merely keep up to date, but may foresee the problems 
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that lie ahead and prepare to meet them . . . We have . . . concerned 
ourselves both with starting and with organization, [and] try always 
to bear in mind their interrelationships."' 
However there was less formal recognition of the "management 
ethos" in New Zealand than in either Canada or Eire." At the 
same time although apparently somewhat at odds with the per-
spective previously noted McCarthy recognized the particular role 
of royal commissions: 
We believe . . . that it is generally not for a Royal Commission such 
as this, to concern itself with details. It should rather indicate broad 
trends and deficiencies, state principles then recommend basic changes 
in machinery.-' 
The Glassco commission was not as ambivalent and produced 
four volumes of a five volume report specifically dealing 
piecemeal with the machinery of government—the organization of the 
major administrative functions relating to finances, personnel and 
paperwork; the organization of the various supporting services for which 
departments and agencies have common needs, or of particular services 
rendered to the public; and the organization of special areas of 
administration." 
The final volume of the Glassco report was intended to consider 
the organizations of federal government as an entity and was more 
in line with the second stated task of the McCarthy report. 
The Devlin group perhaps shared the "principle" approach 
initially, but subsequently found it to be inadequate: 
Initially . . . we were being diverted by the shadow of what was said 
to be the obvious problem areas, from the substance of the fundamental 
machinery of government, the dual structure, the professional and the 
adrninistrator, the anonymity, the indeterminate concept of a depart-
ment called a "development corporation": all these were decoys.'* 
During the course of the three years in which the Devlin group 
heard evidence in private, had discussions with the permanent heads 
of each department and read the written evidence, they had the 
benefit of direct and continuous discussion with their employed 
management consultant. These discussions helped formulate in the 
minds of the committee the parameters of their investigation: 
. . . as we saw it our report would consist of: 
a) a comprehensive description of the role and structure of the three 
parts of the public service; 
b) a description of the organization, management and operation of the 
civil service; 
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c) an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the public service; 
and 
d) the organizational and other changes which were necessary to equip 
the public services to administer the responsibilities of government.*' 
These parameters forced the committee members to take a larger 
view than either that taken by the Glassco or McCarthy com-
missions, even though the latter disclaimed any narrowness. For 
example, it claimed 
Our minds were released from the consideration of detail and we became 
more and more concerned with the wider aspects of organization, 
communication control and development. This was the process which 
forced us to view the total public service, a concept which is fundamental 
to all that we recommend."' 
A clearer example of how such inquiries change or reinforce 
commissioners' appreciation of the situation could not be found. 
Yet, as Sheriff suggests, it is not sufficient for those conducting 
the inquiry to have only their own appreciative systems enlarged. 
Others must be involved if the report is to have any lasting effect. 
There must be both a degree of consensus among the commission 
itself and also a reflection of a "feeling in the air" amongst the 
wider public. Those recommendations which are most likely to be 
accepted are often derived from tentative reform steps already taken 
either prior to the investigation or as a reaction to the inquiry. These 
charges are given legitimacy or extended to represent a broader 
trend which is recognized by the commission and adopted as the 
basis for its report. 
The success of Glassco was certainly evidence of the extent to 
which the report reflected current thinking. Hodgetts discusses the 
increasing momentum of the business management movement in 
relation to the Canadian public service from the early 1900s and 
implies that Glassco is the logical outcome. Indeed Hodgetts goes 
further by directly relating the Glassco recommendations to those 
of 1912 and 1946." There was, therefore, a climate of public 
opinion, an environment in which people's "readinesses" were open 
lo changes of this kind. This is particularly important if these 
readinesses also occur within the public service, as was the case 
in Canada. 
However, the Irish context was totally different, there had been 
no tradition of management in the public service. They were solidly 
grounded in the British experience of the administrative class, 
providing for clearly distinguishable roles and promotional op-
portunities for gencralists and specialists. It was not surprising that 
Devlin should see his committee as striking out to new ground 
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through their "elevated discussions". The Irish public service lay 
in the foothills, unable to rise out of the very real problems which 
confronted them daily and unwilling to face the enormous disrup-
tion to their relatively stable existence. Inevitably the implementa-
tion of the Devlin group recommendations was delayed." 
Critics of the prevailing ethic of the New Zealand public service 
did exist, as previously mentioned, but they were not taken too 
seriously, as the evidence provided by the public service commission 
showed: 
the present machinery for the control and coordination of government 
departments is structurally sound and . . . no major organizational 
changes are required. However the extreme complexity of the present 
system would be reduced to some extent by a more logical grouping 
of functions in departments and by a reduction in the number of 
departments." 
Initially, the creation of the McCarthy inquiry was opposed by 
the public service commission on the grounds that it was unneces-
sary. Another commentator noted: 
With a few exceptions, the evidence given tended to support one or 
another of these views [the views that the business of government should 
be more related to private business or that the business of government 
was more suitably rewarded by the promotion of a universal public 
service salary scale]; most proposed changes were relatively minor; and 
concerned ancillary functions, or long term objectives rather than 
immediate changes. In the Royal Commission's report, much was left 
for subsequent investigation by the State Services Commission; perhaps 
for the reason that in almost every case a suggested amalgamation or 
redistribution was discredited by another interested party in other 
evidence submitted.'^ 
Indeed, it might be said that the main contribution of the inquiry 
was the setting up of the state services commission to replace the 
public service commission. Many of the recommendations contained 
in the report were subject to their implementation by the newly 
created body. The Devlin group also recommended the creation of 
a public service department to replace the activities which were 
carried out by a number of different departments. It is worth noting 
here the uncertain nature of this device by which recommendations 
of the commission are left for implementation. The appropriateness 
of this method will be questioned later in this chapter." 
This discussion of the objectives of commissions, the acceptability 
of such objectives within the wider public and more particularly 
within the public service itself, as well as a commission's own 
definition of its task, emphasizes the relevance of these factors to 
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whether or not a commission's recommendations will be im-
plemented. It will be seen in later discussion of the mechanisms 
by which a commission's report are implemented that there is a 
direct and significant relationship which is most clearly exemplified 
in the case of Glassco. In Canada a mechanism in tune with the 
proposals for change made by the commission already existed. 
Many of those recommendations had already been initiated in one 
form or another in the public service. The existence of the Treasury 
Board and the Privy Council Office provided a forum within which 
many of the matters bought before the commission had already 
been discussed. There was therefore a degree of consensus within 
the commission, within the public service and between the com-
mission and a wider public on the fundamental approach that should 
be taken to any changes within the service. This was not the case 
in either Eire or New Zealand. 
Recommendations 
Less discussion is possible of the other two headings, "Recommen-
dations" and "Mechanisms", not because they are not as important, 
but because of limitations of space. There are as many ways in 
which recommendations can be framed as there are reports. It is 
possible, however, to simplify those relating to investigations into 
the public service into three categories: 
a) those where the recommendations are restricted to matters of 
principle, leaving all details to be worked out by some other 
designated body or group, or to be politically evolved; 
b) those whose recommendations ignore principles and rely on 
prescription of specific solutions for defined problems; and 
c) those where a wholly integrated, institutional and organizational 
restructuring is provided, including prescriptions for specifics 
derived from some overarching principles. 
No single set of recommendations will fall in its entirety into any 
one of these categories, but most reports make some play of their 
intentions and few can resist expounding their perception of the 
warrant given. 
No attempt will be made to delve into the details of the reports 
discussed here; it is possible however to make one or two comments 
about the consequences for implementation of the form recommen-
dations take. The more specific the recommendations the more 
likely that they will be awkward or ambiguous. Their very specificity 
implies that a particular problem has been identified, quite often 
by those who are directly involved in administration, and that the 
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solution is preferred by one of the parties concerned. It may well 
be that the commission concurs with the solution on grounds of 
its general approach, be it management oriented, as in Glassco, or 
pragmatic as in McCarthy.'" Facilities for research will also have 
a direct effect on which problems are brought to the notice of the 
commission for solution. Clearly, a large research potential such 
as Glassco had will present a totally different picture of adminis-
trative activity than one derived through reliance on administrators 
themselves. 
In their concluding chapter the McCarthy commissoin stated: 
It is true that by means of a widely publicized invitation we sought 
evidence (to be taken, if need be, in private) of specific cases of 
inefficiency in the State Services. Our purpose in doing so was not, 
however, to enable us to pass overall judgment, nor yet to redress 
individual grievances . . . . Instead we were concerned to identify points 
of weakness, the better to propose remedies. Unfortunately the response 
was small. 
Undoubtedly this is one of the basic reasons why the McCarthy 
report relied so heavily on the papers provided by the public service 
commission. To quote their conclusions once more: 
the central theme of this report has been the need for a State Services 
Commission—to review on behalf of government, in detail and in a 
continuing way, those matters which we have been reviewing in general 
and in a brief space of time.'" 
The majority of the detailed recommendations of the McCarthy 
report, which fall generally into category b) above, begin "the State 
Services Commission should . . . " or, " . . . it should be the 
responsibility of the State Services Commission to . . ". 
The danger of producing specific proposals is artificially to isolate 
problem areas of administrative difficulty which can only result in 
recommendations causing multiplication of agencies, duplication 
and overlap, or reduction of service through streamlining and 
economy. Leaving the implementation of specific recommendations 
to a new agency, which is supposed to accommodate the work 
previously inadequately carried out by the body it supersedes as 
well as to coerce the other departments into accepting the proposals 
of the report, seems slightly optimistic. 
Glassco was less random in that it derived most of its problem 
definition from research teams in consultation with the adminis-
tration being investigated. In this way there was some dialogue 
about the problem at the level of specifics and also at an integrative 
level outside the confines of the organization within which the 
problem arose. The Canadian report was in many ways much more 
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detailed than the New Zealand, dealing with a wide range of 
matters, including scientific research needs, the Canadian Broad-
casting Corporation, purchase and supply of goods, agricultural 
research and payroll audits of the department of National Revenue. 
Yet there was a significant difference in that the organizational 
context provided already the basis for identification of the problems 
and their solution in the broader context of government activities 
as a whole. 
While it is possible to admire and respect the Glassco report for 
its fluent expression and its total and comprehensive understanding 
of the role of government in a modern democracy, it must be pointed 
out that it did not escape difficulties similar to those met by 
McCarthy. Its recommendations related to detailed matters which 
had to leave so much unsaid and were likely to result in awkward 
or ambiguous situations, derived as McLeod suggests from the 
elaborate "game of musical chairs" in which the commission 
indulged." Two examples must suffice: 
a) It recommended that the department of Transport should take 
over from ihe minister of public works the responsibilities for 
marine works, other than those relating to the acquisition, 
construction, maintenance and disposal of real property in-
volved. One can imagine the bargaining that went on prior to 
the limitation expressed in the words "other than . . . " and the 
consequent struggle to maintain the status quo thereafter. 
b) In relation to national defence, it proposed to limit the minister's 
authority by proposing that the deputy minister (permanent 
head) be given greater responsibility for keeping under review 
the organization and administrative methods of the department, 
and that the chairman and chiefs of staff should exercize 
ministerial power of direction over the armed forces as well as 
having control and administration of elements common to two 
or more services. Obviously here the commission had listened 
to the one side likely to give them any information on the 
subject." 
Despite these undeniably difficult problems, it would be extremely 
unusual for any commission charged with investigating the 
efficiency and economy of the public services of any country to deal 
wholly in principle and avoid any attempt to provide specific 
solutions. The formula adopted by both Glassco and McCarthy, 
simplified above, ignores principles and prescribes specific solutions 
underpinned by a set of principles which the recommendations are 
supposed to exemplify. Devlin opted for the much more definitive 
approach by offering a wholly integrated system for the restructu-
ring of the Irish service. The report of the review group provides 
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perhaps the most comprehensive attempt yet made to create a 
blueprint for a twentieth century public service in the Westminster 
system. The reasoning which led to this kind of report has been 
discussed earlier, but it was always accepted by the review group 
that they were not producing a blueprint that would be immutable. 
Their concern was to maintain an impetus for change which they 
referred to as a "dynamic for adaptation from outside". This aspect 
will be dealt with in more detail under "Mechanisms for implemen-
tation". 
Two major considerations led the review group to the conclusion 
that only a major restructuring would be appropriate. One was the 
growth of the services provided by government and the consequent 
increase in the number of state servants: 
The public service has approximately doubled during the lifetime of 
the State and now represents a significant proportion of the total 
employees in the State and we can safely assume that the public sector 
will continue to dispose of a major proportion of the national product."" 
The second was the fragmentation of structures that arose from 
ad hoc methods of meeting the demands, especially the growth of 
the state-sponsored bodies which employed almost 60 per cent of 
government employees. These bodies were created from a suspicion 
that departments could not cope with the activities they undertook 
and the hope that a "business-like" corporation would deal more 
effectively. 
Both of these considerations led Devlin to regard the creation 
of a unified service as of primary importance, and since there was 
no existing structure capable of accommodating such a service one 
had to be created: 
Devlin's solution is primarily designed as a structural exercise, but it 
recognizes that it must be accompanied by technological change to 
facilitate the identification and performance of the task and by increased 
attention to the human components of the organization . . . Essentially, 
Devlin is about efficient management of the public service and the 
structure he has built provides appropriate roles for the various 
participants in the organization.-" 
For commissions such as those mentioned there is no simple solution 
to formulating their recommendations. Even where it becomes clear 
at the outset that certain kinds of recommendations are inevitable, 
tensions must mount during the process of investigation which place 
a heavy strain on early resolve. Perhaps it is only where the 
chairman is as strong as Devlin clearly was and has his mind made 
up early about his basic framework that such a report can be 
written.''-
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Mechanisms for implementation 
I deal briefly with this heading since there is almost unanimous 
agreement between the three committees that the best mechanism 
is to leave implementation to a newly created body. By the very 
nature of commissions they cannot propose that they be made a 
permanent group to implement their proposals. They have a choice, 
therefore, between making recommendations and hoping someone 
will take them up under political direction, or alternatively to 
include in their recommendations that the responsibility of im-
plementing should be with a particular existing agency, or one newly 
created. 
When commissions investigate the public service it is usually 
reasonable to assume that it is a response to dissatisfaction with 
current methods and practice. Often this situation is the result of 
lack of proper control and leadership within the service by the body 
whose task it is—the public service commission or some similar 
body. It is fairly certain that one of the major recommendations 
will be to set up a new or restructured body to perform the tasks 
so poorly performed by the body superseded, and in addition to 
implement the commission's recommendations. This pattern 
emerged most clearly in McCarthy, as previously mentioned. The 
creation of the new state services commission to replace the public 
service commission was regarded as its major contribution. Despite 
the integrated nature of his proposals, Devlin also saw their future 
implementation as depending on the creation of a public service 
department and made this a first priority in proposals for implemen-
tation. For Glassco, however, the same urgency did not seem 
evident. In Canada there was already a very strong group whose 
tasks included implementing the kind of proposals contained in 
Glassco. Indeed there is some evidence that a large number of the 
detailed recommendations made by Glassco were being considered 
by the Treasury Board or the Privy Council Office prior to the 
creation of the commission."' One major prerequisite of the com-
mission was, however, recognized and acted upon, that the necessary 
political will would only be present if there was a minister with 
responsibility for the task: 
Central direction of the Executive Branch is ultimately the responsibility 
of the Cabinet. . . . It is recommended that the [Treasury] Board be 
given a presiding minister who would be free of the responsibility for 
the direction of a department.''•' 
Devlin however went a step further: 
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The reorganization of the public service and its subsequent maintenance 
at the highest possible level of eflficiency is a matter of such great public 
interest that it must be subject to a dynamic for adaptation for outside 
and must be seen to be continuously adapting itself. We, therefore, 
recommend the establishment of a Public Service Advisory Council of 
eight persons—four from the private sector, three from the public sector 
and the Secretary of the Public Services Department,—to survey the 
progress of the reorganization of the public service."' 
Whether these attempts by commissions to ensure that proposals 
are not lost in the limbo of political euphoria have been successful 
is the question yet to be answered. 
Some lessons 
The foregoing discussion has dealt very superficially with three 
important commissions in New Zealand, Canada and Eire. The 
shape of the public services in these three countries has been or 
will be affected to a large degree by the reports. It is unlikely that 
every recommendation will be slavishly implemented and conditions 
are changing and demand other solutions. Sometimes the changes 
occur even while the commissions are in session, perhaps as a result 
of preparing evidence to be given."' 
Nonetheless it becomes quite evident that all the reports stress 
the necessity of a body for continuous review of the administration 
of government. For New Zealand, McCarthy suggested that such 
a review should be the task of the state services commission. In 
Canada, that role was not left to any one body, although Privy 
Council Office was given a primary responsibility in that area, it 
was spread between the cabinet, the civil service commission and 
the senior public servants. In Eire, Devlin made his priority the 
setting up of a public service department, followed by a public 
service advisory council. It is doubtful whether these bodies can 
adequately perform the tasks they have been given. As previously 
mentioned a newly-formed state services commission (or whatever 
name it is given) must continue the functions already performed 
by the body it supersedes. Too often this is a limiting factor—it 
cannot extend its activities beyond those previously performed, 
either because the officers are transferred and remain committed 
to their previous roles, or because insufficient staff of the right 
calibre are allowed to be appointed by the political masters. 
Eire experienced both these factors. The staff initially employed 
in the new department were those previously employed in the 
personnel division of the department of Finance and they brought 
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with them the limited functional perspective. New appointments 
were limited to already entrenched senior officers with the exception 
of one man on whose shoulders the whole burden of implementing 
Devlin now falls."' The situation in New Zealand was little different. 
Immediately after the creation of the state services commission its 
first major task was an occupational classification of all officers, 
which was undertaken to the detriment of following up many 
recommendations in the report."' 
One ray of hope in this regard is the public service advisory 
council set up in Eire. Under the chairmanship of Patrick Lynch, 
professor of political economy in University College, Dublin, the 
council appears to be making a sincere attempt to perform its 
stimulatory role. No better statement of the situation can be found 
than their own: 
Our task is the continuing one of reviewing and commenting on the 
process of structural and organizational change. But our task is not 
limited to structural change; it is also concerned with personnel, the 
development of personnel and how people interact within organizations. 
Structural reform in large hierarchical organizations cannot be carried 
through successfully unless there is a clear understanding down the 
executive line of the need to manage change. . . . There must be an 
absolute commitment from the top of the hierarchy to the task and 
recognition that past precedent may no longer be a valid guide for 
decision."' 
This statement leads to the next lesson which really needs no 
labouring, but which is often ignored amid rising hopes based on 
a commission's nostrums. No amount of tinkering with organiza-
tional structures can reduce the essential need for properly qualified, 
competent officers. Without good staff, without dedicated, well 
trained personnel, without a commitment to the public service, no 
government administration will ever perform its tasks satisfactorily 
Some would argue that given all these factors, there would always 
be some complaint, someone would be dissatisfied, and that is 
probably true. But these commissions were not created to investigate 
minor complaints. They arose from a recognition that the activities 
of government were not being adequately serviced. The emphasis 
in all reports is on two vital elements in this regard: to provide 
public servants with responsibility congruent with authority, so that 
the capabilities already within the service are properly developed, 
recognized and rewarded; and to increase the potential of those in 
the service through appropriate training with its corollary of better 
methods of recruitment and promotion. 
One final lesson, which may well be the most important to 
recognize, is that commissions of investigation into the public 
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service may not be a very adequate way of obtaining administrative 
reform. As McLeod rightly says when discussing the Glassco report: 
To my mind, the Royal Commission, as a device for mounting a 
successful attack on the problems of administrative change and improve-
ment suffers from inherent limitations, which in the light of the purposes 
sought are unduly restrictive and possibly even debilitating. . . . From 
the beginning . . . the Commission must face a difficult, if not 
insurmountable barrier, in the problem of determining with some degree 
of precision the audience to which its ultimate words of wisdom are 
directed. There are at least three such audiences, the administrative 
organization which is the subject of the inquiry, the government which 
is ultimateh responsible for the behaviour of that organization, and that 
amorphous thing called the public.-" 
By what stretch of imagination can commissions be expected to 
satisfy any, never mind all, of such audiences? 
Perhaps the real lesson to be learned from these examples is that 
change occurs in organizational contexts through the increasing 
understanding of one's own organization as a consequence of being 
forced to think about it by outside demands. The critical faculties 
stimulated by such demands provide both definitions and solutions 
for problems only previously vaguely understood. Expectations must 
not therefore be too high, commissions must not be thought of as 
providing all the answers, nor even some of the right ones. Royal 
commissions must be recognized as being a useful means of allowing 
conflict and expressions of dissatisfaction in a situation where such 
matters are usually regarded as taboo. They may also provide a 
means by which new ideas and methods may permeate the public 
service, but that will rarely be a way of promoting administrative 
reform. 
Appendix: Membership and terms of reference 
,'Vf H' Zealand 
Royal Commission to Inquire and to Report upon State Services 
in New Zealand, 1962. 
Members: Mr. Justice McCarthy 
Mr. M.O. Barnett (businessmen) 
Mr. C.B. Plummer 
Mr. J. Turnbull (retired general Secretary of 
New Zealand Public Service 
Association.) 
Professor J.K. Scott 
Professor R.H. Brookes 
(Victoria University, Welling-
ton) 
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Terms of reference: to receive representations upon, inquire into, 
investigate, and report upon the organization, staffing and 
methods of control and operation of Departments of State and, 
to the extent that you may consider necessary or desirable, of 
agencies of the Executive Government of New Zealand, and to 
recommend such changes therein as will best promote efficiency, 
economy and improved service in the discharge of public 
business, having regard to the desirability of ensuring that the 
Government service is adequately staffed, trained, and equipped 
to carry out its functions; and in particular to receive representa-
tions upon, inquire into, investigate, and report upon the follow-
ing matters: 
I. Any improvements that should be made in the machinery of 
Government, in relation to the organization, coordination and 
control of Departments of State and Government agencies. 
II. Any major functions that should be redistributed among 
Departments and Government agencies, or that should be 
transferred to or from any new or existing agency or body. 
III. Any methods by which eflRciency is ensured, and any 
methods by which the quality or quantity of work might be 
improved. 
IV. Any changes in policies relating to personnel that would 
promote an improved standard of public administration, especial-
ly in relation to— 
(a) The recruitment of staff: 
(b)The retention of staff: 
(c) The promotion of staff: 
(d) Rights of appeal: 
(e) The retirement of staff: 
(f) Classification and grading: 
(g) Training: 
(h) Discipline: 
(i) Relations between employer and employee: 
(j) Superannuation, so far as it affects the recruitment, retention 
and retirement of staff: 
(k) Physical working conditions. 
V. The machinery for wage and salary determination, and the 
principles on which wages and salaries should be based. 
VI. Any amendments'that should be made in existing legislation 
to promote improvements in any of the aforesaid matters. 
VII. Any associated matters that may be deemed b\ you to be 
relevant to the general objects of the inquiry. 
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Canada 
Royal Commission on Government Organization 1960. 
Members: Mr. J. Grant Glassco 
Mr. R.W. Seller 
Mr. F.E. Therrier 
Terms of Reference: to inquire into and report upon the organiza-
tion and methods of operation of the departments and agencies 
of the Government of Canada and to recommend the changes 
therein which they consider would best promote eflficiency, 
economy and improved service in the despatch of public business, 
and in particular but without restricting the generality of the 
foregoing, to report upon steps that may be taken for the purpose 
of 
—eliminating duplication and overlapping of services; 
—eliminating unnecessary or uneconomic operations; 
—achieving efficiency or economy through further decentraliza-
tion of operations and administration; 
—achieving improved management of departments and agencies, 
or portions thereof, with consideration to organization, methods 
of work, defined authorities and responsibilities, and provision 
for training; 
—making more effective use of budgeting, accounting and other 
financial measures as means of achieving more efficient and 
economical management of departments and agencies; 
—improving eflRciency and economy by alterations in the rela-
tions between government departments and agencies, on the one 
hand, and the Treasury Board and other central control or service 
agencies of the government on the other; and 
—achieving efficiency or economy through reallocation or re-
grouping of units of the public service. 
Eire 
Public Services Organization Review Group 1966-1969. 
Members: Mr. Liam St. J. Devlin 
Lt Gen. Sir Geoffrey (businessmen) 
Thompson 
Professor P. Leahy (Professor of Mechanical En-
g ineer ing , Univers i ty of 
Dublin) 
Mr. T.J. Barrington, (Director, Institute of Public 
Administration) 
Dr. J.F. Dempsey 
Dr. Thekla J. Beere (retired public servants) 
Mr. L.M. Fitzgerald 
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Terms of Reference: Having regard to the growing responsibilities 
of Government, to examine and report on the organization of 
the Departments of State at the higher levels, including the 
appropriate distribution of functions as between both Depart-
ments themselves and Departments and other bodies. 
The expression "higher levels" is meant to refer to grades, 
administrative and professional, not covered by conciliation and 
arbitration machinery (in effect, above Higher Executive 
Officer). 
Notes 
1. H. Clokie and J.W. Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1937), 28. These writers suggest three major purposes 
for which commissions are created: consideration of legislative policy; inquiries 
into the activities of administrative departments; and inquiries into social 
conditions. 
2. i>i p. "Government by Appointment" in R. Rose (ed.) Policy Making In Britain. 
(London: Macmillan. 1969). 51. 
3. India, Administrative Reforms Commission, Fourteen Reports, (Delhi: Govern-
ment of India Press, 1969); Canada, Royal Commission on Government 
Organization Vols. 1-5, (Ottawa; Queen's Printer, 1969); New Zealand, The 
State Services In New Zealand, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, 
(Wellington; Government Printer, 1962); Eire, Report of the Public Services 
Organization Review Group. 1966-69, (Dublin; Stationery Office, 1969); 
Australia, Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, 
(Canberra; AGPS, 1976). 
4. Clokie and Robinson, Royal Commissions of Inquiry, 8. For a summary of 
other criticisms sec R.J.K. Chapman, "Machinery of Government: a Field for 
Public Enquiries and Scholarly Research", .\ew Zealand Journal of Public 
Admlnlstralion 35(1), September 1972, 17-33. 
5. Great Britain, Ministry of Reconstruction Machinery of Government Committee 
Report, (London: HMSO, Cmd. 9230, 1918); Australia. Report of the Committee 
of Inquiry Into Public Service Recruitment, (Canberra: Government Printer, 
1959); New Zealand, Report of the Commission upon unclassified departments 
of the Public Service of New Zealand, 1912; Canada, "Civil Service Com-
mission, 1908, Report of the Commissioners", Sessional Papers. 1907-8, No. 
29c; Canada, Royal Commission on Administrative Classifications in the Public 
Service. Report. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946). 
6. J.P.N. Cornwall et al.. "Another Hunt Commission?", New Zealand Journal 
of Public Administration 23(2), March 1961, 14. There is a very useful appendix 
with summaries of commissions in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, United 
Kingdom, and United States of America since 1912. 
7. V. Subramaniam, "Machinery of Government investigations: Fifty years after 
the Haldane Report", Public Administration (Sydney), 27(3), September 1963; 
J.E. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service: a Physiology of Government 
1867-1970, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 247. See also J.E. 
Hodgetts, "The Grand Inquest on the Canadian Public Service", Public 
Administration (Sydney), 22(3), 226-41. where he refers to the use of 
commissions in Canada as "fruitful". 
implementation: Some Lessons from Overseas 299 
8. This was one of the vital elements noted in the author's discussion of the Devlin 
group's recommendations in Eire. R.J.K. Chapman, "The Irish Public Service: 
Change or Reform?" Administration, 23(2), Summer 1975, 126-41. 
9. R.A. Chapman, "The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service", in R.A. Chapman 
(ed.). The Role of Commissions in Policymaking, (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1973), especially 11-12, 13. 
10. National Industrial Economic Council, Report on Economic Planning, No. 8, 
(Dublin: Stationery Office, 1965), noted with approval the comments of a French 
observer, "that some of the main obstacles to effective planning lie in the public 
sector"; Eire, Report of Committee of Inquiry into the Civil Service, 1932-35, 
(Dublin; Stationery Office, 1935). 
11. N. Whelan, "Reform (or Change) in the Irish Public Service, I969-I975", 
Administration, 23(2), Summer 1975, 107. 
12. J.F. Robertson, "Machinery of Government Review and Reform in New 
Zealand", unpublished manuscript; Wellington, 1961, 15; R.J. Polaschek, 
Government Administration in New Zealand, (London & Wellington: NZIPA & 
Oxford University Press, 1958), 292; D.J. Riddiford, "A Citizen's Point of 
View", in R.S. Milne (ed.). Bureaucracy in New Zealand, (Wellington & 
London: NZIPA and Oxford University Press, 1957). 
13. R.A. Chapman, "Commissions in policymaking", in R.A. Chapman (ed.). The 
Role of Commissions in Policymaking, 175. 
14. G. Vickers, The Art of Judgment, (London: Methuen, 1965), 50. 
15. B.C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central Administration", Political 
Studies, 19(2), 1971, 216; G. Caiden Administrative Reform, (Chicago; Aldine, 
1969), has an even more significant definition of administrative reform as 
"artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance". 
16. P. Sheriff, "Factors Affecting the Impact of the Fulton Report", International 
Review of Administrative Sciences, 36(2), 1970, 215, 218. 
17. Canada. House of Commons Debates, 29 November 1962, 2127. 
18. R.S. Ritchie, "The Glassco Commission Report: a panel discussion", Canadian 
Public Administration, 15, Winter 1972, 386. 
19. G.V. Tunnoch, "The Bureau of Government Organization", Canadian Public 
Administration, 8, Winter 1965, 562. 
20. Dail Eirann, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 219, 9 March 1966, 1306. 
21. Ritchie, "The Glassco Commission Report", 386. 
22. The Devlin group preferred to rely on private management consultants for their 
research work, although they heard evidence from academics and others. 
23. In contrast to the two and a half to three years taken by the Devlin and Glassco 
commissions, McCarthy took nine months, hearing evidence for a period of 62 
days. For a discussion of the procedures and other aspects of the McCarthy 
report see R.S. Parker, "Public Service management in the Welfare State", 
Public Administration (Sydney), 22(3), September 1963, 248-54. 
24. McCarthy Report, 2. 
25. It is implicit in some of the comments in the report, for example in the discussion 
of "The location of responsibility for efficiency and economy" on 28-35, and 
also in some aprts of chapter 6. "Personnel Policies", 193-341. 
26. McCarthy Report 11. The ambivalence was called the "Janus-faced nature of 
such commissions" by Subramaniam, "Machinery of Government Investiga-
tions", 272n. 
27. Glassco Report, vol 5, 23. 
28. L. St. J. Devlin, "The Devlin Report—an overview". Administration, 17(4), 
Winter 1969, 340. 
29. This was during the initial period of their activities between June 1967 and 
300 R.J.K. Chapman 
July 1968. These discussions also included the secretary to the group, P. Gaffney, 
a public servant seconded to the group who, like all such officers attached to 
commission staff, played a vital role in the direction taken by the written report. 
Devlin Report, 341. 
30. McCarthy report, II. 
31. J.E. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service, 24-5. Professor Hodgetts was also 
the director of research for Glassco and his book is full of valuable insights 
into that and other commissions' work. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service, 
ISl. In 1912, Sir George Murray, a single commissioner brought out by the 
Canadian government from Britain to investigate the public service, reported: 
Sessional Papers, No. 57a 1913. Previous reference has been made to the 1946 
commission (the Gordon commission), see footnote 5. 
32. One very trenchant critic, Charles McCarthy (not a relation of the com-
missioner) has said of the service, "many of those who moved into positions 
of importance in this static society Ireland are themselves cast in the same 
mould, good people, pious in their religion, paternalistic in their administration, 
sentimental and naive in their self regard and strangely intolerant of change" 
The Distasteful Challenge, (Dublin: IPA, 1968), 10. 
33. Evidence presented to the McCarthy commission by the public service com-
missioner. Report, Vol. II, 577. 
34. D.G. Henderson, "The Machinery of Government and Reallocation of Func-
tions" in D. McAllister (comp.), A Study of the McCarthy Commission. 
(Wellington: School of Public Administration, Victoria University, 1962), 5. 
35. See also R.J.K. Chapman "The Irish Public Service", 137. 
36. Exactly what the difference between these two approaches would be requires 
a separate paper to discuss. McCarthy's "Janus face" may explain the use of 
the term "practical" (see footnote 26) and the reason for leaving so much to 
the state services commission. 
37. McCarthy Report, 387, author's italics. McCarthy Report, 388. 
38. T.H. McLeod. "Glassco Commission Report". Canadian Public Administration, 
6. 1963. 404. 
39. Glassco Report, Vol, 5, 48. Glassco Report, Vol. 4, 74, 77. 
40. The Devlin Report. A Summary. (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 
1970), 10. 
41. P. Gaffney, "Programme Budgeting and the Organization and Personnel 
Function", Administration, 18(4), 1970. 317-20. 
42. Mr. Devlin told me in an interview, subsequently confirmed by Mr. Gaffney, 
that he had drawn up the overall plan of attack, chapter headings and general 
framework of recommendations before the first meeting of his committee and 
his final draft followed this initial statement with very few alterations. 
43. As early as mid-1961, before the first volume of the Glassco report had been 
published, senior officers in the employ of the commission had inaugurated ad 
hoc meetings with the Privy Council Office and by the time of publication the 
commission's director of organizational research and his coordinator were 
appointed to positions with the Privy Council Office. M. C. d'Avignon, "The 
Royal Commission on Government Organization: a Study in Bureaucracy and 
Innovation," (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1972, Unpublished M PA thesis), 92. 
Somewhat similar arrangements were made in relation to the RCAGA, see Trevor 
Matthews, chapter 18. 
44. Glassco Report, Vol. 5, 102. It is interesting to note that even a change of 
government did not reduce the impetus. Hodgetts, "The Grand Inquest," 240. 
45. Devlin Report, 166. 
46. It was suggested in the course of discussion on this paper that habits of 
Implementation: Some Lessons from Overseas 301 
acquiescence in the public service would ensure some acceptance of the changes 
proposed to the commission in evidence, even before the recommendations are 
published. There is some evidence to support this, but the extent of the changes 
appears to be very limited. 
47. The man referred to is Dr. N. Whelan, whose general approach is set out in 
the article mentioned in footnote 1 I above. 
48. Discussion, in January, 1975 with the acting chairman of the state services 
commission and other members of the commission, although they pointed out 
that their role was rapidly expanding, despite the lack of staff to perform it. 
49. Public Service Advisory Council. Report. Year ended 31 October 1974. Report 
No. I, (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1975) (PrI 4509); McLeod, "Glassco 
Commission Report", 386-87. 
20 Implementation: 
Is that the name of the game? 
Cameron Hazlehurst 
Implementation is a clumsy, almost pretentious, word for a simple 
concept. But it is established and unambiguous. Aaron Wildavsky 
and Jeffrey Pressman must take much of the blame for its vogue, 
though they are redeemed by the delicious sub-title of their book. 
Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973): 
How Great Expectations in Washington 
Are Dashed in Oakland; 
Or, 
Why it's Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All 
This Being a Saga of the 
Economic Development Administration 
as told by 
Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals 
On a Foundation of 
Ruined Hopes 
We know what implementation means. It is not the kind of word 
which envelopes multiple ambiguities. It will not, like "responsible 
government" or "the Westminster system" explode in our hands 
or trickle discomfitingly through our fingers if we try to unwrap 
layers of meaning. 
In the chapters discussed here Matthews and Chapman have been 
consistent in their usage. But it is important to note that much 
of what Matthews especially recounts might more properly be 
described as belonging to a phase of "pre-implementation". The 
so-called implementation unit in the department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, charged with planning and coordinating a 
variety of public service responses to the RCAGA, has spent a great 
deal of its time on preparing the way for implementation. Many 
(though not all) of the RCAGA recommendations require political 
endorsement before they can be pursued. Accordingly, the im-
plementation unit's primary task has been to find ways of presenting 
the recommendations in a way that makes political decision possible 
—not always an easy assignment. They have been in the business 
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of eliciting commitments to implementation more than the business 
of implementation itself. 
Chapman's account of experience in New Zealand, Canada and 
Eire emphasises important similarities and contrasts. Matthews' 
revelations of the work in which he has participated in Canberra 
underline some of Chapman's conclusions. And, despite his ex-
cusable discretion, Matthews is sufficiently candid to deepen any 
student's understanding of what actually happens when a large, ill-
digested and unsubtly presented package of administrative proposals 
is delivered to a relatively unsympathetic government. 
The main impression left with me by both chapters is their 
dispirited, or perhaps just dispiriting, tone. They are steeped in 
gloom and despondency, which is evident despite Matthews' stiff 
upper lip and Chapman's manly effort to salvage something hopeful 
from the foreign inquiries he surveyed. 
Chapman suggests, with perhaps excessive understatement, that 
the most important lesson about commissions of investigation into 
the public service is that they "may not be a very adequate way 
of obtaining administrative reform". He tells us that our expecta-
tions should not be too high. Commissions cannot be expected to 
produce all the answers. He might have added that they probably 
will not ask all the right questions either. But he does invite us 
to recognize that they may be useful means of allowing conflict 
and expressions of dissatisfaction and that they may also help the 
spread of new ideas and methods. 
With all of this I agree, provided that there is enough emphasis 
on the conditional words "may" or "might", and providing also it 
is recognized that there are some occasions when the fostering of 
expressions of discontent and the precipitation of public conflict can 
lead to reaction rather than reform or improvement. 
To take only one example, it could certainly be argued that the 
debate over the provision of economic advice to government—a 
debate which admittedly was not begun by RCAGA but was given 
a good stir by it—has, so far at any rate, not led to the sort of 
structural changes recommended by the commission but has been 
followed by a change of a quite different sort. Instead of the creation 
of a department of Industries and the Economy (DINDEC) as 
recommended by Dr. Coombs and his fellow commissioners, we 
have a bifurcated Treasury, and administrative arrangements and 
procedures of a kind which are likely to further entrench rather 
than remedy some of the defects RCAGA sought to eradicate. Yet, 
ironically, the fact that the old Treasury has been split into a new 
Treasury and a new department of Finance, is being employed as 
an argument for ignoring the DINDEC recommendations. 
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What can so very easily happen in an artificially-heated environ-
ment of questioning and dissatisfaction is the emergence of a variety 
of plausible but essentially gimcrack, if not utterly bogus, solutions. 
Increasing the currency of discontent leads to inflation of expecta-
tions. The likelihood of change is increased, but the ability of 
politicians to discriminate between reaction and reform is not. 
What resounds through both Matthews' and Chapman's chapters 
is the perfectly obvious, perfectly predictable, often repeated, but 
astonishingly neglected truth that transient groups of advisers 
cannot ensure the implementation of their recommendations. Even 
more important perhaps, is the fact that when a government sets 
up an inquiry—certainly one whose members are selected according 
to criteria of representativeness, prestige, legitimacy and so on— 
one cannot guarantee that it will not lose sight of those under-
standings about the nature of the task and the desired outcomes 
which led one to have an inquiry in the first place. 
If one is interested in the public policy implications of adminis-
trative inquiry and change, it follows that much of Chapman's 
analysis of overseas history and his attempt to list the circumstances 
in which a commission might succeed in getting its recommenda-
tions adopted, is really a second order exercise. 
A concern with public policy should lead us to focus not on a 
particular instrument, the inquiry, but on the objectives it may be 
meant to serve. It seems to me to be a more urgent question, more 
urgently political if not more urgently academic, to ask in what 
circumstances should governments employ the commission techni-
que? Why, where, and how should it be used? 
We should be asking, have governments discarded the admittedly 
cynical, but nevertheless sensible precept, that you do not set up 
an inquiry until you can be sure in advance what its findings will 
be? And if this cynicism is at a discount, we should want to know 
why. 
Now I can understand that some people might still want to recoil 
with horror, genuine or simulated, at the suggestion that an inquiry 
should really be, in part at any rate, a sham exercise designed to 
justify, or at best work out the details of, a predetermined course 
of action. But why recoil? There are, of course, occasions and 
subjects which require research to establish the facts. There are 
cases, in other words, where it makes sense to have an inquiry. 
There are other cases where the nature of the subject matter makes 
it essential that there be a wide canvassing of views, sounding of 
opinion, and debate—circumstances which may permit but not 
entail an inquiry. There are cases where the government of the day, 
any government, might be genuinely indifferent as between a 
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number of possible solutions to perceived problems—and in those 
cases it makes sense to operate with the paraphernalia of a public 
inquiry. 
But when we know that the themes of devolution of power and 
authority, of more participatory styles of government, and of less 
emphasis on hierarchy in administrative structures—three signifi-
cant and salient themes of the RCAGA report—when we are told that 
these themes already enjoyed considerable political support before 
the commission was appointed, then I believe that we are obliged 
to ask: was there not some other way, a way other than the 
appointment of a group of eminent people to "inquire", by which 
the government might have more successfully advanced its desire 
for change? 
The kind of answer which RCAGA'S commissioners might have 
given to that question is along the lines that change requires 
acceptance, that acceptance requires education, that education 
presupposes inquiry and presentation of a case, and so on. 
Thus the inquiry instrument tends to be justified on what one 
might call intellectual grounds and on grounds of its role in leading 
or moulding relevant opinions. A lot has also been said by Bailey, 
Hawker and others in various places, in support of the idea that 
the very fact of the commission's existence and the style of its task 
forces, public hearings and group discussions, and the commission-
ing of academic and consultant reports—that all of these may 
contribute to the development of an atmosphere conducive to 
change. But here I would want to repeat the caution that while 
that is true, it is also true, though rather less frequently said, that 
the activities of the critics and would-be reformers may be 
paralleled by the much less publicized activities, and the less easily 
perceived hardening of attitude, of the sceptics, the doubters, the 
complacent, those who do not believe in the new nostrums and who 
may be, in some cases, determined to resist them. 
Chapman concedes what he calls an initial appeal in the 
argument that it is not appropriate to judge the activities of royal 
commissions in the same way as one might legitimately judge "an 
organization with objectives and means by which to achieve them". 
He goes on to counsel: "Complaints about poor implementation 
should not assume that this is the fault of commissions. It is more 
likely to be a defect of will on the part of those upon whose 
shoulders the responsibility for the policymaking process lies". 
This suggests three lines of discussion. One flows naturally from 
Matthews' chapter—what can a commission itself do to try to 
ensure implementation of its suggestions? Matthews has managed 
to be judiciously informative about the inner history of the last 
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eighteen months or so. He explains well what Coombs and his 
colleagues tried to achieve and why they failed. What he does not 
say is whether he thinks some other strategy might have been more 
successful with the present government. Nor does he speculate on 
how different the response of the administration might have been 
had there been no change of government. It would be ironical if 
the present government were to take all the blame for outcomes 
which the more powerful individuals and institutions in the public 
service might, in any case, have succeeded in achieving. 
A second line of investigation involves asking questions not just 
about the implementation of a report but about the consequences 
of an inquiry. One would be less concerned here with what the 
commissioners, or even the government, intend or strive for, and 
more concerned in detecting impacts and responses, whether 
intended or not. Almost all the academic discussion of implementa-
tion, both in the papers presented here and elsewhere, seems to take 
for granted that implementation is a "good thing". It is a curious 
insight into the stance of students of public administration that this 
should be so. Why there should be an implicit presumption in favour 
of implementation is not at all clear, whether we think about it 
from the viewpoint of a scholar or an administrator. There is 
certainly no excuse for scholars ignoring the study of how un-
welcome reports are shelved, stymied or opposed. Nor should this 
sort of obstructionist behaviour be treated pejoratively as though 
it is necessarily evidence of "bureaucratic resistance" or "inertia". 
If all change is not reform, then all opposition to change is not 
reaction. Blocking strategies deserve more attention than they have 
received. F.M. Cornford's Microcosmographia Academica: being a 
guide for the young academic politician, (Cambridge, 1908) 
covered most of the ground long ago. 
The third line of discussion derives from the familiar lament 
about the need for political will and it may be distilled for simplicity 
into the question: how should we do it? 
"It", of course, is some presumably already identified kind of 
change—not necessarily a highly articulated, detailed and coherent-
ly constructed set of proposals, but a notion or notions sufficiently 
firm for someone to be able to explain successfully to others what 
he means, and for those others, assuming that they have both 
capacity and intent, to be able to translate the notions into new 
structures and new procedures. 
By putting the question in this way I am perhaps beginning to 
indicate the lines of the answer I have in mind. What we are looking 
for is a process which might be more likely to give opportunities 
for the discovery of those political inventors, the Edwin Chadwicks 
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if not the Jeremy Benthams, for whom Spann tells us he has been 
seeking without success. It is a process which would build, not on 
the discredited psychological postulates of a hypothetical adminis-
trative man—the fearless, forthright guardian of the public interest 
—but on a more realistic understanding of public servants' motiva-
tions. It is a process by which one would avoid the urge for high 
theoretical mastery and universal prescription which Parker is 
convinced, I believe rightly, will doom to impotence any body of 
reformers seduced by it. And it is a process which will rest firmly 
on the kind of knowledge of where the skeletons are hidden which 
impels Pat Troy and others to despair that no one has yet "told 
it like it is". 
As Chapman has told us what is wrong with commissions and 
other kinds of inquiries, and Matthews has given us a very credible 
and discreetly circumstantial account of the fate of the RCAGA report, 
I would like to put forward some bold provisional propositions for 
the next reforming government's handbook. It will scarcely need 
saying that this is not a blueprint but merely the first draft of a 
preamble. 
First, I would submit to government, be clear in your mind on 
the difference between those things you know you want to do, those 
on which you have an open mind, those on which you are willing 
to accept any one or more of several alternative courses, those things 
you want to start and those you want to stop, those you want to 
encourage or discourage. 
Second, remember that the media and the public can be made 
to believe that almost any change is a reform. The public has little 
sympathy with public servants and will respond positively to 
anything that can be presented plausibly as an improvement (and 
improvement does not have to mean the cliches of economy or 
elimination of waste and duplication). 
Third, do not be misled by those who tell you that reforms only 
work if you wait until those on whom the changes will impinge 
are ready to welcome them. What we know of human behaviour 
tells us that habits of acquiescence will do for a start and, if the 
changes in practice do not elicit constructive responses, then you 
will at least have evidence, rather than hypothesis, upon which to 
base alternative courses. 
Fourth, put no faith in those who promise to discover and 
promulgate hidden truths if only you give them $1,700,000—a little 
more or a little less—to spend on the search. Rather use your own 
judgment to identify in the existing administrative environment 
those practices which you wish to see more widely adopted and 
those people whose performance leads you to suppose them capable 
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of fostering those practices. Look for people whom you believe 
capable of practical administrative experimentation. Give them the 
resources. Give them the authority. And let them try to create new 
instruments and think through new philosophies in the front line 
of administrative action. Even major problems of interdepartmental 
coordination or efficiency auditing may prove more amenable to 
solution by encouraging experimentation than by trying to devise 
all-embracing schemes on paper. 
Fifth, to be more precise—if you thought for example, the DURD 
experiments worthwhile, then do not try merely to encourage 
emulation. Ensure it by transplanting DURD people into new environ-
ments—the department of Social Security for example—and let 
them test and develop their faith, their plans, their experience in 
new fields. The key is always the entrepreneurs and managers. And 
if you as a government demonstrate a commitment to a particular 
style of administrative initiative you will not only directly advance 
your schemes by optimal deployment of the first cohort of reformers, 
you will very quickly create an atmosphere which breeds and 
displays the kinds of talents you want. 
Sixth, as the maximum life of a parliament is three years; you 
cannot wait for conversions—you must, if necessary, command. 
It is easy to get carried away with a prescriptive pen—but the 
point need nut be laboured. There is a lot you can do without 
inquiries. If you are not sure what to do then it makes sense, by 
all means, to get Professor Wilenski or even Sir Henry Bland to 
tell you what you ought to be doing. It makes even more sense 
to involve them directly in making their suggestions work. Inquiry, 
publication and public debate to promote understanding or to 
change attitudes may all be valuable. They may even be necessary 
as means to generate or augment political will. But if that is their 
purpose then reports and recommendations must be directly as-
similable by appropriate politicans, not buried in hundreds of pages 
of cautiously qualified exposition and analysis. 
The would-be administrative reformer must never forget that his 
most profound ideas will vanish into the archives or the textbooks 
if he does not learn how, when and whom to persuade. 
General Perspectives 
The Coombs Commission: L1 
An Overview 
Peter Self 
This is a contribution by an outside observer who spent a few 
months in Canberra shortly before the Coombs commission re-
ported. While I have learned a good deal from the other chapters 
in this book, and from those in a companion volume,' I have made 
only minor changes in the original draft. Others are better placed 
to comment on later developments, and there seems no reason to 
change my general conclusions. 
The RCAGA report has already ceased to be a subject of urgent 
interest and debate and has become a part of administrative history. 
As such it will be quarried by both historians and policy-makers 
for a long time to come. My own interest is to relate the themes 
of this Australian report to wider issues of administrative reform, 
and this of course is a subject that might be taken a great deal 
further than in one article. 
Most problems of modern bureaucracy are universal, not particu-
lar. They are associated with size, complexity, centralization, 
empire-building, inadequate tests of accountability or efficiency, 
imperviousness or unresponsiveness to social change, inaccessibility 
from citizens but (often) too much accessibility from powerful 
interests and slow and sometimes discriminatory methods of service 
delivery. To these are added the special problems of political-
administrative relations in democracies following the Westminster 
model. 
These issues were mostly taken up in the RCAGA report, although 
some more than others. There was much attention to the needs for 
decentralization, better service delivery and social adaptation of 
both the structure and methods of the public services; but less 
attention to the influence of economic interests, or to causes of 
bureaucratic expansion or ineffectiveness. 
All administrative reform committees tend to combine radical 
and critical diagnoses with relatively moderate prescriptions. Brave 
words are not followed by equally brave deeds, because while such 
committees must show a proper sense of urgency and indignation 
about the shortcomings of bureaucracy, their conclusions must in 
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practice be implemented by and within that same bureaucracy. 
Modern bureaucracies are to a very large extent self-regulating, 
partly by virtue of their size and complexity, partly because 
politicians (especially those with a short tenure of office) cannot 
afford much bureaucratic upheaval or opposition. Also ministers 
genuinely able and willing to cope with administrative issues are 
rarely found anywhere, not just in Australia; they should be found 
and cultivated by reformers. 
The Coombs commission has succumbed even more than com-
parable bodies elsewhere to this mismatch between diagnosis and 
prescription. One explanation is that, working in a period of political 
turbulence and change, it could perceive or thought it could perceive 
only an uncertain and slippery support for administrative changes 
that were more than small and incremental. 
Nonetheless I find it a matter for regret that RCAGA did not set 
its sights higher. This is where the perspective of administratuve 
history becomes significant. A comprehensive inquiry such as this 
tends to be a rare event indeed, and whatever quick action does 
or does not result, analysts and reformers might hope for many 
years to find a good statement of the possible goals and alternative 
patterns of development that are open to Australian administration. 
Here also the report seems parochial. It adopts some fashionable 
managerial nostrums that have been tried elsewhere, without having 
spent any of its research funds upon investigating how they actually 
worked out (so powerful are fashions in management). And it seems 
that one capable letter from Sir Arthur Tange was enough to 
disabuse the commissioners of any idea of taking at all seriously 
the Swedish or Irish (Devlin) models of policy and administration, 
which should have (but did not) cause them to realize that they 
had found no recipe for their perceived problem of the accountabili-
ty of oflicials. 
Still, with the report, the Australian study of public adminis-
tration has come of age, and has begun to take on new dimensions. 
While a fair amount has been and is being written in Australia 
about political-administrative relations at the top of government, 
study of this report can be expected to open up the deeper issues 
of modern bureaucracy. 
What is administrative reform? 
This paper will examine the report in a general context of 
administrative reform or change. Given such a voluminous report, 
with over 300 recommendations, and given the very eclectic 
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literature at present available on administrative reform, a short 
chapter can only nibble at a large subject. My aim is to show up 
some of the distinctive features of RCAGA (and perhaps of Australian 
administration) as these strike a disinterested observer. 
In seeking a framework for analysis, one looks in vain at much 
of the limited literature on administrative reform. This, I think, 
is because its elements do not cohere. One element is reformist 
literature which enunciates principles and techniques for improving 
administrative "efficiency". The reformist brew is a curious com-
pound of traditional "scientific" management theories, as modified 
by flexible practices of modern multinational corporations and by 
human relations doctrines, combined with modern welfare econom-
ics. This brew tastes much the same around the world, at any rate 
in "western" societies, and the Australian royal commissioners have 
naturally swallowed some of it, although less than I personally 
expected. Managerial reformism is useless for analytic purposes, 
because of its simplifications and dogmatism—but I shall return 
to the way that it is used by RCAGA.^  
The obverse element is literature which analyzes from every 
conceivable standpoint all the "obstacles" to administrative change. 
This literature quickly proves too much, because organizations do 
change and the interesting questions are when, where and how fast.^  
More useful elements are psychological writings about the induce-
ment of change, and political writings about the scope for (but more 
usually the limits of) change. Psychologists can act as auxiliaries 
to reformers, explaining how disagreeable features of change may 
be softened. Political scientists alert reformers to the interests which 
will be adversely affected, and to political behaviour patterns which 
are hard to break, either pragmatically or through references to 
some idea of the intrinsic essence of a polity or political culture.'' 
The contributions of social science to administrative change thus 
tend to polarise between reformers and sceptics. Economists, for 
example, are often reformist and political scientists sceptical, 
although one of the latter may take up a strongly reformist position 
and run the barbs of his colleagues for naivety.* Politicians 
themselves often remain sceptical or indifferent, although some are 
enthusiastically managerial.*' Public oflFicials tend to see reform 
issues in narrower and more incremental terms than do reformers 
or "outsiders", as of course one would expect. All of these 
viewpoints need consideration, and many will creep into this 
chapter, but severally or in sum they do not offer much of a 
framework for the analysis of reform. 
An alternative and tentative approach, to be adopted here, is to 
see administrative change as the product of interaction between 
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three overlapping arenas of behaviour and beliefs: the social, 
political and bureaucratic. The social arena is the widest, and refers 
to the accumulated sets of beliefs, expectations and grievances 
which the members of a society hold about its government and 
bureaucracy. The political and bureaucratic arenas refer in the first 
place to the attitude sets held by politicians about public servants, 
and to public servants about themselves. 
Bureaucracy is thus the focus of administrative reform. It is the 
target for social and political demands about its performance. How 
far can these two types of demands be separated? Traditional 
democratic theory would see elective politics as the appropriate and 
sufficient transmission belt for social demands, just as bureaucracy 
itself should be a transmission belt for political demands. So the 
whole problem will be solved if bureaucracy is sufficiently responsive 
to "political will". One has only to state this proposition to know 
that it is no longer credible, even though still frequently asserted, 
especially in relation to bureaucracy's role. 
The bureaucratic arena is not of course the passive recipient of 
these pressures. It not only exerts a "feedback" effect upon its 
political and social arenas; it also replicates within itself many of 
the changes occurring within society (as well as contributing to 
those changes by precept and example), and it preserves its own 
complex schema of internal politics which revolves around the 
successive adjustments of diverse interests. These are of two basic 
types—the interests of occupational groups and of departments or 
agencies—which frequently overlap. Sometimes bureaucratic poli-
tics surfaces indirectly in public policy debates, but normally it is 
a slow, gradualist and secretive battle of positions. One feature of 
any reform commission is that it activates bureaucratic politics. 
I will now briefly refine my crude and unsatisfactory description 
of "arenas" into a typology of possible agendas of administrative 
reform. The social agenda concerns the interaction between bu-
reaucracy and society. This covers not only service delivery, and 
the "responsiveness" and "openness" of government to the wants, 
complaints and grievances of clientele groups and of the public 
generally; but also the adaptations of the rules, practices and norms 
of bureaucracy to social pressures and changes. It includes such 
questions as: should bureaucracy mirror general social change, 
should it head change or follow change—and in what respects? This 
agenda is concerned also with latent politics—the politics of weakly-
organized groups and weakly-voiced complaints, as well as of latent 
stirrings and grievances within the bureaucracy itself. The extent 
to which such a latent politics exists to be discovered, is itself a 
reflection or criticism upon the workings of traditional political and 
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governmental institutions—or, at the very least, a witness to the 
inadequacies of traditional democratic theory. But if such a latent 
politics exists, a reform commission may be uniquely well placed 
to discover and indeed to activate it. 
The political agenda concerns relationships between bureaucracy 
and political institutions, between ministers and their chief oflRcials, 
and between major elements within the bureaucracy itself. It covers 
such issues as the responsiveness of the bureaucracy to the will of 
political leaders, and by implication the adequacy of political 
decision-making itself, as well as the role of top officials as advisers, 
managers and discretionary decision-makers, and the nature of their 
accountability to ministers and to parliament. 
The managerial agenda concerns the effective and efficient 
organization of the machinery of government, techniques of 
decision-making and execution and the structure and competence 
of the public service. 
The distinctiveness of these agendas lies in the adoption of 
separate perspectives (social, political and managerial), and not of 
course in the isolation or self-containment of the various issues, 
which impinge upon each other in a variety of ways. Nonetheless 
reform movements tend to deal with each of these agendas 
separately, sometimes without recognizing incompatibilities in the 
solutions being advocated. This lack of recognition can of course 
be deliberate. 
The Coombs commission in a reform context 
An unusual feature of RCAGA, viewed in an international context, 
was the extreme comprehensiveness of its terms of reference—so 
broad, as Schaeffer and Hawker say, as to make their detailed 
wording of little significance. Practically any issue under the three 
agendas listed above could have been discussed, and most were. 
Yet it is also familiar that the genesis of the commission lay in 
the particular fact that a victorious Labor party viewed the 
Canberra bureaucracy with even more than its usual doubts and 
suspicion, as a result of a long sojourn in the wilderness. A political 
inquisition into the bureaucracy, however, would have seemed and 
probably have been fatal to a government which needed (like it 
or not) maximum bureaucratic cooperation for achieving rapidly 
such policy changes as lay within its power and tenure of office. 
It is a dilemma familiar everywhere to radical ministers. In the 
upshot RCAGA was rendered more acceptable to the bureaucracy by 
virtue of its competent and informed membership and its broad 
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terms of reference, while its existence did something (if not a lot) 
to placate the Labor rank-and-file.' Admittedly many in the 
bureaucracy still saw RCAGA as a type of political inquisition—which 
is only to illustrate the enormous gulf between bureaucratic and 
political (especially Labor) attitudes in Australia. 
If the vicissitudes of Labor party politics had not produced this 
commission, would something like it still have occurred? Rationally 
one would suppose yes. Not only had the commonwealth govern-
ment continued for long without a major inquiry, but its functions 
and still more the character of the Australian society and economy 
had changed greatly during the Liberal years. Moreover a kind of 
administrative reform doctrine was already spreading, with vari-
ations, throughout the English-speaking world and other Western 
countries, associated with such well-known reports as Fulton and 
Glassco.* Australia was unlikely to escape this virus, and one of 
the interesting points about the Coombs report is its reaction to 
what might be called the current conventions of administrative 
wisdom. 
The RCAGA report is lengthy, diverse and well-written, with four 
quite substantial volumes of appendices. It is generally interesting 
and sometimes subtle. Given the wide scope of the report (which 
mirrors, although by no means completely, the breadth of the terms 
of reference), and given the enormous number and heterogeneity 
of its formal recommendations, it must be an easy matter for an 
observer to miss the wood for the trees. Perhaps indeed the report 
is all trees—a great variety of little changes, many of them already 
incipient or proceeding and receiving from RCAGA a friendly shove. 
This is the kind of result one might expect from a commission of 
distinguished men and one woman who, for the most part, had 
ample experience of government and none of the critical hostility 
towards its operations to be found among many backbench MPs 
and at best some academics and social critics. Moreover this 
commission believed in the slogan "the process is the product", 
received much of its evidence from the bureaucracy, and viewed 
reporting and implementation as a smooth continuum. The ap-
proach was to be realistic, pragmatic' 
It must be tempting then to view RCAGA as a classic case of 
Lindblomian incrementalism, essentially an "insiders" report that 
can shock or surprise few, a document whose lack of public impact 
can be attributed to the relative invisibility of the many little 
changes thereby accelerated (but whose cumulative effect might of 
course be considerable). Such a verdict may well be partly true, 
but it is not the whole truth. What follows is an attempt to 
understand some of the directions taken by RCAGA, which will then 
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be illustrated in more detail. In conclusion I shall glance at the 
unsolved agenda of administrative reform as RCAGA has left it in 
Australia. 
Somewhat rashly I would summarize the course of the RCAGA 
inquiry as follows. By virtue of its origins, the commission might 
have been expected to pay particular attention to political-adminis-
trative relationships and to the discretionary powers of the top 
bureaucracy. The terms of reference directed the commissioners to 
give particular attention, inter alia, to 
relationship of the Australian Public Service and statutory 
corporations and other authorities with the Parliament, Ministers 
and the community; 
parliamentary scrutiny and control of administration; 
responsibility and accountability of public servants, and their 
participation in forming policy and making decisions. 
It is rare indeed although quite logical for a commission investigat-
ing administration to receive such an open invitation into political 
territory, even if the invitation was largely declined in the event. 
But for fairly obvious reasons, including the membership of the 
commission itself, this line of approach seemed unwise and 
unprofitable. By contrast RCAGA found a rich vein of investigation, 
and of latent politics, in the relationship between bureaucra.'^y and 
social change. It is in fact under the "social agenda" thai the 
commission may be expected to have its greatest impact. 
Additionally, and quite naturally, RCAGA encountered the nov 
familiar managerial wisdom packaged as resource planning techni-
ques (PPBS, PESC, PAR, etc.) and theories of accountable management. 
This discovery conjoined with criticism of the Treasury and with 
a desire to strengthen the role of Cabinet in such a way as to 
produce the most specific and most vaunted of the commission's 
nostrums—the planning of forward estimates. Accountable man-
agement doctrines supported the proposed reduction of detailed 
controls by central agencies (Treasury and the Public Service 
Board), and the conferring of more managerial discretion upon 
departments and particularly their permanent heads—at the price 
of their greater involvement in the disciplines and constraints of 
collective decision-making. But as a necessary check upon incom-
petence or extravagance, and given the inability of the PSB to 
perform its alleged statutory job of efficiency watchdog, the 
Auditor-General was advanced as a suitable independent agent for 
the conduct of eflficiency reviews. 
At the top of government, managerial and political issues are 
entwined. (By contrast what I have termed the social agenda can 
be kept somewhat more separate.) Thus the managerial proposals 
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of RCAGA had to have regard to political feasibility, although the 
attention paid to this factor was to my mind curiously uneven— 
although perhaps intelligible in terms of the interests of the 
commissioners and of their need for an agreed and coherent report. 
At the same time, since the political problems of reform could not 
be tackled head on, such specifically political proposals as the report 
contains seem mainly intended to support, though perhaps quite 
inadequately, the report's managerial doctrines. 
This of course is a familiar approach of administrative reformers. 
The hegemony of politicians is clearly recognized, but they are then 
in effect told to behave much more systematically, carefully and 
consistently if they wish government to be more competent and 
effective. Or perhaps it is tactfully assumed that they wish to behave 
in this way, and that it is only institutional peculiarities which 
inhibit them. The incompatibilities between political and bureau-
cratic styles of decision-making rarely surface specifically in such 
discussions, although these are really quite well understood. The 
latent issue is how far it is possible or indeed desirable to reduce 
these incompatibilities, an issue which can be crucial for the effects 
of managerial innovations. 
It is my suggestion then that the main thrust of RCAGA lies in 
certain social and selective managerial directions, subject (in the 
latter case) to political assumptions which have not been, and of 
course may never be, tested. Of course this description excludes 
many important influences upon the RCAGA report. One such was 
the division of work among the commissioners themselves, another 
was the special interest of the chairman in economic policy-making. 
Then there are curious examples of unevenness in the attention paid 
to various subjects. For example, the lack of depth or bite in the 
sections on statutory boards perhaps reflects no more than the limits 
of available time and interest. 
At all events the crude generalizations given above need to be 
developed and amplified. This will be done through considering in 
turn aspects of the social, political and managerial agendas. 
Bureaucracy and social change 
The themes on RCAGAS social agenda are so familiar to Australians, 
and so easily intelligible in other English-speaking countries, that 
they require little description. They posit that bureaucracy should 
be more responsive, more sensitive and more accessible to members 
of the public and to client groups; more "representative" in 
structure and personnel of the society which it is supposed to serve; 
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more open and in a sense less hierarchical in its methods of working. 
These themes lead to a host of specific proposals. On many points 
these are intended to make bureaucracy "catch up" with the social 
norms of the age, on others bureaucracy is intended to be the 
pacemaker for further social change. 
What is less clear is the longer-term administrative and political 
implications of some of these proposals, if they are adopted. Here 
one can spot certain unresolved problems to which I return later. 
In this section I will summarize and discuss briefly the main 
elements in this social agenda. 
1. The proposals for improved service delivery include the fixing 
of definite decision-making powers on counter staff, to be supported 
by higher status, more training, and better working conditions 
(R 73-6); more delegation to field oflicers (R 95-6); various 
measures of inter-departmental coordination at the regional level 
(R 99-106); and the continuation of the one-stop shop experiment 
(R 115-6). 
The improvement of across-the-counter service delivery, already 
exemplified by the commission's experimental "one-stop shop" at 
Coburg, Victoria, could represent RCAGAS largest single contribution 
to better administration. This is one of those rare occasions where 
a commission has done research in action as a basis for its 
proposals.'" The difficulties include not only the familiar problems 
of changing bureaucratic attitudes, but the considerable cost likely 
to be entailed by full implementation." 
Further of course the theme of more integrated service delivery 
and access runs into the familiar prickly issue of cooperation 
between commonwealth and states. It is partly this factor which 
makes the proposals for regional coordination look such a ragbag 
of little, tentative ideas. No doubt better service delivery by 
commonwealth departments may encourage emulation by states, yet 
the problem remains that the more the commonwealth government 
develops its local organs of administration and participation, in 
American fashion, the more complicated (and expensive) becomes 
the administrative maze. 
2. The proposals for "opening up" bureaucracy to the public include 
broader representation on advisory bodies (R 86, R 88-9), govern-
ment assistance (possibly) for the smaller pressure groups (R 90), 
more use of voluntary bodies as agents (R 83-5), closer personal 
contacts (R 91-3), better and fuller information services (R 301-7). 
Some of these proposals are little more than exhortations, 
although they accord closely with the pressure in all democracies 
for more "public participation". As RCAGA recognizes, this pressure 
is directed not only against government itself, but against the "big 
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interests" which have got increasingly entangled in government 
decision-making. In the report this issue is associated with the 
somewhat different one of their dismissal of the traditional "West-
minster model" as a description of minister-public service rela-
tionships (see next section). Their assumption seems to be that / / 
public servants have and feel greater freedom in their consultations 
with the public, they will take more pains to listen to smaller, 
weaker or radical groups than is accepted in present practice. 
But the argument is quite unproven or substantiated. Its middle 
premise seems to be that if (as well) bureaucracy is more "socially 
representative", its officials will feel more sympathy with all sections 
of society. However, the main discretion will still lie with the higher 
officials who are not (in any society) socially representative, while 
the upward mobility and acculturation of those who rise from a 
humble start does not seem to produce the posited attitudes. One 
could even hypothesize that a more "representative" bureaucracy 
would be less open to minority groups, in so far as it would reflect 
more the conservatism of society generally. 
3. The proposals for making bureaucracy more socially represent-
ative include the abolition of the present nationality rule (R 1 17-9), 
the cessation of special protection for ex-servicemen and non-
graduates (R 123-4), its replacement by special protection for 
women and aboriginals (R 135-6, R 296-300), and the creation 
of an oflfice of equality in employment (R 140). 
Partly these represent obvious adjustments of bureaucratic re-
cruitment to the changed structure of Australian society. Rights 
for aboriginals is one obvious case where RCAGA seeks not to reflect 
social change but to lead it. The respect for women's rights may 
be viewed partly in the same light. (Certainly women are weakly 
represented in the upper echelons of the public service, although 
comparisons with society generally are hard to make.) Partly of 
course it may be seen by male chauvinists as an inevitable gesture 
in a country which produced Germaine Greer. 
4. Proposals for "liberalizing" bureaucracy itself include the for-
mulation of a clearer code of public servants' rights and duties 
(R 191-7), provision for open reporting on staff (R 156-9), and 
counselling on ethics (R 1)—although this is primarily directed 
towards the special problems sometimes encountered by top officials 
in their dealings with ministers. 
5. Overlapping with the last two categories are the proposals for 
establishing greater mobility between Commonwealth public service 
and other occupations via exchange schemes (R 94), and more 
mobility within the public service (R 329-31). Special attention is 
paid to the renaming and reorganization of the present second 
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division officers which would increase their mobility (R 238-40), 
and to breaking down what is regarded as the inbred character of 
Foreign Affairs (R 223-7) and Treasury (R 311). 
To some extent these proposals for greater internal mobility in 
the public service are at variance with the later "managerial" 
proposals for increasing the discretion of departments in respect 
of recruitment, classification and promotion. American experience 
suggests that greater agency autonomy and more internal promotion 
of this kind leads also to greater inbreeding. This tendency then 
has to be offset by special schemes for inter-departmental mobility, 
such as RCAGA urges the Public Service Board to develop. The 
impact of such schemes will be greatest at the highest levels. 
The wish to "democratize" Treasury and, to a lesser extent. 
Foreign Affairs accords with the more populist element in the 
report. It ties in with other major criticisms that RCAGA has of 
Treasury, and helps to provide political and radical critics with a 
useful substitute villain for the bureaucracy generally. Every reform 
document must have its villain. 
Political control and accountability 
Latently if not overtly, the commission had to face the basic 
problem of incompatibilities between political and bureaucratic 
styles of working and decision-making. This is of course a problem 
for all democracies. But it is a special problem for a reform 
commission whose administrative proposals cannot be expected to 
work without effective political back-up. It is in this sense, as 
already noted, that the political and managerial agendas are closely 
inter-related. 
The commission made great play with the deficiencies of the 
traditional "Westminster model" of ministerial-public service rela-
tions, which was the subject of a consultant's paper by Professor 
Emy.'' Actually these "deficiencies" are of two rather different 
kinds. First there is a weaker relationship in Canberra than there 
is in Whitehall between ministers and parliament on the one hand, 
and the public service on the other. Secondly there are the intrinsic 
limitations upon the notion of "ministerial responsibility" in an age 
of big government. 
The first problem is more peculiarly Australian, although it is 
also related to the circumstances of federation. Ministers are not 
sufficiently permanent in Canberra itself or in their departmental 
offices to take (as a rule) effective control of their departments. 
The conduct of most of their business within parliament house. 
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whatever its symbolic value in stressing'political supremacy over 
the bureaucracy, expresses also a great deal of discontinuity 
between the conduct of political and administrative business. 
Further the Australian cabinet is not so effective a collective policy-
making body as the British cabinet, great indeed as is the latter's 
limitations. This is due partly to the same political causes as produce 
ministerial weakness, but also to the special factors of caucus 
election of ministers in the case of a Labor government and of 
coalition problems and tactics in the case of a Liberal-Country party 
one.'-
Of course the spatial and temporal restrictions upon Australian 
ministers may be mere epiphenomena. The truth may be that 
Australian politicians would hold themselves aloof from mere 
"administration", whatever their circumstances, inasmuch as they 
do not share the traditional British subject respect for government 
as opposed to party. If this hypothesis is true, then Australia may 
combine an American concept of politics with a British one of 
administration. Something in the end may have to give—either 
bureaucratic power will become entrenched, or the top bureaucracy 
will be politicized. Such speculations were alien to the com-
missioners, who floated happily in the special Australian brew of 
partisan politics and self-confident (or arrogant, according to taste) 
professionalism, and exorcised the conflicts with hearty injunctions. 
Moreover, it is a familiar truth that even an attentive and 
effective minister could today only consider and decide a fraction 
of the acts done formally in his name. To some extent this always 
has been and should be the case. There is no need for a minister 
to decide many matters, so long as he can intervene effectively for 
sufficient political reasons. However it may be that public business 
has grown to a point where this sanction has become inadequate; 
and that in consequence government procedures need to be revised 
to distinguish more clearly between political and bureaucratic 
duties, and to link these duties with changed systems of 
accountability.'" 
How was the commission to tackle these problems? It might 
possibly have ignored them, but that (as I shall illustrate) would 
have been inconsistent with its managerial aims. Its attempted 
answers can be conveniently considered under the headings of 
ministers, cabinet and parliament. 
Ministers and their departments. Three lines of approach were (and 
are) open on this subject. The first approach accepts the inevitability 
of some conflict between political will and bureaucratic response, 
and concentrates upon strengthening the former through the 
recruitment of partisan policy aides who will help a minister to 
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formulate and impose his policies upon his department. This was 
the rationale for the appointment of ministerial advisers by the 
Whitlam government, precisely as happened under the Wilson 
government in the UK between 1964 and 1970; and the views of 
the British Labour party, which urged upon the Fulton committee 
the desirability of arming ministers with politically sympathetic 
"brains' trusts", are closely paralleled or exceeded by opinion within 
the Australian Labor party. 
Clearly this approach was likely to be difficult for RCAGA given 
its composition, just as it is anathema to the senior bureaucracy 
and to some sections of political opinion. Its ideas are as incom-
patible with constitutional and administrative traditions in Australia 
as they are in the UK. But in any event the issue was defused by 
the removal of the Whitlam government, and by growing acceptance 
(as in the UK) of the concept of enlarged ministerial private offices, 
so long as these remain pretty modest in size and do not seriously 
threaten the role of bureaucracy. So RCAGA could content itself with 
clarifying the temporary status and salary scales of ministerial 
advisers. Still the issue may have been shelved rather than resolved, 
and it could explode again. The commission's bland suggestion that 
a minister should work out with his permanent head the jobs of 
his personal advisers disguises, if recent British experience is any 
guide, some very awkward and soul-searching individual problems. 
A second line of approach for RCAGA—more feasible and surely 
in principle most attractive—would have been to espouse something 
like the Swedish model. Ministries would be slimmed drastically 
to concentrate on policy issues and critical decisions, while policy 
execution and routine administration would be done by statutory 
boards. The advantages would be a real clarification of political-
administrative relations, including the role of the minister himself. 
Moreover, inasmuch as Australian government has already spawned 
a great number of statutory boards and hybrid commissions which 
mix advisory, policy and executive functions, the Swedish example 
would fall on fertile ground and would provide an excellent 
opportunity for some administrative spring-cleaning of some most 
untidy cupboards. 
Why did the commission not take the Swedish model more 
seriously then? One answer may be that the commissioners, like 
most Australians, are more dedicated than they realize to some of 
the muddled but pragmatic conventions of the despised "West-
minster model", such as that policy and administration ought not 
to be sharply separated, that relations between ministers and 
departments should be flexible, that governments should be free to 
establish many kinds of agencies and procedures to meet diverse 
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circumstances, and then cope subsequently with the awkward 
problems of "accountability", and so on. If there is a more specific 
objection to the Swedish system, it is that it would both reduce 
and transform the authority of permanent heads,'* as well as the 
potential reserves of authority held by a minister. 
The third approach, which the commission did adopt, is to try 
and strengthen the minister's overall capacity for direction, while 
simultaneously strengthening the "managerial" freedom and ac-
countability of his permanent head. The first point is tackled 
through clarifying the formal authority of the minister over his 
permanent head (R 14), stressing the minister's right to advice from 
any staff in his department (R 16, R 18), and respectfully 
suggesting that parliament organize its divisions so as to be less 
disruptive of the timetable of ministers (R 33). These proposals 
are rather minor and limited, from the standpoint of changing 
Canberra behaviour. 
The changed status (and renamed title) of the permanent head 
is another matter, as it is a crucial element in RCAGA'S ideas of 
"accountable management" as well as an attempted answer to 
deficiencies of the Westminster model. Australian writings by 
permanent heads about their roles and relations with ministers are 
wholly familiar to an Englishman, because they embody the same 
polyvalent roles, the same flexible conventions, the same expressions 
of the necessity for mutual trust (although perhaps in Australia 
the trust is sometimes more strained)."" If there is a difference, it 
lies in the greater emphasis in Australia upon a degree of 
managerial independence for the permanent head, in respect of the 
actual organization and running of the department, which derives 
from constitutional history and from the greater administrative 
remoteness of ministers. This authority is based upon convention 
rather than law, even though supported ambiguously by a clause 
in the Public Service Act which RCAGA proposes to change. But the 
Australian permanent head, powerful though he is, has also had 
to move with the times. His control of communications is being 
modified, as in Britain, and his ability to treat political issues as 
if they were administrative ones (a considerable source of strength) 
is less workable than it used to be. 
Thus in stressing the managerial accountability of the permanent 
head, RCAGA is building on a firm tradition. But the doubt is how 
far this managerial role can be separately defined and monitored. 
It overlaps with policy advice—indeed the commission insists that 
it be related to clear and defined policy objectives. If such a process 
proves elusive, as is to be expected (especially in Australia), then 
it may be doubted how far the respective duties of minister and 
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permanent head will in fact be clarified. The commission is too wise 
to attempt to codify so elusive a relationship, and the suggestion 
that the Public Service Board might do more work on conventions 
and cases cannot amount to much. Perhaps, after all, Australia will 
have to go on living with the Westminster model. 
Cabinet. The need to strengthen cabinet can be stated on both 
political and administrative grounds. Politically, cabinet is the 
obvious vehicle for establishing a coherent party policy under 
conditions of office. Administratively cabinet alone can provide the 
basic priorities and disciplines which keep the departments in line. 
Virtually all the reform literature in countries with a cabinet form 
of government endorses these aims. This is the point where 
democratic political theory coincides with the doctrine of "corporate 
management". And this modern fusion of thought has over the last 
decade born fruit in the creation of special policy units attached 
to cabinet (in UK, Canada and Australia, for example), and in the 
concentration of basic decisions about public expenditure at cabinet 
level (notably in Canada). ' ' 
Naturally enough RCAGA endorses these aims. It proposes the 
reorganization of the department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
to differentiate and strengthen administrative support for cabinet 
(R 319), and the maintenance (or revival) of the central policy unit 
introduced by Whitlam (R 320). It also sees PM & c, under the 
supervision of both prime minister and cabinet, playing a more 
positive role over machinery of government issues (R 323) including 
clarifying and restricting the use of interdepartmental committees 
(iocs) (R 321), establishing task forces—sometimes as an alter-
native to iDcs (R 322), and watching experiments with coordinating 
ministers (R 285). But none of these proposals would necessarily 
represent a major change in existing practice; they are gestures to 
the desirability of cabinet coordination, if ministers will but respond 
to them. For a major change in the methods of collective decision-
making, the commission looks above all to its proposals for forward 
estimates, which will be treated in the next section. 
Parliament. No major changes are proposed in parliament's 
role,which is hardly surprising, except for the important innovation 
of a committee on administrative efficiency whose chairman would 
be paid a ministerial salary and which would be able to demand 
a direct reply to its criticisms from any department (R 59-60). 
This committee would be a vital support for the eflficiency reviews 
to be conducted by the Auditor-General. Only parliament can hope 
to provide an independent basis for such reviews, which are crucial 
for other RCAGA proposals. 
Otherwise RCAGA contents itself with clarifying the rights of MPS 
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to information, and the rules applying to the appearance of oflFicials 
before parliamentary committees. There is little novelty here, 
although (as would be expected) RCAGAS bias is towards more 
freedom of speech for officials before parliament (R 67, R 68, R 64), 
but more protection for them vis-a-vis party committees (R 70-1). 
Resource planning and accountable management 
It was to be expected, as noted earlier, that the commission would 
utilize current doctrines about these subjects. After all, they provide 
the planks for much recent administrative reform in Canada, USA, 
UK and elsewhere. What is most interesting, however, is the way 
that these doctrines have been selectively applied or harnessed to 
RCAGAS perception of Australian problems both administrative and 
political. 
It is fascinating to see how much mileage RCAGA hopes to get 
out of its forward estimate proposals. Basically it is a familiar and 
generally accepted idea that governments should plan their expen-
diture (at least tentatively) several years in advance, to determine 
their own priorities more comprehensively and realistically, and to 
help stabilize the balance between public and private sectors. But 
RCAGA utilizes this fairly simple notion to pursue a whole range of 
objectives (not listed here in order of importance)' 
(a) To reduce the Treasury's influence on the policy content of 
financial decisions 
(b) To coordinate financial planning by the Treasury with man-
power planning by the PSB (both of which would be embodied 
in the forward estimates) 
(c) To have resource priorities settled by a cabinet committee and 
ultimately by cabinet itself, thus committing ministers to a 
coherent framework of policies 
(d) To have departments and their permanent heads cooperate in 
the financial and policy disciplines of collective decision-
making 
(e) To lay a basis of government priorities and objectives which 
can underpin the practice of accountable management in 
departments 
Unfortunately forward estimates are a weak prop on which to build 
such great hopes. 
One wonders why RCAGA did not take a much closer look at 
resource planning in other countries. The introduction of PPBS in 
the USA was also expected (by its advocates) to make the policy 
process there more coherent and more "rational" and to support 
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accountable management. It can hardly be said to have succeeded. 
Interestingly the RCAGA approach is much more modest and limited 
than the PPBS package, yet the forward estimates part of PPBS is one 
element which has not made much headway against the reluctance 
of congress to accept or even to examine advance budgetary 
commitments. But then the USA does not have cabinet government, 
which makes this problem especially intractable.'* 
More relevant without doubt is the British experience with PESC 
(Public Expenditure Survey Committee). Here even a friendly critic 
would concede that PESC has not been too successful in disciplining 
expenditure decisions. Departments have used the machinery to get 
stronger commitments to their future expenditure than would 
otherwise be forthcoming, and Treasury control seems to have been 
weakened by joint decision-making instead of its traditional method 
of dealing severally with each department. There have also been 
some gains in foresight and realism, at both political and adminis-
trative levels." 
But in any event the broader hopes pinned on PESC and (still more) 
its accompaniment PAR (Program Analysis Review) have so far 
proved rather illusory. Cabinet has not proved so willing to immerse 
itself in forward resource planning as the basis of policy-making 
as the reform's sponsors had hoped. '^' Equally, the parliamentary 
expenditure committee has not managed to function as an effective 
critic of resource planning. The reasons are anything but mys-
terious. Politicians' tendencies are to argue about policies first, and 
to treat the availability of resources as a necessary constraint. It 
is difficult to follow the reverse process—to start with a block of 
money and consider how it is best allocated. A comprehensive 
financial plan is the product of institutional necessity which must 
eventually bind the executive but which is not compulsive for 
parliament in the same way. Even in the case of cabinet, ministers 
do not foresee or accept all the implications of such a plan but 
tacitly reserve their right to reopen issues as occasion offers. 
No doubt this picture is too gloomy. It applies up to a point 
to any form of collective policy-making. Australian cabinets may 
be capable of some of the disciplines of forward resource planning. 
But the extent to which they will use the occasion to establish firm 
and consistent policies must remain doubtful. 
More basically still, transformations from basic resource 
priorities to operational programmes to accountable management, 
as sketched in the RCAGA report, would be at best partial and 
somewhat tendentious. This is the language of idealistic economists 
and technicians, but government does not work this way. The idea 
that a permanent head should be judged for his management of 
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a block of resources, allocated to his department for the pursuit 
of agreed policy objectives, sounds fine in theory. But the permanent 
head cannot just take his objectives from cabinet; he must respond 
also (and primarily) to his minister and to other persons as well; 
he will be lucky if he has consistent objectives at all. 
Possibly these doubts are too negative. But at all events it must 
be recognized that "accountable management" covers only one slice 
of a permanent head's and a department's multiple tasks. Professor 
Emy's report, which accords closely with the commission's own 
thinking, quotes Keeling (without acknowledgment) to the effect 
that "management means the search for the best use of resources 
in pursuit of objectives subject to change". But Keeling also pointed 
out that management was one of three modes of activity practised 
by civil servants, the other two activities being "diplomatic" and 
"administrative". In diplomatic activity the aim is to get agreement 
or to achieve consent to or acquiescence in a decision, while 
administrative activity is concerned with rule making and adjudica-
tion in which considerations of justice, fair play and acceptability 
are important and often dominant considerations. Thus while 
Keeling certainly argues that effective resources use, according to 
some kind of cost-benefit tests, should receive much more adminis-
trative attention, he does not assume that resource efficiency can 
or should always be the dominant consideration.^' 
Further, the meaning of resource efficiency is often very arguable. 
Market tests of profit and loss play a limited part in government. 
They could of course be extended if government charged users for 
more of its services, but this is a wider issue. Quasi-business 
methods can sometimes be introduced, as for example under the 
commission's suggestion that departments should be free whenever 
possible to purchase common services from public agencies or other 
sources (R 22). There are zones of routine work where quantitative 
performance tests can be applied, although there are also problems 
and "dysfunctions". But these zones do not occur at the top of 
departments. 
The commission's doctrine of "accountable management" should 
be assessed from two standpoints. For one thing it is an essential 
corollary to its proposal to give to departments (and specifically 
to their permanent heads) greater financial freedom within the 
framework of forward estimates and general Treasury allocations; 
as well as greater freedom to recruit and promote staff, to determine 
individual work plans and to reward individual initiative, within the 
framework of general standards set by the PSB. If departments are 
to have these freedoms, there must be checks upon their use and 
abuse. These are to be provided through periodic reports on the 
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organizational eflRciency of departments to be provided by the 
Auditor-General (R 312-4) and through strengthened consultancy 
work and reviews of standards by the PSB (R 325-8). 
In principle this decentralization and increased flexibility of 
managerial responsibility accords with the best modern practice— 
certainly as practised in business. Probably it is right for govern-
ment too, but there must be doubts about the adequacy of the 
efficiency reviews. Probably RCAGA shared these doubts—at any rate 
there are signs that it had second thoughts about removing too many 
control powers from the PSB." It might have had the same doubts 
about Treasury-control relaxation, had it not been doctrinally 
critical of Treasury. Cynics might say that tough financial control, 
exercised by a prestigious but heartily disliked controlling agency, 
is the only way to get restraint in public expenditure. Lord Bridges 
may have been thinking of the same point when he said that he 
had always wanted to reduce Treasury control but never found a 
satisfactory way to do it." 
From the standpoint of establishing the accountability of top 
officials (and thus correcting the "Westminster model"), the 
commission's proposals seem less than adequate. This point has 
already in effect been made. It will be hard to establish a clear 
distinction between the "policy" responsibilities of the minister and 
the "managerial" ones of the permanent head. It might be possible 
to assess the competence of a department in respect of economical 
and prompt administration, although the minister would share some 
responsibility for the result. It would be impossible to fix responsi-
bility for policy advice among public servants, without politicizing 
the top bureaucracy. 
The arguments about how to provide more open information 
about policy-making in government—which led to one of the few 
interesting splits of opinion within the commission—will not, 
however they be resolved, establish any clear connection between 
"more information" and "more accountability". That of course is 
one of the reasons why open government on the Swedish model 
is often resisted in other countries. It is not without significance 
that responsibilities are more clearly fixed in Sweden in terms of 
machinery of government and of administrative law. As long as 
Australia practises a highly fluid, flexible and pragmatic system 
of administration, so long will rules of accountability prove elusive 
or illusory. 
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Coombs: The unfinished agenda. 
Let me briefly summarize some selective conclusions about the 
RCAGA report. 
On machinery of government it is disappointing. It puts too much 
faith in resource planning techniques, as was done earlier in USA 
and UK, but without enough research into the actual results. Its 
proposals for reducing the role of Treasury, in respect of forward 
estimates and through the creation of a counterweight Department 
of Industry and the Economy, already have a passe look. The Fraser 
government has instead chosen to divide Treasury, more with the 
idea of strengthening Treasury's financial control than sharing 
financial decisions with other departments. However the logical 
Canadian device of combining financial and manpower planning, 
which might have accorded with the RCAGA approach although not 
their actual proposals, has not been adopted—no doubt because it 
would demolish the PSB, a distinctive Australian institution. 
It is also curious that its approach to the regrouping of 
departments and their many satellite bodies should be so cautious. 
Once again it puts its faith, as did Sir Richard Clarke and other 
economic reformers in the UK, in a selective grouping of agencies 
according to sectors of public expenditure. But policy coordination 
considerations are often different from the tidier notions of system-
atic resource allocation, as experience with UK "giant" departments 
has shown.^ ^ 
The commission set its face against "bureau shuffling", though 
it was prepared for a coordinating minister for social welfare with 
a small department, a research bureau and a consultative council 
(R 285). The Australian need for more policy coordination in this 
field was too great to be gainsaid but coordinating ministers of this 
kind have not usually proved very elfective except where (as has 
happened with defence in many countries) they paved the way to 
fuller integration. Again there are the predictable injunctions to 
government to create statutory boards only for good and clear 
reasons, but if created to allow them more independence (R 32, 
R 34-5). But these injunctions do not take the analysis very far. 
Australian government has a particularly luxuriant growth of 
satellite bodies in relation to the total scale of its operations, but 
no fundamental review of their rationale and future was attempted. 
For related reasons, the attempted introduction of a more open 
and accountable style of government, which will establish more 
directly the responsibilities of public servants as opposed to those 
of ministers, will (I believe) fall far short of the RCAGA expectations. 
I doubt, for example, whether the proposals (even if implemented) 
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would change very greatly the relations between ministers and 
permanent heads," or would expose the latter to eflfective public 
praise or censure; and the proposals here concentrate very much 
upon "men at the top". Fundamental changes in these matters 
would depend upon basic alterations in departmental structure and 
in administrative law. 
These limitations may represent political realism. As with most 
reform commissions there is a considerable gap between rhetoric 
and achievement. As Fulton fulminated against the generalist 
administrators but left them essentially intact and indeed in charge 
of implementation, so does RCAGA denigrate the conventions of the 
"Westminster model" without (probably) really altering them. The 
more serious point is to ask what one wants of such a commission: 
is it a set of minor changes that may be immediately practical, 
or a blueprint for reformers for the next 20 years? Bearing in mind 
the rarity of such bodies, it is perhaps a pity that the latter approach 
did not get more attention. 
On public service structure and relations with the community, 
the report is more positive and potentially beneficial. Its proposals 
for a changed management structure for the service, embodying 
greater departmental freedoms and flexibility within a more inte-
grated but looser general framework, deserves full analysis. It has 
its problems, but in many ways looks "the pattern for the future". 
The suggested changes in bureaucratic relations with the public, 
particularly at points of direct contact, could if allowed have 
appreciable effect. 
But there are also items on the reform agenda which RCAGA hardly 
mentioned. One such is federalism. The omission is hardly surpris-
ing, yet the future organization of the federal government, whether 
at its top or bottom, ought to be related to the system of function-
sharing with the states. The fact that the Australian government's 
influence in many fields is primarily a financial one creates the 
temptation for the growth of a "grant-in-aid" polity, with specific 
(though often minor) types of policy influence being bought through 
specific grants. Only in recent years has Australian government 
moved in this direction, when compared for example with the 
American system. 
Yet the writing may well be on the wall, and a price have to 
be paid in the form of increasingly fragmented forms of government 
at all levels. This is serious in as much as state governments are 
often already too fragmented, which impedes (to take one major 
example) the planning of their large metropolitan areas which 
(given the weakness of local government) depend largely upon the 
interventions of many state departments and boards. Federal 
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government interventions seem more likely to reduce than to 
stimulate effective planning and coordination at the state level, 
without being able to introduce a viable alternative framework. A 
consideration of the growth of government machinery in Canberra 
ought to consider how far the development of "cooperative federal-
ism", Australian-style, will weaken the ability of states to plan 
effectively. 
Another missing item is consideration, save perhaps in the context 
of scientific research, of long-term planning and policy making. 
RCAGA thinks of planning primarily as medium-term economic 
management, looking three years ahead. In European countries, by 
contrast, there is increasing attention to much longer-run issues 
about population, natural resources, work satisfaction, physical 
development and democracy. The Netherlands has its council for 
scientific policy and Sweden its "future studies" secretariat. 
Australia might be thought, by virtue of its enormous territory, 
small population, and international vulnerability to be a suitable 
place for long-term planning. In the field of physical planning and 
development, for example, one would have thought that the 
initiative of the Whitlam government would represent only a 
beginning. Is it that Australian society is too prosperous (despite 
the current recession), too phlegmatic, and too introverted to want 
to look ahead, and the RCAGA simply reflects these attitudes? 
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The Public Service Inquiries LL 
and Responsible Government 
R S Parker 
The following remarks are not peculiarly directed to Australia, as 
I think they are applicable generally to governments working under 
any of the variations of the Westminster principles. What may be 
said about Australia is that in most of the states, and certainly 
at the federal level, any difficulties in maintaining responsible 
government are increased by the tyranny of distance, and they are 
exacerbated in all the governments by the effects of federalism. But 
Canada shares these features. Here I shall begin by reviewing the 
orthodox conceptions of "responsible government" which I discussed 
in a recent article, and then ask what relevance the reports of recent 
public service inquiries may have for an expanded view of 
"responsibility".' 
Difficulties of the conventional formation 
As presented in the article mentioned, responsibility in West-
minster-style governments meant the answerability of ministers to 
the legislature for the administrative acts done in government 
agencies under ministerial control, as enforced by the obligation 
of ministers to answer questions, explain their administration in 
parliament and resign if censured by a majority of the parliament. 
The principle (or doctrine, or norm) was supposed to be central 
to democratic government in such regimes because in theory the 
operation of these mechanisms could lead to a general election, and 
the result could turn in part on the account of their stewardship 
that the mechanisms had elicited from ministers during their 
incumbency. I suggested in the article that the effectiveness of the 
doctrine as an instrument of democracy depended on the availability 
of adequate information for parliament and public about what the 
administration was doing, on the actual control ministers were able 
to exert over the administration and on the viability of the sanctions 
that in theory bound the ministers. 
The article went on to record the general opinion that neither 
The Public Service Inquiries and Responsible Government 335 
information, ministerial control nor the conventional sanctions were 
adequate at the present time to make ministerial responsibility a 
satisfactory guarantee—or even index—of democracy in a modern 
community. Indeed, the weakness of these three mechanisms in 
practice has tempted some observers to fall back upon a less 
exacting meaning for "ministerial responsibility" than the mechani-
cal actuation of specific sanctions in certain designated circum-
stances. D.E. Butler, for example, concludes from his observations 
that British and Australian politics work in the social context of 
a generally-held belief, shared by politicians including ministers, 
that government should be answerable at least to the electors; that 
opposition, even in parliament, should be tolerated up to a point; 
that free criticism is legitimate and ministries should not use the 
coercive powers they certainly possess to suppress every challenge. 
Accepting this much, ministers are prepared to face the conse-
quences; measure the tactical imprudence of excessive reticence; 
compete for popular approval. . . At election time: 
every minister, indeed every government candidate is being held 
collectively responsible for the cabinet decisions of the past few years. 
When the time comes to vote, there is no ambiguity about whom to 
reward or to punish.^  
Such formulations express, perhaps, a kind of truth but they cannot 
be a great consolation to the many victims of the arbitrary acts 
of ministers and bureaucrats that occur between elections, even in 
a polity that can be so described. "Ministerial responsibility" ought 
to mean something narrower and more precise than this, and 
"responsible government", as I shall argue, ought to mean some-
thing much broader—but also more precise. 
The earlier paper made a less familiar point: that "ministerial 
responsibility" in its more precise sense has never, even in theory, 
been supposed to extend throughout the whole of the governmental 
system in the Westminster countries; it did not apply, for example, 
to judicial agencies, to elective local government and to many other 
quasi-autonomous statutory agencies. So if these were not outside 
the democratic system, they must (or should) be subject to some 
other forms of accountability. 
The argument that follows is intended to apply both to these 
"extra-ministerial" parts of the governmental system, and also to 
the parts which were nominally supposed to be covered by the 
conventions of ministerial responsibility. It is easy to summarize 
its essentials. If democratic government—perhaps "responsible 
government"—means anything practical it must mean more than 
ministerial responsibility. It surely depends also on a number of 
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Other institutions, which have evolved as painfully and are still not 
fully developed. Furthermore, "government" today cannot be dis-
cussed sensibly in terms of ministers alone: we must take into 
account the whole apparatus of government, especially the adminis-
tration, and the bureaucracies which run it. The effectiveness of 
information, control and sanctions needs to be reassessed in this 
wider context—and so do the other relevant institutions. What does 
this wider picture look like? 
A broader concept of responsible government 
First, for a fully responsible government, information needs to be 
seen as a two-way process. Both ministers and other parts of the 
administration give out information, but they also receive and use 
it. And in each direction some information is volunteered and some 
is requisitioned. Government agencies voluntarily make their annual 
reports, issue their green and white papers, make their ministerial 
statements, issue their PR handouts and arrange their unofficial 
"leaks"—and individual politicians and officials may make their 
critical or revealing "public comment". In addition, parlia-
mentarians, members of the public and media people demand 
information—through questions, interviews, correspondence, legal 
actions, summoning officials to parliamentary committees or even 
to the bar of a legislative chamber. They want access to what 
ministers and officials know and think, and access to their records. 
And ministers resist some of these demands in the name of crown 
privilege or of "ministerial responsibility" itself. In the other 
direction, government seeks information through ministerial ad-
visers, commissions of inquiry, consultations with interest groups 
and research. And it receives unsolicited feedback through pressure 
groups, the media and opinion polls. 
Second, ministerial responsibility conventionally implies min-
isterial control and knowledge of what all parts of the adminis-
tration are doing. Once we accept that this is no longer possible 
(if it ever was), and that large parts of the government apparatus 
are formally outside ministerial responsibility anyway, new ques-
tions are raised about the meaning of responsible government. 
Ministers need control of the apparatus to be realistically answer-
able to parliament for its doing; who is answerable—and in what 
way—for those parts of the apparatus which ministers cannot, or 
are not supposed to, control? How far does responsible government 
require central control and coordination of the administrative 
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apparatus as a whole? How far is that compatible with devolution, 
decentralization and delegation? 
Third, we have recognized that the conventional parliamentary 
sanctions once supposed to enforce ministerial responsibility have 
been made ineffective by the stability and solidarity of political 
party majorities. They have also been partly replaced by such 
restraints as political parties exercise over their own leaders. But 
clearly there are other kinds of sanctions available to keep various 
parts of the administration responsible—some of them old and 
weak, others still new and scarcely tried. There are parliamentary 
standing and select committees of varying eflfectiveness, and the 
intercession of members with the administration on behalf of 
constitutents and interest groups. There are financial, eflficiency and 
effectiveness audits. There are administrative and judicial tribunals 
and ombudsmen. 
Thus ministerial answerability to parliament is one among many 
forms of responsibility enforced upon the various parts of the whole 
administration. Still other institutions are relevant to a complete 
picture. At one end, for example, there is the system of parlia-
mentary representation and all that goes with it—the fairness of 
the electoral system, the free choice of political parties, the degree 
of oligarchy and democracy in the parties themselves. At the other 
end there is the character of the administration—particularly of 
the government bureaucracy. If ministers cannot be effectively 
responsible for the whole of it, then in some sense we may expect 
responsibility directly from the bureaucracy itself. Whether we find 
it depends upon a number of factors not yet fully understood. Is 
the responsibility of a bureaucracy affected by its composition— 
in terms of class, colour and creed; does a bureaucracy, in other 
words, need to be representative in order to be responsible? Can 
responsiveness be inculcated, or promoted by mobility of staff, non-
hierarchical organization or systematic training? Can the bureauc-
racy be made more accessible, and—yes—responsive again, to its 
clients and beneficiaries, by taking thought? In short, is respon-
siveness—a pervasive set of attitudes and expectations—a vital and 
manageable aspect of responsibility? 
With such broader concepts of responsible government in mind, 
let us see what the public service inquiries have to say on the subject. 
After a rapid survey of the inquiries headed by McCarthy (New 
Zealand 1962), Fulton (United Kingdom 1967), Corbett (South 
Australia 1973), Lewis (NSW 1974), Bland (Victoria 1974) and 
Coombs (commonwealth 1976), it emerges that only Coombs 
(RCAGA) was asked explicitly in its terms of reference to consider 
aspects of responsible government. They included: 
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(b) relationship of the Australian Public Service and statutory 
corporations and other authorities with the Parliament, Min-
isters and the community; 
(c) parliamentary scrutiny and control of administration; 
(d) responsibility and accountability of public servants, and their 
participation in forming policy and making decisions 
But the Bland, Coombs, Corbett and McCarthy inquiries were also 
asked—all in precisely the same words—to report on at least one 
other relevant subject: "the organization, coordination and control 
of departments". Aspects of responsibility touched on in some of 
these inquiry reports will be discussed under the headings used in 
the preceding paragraphs: information, control, sanctions and 
responsiveness. 
Information 
The Coombs and Corbett reports take somewhat different views of 
the more orthodox forms of information volunteered by govern-
ments. Corbett recommends, for example, that all public service 
staffs should have courses in communication, that there should be 
a government information department and that it should be 
government policy to change the attitudes of public service man-
agement toward a more favourable view of information services. 
The RCAGA section on information devotes more space and care to 
information for government and the administration than to informa-
tion for the public. It is distinctly sceptical about the existing 
departmental information services and suggests they should be 
pruned. But it plumps for more annual reports from departments, 
frankly discussing real problems. 
On the need to improve the parliament's and the public's chances 
to requisition relevant information in oflRcial hands, most of the 
reports are silent, while the series of observations in RCAGA are more 
disappointing than silence. In effect, this report accepts the prevail-
ing orthodoxy that the disposition of official information should 
remain ultimately within the discretion of ministers, subject to the 
limited encroachments already made by the courts. The procedures 
proposed for officials appearing before parliament or its committees 
go no further than current practice at its best. The report recognizes 
the growing custom of officials assisting party caucus committees 
and suggests that they protect their neutrality in that dangerous 
situation by bringing a colleague if the minister is not present. When 
members of parliament or the public approach departments for 
information, the minister again, says RCAGA, should retain the final 
say upon what is to be released. 
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It is ironical that E.G. Whitlam, whose party came to power in 
1972 with fanfare about "open government", was the prime minister 
who should state the doctrine of oflRcial reticence in its most extreme 
form. When the senate proposed (ineptly enough) to question senior 
officials about government activities relevant to the executive 
council's authorization of a petrodollar loan, Whitlam's ministers 
forbade their officials to answer any questions or produce any 
documents or papers whatever on the subject. Whitlam told the 
president of the senate that the opposition was plainly seeking to 
inquire into government policy and should seek this information 
only from ministers themselves through the "normal and proper 
parliamentary procedures" (which we have already noted are 
notoriously ineffective). He added that seeking to question the 
officials was challenging "the fundamental character of ministerial 
responsibility", which "is, and must remain, the keystone of our 
parliamentary system". 
It is interesting to compare with this what a former British 
permanent secretary said in the course of some comments on the 
Fulton report. On the question of accountability of a modern 
administration. Sir Maurice Dean was not impressed by the 
argument that accountability for policy was achieved through 
debates, questions in parliament and public discussion in the media. 
These activities were usually conducted on party lines and were 
neither well informed nor well suited to creative or analytical 
debate. He noted the stock arguments that policy involves party 
politics and is a matter for ministers alone, and that attempts to 
apportion praise or blame between ministers and officials might 
compromise the confidential relations which should exist between 
ministers and their advisers. To these arguments he replied with 
a useful parable: if a liner hits the rocks, everyone agrees that the 
captain is "responsible", but this does not mean that his sub-
ordinates will be exempt from interrogation—and the inquiry will 
also examine the navigational equipment and the skills of the crew. 
Sir Maurice added: "The confidential character of the relations 
between ministers and civil servants is not an end in itself. If we 
can do better by breaching it we should do so".' 
In a paper delivered to a law conference Professor Enid 
Campbell, a former member of the Coombs commission, was rather 
more provocative than the RCAGA report. While recognizing the 
familiar "dangers", she thought it could be argued that "rather 
than undermining ministerial responsibility, the revelation of de-
partmental advisings reinforces it by providing an essential basis 
for the parliament to make a judgment on the minister's culpability 
and liability to censure". She remarked further that the Whitlam 
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government's proposed ombudsman review system, while not en-
croaching upon the domain of policy making, would interprose 
between officials and ministers an outside source of influence and 
control—and "to the extent that it involves judgments being made 
about the acts and omissions of officials, it provides impetus to the 
idea that officials should be held individually and publicly accoun-
table for their actions". And she concluded; 
It is doubtful whether the fostering of direct and public accountability 
on the part of officials does any great violence to the principles 
underlying the Westminster system. After all, the precepts of ministerial 
responsibility represent just one of a variety of possible expedients for 
subjecting the exercise of public power to the superintendence and 
judgment of the people for whose benefit that power is meant to be 
employed.•• 
Henry Parris gives a number of examples of the freedom with 
which nineteenth century British oflFicials publicized views and 
information and commented on the administration of government. 
I have used one of these examples before because it seems to 
epitomize the psychology underlying the present conventional rela-
tions of ministers and officials. It was none other than Charles 
Trevelyan, founder of the modern British civil service, who after 
visiting Ireland in 1843 reported to senior ministers on the turbulent 
political situation there, and then wrote a long letter to the Morning 
Chronicle about it. Said the secretary of state for home affairs to 
the prime minister: "Surely it is highly improper that a Secretary 
of the Treasury should thus communicate to an Opposition paper 
intelligence which he made known to the government as of official 
importance?" The prime minister agreed: "How a man after his 
confidential interview with us could think it consistent with common 
decency to reveal to the . . . world all he told us is passing strange. 
He must be a consuminate fool". Upon which Parris asks, per-
tinently in the present context: 
Was Trevclyan's action "highly improper" or was it a "public service"? 
If he disagreed with his political superiors it was clearly not because 
he was a "blockhead" or a "consummate fool". The incident was not 
a breach of a settled rule, but a conflict of views as to the proper 
behaviour for a civil servant prior to the establishment of the modern 
convention.' 
While there must obviously be some limits to the freedom of 
action of the parties to the relationship between a minister and his 
official advisers under responsible government, it is clear that these 
limits are connected with such subtle matters as personal maturity, 
flexibility and tolerance of mind, trust and confidence, or the 
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reverse: party-based fears and pressures, mistrust and the instinct 
for concealment. The very phrase "open government", so closely 
related to democratic government, is suggestive of the rare qualities 
of character that would be necessary to make it workable. Sir 
Robert Peel thought Trevelyan was a fool for not realizing that 
the government would want to hug his report to its breast (however 
important that it should become public knowledge) in the hope of 
getting some political advantage from it. The majority of the 
Coombs commission realised that Peel's idea of politics was still 
the realpolitik of today, and while recognizing the abstract virtues 
of openness, were unwilling to explore the possibility of more mature 
psychological attitudes toward open discussion by oflficials as well 
as ministers, and toward the public revelation of unpleasant facts. 
They were content to admit that there was "a need to reassess the 
proper ambit of that relationship (RC 5.1.37)." 
Control 
Not unnaturally, the inquiries discussed the need for control and 
coordination mainly in terms of increasing the mutual consistency 
of programmes, making them more manageable and minimizing the 
waste of resources, rather than as means of making the answer-
ability of ministers to parliament more realistic. McCarthy did pin 
the responsibility squarely on ministers for the economical and 
efl'icient management of their departments, and on the prime 
minister for the coordination of administrative eflTort as a whole, 
and considered the central administrative organs in this light, as 
will be seen. Fulton and Bland were concerned mainly with the 
central personnel agencies and their potential contributions to better 
staffing and internal management. Because of the circumstances in 
their respective civil services they did not see those agencies as 
important contributors to the framing, coordination or control of 
policy in action. The other inquiries did see them in this role to 
varying degrees, along with other central agencies such as the chief 
minister's and financial departments. They all had proposals for 
strengthening the central machinery of government by modifying, 
extending or redistributing the functions and powers of these 
agencies—and in the case of Coombs by adding another one, the 
proposed department of Industry and the Economy. Whether the 
adoption of such proposals would strengthen responsible government 
by making ministers more effectively answerable for adminis-
trative doings was a question most of the inquiries did not explore. 
In the RCAGA report, however, the whole complex of arrangements 
342 R.S. Paiker 
summed up by the term "forward estimates" could be seen as an 
effort in this direction. As suggested by one subsequent commen-
tator, RCAGA wanted by these means to de-bureaucratize the 
budgeting process in order to ensure that ministers and parliament 
had more of the responsibility for budgeting.' (RCAGA also noted 
how parliament had deprived itself of much of the potentiality of 
coordination and control through the budget by allowing over half 
the commonwealth's annual expenditure to get into permanent 
appropriations and therefore beyond the reach of effective annual 
review.) The practical prospects of "forward estimates" involving 
politicians in more responsible control have been amply discussed 
by others. 
Both Coombs and Corbett proposed to broaden and strengthen 
ministerial control through more specific reforms: collecting related 
functions into fewer and bigger departments, promoting inter-
departmental collaboration by "sectional groupings" of departments 
and by staff mobility, pruning the rank growth of statutory 
corporations and bringing surviving corporations with related func-
tions under one minister. McCarthy proposed to begin higher up 
with the same kinds of measures: a rationalization of the cabinet 
committee system, strengthening of the cabinet secretariat, a more 
careful grouping of portfolios and departments under ministers— 
as well as the amalgamation of departments and the bringing of 
the big state corporations under the "eflRciency and economy" 
surveillance of a much more influential state services commission. 
The McCarthy commission revived an important question that 
had been overlooked and forgotten in all the original white dominion 
offshoots of the Westminster system. It recommended (successfully) 
that the state services commission, hitherto an "independent" 
statutory body, be constituted a department of state directly 
responsible to the prime minister, its principal commissioner being 
the "chief adviser to the Government on all matters bearing on 
the overall eflRciency and economy of the State Services" and on 
the allocation of functions and coordination among departments. 
McCarthy added that the commission should, however, as the 
employing authority for the public service, be given statutory 
independence in matters relating to individual officers, such as 
appointments, promotions (except to permanent head), transfers, 
grading, classification and discipline. McCarthy set out the logic 
of its approach in a passage which deserves quotation. The original 
Public Service Commission 
was set up to do two main things: to build a unified career service, 
and to promote efficiency and economy. The obvious interrelation of 
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these functions has obscured their essential separateness. To be suc-
cessful [in eliminating political patronage in staff appointments etc.] 
the Commission had to be made completely independent of political 
control in matters affecting individual public servants . . . But in 
ensuring efficiency and economy in wider matters of general organiza-
tion and conditions of employment, it must act always as the agent 
of the Government, which has ultimate responsibility for these things. 
It has never been and could never be politically independent in 
performing this function. Thus, these two distinct functions—one 
requiring independence from and the other requiring submission to 
Government (that is, 'political') control—must be kept separate . . .' 
Curiously, McCarthy did not carry this irrefutable logic to the 
point of recommending separate bodies for the two functions. Yet 
both the distinction between the functions and their allocation to 
different bodies had always been taken for granted in Britain itself 
and in nearly all Britain's other colonial administrations both before 
and after their independence. Britain organized to end patronage 
in appointments after 1855 by setting up the politically independent 
Civil Service Commission. The other "establishments" and machin-
ery of government functions remained where they had been already 
concentrated (with undeniable historical logic) in the Treasury. 
Fulton had them removed from the Treasury but there was no doubt 
that they would remain in a responsible ministerial department 
retaining close connections with the prime minister. In the ex-
colonial states, establishments functions were generally kept under 
ministerial responsibility and close to the chief minister or president; 
their civil service commissions added the other quasi-judicial 
functions affecting individual officers—promotions, classification 
and discipline—to the control of appointments, and no more. 
The rationality of these arrangements is so clear that it helps 
to explain, by contrast, some of the failures of Australian (and New 
Zealand) public service commissions, and some of the shambling 
disarray of administrative structures and methods in these parts. 
By uniting the responsibility for detailed personnel functions and 
for "oversight of efficiency and economy" in statutory agencies 
nominally outside political control, we have produced certain 
inevitable results. In most cases the commissions have bogged down 
in the inescapable routine of personnel administration. Partly for 
this reason, partly hampered by equivocal statutory powers and 
partly because their "independence" has deprived them of the 
indispensable political support of a responsible minister, the public 
service commissions have largely neglected or shirked what Mc-
Carthy rightly calls the "even more important function" of super-
vising and updating departmental organization and management in 
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line with changing governmental needs. In some cases, as McCarthy 
said of the New Zealand body, the commission has been independ-
ent only as to individual personnel dealings, and has simply bowed 
to the government's wishes on such matters as recruitment stan-
dards and wage policies as well as departmental organization. In 
some cases, governments have decided these matters for themselves 
in hand-to-mouth fashion with scant regard to the public service 
commission. The NSW Public Service Board has been more 
influential than most in organization and coordination as well as 
in staffing policy and administration, partly because of its excep-
tionally strong statutory powers, but also because it has taken care 
to cultivate the political support of governments—especially pre-
miers—and to work in close collaboration with them. 
As we have seen, McCarthy went furthest toward unravelling 
the confusion, though not the whole way. Corbett and Bland were 
at least vaguely aware of the problem. Without proposing to alter 
the formal status of South Australia's Public Service Board, and 
reasoning only by analogy with "any other board or authority", 
Corbett recommended that the government of the day should be 
able to give written "general policy directives imposing broad 
guidelines on public service policy", and (in a manner not explained) 
"to require the Board to adhere to such directives" (C 2.00). Bland 
approached the problem still more obliquely. He agreed with the 
others that the Victorian Public Service Board "must be concerned 
with the structuring, organization and eflSciency of the Service as 
a whole", and should advise government [in disorderly metaphors] 
on "the most suitable vehicle for handling a new function", and 
so on. But, in whatever functions it is exercizing, 
10.34 . . . a Public Service Board . . . should have the maximum of 
independence . . . Yet there can be no quality of absoluteness about 
a Board's independence. Nor, on the other hand, any untoward 
compromise of that independence . . . 
10.36 No Government or Minister may instruct or attempt to influence 
the PSB in the exercise of its mandatory statutory powers and functions 
10.38 . . . the PSB. should, in the exercise of its discretionary powers 
and functions, take heed of announcements of policy made by the 
Government of the day to the Parliament . . . 
Bland expected that "a Government would take this course only 
very occasionally and in respect of policy issues of great public 
moment" (Bl 10.40). This is far from the McCarthy concept of 
ministerial responsibility for the ongoing organization, coordination 
and efficiency of the administration. 
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RCAGA acknowledged in one sentence and without emphasis the 
basic functional distinction drawn by McCarthy, but saw in it no 
cause to hive off quasi-judicial functions from the commonwealth 
PSB, and explicitly rejected the idea of direct ministerial responsi-
bility for staffing policy, organizational coordination, and eflRciency 
of management. Coombs thought that only the prime minister 
should have such a responsibility, and he was too busy. Then, in 
a sentence as contradictory as Bland's, RCAGA declared: 
We consider that the statutory independence of the Board should be 
maintained and that the Prime Minister should continue to be the 
minister responsible for the general working of the Public Service (RC 
11.6.5; my emphasis). 
RCAGA went on to propose a great increase in the managerial (as 
distinct from personnel) functions of the board, as "the prime 
instrument of coordination", through management consultancy, 
promotion of organizational efficiency, control of staflT numbers, its 
input to forward estimates, control of salary and related costs and 
machinery of government reviews (the last in collaboration with 
PM & c). And the RCAGA majority (with commissioner Bailey 
dissenting) did not even favour the government being able to 
implement a wages policy for its own employees; it would leave 
this to the board and arbitration (RC 11.6.25-8). The whole 
approach tends to confirm the sense of the board's isolation from 
government policy and therefore from political responsibility that 
is conveyed (perhaps too partially) in the evidence of Dr 
McMichael, then secretary to the former department of Environ-
ment, to the inquiry: 
. . . when one gets down to particular problems of staffing at the Third 
Division level and starts dealing with particular Board inspectors . . . 
there is no way in which the Board can really assess . . . relative 
priorities that the Government might attach to particular departments 
. . . I do not find any machinery within the present set up which allows 
these matters to be reviewed.' 
There is another aspect of most of the reports whose implications 
for responsible government—or even for control and coordination, 
responsible or not—are hard to estimate. While proposing to 
strengthen the hand of the central coordinating agencies in the kinds 
of ways mentioned above. Bland, Coombs, Corbett and McCarthy 
quite explicitly recommended a general policy of delegating man-
agement and staffing responsibilities downwards and outwards. 
Within the administration, departmental heads should be held 
squarely responsible for the eflRciency and effectiveness with which 
departments carried out ministerial policies, and if not already so 
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should be made the accounting oflRcers for their departments. 
Coombs seemed to envisage, even more than the others, a general 
diffusion of responsibility within departments—by breaking down 
hierarchy, group decision-making, allocating more authority to 
regional and local offices, and so on. It is easy to see, in theory, 
that such developments should free the central agencies, and 
perhaps ministers, to exercise more eflfective control over "the big 
issues that really matter". Yet for the purposes of responsible 
government, small issues may often matter just as much . . .? 
Sanctions 
On this aspect of responsibility there is no particular need to 
distinguish between the various inquiry reports; they do not differ 
in attitude and RCAGA can be used as illustration if only because 
it develops the question most fully. It seems fair to say in summary 
that the RCAGA report explicitly accepts "responsible government" 
as the central tenet of our kind of system, explicitly agrees that 
the nineteenth-century mechanisms for enforcing responsibility 
upon ministers have lost most of their meaning, and argues that 
the essentials of the system can be resuscitated with an infusion 
of new mechanisms—especially in this context the elaboration of 
sanctions (and rewards) applicable to members of the adminis-
tration at every level and not merely to ministers. 
The relevant term frequently emphasised in the earlier part of 
the report is "accountability". In its first few pages the report recalls 
how ministerial responsibility has been eroded by ministers' ability 
to evade responsibility for many official acts, by their inability to 
know all that goes on in the administration, by the statutory sharing 
of ministerial responsibility for their departments with the PSB, the 
departmental head and other officials and by the autonomy of some 
statutory corporations. And where decisions affecting the public are 
made by officials whom ministers cannot really control (whether 
they are anonymous or not) and who cannot be called to account 
in the way ministers are supposed to be checked, there is "a gap 
in the hierarchy of responsibility and accountability through which 
political control could escape altogether" (RC 2.1.6.). The report 
then notes that there have already been some moves to make certain 
officials directly accountable to parliament, which "may be seen 
as weakening direct ministerial responsibility and therefore political 
control". The central orientation of the report in this matter is then 
defined as an attempt to balance the demands of ministerial 
responsibility and official accountability. 
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recognising that the realities of contemporary government require that 
the bureaucracy be seen as exercising some powers in its own right; 
that the independence of those powers requires that those exercising 
them should be held accountable; and that the tradition of the 
supremacy of Parliament requires that the lines of that accountability 
should lead ultimately to Parliament (RC 2.1.8, 2.1.9). 
The most significant feature of this brave aspiration, from the 
point of view of responsible government, is its apparent assumption 
that the lines of responsibility not only cannot, but need not, always 
run through ministers. This seems to be a clear assertion that 
responsible government does not rest exclusively upon the mecha-
nism of ministerial responsibility, individual or collective. But it is 
a brave assertion because it embodies the hope that parlia-
mentarians in their private member capacity can meaningfully fill 
the gap that ministers, despite their close connections to the 
administration, can no longer straddle. Coombs proposes to further 
this process by elaborate and far-reaching mechanisms of official 
accountability: the closer matching of rewards and penalties to 
individual performance, the more explicit definition of objectives 
and tasks against which to measure performance, the transfer of 
the main responsibility for "efficiency audit" from the PSB to the 
Auditor-General, the development of "effectiveness audit" in PM & c, 
the work of the ombudsman and many more detailed measures. 
The whole congeries of suggestions makes up a painstaking 
prescription for the support of responsible government by institu-
tional reform, but there are at least three awkward problems it does 
not squarely face. 
One problem is that an unknown, but large, proportion of the 
work of holding officials to account cannot, for practical reasons, 
be "led back ultimately to parliament", but must be dealt with by 
other officials. The volume of transactions is too vast, and many 
are too trivial, not to say technical, to carry to parliament. As at 
present, the burden of enforcing responsible official behaviour will 
remain largely on oflRcial shoulders. How effectively it is borne, from 
the point of view of the "public interest", will depend on elusive 
factors like the level of professional integrity and the vigilance of 
formal law enforcement, rather than upon those other elusive 
factors, the concern and diligence of elected politicians. 
A second problem is that the RCAGA recommendations would still 
mean an increased mass of reports from the Auditor-General and 
other authorities getting through to the parliament for scrutiny and 
action. Is parliament capable of expanding its effort, or its 
membership, to cope in any significant way with these implications 
of "responsible government" in the contemporary situation? 
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A third problem, only dimly envisaged at the moment, concerns 
the inherent conflict between this proposed new flow of accountabili-
ty back to the parliament and the continuing responsibility of 
ministers which still, in theory, covers so much of the adminis-
tration. This is not a new problem since it is already raised by the 
activities of the joint committee of Public Accounts and other 
parliamentary committees. But if RCAGA were taken seriously the 
problem would be considerably extended. 
Responsiveness 
If the proposals already discussed, for a more open acknowl-
edgement of oflRcial accountability, lead away from traditional 
ministerial responsibility to a degree that may at times prove 
embarrassing, much more so does the whole range of suggestions, 
most extensive in RCAGA and Corbett, for promoting enhanced 
"responsiveness" in the administration. Here it is recognized that 
officials deal directly and frequently with interest groups and 
pressure groups, that they resolve innumerable issues in face-to-
face and correspondence contacts with individual citizens, that they 
may be more intimately familiar with the needs and demands of 
many groups, and their possible political consequences, than min-
isters can be. But the quality of many of the contacts, especially 
with the underprivileged, the unorganized and the uninstructed, 
leaves much to be desired. 
The RCAGA and Corbett cures for the crudity of many oflRcial 
dealings with the citizen are to encourage those dealings to be 
closer, more direct, more sensitive and more numerous. "Access" 
to officials at all levels should be smoother and less discriminatory. 
Official anonymity should be further diluted. Decisions should be 
taken closer to the point of contact, and there should be more points 
of contact available. OflRcials should be openly seen as influential 
in the development of policy, and so in some sense share the 
responsibility for it. In practical terms, the disgruntled client at the 
grassroots as well as the corporation executive paying a lobbyist 
in Canberra should know who is really to blame when things go 
wrong. Or so I interpret the general drift of the Coombs discussions, 
at least. 
What this report in particular seems to be saying is first, that 
at one end of the administrative scale machinery should be 
developed to enhance ministerial control and broaden ministerial 
responsibility; second, that through the middle of the scale the old 
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vertical lines of hierarchical control should be weakened in favour 
of rank-and-file participation in decisions, task-force-type opera-
tional teams, more informal procedures and more delegation of 
authority; third, that officials at all levels should be held directly 
accountable for administration through processes of incentives, 
penalties, efficiency audits and appeal tribunals monitored not by 
ministers but by parliamentary committees; and fourth, that oflRcials 
in the operational front line should abjure their vows of silence, 
anonymity and obedience and become somehow directly accoun-
table not to parliament but to the public. It is not clear just what 
sanctions could make this accountability effective, while the Public 
Service Acts are in and people's courts are out. And if the reader 
feels there is some conflict between the various propositions just 
listed, it is not because he has misread the text. Either I have 
misread RCAGA, or not read it closely enough or there is in fact some 
conflict among the recommendations touching on responsible gov-
ernment. But perhaps some logical contradictions are inherent in 
any attempt to readjust the idea of responsible government to the 
realities of modern administration. 
The meaning of Westminster 
It is possible, indeed, that this sense of conflict results more from 
the potency of the "Westminster" way of looking at government 
than from the nature of the problems we are considering. For 
present purposes it is rather important to unravel the tangle of 
intellectual constructs, emotional responses and pictures of the real 
world evoked by the phrase "the Westminster system". Central to 
these (as it seems to me) is what I shall call "the Westminster 
syndrome"—an abstract model of a set of institutions, and of 
relationships between them which, after the mid-nineteenth century, 
were held to facilitate effective government administration which 
was at the same time amenable to popular influence and, ultimately, 
control. This syndrome had a complex relationship to the real world 
of British government. Some scholars and politicians claimed to 
have inferred the model from observation of evolving governmental 
practice. Some held up the model, however invented, as a set of 
precepts to be followed within certain sectors of government. Many 
politicians and public servants eventually came to believe that they 
did indeed follow these precepts in their daily work, and the ideas 
undoubtedly exercised the same diffused influence over behaviour 
as popular moral canons do, and like them were embodied in laws. 
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Before offering my version of the Westminster syndrome I shall 
try to suggest some of the ways in which it is related to the real 
world. A "Westminster system" is some aspect of a real world in 
which the Westminster syndrome of ideas or precepts is more or 
less influential. It is possible to say that in the British parliamentary 
system the Westminster syndrome is as prevalent in the minds of 
politicians and public servants as it was a hundred years ago, but 
that it is less effective—it determines a smaller proportion of the 
range of government actions now than then. I believe that the 
Westminster syndrome is as prevalent in the minds of Australian 
politicians and public servants now as it is among their British 
counterparts—but that here also it is effective over only a part (I 
do not know what proportion) of the transactions of government. 
On these assumptions, which I shall not try to prove, one can say 
if one likes that Britain (or Australia) now does not "really" have 
a Westminster system (or a Westminster system any more) because 
a great many actions in government are taken as though the 
Westminster syndrome of ideas did not exist. Or one can say that 
both countries have a Westminster system because much of the 
syndrome is embodied in legislation and in practice in both 
countries, and most politicians and senior public servants in both 
countries would defend the theoretical model of the Westminster 
system, and many would claim that it guides their oflRcial actions 
—perhaps "ultimately". Whichever criterion one adopts to define 
"Westminster system", I do not believe there is much to choose 
between the present real world situations in Britain and Australia. 
Some journalists and academic people in Australia bridle angrily 
at the suggestion that Australian government operates on "the 
Westminster system", or that it does so "any more". It is often 
doubtful to others whether this means that the critics dislike the 
Westminster syndrome (as I call it) because they think it illogical 
or immoral, or that they think it has little or no influence (or less 
influence than at some past time) in our governmental systems. A 
third (I think more sophisticated) criticism is that too many 
politicians, and particularly officials, hypocritically profess to live 
by the Westminster syndrome while making decisions in ways that 
pay no respect to it at all. Now I can no longer delay defining 
the Westminster syndrome. 
But first I cannot stress too much that this set of concepts (if 
I have it right) was never intended to apply to the whole range 
of state institutions—for example not to local government nor to 
judicial, quasi-judicial and certain other agencies created by par-
liament to be autonomous under their statutes, such as universities 
and state broadcasting corporations and nationalized industries in 
The Public Service Inquiries and Responsible Government 351 
Britain. Apart from these, however, the syndrome assumed that as 
much as possible of government administrative activity would be 
brought under the direct control of elected ministers sitting in and 
"responsible to" the parliament. 
So the "doctrine of ministerial responsibility" is the first essential 
part—but only a part—of the Westminster syndrome. It is perhaps 
the most difficult part to make sense of, whether as a deduction 
from practice or as a precept. What is "responsibility"? The usual 
reply is: accountability—for what is done or proposed by the 
minister or those under his authority—to parliament or the 
electorate, on pain of removal, voluntary or enforced, by the 
parliament or the electorate. This is only translating "democratic 
control" into institutional terms—but how far do the institutions 
work like that? How far did they ever work like that? So a part 
of the critique of the idea that we "have a Westminster system" 
is a disillusioned answer to those questions—a scepticism about the 
reality in practice of "ministerial responsibility". 
The second part of the Westminster syndrome (as I see it) is 
the need for an officialdom, quite distinct from the political set of 
ministers and other parliamentarians. Officialdom is needed for 
three different kinds of reasons. First, ministers cannot do all the 
work themselves. Second, much of the work needs more or less 
elaborate forms of expertise ministers cannot be expected to have 
or is of a routine kind which would waste ministers' time. Third, 
an appointed official, who does not owe his place to a popular 
election or to an elected minister or private member, is more likely 
to show neither fear nor favour in his dealings with citizens than 
one who depends for his place on sectional interests. Thus the 
politician is elected and removable by the popular vote—removable 
simply when a majority of the electorate do not like him or what 
he and his minions have done; officials are appointed by an 
independent authority and no-one can remove them on purely 
political grounds. 
Here we pause a moment to note what the Westminster syndrome 
does not require, in this connection. It does clearly distinguish the 
status of the politician from that of the official, in terms of the 
respective modes of their selection and removal.The politician is 
elected in order to make him dependent, for his office, upon the 
will of voters and other political forces. The official is appointed 
and removed by a quasi-judicial authority according to legal rules, 
in order to make him independent of such political pressures—a 
servant of the public. Provided he is appointed and removed in this 
way, the syndrome does not seem to prescribe other aspects of his 
tenure—for example, whether it should be permanent, long-term 
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or short-term. No one suggests that the "temporary" appointments 
made under all public service acts are inconsistent with the 
Westminster syndrome. The term of appointments is simply a 
technical question of what best conduces to the efficiency of the 
oificial in the particular position. Some positions may call for long 
experience and familiarity, some for fairly rapid rotation of 
incumbents. So the distinction the Westminster syndrome draws 
between the politician and the oflRcial is not between the temporary 
and the permanent, nor between the short-term occupant of public 
office and the long-term, but between the elected and the appointed 
incumbents, between the one subject to political accountability and 
the one appointed by due process in order to secure expertise and 
impartiality. 
The third part of the Westminster syndrome concerns the 
"proper" relations between ministers and oflRcials—and here there 
has been much confusion of thought. It is not essential to the 
syndrome that there be a clear-cut division of labour—a clear 
distinction of functions—between the minister and his oflRcials. It 
does not endorse such cliches as "the minister makes policy, the 
official is concerned with administration", or "the minister makes 
the decisions, the oflRcial only carries them out", or "the minister 
is concerned with politics, the official with administration". Indeed, 
the usual laymen's attempts to distinguish between "politics" and 
"administration", or policy and administration, simply do not meet 
the case, as 1 tried to prove many years ago.' Even in layman's 
terms, one can imagine a minister running a (fictitiously simple) 
department by himself, policy, administration and all. No one would 
say he should only make the "policy" and not try to carry it out. 
By the same token, it is now a platitude that many oflRcials—not 
only those at the "top"—help to make policy. Some of them do 
it in close collaboration with the minister. No one suggests that 
this offends the Westminster syndrome. 
What the latter requires is merely that in all decisions (and 
decisions inevitably merge policy and administration) the elected 
minister should have the last word, and the appointed oflRcial must 
bow to that. And this of course does not mean that the minister 
must make all decisions and the oflRcials none. Nor does it mean 
that the minister should make "only the policy decisions", or the 
"important decisions". It means that potentially the minister should 
be in a position to make any decision about anything done by the 
department (as distinct from appointments and careers of oflRcials), 
from top to bottom. He is free to intervene anywhere at any time. 
He cannot intervene everywhere, being human. So he expects, and 
should make arrangements to ensure, that the department will 
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always be doing what he would want it to do, and in the way that 
he would want. To sum up so far, the essential relationship 
contemplated by the Westminster syndrome does not assume a 
distinction of function between minister and official, but a distinc-
tion of status (elective versus appointive) and the right of the 
minister to have the last word. 
The fourth and final element of the Westminster syndrome, I 
believe, draws out an implication of the earlier parts. This is that 
the lines of accountability of the whole administration run from 
the lowliest oflRcial up through his minister to the cabinet, the 
parliament and ultimately—and only by that circuitous route—to 
the elector. There is also a rationalization for this element, from 
the point of view of democratic control. It is related to the notion 
of the collective responsibility of cabinet. The coordination, through 
discussion and bargaining in cabinet—especially over the budget 
—of what all parts of the administration do, is the only means 
within government, however ineffective, of ensuring that the claims 
of the interests served by one part of the administration are 
measured against claims from the rest.'" Indeed, I would argue that 
such attempts at fairly balancing the conflicting claims of different 
interests, and apportioning state-provided "goods" (material or 
regulatory) accordingly, is the nearest possible approach to a 
rational conception of "the public interest". It follows from this 
reasoning that the internal strains within the administration would 
be greatly exacerbated by any arrangement which made parts of 
the administration directly accountable to their own clients and 
primarily dependent on the latters' ideas and goodwill. As suggested 
already, this is one of the problems that some of the Coombs 
recommendations seem to raise. 
It may be helpful to set out this view of the Westminster 
syndrome diagrammatically, placing it in the wider context of the 
governmental system as a whole, and thereby noting in passing that 
the Westminster syndrome is only one aspect of responsible 
government, and that parts of the system still lie outside responsible 
or even democratic government. 
Need responsible government stop at Westminster? 
The Westminster syndrome sets up institutions and relationships 
considered valuable to democracy in parliamentary systems where 
government is relatively active and technical. But this prescription 
has not met all the requirements of such systems. First, it is confined 
to that part of government nominally under "ministerial control", 
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3. A relationship between ministers and officials: both are engaged in 
"po l i cy " and "administrat ion" but the minister should be able to have 
the last word at any level, and officials should be loyal to the current 
minister. 
4, Accountabil i ty which runs from official to minister to cabinet to parli-
ament to voters. This is to enable demands of interests pressing on one 
part of the administration to be measured against competing demands, in 
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whereas it has proved necessary to entrust some functions to other 
institutions—courts, local authorities, statutory corporations, parlia-
mentary committees, administrative tribunals, ombudsmen—in 
which democratic restraints operate (if at all) partly or wholly 
outside the scope of ministerial control, and in some cases to check 
ministerial power itself. Second, "ministerial responsibility" as one 
of the essential elements of the Westminster syndrome has fallen 
far short of the demands that modern big government has placed 
upon it. Not only have ministers never secured the right to control 
all that goes on under government, but they have proved unable 
to know all that happens even within their own nominal jurisdiction 
and they have refused to accept responsibility for things done by 
their own departments which they have not personally supervised. 
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Further, the sanctions which once held ministers to their responsi-
bility have been weakened by the growing power of both ministers 
themselves and of political parties. 
As we have seen, some of the RCAGA recommendations are 
directed to increasing the capacity of ministers for more com-
prehensive control of what matters within the ministerial-
departmental realm. Some of the recommendations, also, are 
directed to making it harder for ministers to evade or disclaim 
responsibilities in that realm which improved arrangements could 
bring within their grasp. If we remember that the Westminster 
syndrome calls only for the potential intervention of the minister 
wherever it is necessary in order to keep official actions in line with 
government policy, we should be able to narrow somewhat the range 
of matters over which ministers can legitimately claim to have lost 
effective control to the officials. To put the same point in another 
way, it would be facile to assume that oflRcials are free to run things 
their own way—differently from the current government's—to the 
extent that they have to make decisions on their own without the 
minister's direct participation. There are ways of ensuring that, by 
and large, such decisions will be consistent with what the minister 
would have wanted. If it were not so, no organization could ever 
operate consistently once its transactions multiplied beyond the 
ability of one person to oversee them all directly. 
But in relation to modern government it seems to be generally 
accepted that, even though certain reforms could broaden the scope 
of effective ministerial control, much will still escape it in practice. 
While the Westminster syndrome requires only that the minister 
should be able to have "the last word" where there is a potential 
divergence between the official and himself, it is, for the operation 
of the syndrome, too frequently the case that the minister, who 
might have judged otherwise, is not brought into the situation of 
confrontation where he has the opportunity of having the last word. 
RCAGA seems to accept this—hence its search for other forms of 
accountability that can be applied to the administration. At the 
same time the commission seems to have believed that the West-
minster syndrome provides comprehensive canons for the operation 
of democratic parliamentary government. Thereby, perhaps, RCAGA 
falls into a logical trap. On the one hand it has demonstrated, or 
at least asserted, that a vital aspect of the Westminster syndrome 
—ministerial responsibility and therefore parliamentary and popu-
lar control through ministers—is to a serious degree unworkable. 
On the other hand, when trying to suggest alternative forms of 
accountability, RCAGA stops short of some very important steps— 
such as breaking down ministerial control over public information 
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and records, and breaching official reticence—because they seem 
inconsistent with the Westminster syndrome, while recommending 
others—such as greater devolution and less hierarchy in decision-
making—that seem calculated to weaken the ministerial control 
over administration which is a central feature of the Westminster 
syndrome. 
It is possible that a clearer view of the nature of the Westminster 
syndrome itself, such as I have attempted to give above, together 
with a recognition that the syndrome does not inform all aspects 
of modern parliamentary government, could have helped to avoid 
or resolve some of the inconsistencies we have sensed in the report. 
In order to test this, let me briefly examine the series of additional 
forms of accountability mooted—but not always endorsed—in the 
RCAGA report, in the hope of seeing (a) whether they would really 
clash with the essentials to which I have tried to pare down the 
Westminster syndrome, and (b) which of such clashes may be 
justified in the light of the broader conception of responsible 
government I have outlined—of which the Westminster syndrome 
is a subordinate, only partly effective, and not unalterable part. 
As already indicated, the commission's majority shrank from 
endorsing a decisive shift toward "open government" as a means 
of making ministers and oflRcials more accountable. Untrammelled 
public and parliamentary access to public records (as one form of 
open government) is resisted in the name of the Westminster 
syndrome, by suggesting that ministers should be held responsible 
for deciding which records if disclosed would infringe the individual 
citizen's privacy, or advantage his business competitors, or betray 
the confidences or security of foreign states, or shatter the mutual 
loyalty of members of the cabinet. But it is not the Westminster 
syndrome which justifies ministers in claiming that right of decision. 
It is merely the fact that ministers are heirs to the undemocratic 
powers (the "prerogatives") of absolute monarchs. The political 
significance of the ministerial monopoly of the control of the 
"public" records is that it is open to grave abuse: ministers are 
powerfully tempted to conceal as long as possible what may be to 
their discredit, while genuinely responsible government would 
require precisely that material to be open to the scrutiny of the 
political opposition and the public which has a greater claim to 
control the records than an ephemeral ministry. This is not to deny 
that there may be good reasons, as indicated above, for witholding 
some records, but rather to suggest that judicial tribunals, which 
have already made some inroads in this direction, would be the 
appropriate bodies to identify those records under a system of 
genuinely responsible government. 
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A closely-related means of strengthening accountability which 
RCAGA also rejects would be much freer public and parliamentary 
access to the knowledge and views of oflRcials, including the views 
expressed in their advice to ministers or other responsible office-
holders. Such proposals, especially the last one, are strongly resisted 
on the ground that they would threaten the stability of the 
relationship between ministers and officials which we have included 
as the third element of the Westminster syndrome. The arguments 
are familiar, and in an earlier section we have noted the doubts 
eminent commentators have thrown upon them, while recognizing 
the great growth in personal maturity and security that would be 
required to modify the conventional relationship. The notable 
inconsistency of RCAGA in this connection lies in its reluctance to 
disturb the present rights of ministers to muzzle oflRcials in their 
own interest, after talking about the need to acknowledge more 
openly the autonomous roles that oflRcials play in the development 
of policy and in the relations between government and private 
groups. Given that the Westminster syndrome requires that the 
minister should always be able to have the last word, even public 
comment on current issues by oflRcials would be legitimate if those 
concerned were relaxed enough to cope psychologically with it. But 
whatever awkwardness the unmuzzling of officials might have for 
the Westminster syndrome under present conditions, it is a neces-
sary condition of democratic, responsible government in the broader 
sense. 
On closer examination the relationship between accountability 
and RCAGA'S recommendations for more delegation and more respon-
siveness in the administration appears to be indeterminate. The 
fixing of clearer responsibilities upon specific officials down the line 
is not necessarily incompatible with retaining an effective "last 
word" for the minister, nor with the minister remaining answerable 
to parliament. Neither is a greater responsiveness of oflRcials to 
public needs and demands—as long as there is ministerial authority 
for any substantial change in policy or practice. If delegation of 
authority more clearly identifies those who actually wield it, to that 
extent it makes government more responsible. But greater delega-
tion and more responsiveness could also mean more real official 
autonomy in practice, in which case accountability through the 
minister would be weakened (as RCAGA noted). As was also noted, 
accountability through the minister has become pretty tenuous in 
any case. Are there any forms of official accountability which do 
not simply confuse issues and tangle lines of responsibility? 
Any form of official accountability which by-passes ministers and 
simply "leads back to parliament" tends either to tangle the lines 
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or to have little meaning for responsible government, or both. The 
obvious examples in RCAGA are the various proposals to make 
oflRcials more "accountable" by systems of incentives, rewards and 
penalties, by personal assessment, efficiency audits and reviews by 
a parliamentary committee on public administration. Several points 
can be made about these. A line of accountability that leads back 
to parliament may conflict with the line of responsibility that leads 
from the oflRcial to the minister (and thence in a different way to 
parliament). This conflict comes to a focus where the parliamentary 
committee wants records or views from the official that his minister 
does not want them to have. In that impasse the Westminster 
syndrome at present generally prevails over eflfective responsible 
government. Second, the parliamentary committee (and parliament 
itself for that matter) has no way of enforcing accountability against 
the official. So the only way of making this process significant would 
be, as already suggested, to enable it to be used to enforce 
responsibility against the minister—by getting at the facts and 
judgments by which the minister's own performance and that of 
his department can be more knowledgeably appraised. However, 
as things now stand, a parliamentary committee will not be able 
to promote accountability in much of the administration in a year. 
Just as control of the bureaucracy might be enhanced by a much 
enlarged ministry, so accountability of oflRcials or ministers to 
parliament would require at least a massive increase in parliament's 
resources, and might benefit from an increase in its size. Short of 
extensive changes in the machinery and attitudes of parliament, the 
accountability envisaged through eflRciency audits and the like 
would be mainly the mutual accountability of oflRcials, and would 
have little to do with responsible government. 
It may be suggested, finally, that the line most worth exploring 
for more effective accountability of the bureaucracy is one which 
potentially ignores ministerial responsibility and cuts through the 
whole of the Westminster syndrome, and upon which the Coombs 
report had virtually nothing to say despite its emphasis upon 
improving accountability. It is possible that the whole of the RCAGA 
recommendations on that subject would not do so much for 
responsible government as a determined and sustained attempt to 
develop a comprehensive and coordinated system of administrative 
law and tribunals. As a result of an extensive inquiry in 1971-72 
the Law Reform Commission of NSW estimated that a citizen of 
that state had a right of appeal against about one in twenty of 
the types of decisions that public authorities, including ministers, 
could make affecting him. That commission's recommendations for 
rationalizing and enlarging the system of appeals in administration 
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gain more interest from the promptitude with which the state 
ministry rejected them—save for the least significant (though 
useful) one, the establishment of an ombudsman. 
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the Westminster Model? 
//. /I/. Collins 
The chapters by Professors Self and Parker address in depth such 
a diverse range of issues that a review of them must be selective. 
I have chosen to concentrate upon an area in which they overlap: 
the eflRcacy of the Westminster model for descriptions of and 
prescriptions for contemporary Australian government. In particu-
lar, I shall be concerned with questions about the relationship 
between oflRcials and ministers—the appointed and the elected 
elements of the executive—within the context of conventional 
notions of ministerial responsibility. While these matters are of 
central importance to both chapters, no less than for RCAGA and 
the other inquiries under discussion, the proportion of each chapter 
within this area of overlapping concern differs considerably. Thus 
it will be apparent that to select this topic is to focus discussion 
more towards Professor Parker's chapter than towards Professor 
Selfs, but Selfs has in part supplied the lens through which the 
issues are being examined. 
Selfs overview: the agendas of administrative reform 
In a characteristic combination of gentle manner and tough 
judgment. Self describes the RCAGAS report as "generally interesting 
and sometimes subtle". His own chapter is invariably interesting 
and always subtle. We are given a clear delineation of the dominant 
features of the report as well as a precise indication of the significant 
details. The vantage point is Selfs critical discussion of theories 
of administrative change; as a perspective upon the commission it 
has lifted our debate not only upon RCAGA but upon all of the 
inquiries discussed. His overview has done more than give shape 
and order to our reading of RCAGA: it has taught us new ways of 
understanding this field of investigation. 
Selfs sympathy towards the commission, its staff, and the 
circumstances of the report is evident throughout. Yet his criticisms 
of the report are far-reaching and should be understood as the sum 
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not only of his suggestions and specific doubts, but also of his 
reticence—of leaving unstated, though rarely failing to suggest, the 
broader implications of many of his detailed observations and 
reservations. Selfs analysis of the report's forward estimates 
proposals, the centrepiece of RCAGAS recommendations, is an il-
lustration of the full force of his judgment, animated by an 
insistence upon the capacity of government to defy vogueish theory 
and vaunted reform alike. One does not need to emphasize how 
much of the report is undone even by this example of Selfs critique. 
Selfs typology of possible agendas of administrative reform 
enables us to make sense of the inconsistencies in RCAGA, putting 
its disparate fragments into related bundles, while exposing the lack 
of coherence between them overall.' This lack of overall coherence 
accounts for a widespread sense of disappointment with the report, 
as in Spann's comment that, notwithstanding its merit in parts, the 
report offered "no sense of well-directed intellectual inquiry", or, 
indeed, in Selfs own observation that it might have aimed rather 
more at becoming a durable blueprint for reform. 
We all realize the commission's plight, RCAGAS terms of reference 
required it to cover all three of Selfs agendas. Wishing to achieve 
change (to act politically), it made political calculations about 
which agendas of administrative reform it would get through. 
Hawker and Bailey have explained with great candour the rationale 
behind these choices. In Hawker's words, "a committee appointed 
to do a political job will not produce an analytical exercise".^ Alas 
for RCAGA! A commission of inquiry will inevitably be judged both 
for its political effect and as an analytical exercise. Some might 
even want to argue for a correlation between the quality of analysis 
and the prospects for political eflfect. The demand for overall 
coherence or superior analysis does not require that the eventual 
report make explicit a commission's views on every subject con-
ceivably before it, or to which it has given consideration, but simply 
that within those things a commission chooses to say, and between 
these and those matters for which tactics or time dictate silence, 
it is desirable to discern a pattern or design which has imposed 
some order upon its priorities, some intelligibility in the evidence 
it has assembled, and some vigour in approaching its conclusions. 
This does not appear to have happened with RCAGA.' Rather, from 
Hawker's chapter we gain a picture of a commission bent upon 
reforming government yet resembling nothing so much as the 
government which created it. 
In his review of what RCAGA made of its daunting task. Self 
demonstrates its preoccupation with the social agenda, discounting 
the significance of most of the little it contributed on either the 
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political or the managerial agendas. Although it is under the "social 
agenda" that the commission may be expected to have its greatest 
impact, the longer-term administrative and political implications of 
some of these proposals are "less clear" than the familiar themes 
inscribed on that agenda. 
At this point Selfs typology assists my discussion of the 
treatment of relations between ministers and officials both by RCAGA 
and by Parker. The commission divorced its treatment of the social 
agenda from the other two, and especially from the political agenda. 
As a result it has been able, in Selfs words, to denigrate the 
conventions of the "Westminster model" without (probably) really 
altering them. I shall also argue, later, that a failure generally to 
harness proposals under the social agenda to the political agenda 
effectively weakens the elected element of the political system with 
disturbing implications for representative democracy. A discussion 
of the political agenda is thus seen to be crucial for theories of 
and attempts at administrative change. 
Parker's syndrome and responsible government 
The items Self lists on his political agenda are the questions Parker 
takes up in his chapter. He offers us an interpretation of "the 
meaning of Westminster" with, if I understand him, two broad aims 
in mind. First, he seeks "to unravel the tangle of intellectual 
constructs, emotional responses, and pictures of the real world 
evoked by the phrase 'the Westminster system' ". Second, he aims 
to cut through the tangle, identifying the essentials in a way that 
would permit a reformulation of notions of responsibility congruent 
with the "Westminster syndrome", as he calls it, and applicable 
in the contemporary world. The problems Parker tackles are indeed 
vital and serious challenges for students of Australian government 
and administration, though I have a number of diflRculties with and 
objections to his account. Exploring these difficulties and objections 
may add a piece or two to the puzzles he has set before us. 
The Westminster syndrome: problems of construction 
My first set of difficulties with Parker's account of the Westminster 
syndrome concerns the construction of his account. My problems 
begin with his term, "syndrome", and with what it is intended to 
cover. When introduced the "Westminster syndrome" is defined as 
an "abstract model of a set of institutions and of relationships 
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between them . . . ". Later, however, it becomes a set of "ideas 
or precepts" more or less prevalent in the minds of politicians and 
public servants; it is a "set of concepts"; and it "sets up institutions 
and relationships . . . ". Clearly my chief difficulty here is the 
departure from the original definition to the extended discussion 
in terms of the Westminster syndrome as a set of ideas or precepts. 
The latter seems to me to be what he has principally in mind when 
referring to the syndrome; my interpretation will follow his usage 
of his term rather than his formal definition of it. 
It is important to establish this reading of Parker's term because 
I want to distinguish between Westminster syndrome and West-
minster system, broadly between ideas or principles on the one hand 
and institutions on the other. I shall interpret the Westminster 
syndrome as the set of axioms which underlie those concrete 
institutions and practices which Parker refers to as the Westminster 
system. 
This brings me to the second of my difficulties with Parker's 
construction of his account. The syndrome, or set of axioms, may 
be discovered or inferred from an inspection of the institutions and 
practices of a polity or polities. His account suffers from a diflRculty 
attending most constructions of the Westminster model. One can 
envisage a model being abstracted from a comparative inspection 
of the parliamentary democracies in the new commonwealth," or 
even of Britain and the old dominions, and labelled the "West-
minster model". Most accounts, however, begin not with a com-
parative inspection but essentially with a special case—the British 
system. Westminster is more deeply embedded in most accounts 
of Westminster models than is usually admitted Parker's account 
seems to me to be no exception. This presents serious difficulties 
when transposing Westminster doctrines of responsibility into the 
alien landscapes to which the model is said to have been transported. 
Such difficulties are of two kinds. 
First, there are axioms which arguably underlie politics in 
Westminster yet which are not present in our system. In what sense 
is Parker's account of the Westminster syndrome complete without 
including such axioms? Upon what criteria are they excluded? An 
example of this sort of difficulty is the axiom of British politics 
that parliament is sovereign. Clearly this is a fundamental idea or 
principle or precept: much opposition to British membership of the 
EEC appealed to this axiom against the abridgment of that sovereign-
ty by supranational institutions. Clearly also this axiom interlocks 
with those identified by Parker: indeed one can ask whether the 
dignity ascribed to parliament by this axiom does not increase the 
weight and seriousness of the axiom that ministers are responsible 
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to parliament for the conduct of their departments. However, it 
is sufficient for my purposes that his syndrome omits an axiom 
crucial for politics in Westminster, yet which we do not and cannot 
share.' 
Second, those axioms which Parker identifies as the Westminster 
syndrome are frustrated, fragmented or confused by our institu-
tional framework. Is it therefore appropriate to seek to apply these 
axioms here at all? Two examples may illustrate different aspects 
of this problem. First, what strength does the axiom that ministers 
are responsible to parliament derive in practice from the unitary 
nature of British politics? By contrast, how depleted, indeed how 
practicable, is this axiom in a federal system such as our own? 
Granted, Parker notes the "exacerbation" of difficulties in main-
taining responsible government presented by federal systems, but 
are these difficulties of kind or of degree? Federalism fragments, 
obscures and confuses the spheres of responsibility and hence the 
lines of accountability. Where power is shared so intricately how 
are the mechanisms of information, control, sanctions and respon-
siveness to be put to work? Can we with hindsight give a diflferent 
administrative content to Hackett's 1891 declaration of the essential 
incompatibility between federalism and responsible government?* 
RCAGAS relative silence on these problems may be understandable 
yet this surely breeds a great unreality in the report as Self implies. 
For this very reason, while I welcome Selfs observation that some 
of our problems with the Westminster model are peculiar to us, 
I dissent from his observation that the administrative effectiveness 
of Australian federal ministers should be greater than their British 
counterparts because the volume of central government business is 
substantially less here than in Britain. This overlooks the additional 
difficulties for ministers and departments of coordination and 
competition presented by our system, particularly since the "na-
tional" parties are state-based. 
A further illustration of the difficulty of making a shared axiom 
congruent with a different set of institutions is posed in the problem 
of how the axiom that ministers are responsible to parliament is 
to be translated from an essentially unicameral legislature to a 
bicameral legislature in which the powers of the two chambers are 
virtually equal. This is now a compelling question in Australian 
politics and it is one to which I see no ready answer. What meaning 
is now to be given here to the expression of the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility in the form that ministers are obliged to 
"resign if censured by a majority of the parliament"? As Colin 
Hughes has observed 
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today constitutional logic demands that [a government] or [a Minister] 
must resign should [a motion of no-confidence] be carried in either 
chamber. If there is no resignation, then supply can be withheld to 
enforce the point. Accordingly it can be argued that when the then 
Attorney-General, Senator Murphy, erred in not resigning when the 
Senate carried a motion of no confidence in him, the then Governor 
General, Sir Paul Hasluck, erred in not withdrawing his commission 
when he did not resign . . . .' 
Have the events of 1975 made government with a hostile senate 
impossible? Can any government now be legitimately commissioned 
with a majority in the house of representatives alone? What would 
Sir John Kerr have done if the results on 13 December 1975 had 
repeated those of 18 May 1974? It is at present uncertain how 
an essential axiom of responsible government is to be made to work 
in our institutions. Moreover, the questions that pose this problem 
are a timely reminder that critical tests for responsible government 
can arise independently of officials and the mechanisms of adminis-
trative responsibility and almost entirely within the domain of party 
politics. 
Yet insofar as the axiom holds that oflRcials are responsible to 
parliament through ministers, our assertive bicameralism has a 
direct impact upon oflRcials no less than upon ministers. The 
summoning of oflRcials before the bar of the senate in July 1975 
raised the question, "to whom ministers are responsible?" in its 
sharpest form. Do oflRcials called before the bar of a chamber owe 
a greater obligation to the "parliament" or to the "government"? 
If an obligation is owed to the government, is it greater than that 
owed to a minister of the government? As Spann notes, the PSB'S 
oblique reference to the salient test case for this dilemma, namely 
Sir Frederick Wheeler's obligations to Dr. Cairns, continues to 
assert the duality of the obligation to minister and government That 
verdict must be seen as seriously qualifying an oflficial's obligation 
to his minister and simultaneously enlarging the scope for official 
discretion in relation to that obligation. 
The Westminster syndrome: problems of interpretation 
Turning from diflRculties with Parker's construction of the West-
minster syndrome to the interpretation of responsible government 
based upon it, my problems again come in pairs. The first relates 
to the syndrome's constituent parts and hinges upon the relationship 
between ministers and officials. My second criticism relates to 
Parker's evaluation of the relationship between the syndrome and 
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the broader system of responsible government. A revised version 
of the syndrome—or set of axioms, in my terms—allows me to 
present a different and more positive evaluation of the function of 
these axioms and their associated institutions as legitimizing the 
broader political system, including limited departures from practices 
consonant with these axioms. 
Parker identifies four parts to his Westminster syndrome. These 
are: 
1 The doctrine of ministerial responsibility. 
2 A distinction in status between the elected and the appointed 
governors (arising from "the need for an oflRcialdom"). 
3 The right of the minister to have the last word in relations with 
officials. 
4 Lines of accountability run from official through minister and 
cabinet to parliament, and only thence to electors. 
My quarrel here is with the second item, which I believe must 
be eliminated from the series. The first item implies the existence 
of or "need for" an officialdom, while the third part is the axiomatic 
expression of the relationship between minister and official, and 
hence defines their respective status. The four-part syndrome can 
therefore be reduced to a logically consistent triad: 
1 that ministers are responsible to parliament for the conduct of 
their departments; 
2 that in relations between ministers and oflRcials, ministers have 
the last word; 
3 that officials are accountable to the public only through the 
accountability of ministers and cabinet to parliament. 
In this light Parker's discussion of the second part of his 
syndrome can be seen to belong to the level of institutional 
innovation rather than to the level of axiomatic discourse. Indeed 
his lucid discussion of the distinction between tenure and status 
of officials seems to me an excellent example of how to go about 
devising institutions and practices congruent with the basic ideas 
and precepts. 
Furthermore, this reformulation of Parker's syndrome into ax-
iomatic principles is necessary because his discussion of ministers 
and oflRcials at this point is inconsistent with the other parts of 
his syndrome. Indeed, in this respect his Westminster syndrome 
departs from the Westminster model rather than illuminates it. I 
have already maintained that the distinction in status between 
official and minister is covered by the third element, reinforced by 
the fourth and the first. I am not denying the importance of oflRcials 
here, nor their political role. They were surely described accurately 
by Richard Neustadt over a decade ago when he portrayed the 
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government of Britain as a "virtual duopoly" of ministers and senior 
oflRcials, based upon the "tacit treaty" by which officials trade 
loyalty to government decision in return for ministerial consultation 
with oflRcials before decisions are taken.' 
Parker's departure from both the requirements of his own 
prescriptions for lines of accountability and a classical feature of 
the Westminster model occurs in his description of the official as 
"a servant of the public" and in his suggestion that the quasi-
judicial mode of the oflRcial's appointment is to secure "expertise 
and impartiality". As the axioms make apparent, the thrust of the 
Westminster system is that officials are servants, not of the public, 
but of the government of the day. In this sense, what is required 
of oflRcials whose expertise is placed in the service of the government 
is not so much "impartiality" as loyalty to that government.' 
These observations simply reflect what Parker elsewhere notes, 
namely that ministers are "heirs to the undemocratic powers (the 
prerogatives) of absolute monarchs". Officials are now effectively 
servants of the current government just as earlier they were directly 
servants of the crown. The key to the Westminster model is to bring 
the executive and its prerogative powers into the legislature. The 
first and third of the axioms express the precepts governing these 
arrangements. Government retains its prerogative powers, but these 
are tempered by the government's institutionalized vulnerability to 
opposition. An amendment of Parker's diagram is therefore neces-
sary, to bring the exercise of these executive powers under the 
operation of the set of axioms or syndrome. 
The constant challenge of the Westminster model, both to theory 
and in practice, is therefore how to achieve genuine vulnerability 
of government to opposition without sacrificing the eflRcacy of 
government altogether. There is a perennial trade-off between 
accountability and efficiency. Not every test of ministerial responsi-
bility will invoke its direct sanctions. In terms of the wartime 
distinction between SABUS and SNAFUS,'" it will be important to 
distinguish between the mundane administrative mistake and the 
monumental executive blunder. Thus, as David Butler argues, the 
everyday test of ministerial responsibility is simple ministerial 
answerability, arousing parliamentary expectations of domestic 
courtesy rather than of dramatic scenes." None of this gainsays 
that in an age of big government the odds are stacked in the 
executive's favour. That the Westminster model's fusion of bureauc-
racy and ministry exacerbates this problem, I freely concede. Yet 
I believe that many of the model's would-be reformers, and most 
of its critics, have misunderstood or underestimated the diflRculties 
either of altering or of abandoning it. 
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This brings me directly to the problem of evaluating the 
significance of the axioms, to assessing the relationship between 
Parker's syndrome as I have modified it and the broader operations 
of responsible government. I agree entirely with Parker that 
democratic or responsible government refers to much more than 
ministerial responsibility. It is also evident that large and important 
areas of political systems of this sort will be independent of or only 
remotely linked to the institutions of ministerial responsibility. My 
dispute is with his assessment that ministerial responsibility is a 
"subordinate" part of the broader conception of responsible govern-
ment. 
Ministerial responsibility is at the heart of responsible govern-
ment because the function of the axioms I have identified is to 
legitimize government within the system as a whole. Of course these 
three axioms are not a full account of the principles of legitimacy 
for the total system: other axioms affect such key elements of a 
responsible system as universal adult suflfrage or due process at law. 
Nevertheless, while not a suflRcient account of legitimacy, these 
axioms are necessary. Their vital contribution is to make rule 
acceptable. They connect the other values underlying the system 
to the parliamentary confrontation between the powers of govern-
ment and the mechanisms of representative democracy. These 
axioms are at the heart of the system, rather than subordinate 
within it, because they concern those institutions which are central 
both to authoritative political decision and to popular representation 
within the system. 
Indeed, it is possible to extend this argument to include those 
aspects of the broader system which are not covered by the 
institutions of ministerial responsibility. The autonomous, and at 
times undemocratic, operation of such parts of the system requires 
to be justified as a departure from the basic set of ideas and 
institutions. The legitimacy of other organs and institutions within 
the system thus derives from the legitimacy attaching to the central 
representative institution—the legislature—and the central man-
ifestation of the executive—cabinet and the bureaucracy. It is 
largely because these axioms are so vital to the legitimacy of the 
system as a whole that the Westminster model so obstinately defeats 
attempts to get around it or to do away with it. 
The link forged in the Westminster model between government 
and legislature may be crude, but it is undeniable. The connection 
between rule and representation gives the model its durability. By 
contrast, most attempts to escape the Westminster model become 
an escape from representative politics as well. The classic refuges 
from elective politics in our time are legalism, therapy and rational 
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decisionism. Examples of each of these can be found in the 
institutional reforms canvassed in Parker's chapter. Thus, judicial 
and administrative tribunals are an appeal to legal values. The link 
between open government and "more mature psychological at-
titudes" is, so long as politics breeds its own anxieties, a therapeutic 
hope as well as a slim one. The demand for more access to 
information as a means of enforcing responsibility suggests a 
rational conception of decisions: if we had all the papers, we would 
know all the facts, or all the reasons, or both.'^ 
Each of these forms of escape from the Westminster model is 
ultimately an escape from politics. The model's merit, and most 
of the difficulties it occasions, is that it attempts to forge responsi-
bility while accepting politics. Contrary to some accounts, it does 
not separate administration from politics;" the Neustadtian formula 
is thoroughly consistent with it. The Westminster model, indeed, 
makes nonsense of the recent invention in Australian politics of a 
"caretaker" government. That could only have been the work of 
lawyers. 
Improving the system 
The Westminster model may be in trouble, but the dominant 
response to its diflRculties and deficiencies clearly reflects an avowal 
of reform rather than an attitude of despair. The preceding 
exposition of the model can be linked to these reform proposals 
through a brief comment upon two aspects of them. 
First, more attention might be paid to bureaucratic means of 
strengthening the collective performance of cabinet within the 
system. Bagehot's "buckle" has loosened, but it is still there and 
it is still vital. The scope for ministerial involvement is greater than 
is often admitted. Indeed, the critique of ministerial responsibility 
is certain to be a comfortable doctrine for ministers themselves: 
it promises to get them off the hook. Are there devices that will 
assist ministers to assert their involvement and thus fairly keep them 
on the hook? Self has succinctly reviewed the typical innovations. 
Two call for comment here. First, I would underscore his criticism 
of RCAGAS neglect of long-term planning. This is an area in which 
cabinet needs and can reasonably be given collective as well as 
departmental advice. Moreover, such planning units oflTer a ready 
opportunity for the flexible mix of skills, backgrounds and careers 
which most reformers seek to inject into oflRcialdom. Secondly, a 
cabinet must have resources to move the machine. Hence the vital 
significance to the elected rulers of Selfs managerial agenda, again 
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SO much ignored in RCAGA. Can the reformers devise means which 
will both enable governments to shape the bureaucracy to their 
needs, yet also protect the individuals within oflRcialdom? 
Second, attempts to create new forms of bureaucratic accoun-
tability contend directly with the institutional and axiomatic 
elements of political legitimacy, which is why change is so diflficult, 
especially if piecemeal. Schemes proposing bureaucratic accoun-
tability independent of ministerial responsibility raise issues on each 
of Selfs agendas. Only analysis in terms of each agenda can reveal 
the impact of such proposals upon the system and its legitimacy. 
That is why partial analysis is unsatisfactory, and piecemeal 
attempts are inadequate. By confining itself to the social agenda 
and failing to confront many of its recommendations with issues 
on the political and managerial agendas, RCAGA pursued a dangerous 
logic. The proposals for direct accountability of officials to the 
public appear to rest upon the naive assumption that a bureaucracy 
which ministers have difficulty controlling will nevertheless be 
amenable to its clients. Without even the weak intrusion of 
representative politics that we now enjoy, I believe that bureaucracy 
would quickly succeed in making its clients amenable to it. In places 
the logic of RCAGA seems to be the logic of the administrative state. 
The major diflRculty confronting attempts to invent new forms 
of accountability for oflRcials is, in Selfs phrase, "the incom-
patibilities between political and bureaucratic styles of decision-
making". The possibility and desirability of reducing these incom-
patibilities is, "an issue which can be crucial for the affects of 
managerial innovations", RCAGA failed to take this problem 
suflRciently into account. It is not the Westminster model that 
separates politics and administration, but the determined effort of 
many of its reformers. 
The radical critique 
The Westminster model has many doctors, but few coroners. The 
latter's verdict, that the model is moribund, is a serious challenge 
to orthodoxy and a corrective to any facile complacency. While the 
radical critique surfaces in places in RCAGA it has not yet supplied 
a sustained account of its position. Nevertheless, the outlines of the 
critique are clear and much of the evidence it assembles is an 
embarrassment for established doctrine. Before it can be fully 
effective as an attack upon the Westminster model, this critique 
needs to overcome two obstacles. 
First, the critique has so far been directed to the institutions and 
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practices of government, rather than to the axioms underlying the 
system and the relationships between these aspects of the total 
model. As a critique of the institutions and practices, the radical 
account has so far been vitiated by concentrating almost solely upon 
the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, this allows the strengths of the 
radicals' case to be overlooked and their position dismissed as 
crudely anti-bureaucratic. The critique has yet to turn its attention 
to deficiencies in the elected element of government. It has still 
to expose the contributions of politicians no less than of officials 
to the crisis of our political institutions. Moreover, the critique 
would gain additional force by examining certain assumptions 
within the model about the relationship between ministerial respon-
sibility and other elements of the system, for example the role of 
the media. Surely the strains at the centre of the model have been 
exacerbated by the breakdown of related institutions, which no 
longer support the centre in the way the model suggests. 
Second, by ignoring the axiomatic aspect of the model, the radical 
critique has underestimated the scale of its task. It is tackling the 
fundamental precepts of legitimacy for the system, but it has not 
provided an account of how its institutional recommendations fit 
the existing principles of legitimacy. Nor has it yet supplied an 
alternative constitutional theory that will connect a different set of 
axioms to a new set of institutions. One has only to pose the problem 
to see the magnitude of the task. 
The struggle between leadership and bureaucracy is sharp, but 
scarcely new. Weber saw history as "the variegated struggle 
between disciplinization and individual charisma".'* We still live 
in the tension Weber describes, but, because we have seen the 
political shape it can take, we are unwilling to put our faith in 
his prescription for charismatic leadership of plebiscitarian de-
mocracy. Responsible government can be seen as a deliberate 
attempt to break through that struggle, yet its victory is never final. 
Nor is its victory assured. As Self remarks, the traditional 
democratic theory of the relationship between political will and 
bureaucracy is no longer credible. Is it possible to invent new 
theories that will replace the discredited account? Herein lies the 
seriousness of the radicals' challenge. 
This suggests a hypothesis concerning commissions of inquiry. 
A collective commission of inquiry may be technically inventive, 
but cannot be theoretically inventive. Such commissions will at best 
codify existing theory and debates; at worst they will be captured 
by a particular and partial theory. They always depend upon the 
existing stock of knowledge. 
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Peter Wilenski hoped that RCAGA would be "a dividing line". So 
it is. It shows us what was known then. Already we are on the 
other side of that dividing line, RCAGA. Self and Parker have set 
a lot of issues on an agenda for research and academic inquiry. 
We are already at work on the next commission and the quality 
of our analysis will affect the quality of its performance. 
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